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ABSTRACT 
Iran has always been a vitalJy inriportant country mainly 
Dwinq to ats qeo-POJtacal signa^f i cance strategic location 
and economic potenti^J^- Lono be'fore the Islamic revolution 
the cottntry was hartdpi c *• ed b'- the Western powers especial 1,.' 
the United States to Ea"*eoiiard their interests in the 
region. Before thof^emi s rise to poyjer countr-.' v^ as a 
military giant, a re£!iortal power and witnessed rapid rate oi 
economic growth. But with industrialization came mindless 
westernization and mc?c*erni ration under the aegis oi the U.S, 
which. in many respects, amounted to neo-imperi al ism, 0"ften 
American interests wefe safeguarded, ei."en given priori tv over 
all others, including Iran s ov*n interests. This antaqonired 
a powerful section o^ the country's mtel1igentia as well as 
the clergy who ultimately brought about the Islamic 
revolution m 1V7V, 
The Islamic revflutaon of Iran at the end of 70E was a 
remarkable historjc?tl event with i ^r reachmq conseatiences 
both for the reqion and the world at large. The revolution 
changed almost evervthang m Iran including its foreign 
policy. The present *hesis. aims to stud/ some important 
li 
dimension's of the Iranian foreign policy =ince the Islamic 
revolution in 197'?. The thesis consists of si>- chapters 
besides a brief introductory preface and the conclusion' . In 
the ensu. ing pages a brief summary LS presented with a view 
to giving an idea of Nhat has been discussed in detail in 
the thesis. 
The "first chapter, causes oi revolLition, deals with the 
reasons behind the l&la»T«ic revolution. Amonq numerous 
reasons only few such as econo^ftic, political and reliqiotss 
one's have been dealt in detail. It is. a Known -tact that 
before the? Khomeini era Iran had adopted an economic policy 
which favoured industrialization under the aeqis of the 
Westerners or western educated Iranians. The cocmtry s 
agriculture sector was grossly ignored.Moreover most of the 
industrialisation took place in biq cities 1 i »• e Tehran. 
Is-fahan, Sheraz, Abadan etc. The- city based 
industrialization and the neglect o-f agricultural sector 
naturally prompted rural population to migrate towards big 
cities causing a ..great deal o"* social dislocation and 
tension,The cities failed to qainlully employ or absorb the 
incoming masses -from the rural areas. As a result a lot of 
people, jobless or semi-employed began to live in slLims 
iii 
around big cities, whe^e develooed 4. 3h.*f-D division between 
the haves and the hove-rvots. This natural iv drew the 
attention of in tel I igen .. t£a and the radical c lergies .M^nv 
modern educated intellectuals 1 i» e Ali Shari.ati and clerics 
began to criticise and created an awareness against the 
wrong policies of the Shah, Radical clergies lite Khoriemi 
also came into open and bitterly attacked.not onlv the 
Shah's economic policies but also his attempts of 
modernization or wes terns, E^ t ion which they saw as being 
anti-Islamic. Thus trouble was brewing for long and burst 
out into open mass rebellitjn in l'?/"? leading ultimatelv to 
the Islamic revolution. Besides economic causes there 
were political I reasons fcsr the 1979 revolution. As usual 
tyrrant rulers do not tolerate critism and opposition 
however right and relevant. They resorte^to the liouidation at 
even their most sincere and qenuine critics and opponents. 
The Shah of Iran was no e>;ceDtion. He was a tyrr-ant oar 
excellence. When faced with criticism of his policy of 
mindless westerniiationj he unleashed a reign of terror, 
oppression and I iquid-> tioini, The SAVA*:, under His Majesty's 
command carried out secret trials and heinous missions of 
liquidation and murder both within and outside the country. 
iv 
Scores of tiujahidin-e fhalcj were either itllecl. oDenlv or 
mysteriously, or out behiod the bar where thev were 
subjected to indescrible brutal tortures, both physical and 
mental. Even intellectuals and ule»T\a were not soared, Ali 
Shariati who was the heart beat of thousand af ,• -
educated Iranians was billed m London i" mysterLous 
circumstances. Avatollah ?'"homeini was ei-'iled, Man-.- leading 
ulema who remained m Er-an were subjected to various \ inds 
of punishments and even murdered. For instance in Mav l'^ 7g 
Shariatmadari • s house was attacied by secret agents and tv<o 
leading theologians wre billed. Not only active opponents of 
the regime but also their innocent family members also could 
not escape the onslaught. They were harrassed, tortured and 
imprisoned. This political ooDfession unleashed by the Shah 
ultimately became his own undoing and contributed a lot to 
his overthrow in 1777. 
Khomeini's charisfna and personality may be regarded as 
the third major cause o1 the- Islawuc. revolution. Iranian 
opposition to the Shah date>j bac»< to Mc^ssadeph s brief 
period in power. Bitt Mossadegh was. a n^ it lonal i st leader. The 
religious opposition tc the Shah's rccjienae E tar tedder rather 
qot momentum with the arrival of Khovtemi on Iran s 
political Bcence a ^  ter the death of Ayatollah Br-tj jer-rj i. in 
1962. (<'homeini who was a radical clergyman conceived o *" an 
Islamic Republic, nooo'sed to the Shah s monar-chical and 
dictatorial government. He was ver-atile, scholar, quide and 
political leader. He provided not only religious guidance 
but also led his people oo political fronts. He opposed the 
Shah's policy of Land Peform attacted the Capitulation Bill 
which gave unlimited rights and pris^i leges to all Ai^e'-icans 
in Iran and bitterly criticised his anti-religious policies. 
The Shah reacted sharply and e>rtled him in 1964. But this 
did not stop Khomeini. He continued to guide his people 
first from the holy city of Najaf and then from Paris. 
Ultimately he was able to overthrow the Shah. When he later 
escaped from the co«<ntry on IQ January, 1V79. f homeini 
returned tc' Iran in February, 197"? and led his country till 
his death in 1989. 
The eE'cond chapter olf the thesiE- dea3E. with the salient 
features and determmanq "CactorE €>i irari E. foreign policy. 
In brevity it firs-t taHes. imto Hair account o^ t^e 5t->ah s 
foreign policy whic*"- nas basicalliy pro-West ,andi then deals 
with the foreign relatiDns o"f Kho^ seirsi ' E, ]ran. The foreign 
policy of J&lamic Iran, as a matter of ^act, can be 
vi 
described under three fi^ ejids i.e. Pan-Is lamisn» or concern far 
Muslims th€? world ove? , Noo-s 1 ignmeo t t-^ hich the [r^nians 
tried to oractise m its letter and soirit and anti-
hegemonism which l.he' enshrined m the oopular slogan: 
"neither West nor East" by which they meant total rejection 
of the supremacy of thtf two super powers. 
The third chapter is devoted to deal with Iran 5 
policy towards the United States. Iran under tiohd. Reca Snah 
had close and cordial relations with ^^merica. Whe" the Sha^ 
unleashed the reign «:-f terror and bega" to suppress all 
opposition to his ruthless rule he was '^ullv supported by 
the U.S. The Shah's opponents when the>' ultimately succeeded 
condemned the U.S. as being a close collaborator of the old 
regime in crime against the Iranian people, ^homeif^i s ire 
against the U.S. was so strong that he used to call it 
Shaitan-e Buzurg, the great Satan. And when he came to power 
in 1979 the old pro-American policy was naturally changed 
and replaced by an ti-hegemonism ar>d an ti-Wes ternism, 
Relations between the two countries began to deteriorate on 
a tremendous pace which culminated in the seirure of the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4. 1979. This act was 
condemned by the U.S. and the world community. But the 
vil 
radical students y^o h^d seized the e(T»ba=s^  with the 
blessing of J'homeini oroved bevond doubt that the «PissiQn 
was used not on I v for diplomatic purooses but also fot-
interference m Iran s internal affairs. 
To free its hostages Washington under too* a rescue 
mission in April 1780 which badly failed and further 
worsened the bilateral relations of the two countries, TQ 
taJ'e revenge by other <neans Anierica encouraged Baghdad to 
invade Irar m September 193o. During the long eight year's 
of war, despite Iran-contra deal the relations of the two 
country remained sour. America s indirect support to Iraq, 
shooting down of an Iranian pass^viger plane, re flagging of 
k'uwaiti oii tan^ers and destruction of the part o«" Iranian 
navy by the U.S, naval ships were the few maiof reasons 
behind continuous tense relations. 
After Khomeini's death and particulary under Paf^anjani 
Iran, with its eye on reconstructing its war-ravaged 
f 
economy, has tried to open itself to the west.However. the 
relations with the United States aire yet to be normalised. 
There sre so many snags and barriers which the two countries 
have to cross over bef'3'"e relations become fullv normal and 
cordial . ,^, \ 
./ 
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The "fourth cHapter discviE-E-e's. Iran's. relataooE with 
anotU^r sLiper power, the Soviet Union, AE eicpiamed earlier 
Iran tinder Khomeini became anti-heqemoni c and opposed to the 
BLipermacy oi the two ^^ tiper powers. As well »f,nown the v<or ] d 
was divided into two blocKs, dominated by Ri.«ssia and 
America, at tbe time Iranian revolnticen was bronqht abotit 
Khomeini anti-Americanism SLUted to Pussia but other 
dimensions oi the revolution such as Pan-lslamism and the 
policy o"f exporting the revolution were highly disttirbinq 
for them. They feared the revolution might stir their fittslim 
subjects in their Mttsl im-dominated republics, Nence their 
response to the Islamic revoKition was cautions. 
Meanwhile there tooK place cerlain developments. which 
strained the bilateral relations oi the two countries.. First 
the Russian support to Iraq, especially the supply o^ Scud 
missiles vihich hit civilian and military targets. m many 
Iranian cities greatly displeased the Iranians, Second the 
Rtissian intervention in Afghanistan was too much for Iran to 
digest. They condemned the intervention m , strongest 
words and provided military and econo«i»ic assistance to the 
insurgents and helped the resistance movei^ients ir< 
Afghanistan in many ways. 
ix 
But reJations began to normalize atter Pufisian 
withdrawa] from A-fqhanistan wath Gorbachev'E. acceES to power 
in Moscow, Rus-s-ia's. s^ternal oolicv ur^derwent a drastic 
change. To capitalize on his Gl aEnoE-t and F're»Etroa^a 
Khomeini wrote a long letter to Gorbachev and itrqed ham, 
inter-alia, to embr f^ ce Islam, The writing o1 the letter 
mari'S a new beginnang m the bilateral relatacjns o"< t^ 'e two 
countries. 
Hiqh—level delagations o^ both sides have e^cJ^anged 
visits ^y^d -..; concluded aqreements, Although Iranians are 
sour over the oppression of MtislimE- m Russian Arerbijan but 
under economic cumpuls.'ons and internal consider at 10"= they 
have Kept a low pro-file and continued with the proceEE oi 
normalizing the bilateral relations. 
Chapter ^i-fth is divided into two sections, <^  arid B, 
The "first section is wholly devoted to the bilateral 
relations oi Iran an.-i Iraq, EKtring the reign of Mohd. Reza 
Shah Iran was milita«'ily strong and created problemE. ior 
Iraq mainly through helping the *,urdish rebels. By d*nt of 
military strength and hegemony in the r^^gion, Iran concKided 
the AlqierE- treaty in 1^7^ on its- ov*r« terms-, Hov*ever, after 
the fail of Shah, »»«hen Iran was confronted with dire 
internal strifes Iraq upset the balance of power m the 
region by invading Iran and reqistering a victory m the 
long drawn war. This section further taJes into fair acount 
the uDs and downs of bilateral relations between the two 
countries during and after the long drawn war. 
Section B of the chapter fifth is concerned with Iran s 
relations with the GCC countries particularly Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia where sizable Shia population was 
urged time and again by fomeini to revolt against their 
"corrupt" regimes.Compared to Iran the GCC countries have 
always been militarily wea>^  . During the period Q<^ the Shah 
they had hardly to fear because they all belonged to the 
same camp, the West led by the United States. But the 
scenario changed when *:hQmeini came to power, Iran adopted 
Pan-Islamic foreign policy began to taH openly about 
exporting its revolution to neighbouring countries. and 
disregarding international principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs of a country. He openly urged the people of 
Gulf regimes to ri'S'e in rebellion against their corrupt pro-
West rulers. Thus relations of Iran with leading GCC 
countries were not cordial when Iraq invaded Iran m I'^ BO. 
xi 
Almost all the GCC CX>^^y\t'?^e-S, especially Saudi Ai-abta and 
Kuwait provided hoge tmamcial and other * inds of help to 
Iraq sustain its ^^ ar against their cominon enemy. Other 
dimensions of Iran '^  policy towards the neighbouring GCC 
countries have also been fairly discussed. 
The last chapte'" of the thesis focusses on [ran 5 
relations with the Third World countries. Ir^n has got some 
concrete and logical •'"asons fiyt- its cooperation wit>*^  the 
Third World C~0i^y(1vtts >v^ d the non-aligned movement .However. 
it has enjoyed little peace after the Islamic revolution in 
1979, Moreover the eight vear war with Iraq and its 
isolation in world community crippled its potentials both 
economic and political to do anything concrete and 
practical. However, they have actively opposed the economic 
and plitical ei>-ploitation of the Third World, and criticised 
the superpowers', atfce»«pts to undermme the sovereia^t-^ ot 
the non-aligned. Having strained relations with the two 
superpowers and othei" industrialised countries Iran /tas 
tried to establish special economic, political and military 
relations with Third 1<iorld countries lile China . Syria and 
India. However, still therejis to be achieved in regard to 
Iran's policy towar-ii the Third World. It has to be seer. 
:ii 
that how they ^eep a t>a lance between thetp^ prQ-Third World 
policy and their compulsion to norma I ice relations with the 
West for help to reconstruct their war ravaged economy. 
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H^KFftCK 
The lElamic RevoKition oif February 1«5'7*5' as- rightly 
reqarded as one ol the roost jmi:»c«rtant events- in the wodern 
nj&tory o^ Iran, It wa& an nil ewbracing revolution which 
drastically changed the lace ol Iranian society. Not only 
old n>Dnarchical institutions but also »any aspects of 
•Westernization which m wany caseiE. was blind and windless 
•jere either replaced or overhauled, to a great extent. The 
rhampions oi the Islamic Revolution, in a nutshell, decided 
to shape their internal as »ic-1J as external policies a-<ter 
:he teachings a1 lsla<f». At ;>offe Islam began to be strictly 
mple^nented both in individual and collective iiv&s. ot 
people. Likewise the country s, foreign policy underwent a 
lajor change. Under the Pahlavi regime Iran, though 
jfficially non-aligned, was thoroughly pro-Wes-t, 
>articularly a pro-American country •-T-t»e new Islamic regime 
»eing -fiercely anti-West adopted a radical "neither West nor 
ast" policy which aimed si challenging the hegemony of the 
wo super powers, particularly the Linited States. o1 America 
m the one- hand and favoured or espoused what may be called 
in Islart'ic and non-aligned Tureign policy on the other. The 
slamic aspect of the foreign policy mainly meant to export 
the Iranian brand ot Isl^'wic revolution to other Muslim 
countries particularly the uuIf States. The Iranian position 
on this matter Was highl/ radical, even tantamount to 
interference, which strained its relations with the 
neighbouring Gu 1 <"' States. The Iranian view of non-al ignmen t 
was also very radical. They not only opposed all Kinds of 
alliance and alignment with either of the two superpowers, 
but also challenged their so called supremacy and hegemony 
whether political, economic or military. 
Since it is the I s t s.'V. t c Revolution of 1979 which 
brought about changes in lit ^ .'. 5 traditional pro-West policy 
it has been deemed apprcartate to focus 00 the salient 
features of the revoluticm itself. As a result two 
chpaters,! and 2, have bee>^ devoted to discuss scwne major 
detemining factors as well as religio-political and socio-
economic causes of the revolution with a view to 
understanding Iran's foreigo policy in a wore proper way. 
In writing this thesis £ have received generous help 
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wor^s I have e>;tensively benefitted. I also wish to thank 
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other respected teachers at the centre for their generous 
and ^ind cooperation during the writing of this thesis, I 
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CAUSES OF REVOUJTION 
The revolutionary process had been fermenting in lr«n 
since America brought back the Shah to power in 1953, It 
directly in-fluenced the international situation espvcially 
the political developments. By the time Jimmy Carter bvcamv 
the President of United States on 20th January, 1977, the 
revolutionary process in Iran had aireBdy entered its final 
phase for an all out eruption. The masses taking part in 
revolution shouted slogan 'Down with the Shah'. People of 
different ideologies had one goal in mind i.e. the overthrow 
of the Shah and eliminating the monarchical system. The Shah 
disregarding people's resentment and anti monarchical wave 
managed to stay through tyranny, torture, supression and 
injustice with the help of an intelligence organization 
called Sarmane ettallaat va Amniet-e-Kishwar (SAVAK. 
Moderniration and westernization in the absence of people's 
participation in decision making fuelled the fire. Anti-
religious policies of the Shah further added the strength of 
the movement against the Shah. All these things gave birth 
to revolution popularly known as Islamic Revolution. 
Revolutionaries were determ.ined to fight to finish for 
ireedoin, independence and justice. 
Though, signs of opposition to the Shah's regime were 
already apparent in Iranian life but the celeheration oi 
2500th year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy in October, 
l'=f7i. and lavish spending in it further increased the 
people's hatred towarrj?, the King, The combination of such 
elements as unequal d^  r: i ' ibution of the enormous earnings 
from oil and the suppr'•'^ - - on of every kind of dissent turned 
out to be politic.. M'. mtye explosive. Under these 
circumstances the seci.i'^ ity precautions increased. As the 
people began to openly criticising the Shah and his policies 
the intelligence machinary i.e. SAVAK stiffened its attitude 
and started ruthlessly stamping out even slightest signs cyi 
agitation. This leti to a increase in people's resentment who 
decided to fight to finish and ultimately brought about the 
isll of the Shah ear^ ' »n J979. However the process tool' 
about Quarter of a cpn + t>ry for social, economic, political 
and intellectual forces c assume proportions necessary for 
generating revolution- "'^ developments which took place in 
the economy during twT. , ,• 'ive years after the coup in J*?S3 
cannot be underninG>d. The massive increase in the oil 
revenues gave a bio toost to the economy. Iran's oil 
revenues had increased from * 34 million in 1953 to * 20 
billion in 1977^. 
He spent a huge ftmount ior the expansion o-f education 
and industries as evidenced from significant increase in the 
literacy rate and appreciable rate o-f growth in industry, 
the modern middle class had increased -from 3,2^030 to 
6,30000, In addition, tHere were nearly a million students 
in secondary schools, higher education, and in -foreign 
universities who were eager to join the mainstream in Iran. 
The urban working class had also grown rapidly, from 30,000 
in 1*?53 to 1,7 million in JV77, The Pahlavi regime, however, 
failed to win the support irom either the urban middle class 
or the rurrkl population. It has two rBBS^ans. First, the 1^53 
coup not only changed the popular leader Dr. Mossadegh, but 
also destroyed labour uniorns, professional associations, and 
si J political parties, Jt created an unbridgeable gulf 
between the regime and the two modem classes. 
Second, the regime widened the gulf by implementing 
policies benefitting the upper classes rather than the 
middle and lower classes. These classes "had no pressi.ire 
1. Irfani, Suroosh, ^evolutionary Islam an Iran (London, 
J'?83). F',149, 
group through which t.hi-i\. could alter or peacfully oppose 
government deci^iions" , 
With careful e'^a'nination of the past conditions it is 
evident that Shah's attempt to have complete control had no 
solid base. It appears, that "After nearly -fifteen years of 
political stability ant? at decade of remarkable real economic 
growth <averaciing ovf?r !0 percent a year), Iran seemed set 
on a course of moderm r?^tion"^ , In view of rapid progress 
in the country Iran w«?. ^ ^l^eady on its way to join the ranks 
of developed Horld '^'' Shah's regime was facing active 
opposition from radical urban guerilla groups on the Left 
and the religious figufpr. on the Pjoht. Despite sporadic and 
isolated minor disturbipnces sar»ce l^^^O, the government 
generally posed having full corttrol and, making striking 
economic sticcess. However there were many demonstrations and 
agitations but of a temporary nature stemming from rampant 
inflation, speculation, power failures, pollution and 
congestion, 
2. Ibid,, F'.ieiO, 
3- Treverton, Bregory, Revolution in Iran' jn Treverton, 
Gregory (ed,), C'ri-js Hanaqement and the Superpowers an 
the Middle East d or don) , j Vft i| P, v^, 
The Iranian re-vcOution oi JIV78-7V was a social and 
political event. It e.^ rlorJed the worjd scene leavincj in its 
wake new and heightened aspirations, ifears and insecurities 
both in Iran and throughout the Third World. Revolution was 
a multi-class pheno«nenon in which the people oi alnjost all 
sections in Iran rose enmasse against a hated and decrepit 
old system. Religious leaders and Islamic Scholars (Ulema) 
played pivotal role ir- JJte' revolution. It was Shift religious 
establishment that inf.^'t directed the course oi revolution. 
The ulema palyed ? critical orqaniiational role in the 
movement and Shias ideology turned to be overarching 
ideology oi the revplistion. The Shi a clerics used mosgues, 
schools, (hojrehs) cells, hc«ly shrines to raise their voice 
and mobiliie the «nasses aginst the Shah's regime. They 
ef-fectively organised tf''e opposition which ultimately led to 
the collapse oi administration and destruction of the 
Pahlavi regime . 
Economic Causes 
Practical difficulties exacerbated the Shah's problems, 
as economic growth ar.relerated social dislocations. The 
^, Bill, James, A,, ^*ower and Religion in RevoKitionary 
Iran', in l^idd}^ East Journal (HEJ), vol.36, No.l 
(winter ,l«782) P,?J 
agricultural sector •5 deterioration, as a result of the 
Shah's emphasis on r^pid tndustriaIieation, was particularly 
serious. Since half o^ the population lived in the rural 
areas. The land reform, programme initiated by the Shah in 
1962 failed to achiev*^ - ^he desired objectives. 
Shah had an sti-arq urge to modern ice the country 
through industrialiritJ00 using it as a sure and quic^est 
way to success. H^r-f? he committed a mista^e as at the time 
of launching White Pcvolution, majority of the population 
was living in the rur^l areas. There was marf^ed difference 
in the standard of iiving between rural and urban areas. 
Agriculture sector was suffering from many problems. It was 
not a question at that tt«ne of the development of either 
industry or agriculture, rather their was imperative need 
for the simultaneous dc'elopment of both the sectors of the 
economy i.e. agriculture and industry. In the agriculture 
sector land was unequ^Hy distributed and landless peasants 
were suffering on a^-counc of absentee lands, a system 
prevailing for centuries. Realizing urgent need to improve 
the conditions of rural masses and bring about equal 
distribution of land and getting the landless peasants freed 
from the clutches of absentee landlords, the Shah launched 
land reform programme :- !'^ 62 which was implemented ir\ three 
stages. The purpose o<" 'he reform, as claimed by the Shah 
was to, improve the i ,- . ; r^g conditions o* the peasants, 
increase production in ' i-<ii agricultural sector and checV the 
migration of the r^.tt .yl i^opulation to the urban areas. A 
close e>;aminatiQn of '^-p whole progr^imme ma^es it clear that 
the programme was, to .^ n e>^tent. politically motivated. The 
Shah through this proi^ r^ .time wanted to breaV the stronghold 
of the absentee lanlords and gain the sympathies o''" rur^i 
masses. However Shah t\5iied in his attempt and the net 
result of the whole n'"OG''amme was that l^^n which was net 
exporter of food items prior to the introduction of land 
reform programme, turri<i^'>d out *"Q be net importer of food 
items. It is rightly pointed out even after the introduction 
and implementation of ^ ^ir d refo»-tn "The 'icher peasantry 
continued to prosper, r.'"^ne 1, 7fi mi 1! ion families were le^t 
landless. Urban incom?- became ucto five times higher than 
rural ones. It attract^^o labou'^ to the cities, wea^enlnq 
traditional family structures -iod further depleting the 
agricultural sector (by 1978 it had become necessary import 
* 2 billion worth of food a ys-sr}''. Once m cities m^n^ 
5. Trever ton , no. 3, *=•, ^  5 . 
peasants were better of-* in absolute terms, but this was 
o^-fset by High rents and intjation rtmninq at over 7-5 
percent. Furthermore, the- widening gap between the rich find 
poor (10 percent oi population accounting '^or 40 percent of 
consumption) became stril'^ inQ and a source oi additional 
discontent. Real growth slackened to 7'.2 percent atter I'^lh, 
The migrants had to "face unemployment. They were attracted 
towards religion or vjere mobilized against the reqame by the 
clerics operating throiigH tami]iar social institution i,e, 
the mosque. These difficulties were also realised by urban 
population who was Je^t without the right to organise o^ 
strike. While government launched selective anti-
pro-f i teering campaigns, the bazanes who were benefitting 
•from economic growth, were a-ftected. Hence this class also 
lent its support to the mullahs and, in particular, to thear 
most forceful representative, the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, 
^oreo'^er there increased resentment amoung the middle 
classes 8,00,<!KK> civil servants and about 7,50,000 workers 
in industrial plants as their prospects of material reward 
decreased. There was strong tirge for the impulse for 
political participation, AJongwith the quadruple increase in 
oil prices and resultant increase irt revenites of 1^71', many 
of the older structures jn the economy were destroyed and 
the new ones were cr-eated. Sudden increase in r-evenues 
resulted into massive incre<9se in spending. This led to 
increase in urban wages whicH attc-acted. especially in 
construction^ ru^al *Ttigrants, Increase irs demand without a 
simultaneous increase m production led to ^n increasing 
inflation. The salaried classes had to suffei^ - as a result of 
high rate of inflation. The high cost o^ matet-ial and 
enhanced wages made building of a. factory in Iran as 
expansive as in Japan. !•-• vie*-* of highe»- w^ge fate end lac'' 
of local training of si^ mi-sl. i 1 led and skilled labouf^. Ir-an 
resorted to importation of labour- and it led to the 
emergence of native '•-e-aen tmen t. The bribery at di ffei^ent 
lavels of society in obtaining licences fo'- protected 
economic ventures became the order of the day. The following 
three things suffice the purpose of throwing light o" deep 
sense of discontent. 
(a) Agricultural Policy: 
Agriculture sector whic^; W^E already stifferinq ^rcw 
many problems. -for s Jong time MBS- further dislocated in 
I'^'i'Os-r A massive import o"* food items frofn other countries 
at cheaper rate and tHp-ir sale in Iran further worsened the 
economic condition?, a^ t^ ie "farmers, Thp indigenous ^ood 
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items with higher price's were not i9ble to successfully 
compete in the market in face of lower prices of foreign 
stuffs. The farmers got a set bac*. Investment shifted from 
small units to large new mechanised projects dependent on 
large irrigation dams. When land was consolidated for large 
scale farming by the for<=ign aqro-business firms^ literally 
many peasants were squee^red off the land to ma^e way for the 
aqro-business and state farm corporations. 
(b) Latxmr recruitment: 
Three hundred thousand semi-=> i1 led, sHilled and even 
unskilled labourers were imported, Afghan labourers too** 
jobs which the Iranians bad declined. Iri the absence o"f 
proper training ^rtfi Iac»< o^ indigenous truc^ers, Korean 
truclf driver^;' were imported to ^Bndle the business. Jn this 
matter a sizable commission on tHe deal accrued to labour 
recruiter and the royal patron. On the one hand there was 
resentment among the local population over the recuruitment 
0"f "foreigners and on the other, there was growing 
realization oi the wastage oi the talents, oi indigenous 
drivers. Besides burc^aurrati c controls, the local 
population was subjected to accent tHe existence of 
corruption. They were denied o"* a sense of participation in 
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policy -f ormn] atiort, 
(c) Financing 
t^anv new prc^ '^ec*^ . were launched, expendituire o-f 
projects outpaced the incofninq massive increase in oil 
revenues <as a result o"* oil price rise D"f 1^73). Within two 
years Iran had to resort to borrowing -from international 
market. By 1*?77, oil revenues had leveled oH . The only vtc\y 
under these circumstances to ^een employment levels up and 
counter in-flation was to siphon money away -from the enormous 
(Tiilitary expenditures ^  Hoviever proper strategy -for this 
purpose was not adopted. When government introdticed measures 
to check in-flation and get the salaried class relieved o-f 
the burden it resulted intc< widespread unemployment, 
especially in the con'Struction industry , 
The agrarian refcjrins under the White Revolution 
programme of the Fh^h failed to liquidate large 
landholdings. The glaring inequality in land ownership was 
compounded by the inequality in the distribution of income. 
Attempts to develop the economy by helping ortv,3te 
6. Fisher. M.H.J.. [ran ;FrQm Religious Dispute to 
Revolution (London, l-^OO), PP. 170-71, 
12 
entreoreneure led to s dra«natic incfease in r^oit^lism, ^nd 
its related problems. During the seventies the Iranian 
society was representing one of the most ineauaI societies 
of the world. About top 20 o^r cent of urban families 
accounted for as much as 55.5 oe<^  cent of the total family 
expenditures, the botton 20 per cent for as little as 3.7 
per cent and the middle 'lO per cent for no more than 2h pef 
cent . The socio-econc'fi c tensions, therp-fore. increased 
'not by modern! rat.ion per-se. but by the way the 
modernization was imp^ f?piented Br-d by the- fact that the 
capitalist method of frcdernj zatictn invariably benefitted 
the rich more than the "-srst o-i the Ectcietv, By 1^77. near]./ 
two million rural mio* f>" ts had clustered m the shanty towns 
around the capital to D''ovide the revolution with another 
active base. 
While modernizing the society the Shah did little to 
broaden the support base ^or His monarchy by winning o\'^r 
the modern urban classes and by opening political channels 
for social forces and pressure groups. Instead of granting 
political freedom and thf ripht o-f -f'-ee and fran^, expression 
7. Irfani, no.l.P.iriO, 
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the Shah formed the Resurgence Party (Hezb-e-Pasta^hij ) to 
transform repres'sive monarchy into a fascist style of 
totalitarian regime. The purpose of forming Resurgence Party 
was to tighten control over the in te 1 1 iqen tia and e>; tending 
state control jnto the baraars and religious establishments. 
While the Shah was busy in appeasing the salaried 
middle class and the inteI 1igentia, progressive Muslim 
intellectuals like Dr. Ali Shari^ti, Taleqani and Bazargan 
were engaged i.n propagating modern Islamic ideology which 
was revolu tionaf-y, progressive, anti-despotic, anti-
imperialist and aqsinst any form of e>-ploi ta tion. On account 
all these things Islam was becoming ^ r^iiiying force both 
emotionally as well as intellectually among the middle 
class. The students and inte11iqentia forces tbat had 
largely remained distant from KhQfneini's formalist Islam 
durinc) the June uprising in. 1763 became actively involved. 
In the beginning of 1977 industry and agriculture were 
subject to disruption because of power cuts. The Majlis 
blamed the government for widespread shortages caused by 
dvelopment outstripping the manpnwr;r a'.ailab''= -^ '^-^  the 
Ibid..P.150 
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existing in f ra-s tr-uc^ i'jf'e. It w^s ^lleaed that t^ t? P n m e 
Minister Abbas Hoveyda, who h.?d ruthless iv tf^ ied to cf-i.ish 
h o s t i l i t y t o t h e S h . ? h , w ^ s f C S D O n s i b l e ^O'^ m n u n t i r i Q e c o n o m i c 
ch-sQs. He was ^^ccised of connivina at the Tiou^tinq 
embes; lemen t, cQf~f"uotion and nepotism r-ampant in all the 
major government projects. It was further alleged ^hat he 
had given undue oroiTvotion and patronage to Bahais. In the 
face of mounting ooposition to Hoveyda the Shah had to 
replace him on 6t{"> August i'?77 with Amuzegar, ir» an 
interview published <<> Tehran on 25 October, the Shah 
declared that the count?-y's enormous oil re-/enue would no 
longer be used to buv cirosperity for those of Iran's oeople 
who refused to worfr. ansj contribute to the economy and that 
he was determined to lead this nation into great 
civilisation, by force if necessary. 
In August 1977 a nation-wide campaign of debate on 
national affairs was organized by the Persian Kayhar. under 
the litle "what is wrong" ? The following revealing summary 
was published by the English Kayhan International on 13 
August 1977. 
"Industry in Jrar- 'i'^ weal' with the notable e-'<ceptaon of 
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oil. Most units tn hcth government and oi^ivate sectors 
operate at between 33 n^ti 6"i per rent of c-aDacity. Even if 
they operated at full r^p^izity, don'ostic pi^oduction wiould 
still be meagre. 
Aqriculturf and industrial production in Iran ran^s 
artiong th^ st o-^  the lc»wp> r^-Heinns o^ the developing countries 
while thp consu'nptjc»n tp-c'] js amono the 25 highest an the 
world. The nunterous np^^'i- T? responsi 3 el e"f er it include lad-
of s»<il]ed manpower, ^-ub-standard management, lac'- o-f 
•forceful marketing pot^rj^s^ low productivity and, power 
failures. 
Iran's GNF' as cur'^ciiiy about * 70 billion and its non-
oil e''fDorts about * • billion. That means the country 
exports less than one t^evpntieth ii.''7;;n D"f its products. In 
order to maintain f Ur^ present standard of lining 
independently o-f oil. '-'i-f must raise its exports forty-fold 
within 30 to 35 yrs, --' '- the aii runs out. This means an 
increase of more than ' •.- per cent exports every year' 
l^ore than 60 ic-i .r-nt oi Iranians ftre under 2(), and 
thus not included an f'r^  labovir -force. A large section of 
the remaining 40 per "•'-?,, most oi them women, still shun 
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viorV in surviving deference to outmoded tradition. This 
means that between five to si>: million Ir^m^ns h^ve to 
support a nation of 36 million. 
Compounding the situation is the fact that Ir-^nian 
labour has low efficiency. Many Iranians produce less than 
3tn Indian and have ^sn income on a par with that of their 
Europeon counterparts. Iranians consume more than twice as 
much as they produce' '^ .^ls is putting the horse before the 
cart. Iran should equal advanced nations in production, not 
in consumption. 
By the turn of th? ^e-^tury, Iran will have a population 
of 7fi million, uli expecting the highest standard of living 
in the worldr 
Ciggravating these basic problems srB a host of others 
liVe needless state intervention in the economy. faulty 
planning, the e'<p3 osioi- of expectations, inflation and 
unequal distribution of income and opportunities". The 
article said these pT'blems had not come into existence 
overnight, "Furthermore, legerdemain is useless in the face 
Q-f these problems, '^^r.. >.mportant thing is for people to 
understand these probj»'-"^  and for the government to be aware 
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of them". 
The Pri<T»e ^tmister A«rn.i7egar add&d has view, declarmq-
"Wp must ;«1=.D not iqnore the -fact that ambaJances 
in the economy srch as- a relative ^aJl in the 
private sector's share an economic activities, 
excessive reliance on -foreign exchange earned from 
oil exports, -faster expansion o-f cities compared 
with rural areas, and an early tendency "for high 
consumption, are factors which are not conducive 
for a society on the march towards develooment" . 
It was impossible to hire a reasonable unfurnished 
single room flat in Ts^ hc-An even at the price of * 1,000 oer 
month, as the large -ommunity of foreign worler^ had 
increased rent out o-' ^iL proportions by their ability to 
p^y ^ny price, which o*ten resulted m landlords rentmq 
exclusively to foreign-^'B. 
The greatest Ft r'nH;^ ] at this time, was Pahlavi 
Foundation. The Shah cJAired that he had assigned the major 
portion of his personal fortune to the Foundation for 
wel-fare wor>< , although m reality this amounted to only 
about 10 per cent of hic persona] assets. Not only did the 
Foundation control many important industries through its 
*?. Rirvj, S,<^,Ar, l/f.-7. Royal ty ,Rel iqion and Revolution 
{Canberra ,JV80>. r i. .2t?4-«;'?, 
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monopoly rights .jnd n •v-^ t-ment, but it also Jicquired L^nd 
for qovernn»ent spons'-f-i-,' '."ons tructior. ^nd tourist projects. 
The leading figures n • ^ -e Foundation did not hesitate to 
acquire land for pri",i-:--> buildinq projects and suddenly 
became millionaires, f '-•' enormous size of the holdmqs of 
the Shah and imperi-jf 4iinily, and of the leading courtiers 
and government offi's-'^s m mu 1 t m a tiona I cof-por^ t ions, 
international banl'-s vrii independent mdustr-ies entirely 
upset the normal cow^^e of economic development. The 
tendency to deposit mo'^ s^ v in foreign (particularly Swiss) 
banJ'S and to invest ii'> foreign projects assumed outrageous 
proportions not only v?r -.-; capitalists and the new class of 
entrepreneurs but ev-'i ;>mong those who were able to save 
only a few hundred d'" ' ' -fs. Althouah the Sh^h resented the 
outflow of capital, >--i" tj--n assets in foreign bants were not 
less than ^200 biUtc. i 
In these ci rcu'-^ '; * •.' -es the bszsaris (the traditional 
bazaar merchants who ' •.- 'Jed a thard ci"f tHe nation s import, 
two-thirds o"f its rE-'t.-,, trade and a large portion of its 
non petroleu'n e<pr-' t*: i had to enter into ruthless 
competition with the- i->r- eritrepreneurs who were favoured bv 
the CDurt> Because c>' t-.-ir privileged situation the latter 
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were able to obtain license's and it^ iport I'acilities, a-id we-^e 
even able to smuggle HO'se com«>odi ties. Although the sons of 
rich bazaar is had also 5?ntered the professional middle class 
and held positions i-^ the government bureaucracy, law, 
medicine, engineering snd universities, the Shah did not 
favour them because t»"«e' ««*e»'e par-t of an ancient netvJorV r>f 
family, ethnic, tribal and f-eligious ties. Inflation 
increased on the »«»e-*ith of the bazaar is, but the price 
control commission s<=?^  «p by the Shah m the lV70s attached 
their profits. Acca""''t-^ g to the West German magazine De 
Spiegel, some 2,50,'K'*> 5'^op^eeper5 in Tehran and ten other 
cities were arrested and fined by the commission. About 
80,000 were sentenced to imprisonment. In addition,the 
government planned fo reduce traffic congestion by 
constructing an eight-l-isne highway through the centre of the 
Tehran baazar which would affect more than 50,000 shops. 
Almost 20,000 shops in f he congested baazar ^r-i^s around the 
Imam Rezas Shrine m r^ashad had already been bulldozed m 
order to mat-e way for ^n extensive part ^nd ro^ds. 
The b^z^sr-is^ had '•'•'•isi'- o*"n we i I-organized committees 
with leading busine^- '»• >n as chairman and other office-
holders. Through sub-irr-irii ttees these controlled even a huge 
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number of labourers ^ni ^jorters. They also exploited many 
agricultural laboure* - who had left their- villages in. the 
hope of finding bet ee?--pa id wof-n in the construction 
industry in the to'^ n-?, but had failed to do so. The 
govern«nent had little control over-them, and without homes, 
wages or proper f oorf, they were at the me<-cy of the 
bazaaris. 
The rise in the i^rices despite price control.and the 
frequent disappearancr r'l such stspJes as bread, cooking oil 
and other essential rommodities made the li-fe of white-
collar workers harde-. 'hey o-ften unde'-too^ more than one 
job to mBke ends meet,Tf^.' maintained cars m order to ^ eep 
up their social f>^'^*ion. The e-.'pectations of the 
professional bureaucr r,-i c class were not met, political 
dissatisfaction naturr/Jly escalated, despite SAVAK and 
repression . 
Shah's approach 5 r- "economic modern^ rati on" and the 
loss of American siu't t •• t in two major ways may be held 
responsible for the f-^  5 "' of the Shah's regime. The Shah s 
10. Ibid., PP. I"?^-^^. 
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modern i la t ton plans «*«ef"e domin^ -j ted fr-ocr> inception by 
political cons tde^a tion-5, [t can be traced tf-ori the fi-^ Et 
Seven Year Plan. f^u's olan could not be imp ie<Tien ted on 
account of the shortaq*? o* funds. In the formulation of this 
American had played 'KI i.moo'-tant '"ole. while assigning 
priorities they had '-ept tHeif- own inte^'st in mind. These 
considerations were !*pediments in the wa-- of genuine 
economic development. '••'a''" Tho^nbufg, the Pi^esident o* 
American Overseas Cor-su I tan ts IncfOCI^, was invited to 
assist in formulating this plan. He was of the view thjt the 
Plan failed because of wr-ong pf-iori ties. The f-eqime qavo 
preference to industrial ove^" aqricu 1 tui^ a I development. 
There v/as over- e-^phasis O" educational and he-^! th 
improvement; and on t'">n of it was qn\/e'"nment s "political 
interference". 
The persietencf^' c<-f this tv*o-fo3d problef" i E- evidenced, 
-for e'^ampje. by the Sh.-tf. = siriole w.ct?;-t impo»"tarit attempt at 
economic neformc. in the i'^ 'i'Os, The Focalied "White 
Revolution" was prompted in the ~!irst place partly by the 
pressures, o-f the kpnne':*',.' Administration, which withheld 
military aid to the 5h?h"i:, regime as- ]e--.-eraqe fo"^  social 
and economic reforms.But the Shah also had hi?, own political 
22 
reasons for l.?unchin"g tHr- land r-efofm progr-^m. He ui^ s •f^cinq 
a potent two-.foid tHs-«at ts3 hj_s f-egifne. In terna 1 ly , the 
forces of opposition w^^ich we^e being suppressed for a wholo 
decade had re-emerged on the po'itic-^I scene. The NAtion^i 
Front leaders de'T^ aoded "Liberty and democracy" ^mH " ^n 
independent national' ^'oreign policy. There were t^ache*^? 
strikes, and mass de-r.ons tr^ t ions at the university c* 
Tehran, The land ""inform programme. in fact, WJIS nQ^ 
intended simply to v/oc the peasantry by curbing the power of 
the large landowners, l^ was rather, intended to puIt the 
rug out from under th»^  reformist nj^tion^iist demands. to 
curb the power of the clergy, and to counter the Soviet 
propaganda attaci' '^ n the rotten monarchical regime" by 
adopting a "progressive'" plan. 
The Shah's brutal supression of the June 1763 uprisings 
against his land reform program increased popular alienation 
from both the regime and the United States, Just as the coup 
of a decade &Arli&t- wa-m perceived as an "Omerican Coup", the 
reform programmes of l^ 'Sl were regarded as '^rx "American 
revolution". The arres r .^ nd e>-ile of religious leaders 
opposing the land reforiT* programme aroused hostility 
towards the Shah. The clergy was opposing the programme not 
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beacuse of their vt?s t??d inte^'est, but because c *• ':'~'eif" 
belief in the sanctity of private property and their need 
for revenues from Vaq f lands for p-eitaious education. The 
introduction of the i •^ nd f-efof"«n pr-ogramme destroyed tf^ e 
religious support that ^^ he Sh^h had enjoyed previously as a 
result of the coape-ation of Avatoilah B'-ujer-di and 
Behbehani. The AyatoHah ^ihomemi svniboiLzed the r-eiiqious 
opposition to the Shah s regime. He resented especially the 
Shah's casting his land refo*'«Ti m Islamic terms in ^n 
often-neglected speec'H if. the holy city of Qon», in which the 
Shah said that on 1 v 'hT=e r-eligious leaders who did not 
oppose his land rof-!*-.r, " a'-e jndubitablv o'."- r-eiioious 
leaders and by the b!es'4ing'= of this scaled chrme thev i^n I i 
serve Islam, the Sh^h s^ot-? thei?- counfy" 
By the 1975, howeve'", econoir.Lc and social realities i->ad 
bequn to assert themss^ " i ves. The hiqh r-^  te of inflation of 
food and accomodatiQ" '^-is-ices forced the state to tate shnf-t 
term t^ctic^31 measures. which did nothing to solve the 
problem. It led to the emergence o*^  new problems. The SAVAt^ 
intelligence orgniiation misled the Shah hv intimatinq Him 
11. Ramacani, R-*"'., who Lost A,-n^rLca" The L a'se of t-^-^n 
MEJ,Vol. 36, No.» i'hnter 19i3Z'f, PP. 15-16. 
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that the food inflation cfa^  mainly t>Tc result of specul-stive 
practices by ot-dLn^ry trader-a amd SHODV eepers . [n ro'^nnns? 
to this the s ta te-f"»."-< chambe'' o*"' Guilds, co'^ sume''"s 
Association and Ma t j.-ijna I Pesurqence Party were all 
mobilised to fight against the speculators'. Youngmer 
mainly students r:ar-ry i'n,':} special parity cards were reqularlv 
sent round to ordinary retail sHops far inspections , which 
involved harassment and persecution. Some shops we-^ e 
summarily closed dowfi without ^rkv hearings or appeal 
procedures. 'Shoe*'. tron(-f= a term which some of the Shah s 
henchmen must have reirvrmDerd from their readings about the 
Russian civil war, when they had been membe'-s of the Tudeh 
party were 'organised to deal with the economic 
'bottleneck ', but irt^.r-^^iy created greater chaos --.r.H 
12 
confusion 
Political Causes: 
The land re-form ip=.ue wes the catalyst that brought 
into the open clerical"' opposition to the Shah's overall 
repressive policies anH the perceived U.S. dominance of Iran 
12. Katottrian, Hcma, The- Politicaj Econojr^y of Modern ij'ii.l 
<1 "^26-79) (Londn-. ".*?8i>, P. 734. 
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through its .s I 1 i<3'-.c-- '^Lth the- 5h.jH, [r- diddition ^o -^'-le 
defies, the Nation.?? "•^tists opposed those DQlici.es. They 
supported ^ major fsr..s, jv^ r^s' stride in May 1^61 whon Abdol 
Hussain f'.han'ali, ^ *^?^der of the •striving teachers, was 
billed. Such Nat ion-a? Pron t leaders as Baqer f'acemi, 
Allahyar Sale'h, and '-.>»-im Sanjabi demanded "Liberty and 
democracy" and "sf^ independent national" foreign police. 
These demands final i- i ed to mass demons tr,? tions in Tehr-^ rt 
University iri January {^6Z, which were brutally crushed, ^h? 
Shah had already dissolved the Majlis without indicating a 
date for new election-:;, contrary to the constitution. Ho 
then ordered the ri>• i •• qQ.yerrimen»- in i^ovelrber 1*^ 61 to 
implement a May I'-^-*"- * "id saw, ^n-t after the fal! of h he 
Amini government ir ' *. 1V6Z he s*-iught to legitimise hi? 
decreed Six point re^r- r orogram fthe "White fevolution" i by 
a referendum in J^ nut'n--f 1967 m the absence o^ the 
Parliament 
ThroLiphDiit the jiate s-j-^ tie-E rind seve^nt j es- protests 
continued sporadica] 5 y . Ihey were primarijy directed agpi^'Et 
the lighteninq poJiLr-^- syste-Tf, with econo--^ :! c comp] a a' t s 
13, Ramarani, P,t,, L'n; ' ed States and Ir^r, (Nevi Yori , ' "^ P? ' . 
P,76, 
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being more scattered un*. lil the mid-seventies. P'rom 197a to 
1777 there were some fw.g'nt'^  five m^jor f,5ictory striVos, hij t 
they were quicMy r'-----*! ved by arresting the Ie-3ders n^rj 
forcing the owners to meet the economic dem^snds. Less 
controllable was tt«^ -"molderinq hosti 11 ty to gQvef nr>or. t 
medding m ail areas c *^  organised I i f e, and especiall-- the 
intimidation by SAVA* . Peports o^ " torture began to aopear in 
the international press with consistency from 1''65 on. 
In March 1970, uni^-ersity Students protested bus fare 
increases as a hards'"..MG on the poof"; they attached hundred 
buses; five students weu-r- billed, five hundred injured. and 
a thousand arrested, I-T n^ iv there was a protest agamst the 
selling of arms ta tMf-eigners on the occassion of ^ 
conference of thirv i^*/r AmeriC'^ n^ S'ecutives in Tehr,3n ^nd •^  
Unites States Comnverc"^ Department industrial e''oosition. 
Speakers S, Mohammad "^ eca Saidi and Tehran Po 1 / techn i r 
student, Mi^daudr, were arrested and tortured to death. 
Demons ti^ations were held m Qom, The government bannorj 
memorial services, but thev wer-e ^^ eld nonetheless i^ the 
mosque where Saidt h^ '^  < ?en imam. The Shah p o m ted 1 -'• sen (-
letters of condolencs?. to Oyatollah Sh^r i^ tmadar i ^nd 
Khonsari, but not to *< m<?int, Shar-ia tmadar i ac^nowledged 
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the letter, and was '-^warded by dett^ ons tra t ior»s at his hoijse. 
Forty-eight Ulema '^ f Qo^ n -^ eot ^ letter o* condolence to 
Khomeini for whicH 'Harv were exiled ff-om Oc" bv the 
government. The university students demonstrated with t-.he 
slogan, "Long Live •He ma jm". 
During the monlH c* Najj i^7i, *> home m a sent s mesE-Bqe 
to Iranian piJgrims • r s-t^/ sway •fro'^t the Shah's plannpcj 
celebration olf 2',5<»0 •/r'^ <r& o-* continuous monarchy: "Anyone 
who organizes or rn-^ ^  cipates m these -festival? a? a 
traitor to Islam ?'(•-' the Iranian Nation". Guerilia 
activities follwed: t-ani- raids., attacts on police post-;, 
explosions, and attempts to ^idfsap "first prince. Shahr-afTi, a 
nephew oi the Shah, and theri the American ambassader . 
Douglas Mac. Arthur, Efe'^ ore the ce] eberat i ons, some s x •^ 
hundred to a thousand people were tai-en into protective 
custody; travel permitr., viere reoLfired o'f anyone goinq near 
the celeberation ^rea. 
]n 1'^'72 and 'i.'^'^'.'. three- United State colonels. a^ 
Iranian brigadier g^-nii'rs} , an Iranian gende'-me'^i e serqeant. 
and an Jr^ni^n trans ^ a^ r-r -for the t'ni ted States Embassy we"-? 
assassinated. In 1*?"^ ?, ? preacher, Gha^-fari, v^ as torttired to 
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death in prison, and the lar-gest ^nnj vers^ sf-v commomor^ t ions 
of 1963 in the entire twelve years were held in Dnm, 
protesting the one party sv-stem PastaVhic party. In i'576 sn 
Isfahan! mujtahid, 3, Abdul Hasan Shams-abadi. was 
assassinated and death threat were made against three other-
ulema. The motives and identification of the perpetrators 
remain unclear, some blaming SAV'Af , the government blammq 
followers of (chomeini (Mujahideen Khalq) m ^n attempt to 
radicalize the protest. In August i'='77 Tehran slum dwellers 
protested in large numbe'-s against eviction notices ^riri t^e 
levelling of their aero rodat ions; a number of people were? 
killed. A series of arson incidents swept Tehran factori^':^ 
in the late summer. In September there was -^n attempt ci t^e 
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life of Princess Ashraf . 
Since the proble'n of suppression. imprisonment and 
tortitrp o-f political prjE-oners hsd becomp a major issue and 
the opposition's «nos.t povjer-ful weapon against the 5hah 5 
regime, tHe- demand "for freedom ot political prisoners became 
a rallying point against the Fhah. Thp two ouefilla 
organizations. Muj aha deen-e-•'^ Hal q and Feda/een -e-Khalo ta • 
not have succeeded, on tneir own, in directly mobilirina tHO 
1^. Fisher , nD.t,F-"«-'. J&9-8^'. 
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•Trasses in an armed .^m* !-*ng against the dictatorial requr.e. 
Nevertheless, they d'si ^'icceed in e-tposmq the brijtal a-id 
ruthless nature of '•^---^  ^ -^'ahlavi dictatorship hv refusing ' •> 
submit to its torture jr«d in ti<'\ida tion, and by manifesting ^ 
living image and a tangible model of what it meant to he 
revolutionary. Above a M , they presented the people with nt^iw 
'personality models" thetr heros who had made the ^upfo-io 
sacrifice by offering J^ eir- li'.es m the struggle Aq^Jr~^^ 
the imperialist bacl e-1 dictatorship of the Sh^h. Thf=-^o 
models became the bea>- jn for guidmg people, par ticu I a"^  1 / 
the young, into a high- •^imenslQn of human e^'perience where 
commitment to a colJe'~^ 'e or tf'an sperso^^ i ide-^  I assumed •=> 
new meaning. The he'"?'.' •^esist^nce which the ''evo lu tion^rv 
vanguard had disp! ^yv-i'-! 'n the Pahl^s i dijnqeons becoi'rir^  a 
living eKperience sh3i*-*3>' by the people whan the *irst h-a'-w-< 
accounts of torture m ehe 5hah s prisons n^ r-r-ated b^ thr-is'= 
who had ensured them, >--id 5Uf"vi>/ed t-hem, bec-^me available *-^  
the people. These na^fatives, along with the boot lets, 
handbills, and brochures detailing speeches that members of 
the guerilla organ i sat in-v^  had made m their defence during 
their trial by the Sha>- -= milita'-y courts, became the -^ os •• 
widely read material *'. ' m g the summer G* ["^ q^ and jf ^e•' -
These living testimonjf ja^ /e an irrc^vocable fo'-'war-d thr-ii--t 
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to the r^volut Lon n^r* "- j oeopie 5 deter'mina t ic^ ''o oust *->-•<= 
"despotic regime of klnn^i and torture ^t (3'^v cost. One s'.ic^' 
document vihich almo-s'' i^-' »•>"'-> i ite'"-=>te person invol /ed -^'i t^ ^ 
the revolution had >-e3'"* was tf^'e letter •;><"" Peca f^ er-si, a 
fifth year medical •s'-ijident from Shiraz Univer-sit- and ^ 
leading memebr of tluj a^ j deen-e-K ha lo , whicH he h^d w-jt'^ e'-' 
and sent abroad a f te'' "** ing his esc-^ne ff-c^  S^VA^ s I'lS^odv 
in 1971, Pera was =ub-3equen 11 v billed bv SOVAK duf^inq ^ 
gunbattle in ''"ehran t^-'j /ea^s -•» f te^ his escaoe. Two zy*" ^1 = 
brothers who were a'n».'?>a ^he Dioneef members o* ''''u ' •^ hidee'" 
also had lost the!«- I i /es i-"' the struggle against '-he 
Pahlavi dicta torsh ir. '~'cerD^s frryv P<3Z0 Perai s let*-""" 
read; ' un for tuna te I; . 5 itonq those who wef~e to^tu'^ed the 'Tirigf 
savagely -by SAVAf , OT--^ is abli= to describle them to -'ou. 
Some of then have died 'nder torture, other's wef'e shoh. to 
death'. 
Through torture t'-'o goals a'"?- Eouoht to be reachoH, 
F i r s t , to frighten *'-f '•• who ••lO^'* t h«^ rpQime so th^* *••-•(= 
will surrender thei"" "^acred 'f lo^'t , Second to f^ ale t*-'p 
political prasoner t B i ^  -<bout -^a E O'-gani r at I en , and thereb-, 
reveal the names c"* .ar.-ive opponents. Since the birth oi 
urban querilla zri Jrs'-'. the i-^tencity 0"^  torture increased, 
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especially with reQ?f d '.o those v'^ a belonged to diffef-e^t 
guerrilla groups. 
• *^  guerrilla is- u?^der the- most intensive torture dv-srinQ 
the twenty "four hour'; wihsch follow his arrest. The most 
violent tortures are the Mhip niade o^ electrical cables, 
then blows qiven b- r'eople who ^ now karate and judo. 
Consequently, the prjsrr<*"-"r -falls m t o a coma. His -feet swell 
because a-f the Jashes r^-OT! the v/hjo, which prevent him from 
wal**, inpr Generally, ei ' her the hands, or the -feet, v *^p 
nose is broken. None rf^ n bear these tortures, especial]'-' 
when the body is alread/ il] , Then the aqents o-f SAVAI" come 
-for the prisoner's ti>n-f ess ion, He ha= to siqn has 
con-fession, assertir.Q inat he was not tortured and that he 
is well , The SOVA*'' is to*al]'/ "free to do what they want, but 
in order to abuse puhlic opinion,they proceed with the 
construction oi a leqal -file. Torture with electric a-'i^ 
automatic electric rodt is the most popular at present. "T^he 
shocks leave no mar«i , but totally paralyze the bodv . 
Jnjectnq drtigs such as rardiozr-I , c- pulling -fingernails out 
Bi^e also com^non as x^ ^he VSB o-f weights attached to the 
hands. The prisoner IF I-'ISD submitted to intense light e^ 
biq projectors, to v .^ * »sonic vtaves, and electrical ^^oc'-'^ 
32 
to the head which pr o^ '7^ --, madnes-s , blindness, ^nd de^+nes-. 
The evidence p red bv thLS t^ ives 11 >]-31 LQH r-in^ irtiod 
much of what Reza R n-, •,-. had descr-jbed about torture ,snd the 
state of political pr J-'.->-«ers m [rAo, 
The Sunday TI'T^ ;?" «^e3ort stated that tortures rnost 
commonlv applied •^o 'jrigoner-s included felacca, f^ Ho 
sustained flogging o* the soles of the feet, e^-traction nf 
finger and toe nail',, electric shoes' troj, tmen t to •^e-'i^! 
organs. Prisoners we'*"« also subjected to psycho i oq ic^ I 
torture. This included being forced to watch their children 
savagely mistreated, ' found it so unbearable . one man 
reported, "that I wi^ *-'--' t had a ^^ife so that I could t* i ' 1 
my son myself, rath»=>'- * ban see him suffer i iV «s that . "^ .^-v 
of the psycho log ic-''' i-fture consisted o<- preparmq t-he 
prisoners for their c-- ution, leading them to the edge ^^ 
a freshly dug grave n- 'he prison rorr^ pound where executions 
are carried out, b J inii»•-i H ina thF>iT,. and ^ hen -firing ^hots in 
the air. The prisonf^f - -.'Duld <-her be told that ^hev had heen 
reprieved' and tat'?"' 'T9C> tc their cells. The Sunday Times 
report also pointed >?'' SC^ Vfl^  s q-im distinction of h^/inn 
invented an ins trume"""-1 <7f tor'nre which victims call the t^^ t 
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Table-an iron fr-ame r-.-jtHer liJe -3 bsd fr-sme. covered w i'ih 
wire mesh which I'H «? i<='ctr ic-^i H y heated ti^e a toAste' , 
Prisoners would be strjcioed to the tabLe while it was heated 
until it became redhot, 
When the reqiff.p was -forced to reJes^e hundreds of 
politica] prisoners tr> October i978, the tales thfst 
surviving revolutionaries brouqht -from t^e dar^ - days oi 
their tortured cors-f me-.T-Kn* -flooded the oress which, at that 
tame, was enjoyinq its brje-J E.pe] I o"* -ful ] -freedof", "^  ^--e 
released political priE.onerE. ^ ormed thear own association 
and interisi-f ied the rfvol'jt lonar y process t^irther through 
their public speeches, 
f^amilies o^ revolutionaries began revealing their side 
o"f the story, how they were harassed, beaten, and tortu'-ed 
in-front o"f a son or a daughte-- whom SAVAK had ta*-en awav , 
Many parents cff e'''ecu*ed revolutionaries complained thev 
were never told the Ir.cation o-f their children's graves or 
given the bodies Cff their da^-ighters and sons -for security 
reasons. Another 5eci"-ity nieasure prohibited the mart^ t-^  s 
-family -fron"" holding fiemof"ia3 services -fc"" the deceased 
member o-f the -family. 
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Iranian students abrortc? and e-xi]ed v^ rite-'s hftrt 
published booHs and pswtphlets »-evea]iriq crimes o-f the roqime 
against political pr jc-onerc,, and even thoLigh the ideological 
tracts- and defence speeThes cf the revolutionaries executed 
by the r-egiiTie enjo/ec ^ clandestine circulation inside the 
country,it was "ot v'^f *: • 1 1 September IV79 that these bro' s 
invaded Iran as. "wh.->.'^^ cc^er booi-= , In the three month? 
•^ollowinC! the "^irst t^•• * l —E<H3h demonstration on 4 Septembe'" 
1^778, unti 11 genera] Arharj s mjjatary government was 
clomped on ]ran m f'>'o/&mber, ne'sr-}/ ten million copies oi 
the forbidden boo''E vrz-ri^- sold. Almost all vf these booths 
related to the wor^s. o-? Dr. Ali Shariati, the Mu j ahideen~e-
li^ halQ, ancf proqre? ~ i ve literature, Qenerally, "''he 
distribution system ci t*"'e5e boo> =• was uniqiie in it'=^'='l f , 
When most booK stores •'•terp closed '.mder General Az^^'' i s 
military government, * he students crganired di st ri but ic- '--•^ 
the boo''s in almost e-s'",' pas^ t c' Iran, when one qr.Lic '-''as 
arrested by the military for ces , another wotild quic' 1 •' 
replace it, thus re"? J s ' ' i'tq tte "fart that the f-'evoluticn had 
become the deterdtaner* struoqle o"* an Br'ti>"B' nation -for 
T reedoiri 
15. Irfani, no.i,PF-% "--'"'.-i 6-? . 
The gener a 11 s a *'• " o"? * hp- stats ">"' tortu^'e and 
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DP'"£•£"" l i t 2 or- Brtd t Ho !• ' \ z'^ » Hj^ " ' te"tHo:ic An(j t e c ^ " i ^ i " '~ 
£•"103 Qved . b e o a n t o a"'* ~t t^ »B -H''t?'"+io'" v* i n +pt r ;^ +-s r^ ""-^  
P l ! b ] j r C»PJ'"'J!Cn ' a J t >"»'_"• " '5 ' ' 37> n r * ;:is<- - o c "* a'^ -^^n j -* p t i + ^  f -
Phat-- snc* b j ' • arc*?' ' '"" *''ad ^ ] w s j don&- thea"- b e s t . b 
p r -opaoenda a'r w e l l -^" dji""e'~'' rin-^ a n d n r e c t b i ' i b e* ' - '••^ 
m a i n t a i r i a ' 3 0 0 d im-*n t b » ~ o a d r •>'-i^---1-p r-* c - f - f c f t E b t Ho 
S a r t r e C c n m i t t e e •< ~' - c rSe' 'fe"re o"* I r a r i i a n D O i i * i c ^ J 
p r i s o n e r s , arid cfi £-> - a c t a a t a ^ ' b a "f ev, B r a t a s ' " ^--f 
A m e r i c a n p i (b ]ac c " ' " T ] i t i i = t , 'Hg "le* a cii 3 OLIS a^id 
C O n S C l P ' n * 101.1 £ &-* '^ or A T - . C . ^ j T ' - p r ' - ^ + j o n a ] aric"" J + -
Iranian derartment, sartr*; li -^  E . r]a eri r^  s a r::*"'! f 1 - ^ ^t 
role in tHe vpr* E^ 3t '''-!£.« ~- CDl]«^C*inc tellrib'^ 
intorfTiation and e''.'l'^«^  a'"<d :i;c''i'"!i it all tooptbe"" a' •^  
incontrovertible Dt'b'' < tatenrt^ •>• E -^Dctt * ^-e- E-stemati- ar-i 
hideous violation o*" ^  ' I-L'3^*-5 ^- I^ -af 
The tactics Q*" f-f-i'^i -"^ ih = Q Q rS" "^men ts •^iso contin'iec! ^^ 
be provocative du^'iT-c *-he P P C Q } - t-ion, E-cer*" •fo'" "-HO 
Ayatollah Puhollah »^ xs-.-jri., f-3 .n^ -^ -vir relioious c" cjp.-.il^ -
leader demanded t^ ia -{ n* * h^ s^ ^^ = ^eoimo te*" •" 
16. "< ato'jzian .no . ir.*^ " 
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spread bv the ODOOsition that the t LT-G was 5AVOJ': ' s doinu. 
In short, the fa 1i of the Shah s regime and with it ^he 
long-standing American 'til's in Ifan was a by-product of wh ^ t 
I may call "the Iranian Syndrome". At the heart of that 
syndrome lay the interolav between the Shah's oersonality 
traits and enventually, ohystcal ailment-and the deeo-rooted 
problems of social, economic, political, psychological and 
cultural continuity and change of the Iranian society. The 
interplay shaped the Shah s policies, strategies, methods 
and tactics that significantly contributed to his rwr 
ultimate demise. The main thrust of his policies was 
threefold: (1) Obsession *«»ith militarv powers, (2> "economjr 
modernization" aimed primarilv at internal and e>'ternal 
political gains, and f7 J "Political liberalization" used 
largely as a tactical device to avoid sharing real power 
with the forces of oooosition, moderate o'" radical, and to 
ingratiate the regime with the United States, 
To the extent that the American, approach to I'^sr-
reinforced the main thrust of the Shahs policies, it 
contributed to the fall o**" the Shah and the collapse of U.S. 
influence ir* Iran. First, the Shahs obsession with militarv 
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November 5, 1^78, wh;>-. Baifl'-ns-^, Sanjabi and the P-=irRer3 
leaders ^1 I sLiccufrthe-^ J *o t*""e c~.e>-a]] Ipt^derEhip o"* + He 
Avato l laH, Dtirinq tHp < ono a'"«d tisfsM'! tLioiis tpn fnonths bp-'ore 
then, the regime 5 mi ?.handj jrio o"* the demonstrations and 
s tn i - es rad ica l ]y triVHS-for-Tipd evc-n the --e-formist ca l l s of 
the more mo'sierBie flemersts r"* the-- r'DDCEitiT' xi'^-f 
revol Lit ionarv demanris -J^r the deE + " ' jc t icr. o"* the rt^aiffe. ^'-r 
example, there IE 1 i t I ) e doL'bt th-T;-! the de^tons t rat i on«^  ^ »^ 
Oom an v^antiar-.' i^7'p. U.jch vTiarf ed the hooinnjnc! o'f main' 
revoJ Lttionar'.' d iEtu! * ,-e=-were v^BCBiu} , but the po l ice 
opened " ' i re j^n-'wa/ , " * oovernrr-ertt was rtfi less provocat ive 
m ats hancHino o-* ''>•. TaSfj? ds'P'orsE-trataons m Febrnai-v 
when i t loc' ed the rr--i''« ^^^il mc'.smer5 jn t^•e mosQue ''ma*; •'e'^-
e—jomah), The cal 10:"=; •" r-^s o'f the oc''.'ernment toward ooD'jlar 
sentiments was no s ess s'-'ide-^'t vihen. in ALIQLIS t i'^'^B, 
i n s p i t e oi the a l read. i^'-p^o-i/p p o l i t i c a l atmosphere ^ -c 
the re l ig ions, sens 111'•-'i f ' v«hir' wa? at i t s ^s iqh* durinc t-^ 'o 
Pamadan, i t chose to c?^  . ^^  he-rats f ' f TE'th o"* r-lprdad-th^ c'af'c-
oi the Shah s- Americars •• *.ir<pctr t =*?? '"c-v-o m i^'IC b,-' sendmc x •• "^  
goose—steppi nq sold i f f '^  to r'?r.-*r;u. i;'"s Ti^-firan. The c'ate 
coincided w i th the t rao ie •^  1 "e at < t^iadan and, t-jhile the'"'=' i •= 
no evidence the 5haf" " -oents werF sn^/olved. the a t t i t u d e 
represented by •* ht • i ade ^eot c r e d i b i l i t y to r'.(moi.i'"s 
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DOwer oaralleled America s a^er emohasLs on s t^•=» t'i'a i-^  
consider-a tions dufino evgrv d^'T-1 r is t^ -^  tio-^ . "'"he so c-i I ! "^'I 
evceptions af the f<eor.ed'- and Cafte"-^ admin 15 t^-at ions h^ ,-a 
been exaggerated, Tr-'jG, '''"SLde^ 't heT~ie>jv ^ •; fi'-s'i <?iTVDhas 1 red 
social and economic ch^j^'ce, b'!*: "^ e wss toe a'jici to C'-^J'^P 
the Shah for his oi^f'-'ed land -e*'Q'-ms. wlso, f^ f-es ide'" *• 
Carter talfred about ooiitLcal ! ibe---? t 1 r:a ti c-"' in [r~en, b'i»- ---
"f-^ ct his human f-iQhf- nil Lcv ito'."a''"d t^e Shg-*' 5 "~e'3ime H^H 
more bar^ than bite. Li'-^ the rolsci'^s 3* -?il othe*^ Am.e'^ ic-=>'~ 
Prs iden ts , h IS was a'Jiie"' "^ai^L. b-- stfateoi-r rons ide^^a t i^n = . 
Second m l'^60s m oafti ••la'", ii.T^e'" ican DC!IC-- ^s^^r-s, ^-n^^ 
few e/ceptions, wer«s '-3 Less infatuated than r--3r-ii;3^  
technocrats with th-- t^'f- o*" econowic arow»_;- as th^ rr: ^  , _ . 
of economic deve Ic-ome'-' . ii~:< t^-i^'-d, (•.'*^:L'5 ti^ e ?'--^'- = 
"Political I ibei-^ a I 1 na ti "J- ts^ s o'•" i •'• T-" 1 I'-' a ""-^rtical de ' r = 
Qf the ' f^ 'd mentioned -sbc.'s, t'~'e r^-o'^d =hQws that ^ *" '"'" 
time did the Amer 1C'^ '" " ~ te^'es t i*" jpx-^ rn-- 1 *- j •;• ^  ^  i r-ir^  - * *-'- -
political of-ocess f '^ -< i.-c-.f^ -'He .»---^  t-p.-• - --^s ide'" ^  t; -"-• 
f h e "^h^H ^n-H -•! ^  'ha i,-. ,r * • - - ^ ,.^ ,- » j n n ^ ' - »- - ! i. Hc=' ^  J - -
f h o Tr-^i-il^r DO L 1 t ! Ca ' '-•--.•' t.) -^  5 ^ ,^-.c--^ eC *" = ^ "• D I *" C * ^ *~ ~, 
This ob"/lO'js 1 v cont^'BCi " ""•" 201 ; r.' '''as D'j'~s'jed i"" the •"•-•'L •= 
hooe that a desoot co'f ' ''1'= ' ' '-" - •'-e'^  i-tr a ^emoc^-^* -
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Too o f t e n t h e c f i ' ' - 'la-ze i.'" v •J-iciHod aa-ain-=t i^mo-r- ir^ ' -• 
f a i l i n g t o unde'^'3'"'>'!''* r<o (^vitoll^^ khoir.ei '^i o?" t h e t o - r o ^ 
of o p p o s t t j o n . As ' f" i?'5 te 'J .sif-h t h e jii^iefic-^" l^c^ •"> *" 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 1 1 ^ '^' '^ •s t t'-fKini^ v<Ti t h e M i d d l e E a s t . t h a t 
f a i l u r e l o o t s i n s i 'T^ " * i c ^ n t , B j t ^ i i t o l d , o«^  b a l a n c e t^ se 
c o u l d n o t h a v e s a v e d ^he •^ ^^-^ t-rc** huTse i*" , nQ»- [ - ^ ^ x ^ r 
S o c i e t y from t h e a n c e n t c r i e s ' j " t ' - a q j c c o n v u l s j - r -
m c l u d i n q t h e c u * ' r e n t s'-evolsj t j of^  i'"% u p h e a v a l . The ^h^sh 
w o o e d , won, b u t l a s ' " i-i-'.-^ f i c a 
The '"evo lu 13 on.3 r- eg t tne ^»3'5 ' - o t "SO I'af b e e " a D l e ' :• 
a b a n d o n t h e a n c i e n ' ^ l-•?*•» l a o ^^bi* a*- e . - - p i Q i t i n g + o r e n r -
p o l i c / a s an e s c a p e *?-.,.- ^he proh| .e">s o*' do fmes t i c s o c i e t , 
s u p e r f i c i a L I jf , i t '^-»" ^ppea '" tH^ t t h e o p p o s i t e i s '•r-\^^ 
A f t e r a l l . t h e I '-aiE *' ' ' ^ v o ! <J "" 11«^  c l a i m s t o h a v e d e s t r o - ^ i * 
I r a n s d e p e n d e n c e o*" *• " Un t t*^d 5t-=»te. The s loqai^ '"^iei*•he' 
E a s t n o r W e s t " , h a s ibe-.^  accotTin^n le--' h^ c o n s t a n t oreachiTicn ^ 
on t h e v a l u e of Irani'-;-^ alf r e : i a " f^. U'"'der t h e S h a h . tHp-, 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e - -^ «s««, [ ' a n t-^st i t s j r^depender^ce >-"^  *• 
on 1 y po 111 ii^a I Iy . b*' ' * "^  - 'i e c o ^ o f ! " ^ i i • A^H - I • I *-ijr-^ i i , '^- r> 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s e M '• ' l a s ^ c e , f h e r e + ^ ' ^ r s ? , i-nos*" '"1=' 
1 7 , R a m a ^ a n i , n o . 1 1 . . ' ,i^-^' . 
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comprehensive. tot?" a^-id Lf"f"e ^ ''sibie. It must JI^'-IIH^ 
comolete economfc 519 i f s^ j *" f i-Ci<^ ncv , o^t-?l DO i i 11 L^ 
independenece and -5*^  = lute ciituf-?! autoTDm. . 
Three events wh*.ch arove-d •••a' be i-najc- tui-ning noir-. ^ s 
are, however worth e«T»ph3s LS f^ q t*^ e *irst was the pub L ica t lo*"! 
of an article, written u ,,j^- 4 oseudonvm, in the d--<L!v 
newspaper Ittila at at that amounted a dastardly attach "^i^  
the person of A\f a ^  vi i lah Knome 1 s^  j. , the e'" a L ted ''''a'"!^  ^i 
Taqlid, to the pojnt n'' accusL"~<q hj.tn of biac' .i.e. B'"'':i5h^  
imperialism. This w^s the S^ 'Sh s oe'"sona 1 resDC'ns'= to 
Ayatollah's written -->nd sp'ij'f e^ edicts -a I i m q fi-r- n-o 
overthrow of the '5^  "H s ^^ e'^ i'^ e vo tc that tTiomer-'*" -^  c 
reiicjious occasion';-^  ( ^d bee" "jsed h'" al! the par t ir: i c^ f^  •" 3 
for political demons* attons. the m 111-^  •-1-/e was s^iti i-^  
the hands of the divjr'ed ant-t fjad"'" orqani-sed con-zei^  *• lona i 
political groups and ""Trees. The attach on the Ayatollah led 
to large street demons tfatior.s i?^  the ho I v city of Oom, a^d 
on "^  January 1978, the demons fira tors were tired b--' the 
police, leaving many 'is^d. and w'->unded. This me^el^ m-^.-ici 
people all the j-eadie'-" to sacrifice themselves i*^  ""ho 
struggle. The o ther •fia'-a j a-and , especia I i j , the sen lO'" '^^-^s'';-? . 
Ayatollah Savyed '^-.zi^r, rh^ r-1 ^  ^ m^ ij^ f-i . resDonded h^ 
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condefTin i n g t h e ^ i i i ' "-j •; 3r>rf :!<?"T»^ '"":i i'">g 'i'"'"3 pi^ 'oseciJ t L'~"^ ~i"f 
t h a s e r e ^ D o n s i b l e . S'--•>.--la ti5^3d3P-i , a h i g h l v m t e 1 I iQP"^ ^ . 
t a c t f u l -and f"sspectH>' ' •-.'•-••la^- *-ei 5'ji'^u'= iB-sd*?''", concLude '"^ ' ' r 
f i r s t s t a t e m e n t wt f" ' '>? #^ a [ Ic-f I ' ^ Q v e ^ s e fp-om Ouf-am: "^hc?*? 
who c o m m i t i n j u s t i c * ? - • : ? Le>.if-'T whe i -e t h e y w i l l b e r - e t u ' - n ; rr-j 
t o ' . O n c e t h e S h a h " - t - . f f - an ted o e ^ n L s s i o n t o s h o o t a t t h e 
c r o w d s , e v e n t s e s c ^ i ••!''i'-'t rvjpidi---^: t o o b s e r v e t h e t r - ^ d i t j on^? 1 
f o r t i e t h d a y o f f h f -^sassac^-e o f Qom. S ^ a r l a t m a d a r L i-iad 
a d v i s e d h i s r e l i g i a u < = ; *>>1 l o w e ' ^ s i n '^^b^'iz tc- q o o " s t r i f r a , 
a n d a t t e n d m e m o r i a l '-•'5'"vtce'5 i<" • • ' ^osTjes : b u t h o '-i-ir' 
i n s t r u c t e d t h e m t o r-^f--iii-i fj-rjm a l l s t r e e t d e m o n s t r a 11 o n = , 
So t h a t t h e rea i iT i f ^ ' l i d *"-3v>.? nt^ p r e t e ^ ' t f o r j inoth-or-
m a s s a c r e . B u t t h e SAVA*--pf-o'tj-^*^-! v w i t h o u t t h o S h a h ^ -^' ;-r^ f-
k n o w l e d g e s e n t b u s ksi-^" o f «?»«=o t o t h e ' c t t v t o r e i n f ^ r c p i*"-
e X i i s t i n g a g e n t s p r o v T C A «-eu r s a n d D^•ovo^e - a n o t h e r b l o o d s h e - j . 
T h e y f u l f i l l e d t h e i ' •>••. ^ s i o n . , a n d an e v e n g r e a t e r m a s s a c r c i 
r e s u l t e d . G r a d u a l I v , - t - r e e t •^e'•"0'^s t r a t i o n s a l l o v e r t h e 
c o u n t r y b e c a m e a n-jf • of d a i l v l i f e a n d d e a t h . T h e rr.n-^t 
a u d a c i o u s p r o v o c e t i ' V • ' ^ t w a s wh^n n n li"> May i ' ^ 7 g , A g r r r i p 
o f c o m m a n d o c r a c ^ - i ' ^ " ? C Q S , i e d by t h e i r s u p ' " e m e c o m m a n d e r . 
G e n e r a l * < : h u s r u d a d . ' •••-ded ir, Qo''^, r a i d e d s ^ a r l a tmada'"" i "= 
h o u s e i n a b s e n c e , e m p f ^ e d b u l l e t s i n t o d o o r s , w i n d o w s -^ n-< 
w a l l s , a n d d e I i b e r >^ ?-,--' . s h o t ar d V t i l e d t w o o r t h r c ^ e 
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entirely innocent theniogic-sl schoi^t-s who h^d f-e<=user) to 
shout 'long live the '3»>^H . 
The second fnajo*' turriing poant was the biiminq on 19 
August l^VB D^ the cirteme-P<Bv ir-. 2 >-ar-' s , Abadan r all t^ i? 
exits had been secureJv locf-ed, and 'isr-Qi? an-«ounts c^ petf-cl 
t-iBti been used to set ''ir-e to the- cirseTia, as a result o-jer 
400 men, women Bndi c*'>2^rj'-er> were roasted alave. The matter 
has ne^'er been invest: Oi^ i. ed not even since the revel vit lonary 
triumph but the ab-i'^ -^ s's theory was that it was a SAVAK 
operation, with or- VO^'IT;* the Shah =. prior ^nowledqe. Th^c 
wotild be consistent •''i '.'" the reQi^ '^e- ?• ir^o^'e recent proraopncle 
I me that the revoT •; * i r'.->ar len ?nea"<t to restore tl^'-i 
reaction in Iran, Tuc^-'- i fin be no doubt, however, that the 
people interpreted tf~^^* col d—bl ctoded masE 'rn.irder as a Si^ A^K 
atrocity, and the who;? '-o'.mtry rose in revolt. 
The third, on ^ Septr-mber 1^ 7Ei a massive and we 1 1-
organised demonstration s^nd street prayers vjere held m 
Tehran on the occasion r-^  the c-eat Islamic Festival o"? Eir<-
Fitr. Which must have i-oth -fnohte-sed and angered the &h^H 
and his 'loyal' serv^ ir.'^  in the ^rm.-, especially whe^^ on + hc^  
followina day hunHre'j'^ c** thrusanrk^ o-J vpovle too*- par* ^ n 
43 
an organised street dv--.-i.<-.s t*-^  tian =ho-jtana --^•' de-^th r^l '-he 
Shah' , On Friday 8 '-^ n te'^ber. 'he -^^ ^^ e crowd gathei^ f^ d i<-< 
Zaleh Square, and i.' was moved dowri wit*^ tan^ s and sub-
machine guns. Thi-s wa-^  orobatrly the qt^eatest single iri^ssacre 
of the Iranian DeoDl*^ L^ tne ttxe^tieth century. The niqhf 
before martial law h>f been declaf^ed, and Qene'^a I Ov^isi, 
the martial Law admir-is tf-a tor o-f the bloody m^^ssacr-es of 
June 1963, had bee»^  <i 3 ven a f^ee Hand. Yet. it is --erv 
liVelv that most of t^-e people who went to Zaleb Squaf'e o" 
that fateful day wer<= un-^ware of the declaration of martiai 
law and the banning n^ ^'J public demons t-^ r-t ions, This t^ oo 
was a major blunder .^^ ' ;<e regime t^ 'om wbicH it w^s ne^ -'ef ^-f-i 
18 
recover 
The 'Capitulation' Bill : 
As the Shah's regime was bpcoming more and morp 
dependent on the Ur.?tpd 5tate*E -ior implementinq j+s 
polacieE-, the presence oi an ever irnrreasana number o"^  I'. 5. 
personnel was necess la^ed r The rg-cume r-eal ized that \^s 
survival rested or^ t^e '.cntinijal a-'^ '-jval o-f laroe mjmbe'''^  oi 
U.S. advisers in al'' L-herps of c*evel Dpfent . par 11 cw I-->• i 
18, > atouzj an,no, JI . «-'? , '.^ I'-3'5^  . 
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defence. The regime i-'^ s, trh?e»-ef of-e, D^ -ep•?f-ed to -accept ^ny 
condition imposed -^-.• t^ e^ U,'5. th^ it would acce lef-a'~e *:He 
inflow of U.S. advi --; -= A o»"J«Tia''v condition that If-^ " n^H 
to meet was to ensures *-he imi««init'-^  of Amor-).cans in Ii^ an to 
Iranian Law, In this content the Shah sponsored oafliament 
passed a bill that g'anted diotomatic immimtty to alt !J,S. 
servicemen and their families and personnel stationed i^--
Iran. Under this bill A'^^ericans »'jho violated the law -3^- wore 
implicated in events 'equiring legal p'ocedure could he 
tried only in U.S. cou- •-^  . Khomeini viewed this bill as the 
surrender and capi tu la ^  ir,'^  of the [fanian nation to i3mer!.c^. 
On 26th October I-.'?, the dav m^r-i'ing fofty fi'^ th bir-t-h 
day of the Shah ^nd = national holida'- fo»' nat ion-wi de-
festivities, Khomeini r'tade a speech that was to be his Ms*-
in Iran for the next fi* teen years. In this speech ^home mi 
made a systematic evpo'ri i tion of the regime s treason fof 
selling the nation to America. Excerpts fr-om this speech 
read : 
I can not e^nres^ my tie-srtE- sentiments, •^'y heart 
is heavy. Since tne moment I have learned abci't 
t h e p r o b l e m s ( e n s " r i r i Q f r o m U . S . d o m i n a t i o n ) o-f 
Iran, 1 sleepless, Jr^rt no JoT'ger hfis any occasio'-' 
Q-f festivity (Fie-'', ~hey have- t5.«rned ow Eid into 
a day o't mDin"n'nn, vet together they 'Shah and 
Ame'-icai dance, '^'•f-?-/ sold iis and our independence 
45 
and yet they re;''^vi-'=» witH d-snce -sod festivities. 
Our honour has hj->--n r'-ushed, [^~•3ln s greatness is 
destroyed. They •»-•.^  ta* en ^ bi i I to the Majlis 
which gives all r---- i can military advisers, thei-
famil ies employe>^ • '"^ ei^ " personnel and se'^vants a»-
anyone lin^ed ''-' them, nrnnunit'^  ^rom f the 
consequences) ot -^'<(y cf"i«^ e they commit m Iran. If 
an American coo* >' •sers'an t ? ills vQur r-eltqious 
leaders, Iran's P'M. (ce is not allowed to stop him 
from doing so. fr-tn's court does not have the 
right to try him- ' ii~> case must go to America, and 
there the "mast" •, -should decide' (The r-egimei 
V nows that if t'-"^  • -f g> h^s influence and power, 
it would not T! 5 ;;w [sf'aei to monopolize the 
economy of Iran, 'f the clerics have power, they 
will ^ icJ' this ao^'-'rnment i rs the mouth ^nd throw 
these members ou'v vf the Parliament. If the clergy 
has power, it WT i J not allow boys and girls to 
wrestle in each ofhecs embrace. It wot.ild not allow 
the pure daughtet-s of the people to be in the 
hands of young"'""'" m schools (the irale school 
teachers}. It wou! i:^  not allow women to be sent tc 
teach m boys schools, and men be sent to teach m 
qirls schools ar'-'^  -ti'- up cor-r-uption 
Khomeini vowed ' "^-'J the rle^'gy would neve^ allow •sr, 
American puppet such *•? *•'^e Shah to rule [ran with such b n h 
handedness. It would « '-' 'HJITV out of [f-an. 
It was in thi-= --o-^ -^ -h ^hat f home in i pub lie I v deci^ f"F"d 
that the regime m DO •» \-^. Iran was American . He str-es-e':* 
the need for Islami-- - \-'> - t^-I.<B-= ^o he independent o* sure'" 
powers, adding that r^ -t a {><--e--ent "-ime, U.S. imper la I ir-i-" i-
19. Irfani,no.l,PP.'?'^ "• • 
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enemy number one ot -^'o-f ! !Ti=: '^msr- f.--^s is ••'or-^ e th^n 6r-it^ i^^ , 
Britain is worse th.50 .'ir^ ei'^ Lca. Pij-ssi-s is worse than both. 
Each IS worse than th*^- othef, Eac^^ is mof-e unholv thjin h^^ 3 
other. But today we hav*? to deal with Oine'-ica. 
ReliqicHis Causes? 
A f t e c t h e " o v p " " t f s i ' o w O"' ?^05SflC?e'0 S o o v e r n m e - n t i n J ' ^ ! ! ^ ' " ' , 
the 5hah ruled Ir^ t'^  without con-frcn + ana any seric^js 
opposition ^or about ^ •decade- ShfsH's relations witH Grs'^H 
Ayatollahs a-f t h^ f tj "->=•, incl'jdinn tu^ A-.-atolIah o]-Ori.Tia 
Brujerdi, the leading * » la-e-Taqlid and religious leader r,-f 
the Shi a w orld, wc?*-?- friendly ar-d WltHoilt any B-€'''li~nj^ 
di-f-f erences . OvatolT"*-' *•'-'omc-ini . a dis.t inquished teacher r.-f 
Islamic jurisprudencp, ^hi 1 cisoph-;. , and M/sticism a* Or.T ^ 
theological school c^i*^-*-. to li^e light on]-,- a-fter the rif^at^ 
rt-f Ayatollah Bfuief^di • rt i ^ 62', Thereafter Hp v<as proved *'o 
5p the most outspo*'^'" <'' itic c"* •he Sf^ a^ ' E •""oi<'ne, >• hc>m*^ i n 1 
opposed tHe Shah s p? ^  - <- ,- r.*"* separating I^;^!e cbtirch -f rctm t Ke 
state and his wes ter •-i 1 .^ t 1 on o-f Iranian scciet-.'. He terrr-ed 
it 'a plot by impe'i'. ; ''t E and iionistE "for lonfol 3 ^ -^ a 
Iran, Khomeini propan.T+r^d t•^ at t^ 't ^eal ffioti'.'e behind t'^ is 
policy, was to liqui-'- ' >'-• t*"'e -1^''D.' and itE 1 n-f ] tie*" ce iipc""' 
the Ir-anian masses- --• -f>j'-*\'^-- ia2d t*"ia* the E'-ia'"' vias 
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planning to we3i'«?n the ZI'B<'-~<QV ijv encouf-SQing the inv^%von 
of Iranian society h^ ij^ s te^ r» cu I •'u»"e and v.Alues. The ^h^h 
was considered to be -in l^stru'ne'^^ for the imp lemen f,^  t icrv n* 
the imperialists plo*-, is the sur^-ival oi^  his reqine u ^  = t-o 
an e>"tent dependent o^ - the contimiaf -onso 1 ida tir>'- -r 
imperialist culture i""' ['"-^n, fHe •s^ '-e •Ar-Qume'''•'s wei^e of •*"*='="'' 
earlier too. Howevet , ^ i-,Q.^g j^ ^ j^  qave new impetus or li^e to 
them. He further, 3-* "^ d^ a f-evol'i tiT^a'" ' pei^spective bv 
frequently using the 'erw Zionisflfs and imperialism in 
his speeches. Durjna ^he const1fution^i crisis tn the 
begining of the twentieth century . •-he clerics had r-Ai-^ pri 
the same points whiie opposing the cons ti tu •-lO" •^' 
Revolution. There wa'^  roch hue and c»"y on rran s t'lr''-'<^-^ 
into a republic in 192"^. This opposition was based on (• ho 
apprehension that h^l^ - would bf'ing the !-nuntrv unde' t^p 
control of m tel I igen f^  la ^r^d modernists, to which ^ho 
formalist clerics had always viewed with deep suspicion. 
Under hea-zy pressure <•'' the cIe^ -«5^  the shah had to give up 
the proposed bill for qivmg equal rights to women du^inn 
local bodies elecfi^i- eaif-ls m 1962. On its withHr^w^] 
Khomeini expressed sa" \ 5 t^ .-15. ^ n and paid gratitude to <-he 
Shah. Khomeini made '^ cle-'f ehj» His Imoer-tal 'iajes*--''' 
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had a c t e d a l o n q Qur.=i.'- • c o r i n c i o l e s . We d e c i d e d tha* : ! '^  i-<-:»s 
i n c u f n b e n t upon *ii< ••>»-C'p!«r' t i obey t^t^ t m o , who w^'= •-ho 
g u a r d i a n o'f t*^e c o " - . * i •.•j (" i r--n at-d Lndeoe'^de'^ce and •z.^.r^-'- • t •. 
o f t h e c o u n t r v , <  •- - ^ i n i s b l i n d o b e d i e n c e t o t h e f n i i-^c: 
a u t h o r i t y as r e f l ec * <"• z i n h j ? ^-^,n4^-^ j-^fi^F-.^ »;^ t h e r-^^jj---- o * 
an I s l a f n i c governrTie"^' Jio^tj^-* b». ^ jLcst i^ ' j le*" . A j u s t " ' ' e^ 
can o r d e r t h e a r ^ - e e t ' •• anv nef Hnn o r bu f ^n inq down t^^e hr-.ti-^e 
o f a n o t h e r , o'" •"fi^ s • t e f m j - .9 ^ i on •:> ^^  -^ c n m n u n i t y w h i c ' " I ? 
d e t r i m e n t a l t o I s ! - ^ " •< ' ^ • j s l i ' ^ s . i n tt^e'se c i r c u T i s tanc'-"'^ i^\.^ 
o r d e r s based on 5!)•.-^| >' »n.j.5f_ HJ^ ^ ttpyi^H , rt-n? • • • j m i n q n o l n ^ 
i.<~i t h e r e l a t i o n betv» '" '<"'? '---"^h i^ niT! >< ho"^e s n j i-^me on ! v nK.-jr, 
t h e Shah d e c i d e d •'o 1 i • .r.! ^ 3', -j'-^ t->-),-j wit^ •=•">': l a I AOH ecn'^"^'^ I •' 
'^e ' forms t h r o u g h h i - - 'hit-)? ^«=-'- l s.i t i c " , ^r d o i ve [ - -^r - iTr 
women t h e r i g h t t o ',*n; • ^nrj c^aual ' f ' l a L •?•" ^  *'„'•=;. "'"he '5'^^^" ' ••'-' 
a l s o d e c i d e d t o a h ' - ' • -^ l a n d lo^ ' : : iS'-n m [ r -^n thr -cu-2" ' s-
' W h i t e R e v o l u t i o n , I*^ - e a c t i n n t o ^^>e i n t r o d u c t i o n o"*^  t-bir-r^c 
t w o p o i n t s o f W h i < e ^ • ' ' " v r d u t .". e n , t h e r o w a s a n U Q r i s i n n in. 
I r a n w h i c h i s r e f e r r e d '_-? a r j u n e u o r i s i n g o ^^  l ' ^ 6 3 . • homP'i n ^ 
b e l i e v e d t h a t women s " ' f a n c i p a t i o n and wo«T>en s " ^ i g h t t o ^ - r t e 
i s a g a i n s t t h e law Q* 5 (am -j-^d 7* f ^ e count'""" ' . To •^'^i <? 
home h i s p o i n t . ''hoiTii? •« s u p o c r t e d f h^ ] ' - ' "? cons 11 t u t j f^ '- *'-^ f-
t h e f a c t t h a t i n th r^ - ' - • • • ^ ^ ! t " * I ^ r • . wO 'Ven w<=>ro n o t g i - / " ! - , ^^l^= 
r i g h t t o v o t e and f"'<• ' ' " e T ~ t -^M-fweH *"o q e t e l e c t e i ^ '""^  
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that state of •sff^i' »-hc» m|^^^^ahtds c* Ir^n ^ece' /•'^M 
hundreds of million- ^^^ '"foli^ f-s •=*"- •"eligiou'^ navmen^^ *r -xr 
the faithful by th^ * ••'' ->* Za^-^^, J homs. and Sa Im-i-ima'^, 
The clerics had the f-j i • to use h^F» funds f'T- the people m 
a way they deemed fi'. ' ne mujt^^hid^ had become m effec*" ^ 
glorified Social Welf3 ^ ^joents who -eceived and distributed 
wealth as needed throi •> u* the lowe'' re9chos of societs . [^  
any of that wea 1 "•> ts settled m his own h^nds. his 
reputation is imme^l;«' <- l--- sullie<-< a^d his position ^^ 
Ay a to 11 ah damaged bev<-i-<-v^  r-epair. 
It IS not eas / to say t*^ at which of <"he four ic: = ,io^  
exercised the ulema nof ; f j > •^^ e qf'owinq autocracv of t-ho 
Shah; (2) the corruptif o*" the ''erjime, fTI women's '-ig^ ^^  
(4) the land law. Pf^ oh-iSiy it is closer *a the truth *--
suggest that the ulemA considered the various disci-'='»-'=" 
issues to be mevtriabl bound up with one another. As suci-, 
each was an individual 'imension of one great pi^oblem; rule 
without justice (i.e, e-win). 
The matter most *' '^teni"Q f- the mste'-ial mtere^^ts 
of the clergy was thst -^ the land law, J+ ^s not that '^^-^  
land law would have '-;^ ar,t the dive&titLire o"? private 
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p r o p e r t y f r o m w e a P ; ' ' u l e m a ' t h a t c a u s e d t h e cler-Q> i t ? 
c h i e f d i s t r e s s - a l th<~' - . ' • •s - th is may have beer- a f a c t o ^ L " 
c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r i n - ' A i c e s f e a t h e r , t h e ••natte'^ had t c do 
w i t h t w o o t h e r probl?^»f ~ ' i > t h e vtvipact o f t h e law upor- l ^nH--
h e l d by t h e c l e r g y as v a q f ' , t h e r e v e n u e s o f whir"- . 
s u p p o r t e d m o s q u e s , - isa- larsahs. csf-enion l a I s , and c l e r - q y ' ' 
r e l i g i o u s s t u d e n t S A l a - - e s , s t i p e n d s , e m o l u m e n t s and pens io f ^ 
( 2 ) t h e S h a r i a h s t r e s s ^ " on t h e s a n c t i t y p s - i v a t e pr-apei^t '^ ' . 
S i n c e t h e v e r y b e g ^ n i n g o f t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t he f "e 
has been a t e n s i o n D^tween t h e s e c u l a r - a u t h o r i t i e s , ••i-*c 
Shahs on the one hand i d t h e m u j t a h i d s on t h e o t h e ^ - , T h j s 
t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e tw-* f o r c e s d e e p e n e d w i t h t h e p a s s a g e o^ 
t i m e . D e s p i t e i n c r e a s i n i t e n s i o n bo*-h c o n t i n u e d t o c o - e ' i = t 
a c c e p t i n g g e n e r a l r > -'••^ o f t h e o t h e ' " t o e > ; i s t and *. r 
m a i n t a i n i t s sphere^ i^' ^ ' j t - h c f i t y . The l a s t a b o u t ^ir>e 
c e n t u r i e s have w i t n e 5 < - ' - ( man^' s i ^ ve -e s t r a i n s s p e c i a l l y a*" 
t h e t i m e when f i r s t ' - ' - l a v i »< m g (PIB^^ S h a h * s p o f - a d i c a I ! ^ ' 
a t t a c h e d t h e i n f l u e n c e 1* t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s m t h e l'^Z';'s 
and 1 9 3 0 s , However dur >,r.g e a r l / I'^^'Os t h i s - e l a t i o n ^ h i n ?-f 
l o ' / e and h a t e c o u l d no^ ~ o - e ? ' t s t . 
2 0 , A ^ h a v l , bhahr-nf i : fh , F ? e I i q i o n and P o l i t i c s i n 
c o n t e m p o r a r y I r a r ' ' o .^, / o r i ' 1 9 8 0 ) . ° , 9 ^ . 
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The " f i r e was BI firmed when flohammad feza Shah s 
q o v e r n f n e n t a r r e s t e e ' i r d t o r t u r e d t o d e a t ^ ' •=* l e a d m o S h i e 
m L i j t a h i d , A v a t o l l a h fii ,hafn<nad R p r a Sa i d a i n i '?" ' ' ) . T ( - ^ 
e ' « e C t l t l O n t o o t ' t h e T r a n j in p o p ( . i ] a t l c n h v E i s r i i r i s e r<ricf C B l l 9 « " r ' 
t h e e m e r g e n c e oi '^ t-; c r i t i c i s f r j bv t t "e 5 h i a r c - l i Q i o M c 
C C P m n n i t v , Open critic ^ '• 0"f the Shah s rcqimo was tl'^COmmor^ . 
It was con-fined tc t >- >• "^  , <^ 'ter the celebration c^ 2"^  ' ' 
vears oi tnonarchy hei'-' •{ Pert.epo3is in October 1'T'7J , the 
Shah s Qovernment 1 BM' <• hed ti t'-cntal attaci- on the Shi .a 
religious e&tabl ithme'-^ The Hns spini--'i Er^had, a ho ' 
(Tieetinq place in nortf 'ehran wherp thoiiEands oi ] r arM ^ r <-
would Qather in the i^ veni nr"^  to hear Be^'mo^s QI'^'E''' '' 
esteemed religious 'y i 's-rt, .-tc we]] as bv Eocial criticE ^-
Dr r All Shariati, wa? ' i-ed down, Di.irinQ 19~'2-1'^~'~' thcrp 
was constant attac' ' '" 'eJiaiOLis 'eaders. The go--er'-'mc t 
slowly and gradual! • ' ^ o^ z er t''*- contrc o^ t hp ^^ o 
endowments (owqaf!, Tht-iJ^  was nuch i nt i 11 r at i or oi 5AV/'A> r^ 
rnosaues meetingE af"f v^ e • e> ?f sions, the rplioir'": 
publishinQ house ir =hran and Dom ' «^  . a, Sherl R* i 
Entesheratt coLild n'"*'' '-raoe the '-•-.5 ] a^ iaht , were c ]'"! = '=:? 
down, reliQious studeni T qani E ;^ +1 ciri were ri^chanded. Be^^idp^ 
this the men oi secret '-.'TCP -tn^  'ilitar.' baciaroLmd wp'-o 
•= 7 
made the inc^iarge o'*' • loiiest 5h- mc^s , TUf^ ^ pnointmon^ --^-^ 
Abdol Alia V;?li^n -»•, * erner-Geno'A 1 of n^ -^ Har" ^mj n :5 i H, 
al-towliych of fhe - "d shrine o* imam op-a begininq ;-
1974 was Dart of fH] conspiracy . Moreo-/er mullahs Ao^ 
muj tahids \^t^r^ regulaf !• arr"es'"p>d, i mpr isonorf ^  in terroQ^ •:•='j , 
and even e>'ecuted. f^ an^  T* the clerics a J leqed to h^ve t-^ '-on 
leading positions m '* •-'•<•• aftP"- the revo lu tionarv ovei^thr^w 
had to spend time m -'-^ h s pr-isons, Amonq these incIudeH 
Mahmud Taleghani, Hus=;^. All Montares-i, Ali atbar MasheTM.-
Rafsanjani, and All Hn'^--~.^\n '<hamenpj. 
The governments "»? tact's on -hi is'^n which cor^ tirn o-^  
right up uptlll the S*^ - Ov<=i' th^-ow resiilt^^d info rnmn!,o*-o 
alienation of the • fe reliOJ'^'JS es tah i ishmen r . "t-5 
leading moderate -' '-^hids WH^, had some so^t - ^ 
understanding with th*- '^^hla/i qo>.'«^ rnmen t and had mod'='•s^ '=' 
political tendencies :» «•- ^ur-n^d ag-^mst the Pahlavi roqifn*^ , 
A land marl- m this ma'-f'-f could be ta^en the incident whan 
the Shah s special for *--=; brof f= I'^ o^ the home of fivatoi [ar 
l^ azem Sharia tmadar 1 j J-- * J^R and ^ 11 ' ed one o* his *nllowe'-s 
before his very eves. '''•(- enr^ge-l! in^'a^ollah sha--la tma'i^" ' 
A political pragma*"!'^' -^ nd x^chcia-- wj fh ^nme *^ isto'' * 
cooperation with th<:> "^hla*. 1 '"i^q i me t-jrned ^gain-f •-ha 
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regime and joined f.h'P ' innsitmn with '/enae^nce. 
Much has t!*^t?''! <• t ten ^bout the f^ dj^ Qn-^  ujh^  *^ '-D 
Iranian, the cler q-i • ••'1*='f h^^ E^  i o^ rj^ r-cii-iin of a^ '^ t-nii^ t-
Khomeini Spearheadet^ *• f'e'. o ! w t lari ^o ovefthr-ow the '5^^^. 
The ulema grew again = « '"he Sh^h b"? "ause o* his m s 11 f-u t' ••^f^  
of programmes of mode'"'" i ca tian and indus tr • A i is^ tion . ""^ o 
an ti-modern isa tion »;h3^ ,i-= ^oems 'ri be co<^ f ij-=; m o , After •-he 
revolution, there havty h<^ en a number of c-^ ses wher*:' i" ^^<-
leading clerics ha " ' heiT>'9f=> L^ i^i="3 beeri' f r'SDon'=; ib! e ' i-
reoressive and reacti.-"' ' " mea':,'!--e'= . Ji >na ^ he sfated. ^'^'-• 
an ti-moderni ration" . '''^  'ri'=;. hicievi=»"-, ^  ^  e-frome L / <n is lf=^  *'"" ^  
and does not evplat'"' *-»* f-evoiu tic^ tool- D'a-^ e onl" in ^>-cr 
late 1970s and when ' ^' nqram'ie o* economic mndern L r-^  ^  i'~"^  
was initiated and ac->->' r-f-a ted , One fails to *ind out looi'-
on which a number w" -^dmq muj *"a»-ids e o . , OvAtclI^'^ 
Ka^em Shar la tmada-J • s-^ adj t^iian') tac?fli .-O'-^ Der^  •-o^  
with the '"'ah lav 1 '"eg iir <!r>(-i}5 !Hi5 i^fe I'^^M-^, "''ho rnj-T-
CQUI d be a t tr ibu ted t"^  -M*!''^! *a *'ics ""f "-he Sh^h. w>-^ i-,<-
regime decided in the r-A ] v j'^ r '^ *_"> dismanf le -^ nd cfn-*"! • "^  ^  
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religious power stru-"^'' 
21. Ramazani.no.il. ^^' .=--26. 
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It was in ^1a^ch i"f/! t*-'r(t ••hofTic-ini was -fma]]-.' relea-^cd 
and allowed to retn'^^ to Ortm. On],- t'lrep f-iay^  a-ftp-- •-i = 
release, while addrf^-.Tq a qrotip of Ftttde^^E i r o<^' Trhr-.-i 
University, t-'horrieini made it c'^ ear t^at. 
1 a«T( not o-f thos"? fTtnlla^ :? to sit Here and take uv 
rosary breads, 1 ?'»' not a Pore only to conduct a 
ceremony on Sundavs, Those oi vou who Br-B m the 
University should Hcrea^^ the word that the clergy 
does not support t^  he Shah's revolution. One can 
not en-force re-forvf^, under the tins 0"^  tia/onets, Pv 
writinq on the '-••^ Ils m Tehran "^homeinj 15 a 
22 traitor". The count-'-y can no*: be r-e^ 'ormed 
Before the comir'Q f^ ann Lve'^ s ?ry of tho June •_'c "^  ! •^  1 "^  .; 
Khomeini had launch-?* all ^ffo^'ts in of^ de"" to wi^ ^ t-K^i 
support of other re i 1 •" ? -3 leader's for- declarinq 4 Jursp -?•= -T 
day of national mo-^  • ' "^, Hoi-ieve*". despite his -T,a?si '?? 
efforts Khomeini sue.-- ded ir^  gef-mg onlv two o'~ * Kr-t; = 
Ayatollaihs to sign th«-.i^ - names 'jnder hj.s bulleti" '-^• 
indicate their suppo'"t .'''he majo'^ it-- o^ Avatollahg did "i-i*-
l i t e t o r i s l * s i g n i n g t h e i ' ' n j i r ^ c s i jrs j iPf- a K h o m e i n i SP0 ' ->30 ' " ' = ' ^ 
b u l l e t i n . Some o f th>? c l e r j c s w e n t t o t h e e > ' t e n t r i f 
o b s t r u c t i n a i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . As a ' " i n s u l t , • ' h o m e m i f a i l e d 11^  
m o b i l i z i n g t h e masse's -^fAd o r g a r » i c i n g a ^ J ^ l o n - w l d e s t r i ' e 
2 2 . [ r f a n i . n o . 1 . P P . B 4 - « ' , 
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for observing the *-; r =• f ann L^-fefs-^"" • of ^ inne 'T^S'B's^r-'-^. 
Khomeini s failure h*='»; Tsade *"hp '-^ 3h -^ ee' convinced '-f-^t^  
the trouble^ m June ."* .' we?-e S^ •"•-t lived as his soci-^l, 
economic and Doliti'"-"'' re^ a'"!^ 5 '"a':? bee" endofsed bv •-'-'o 
Iranian nation. The .:3-«^ t majo^-it^ o^ rgijrjj^ nij^  leader-^ tnoi.) 
this and many had qi ,"="-• him tHeir supoort. 
In October l'?64, •'homeini i^or>ixed the reaime in pown- i^  
Iran a^ 'American'. He -ailed U D O " the [slarric countrie- *'-> 
be independent of 3^/f>ei- Dot"e'~'5, He declared the '_'.'^'. 
imperialism as number '"jne enems c <^  ""luslims. He decl^ f<=^ ':^  
"America is worse th,3n Britain*'. Rritajn is worse th^-
America, Russia is wQrs<= than both. Each is Tiore unhol^ th-^ '^  
the other. But toda/, "JP have tn ds=al wit^^ America.. 
The Shah wanted '"o elimLn,>te ri\'4toll^ '- • hoiT^ e t n j bn^ ^ 
steps for physical ei i"*! "a tion ot 'ho^eini wj-iid h^^e ->-AI.-" 
the support of rnoae*- ir^ Ayatollahs and "-ht? majorit- <^'^  
clergymen, who were the supporters of th«=> monarrh^, TI-^ 
Shah, therefore. decid<='^  to quis^t!> send AI-IA- t<hrimeini t"*-
exile in L'564. 
Ayatollah Mahmcud TaJeahani and Avatollah s-hofT'ei' i 
launched heavev crjf icisiT' o'' t'se Sha"-. '- land •'<• "'•^' "• 
programme. Even A /• ' - ! AH B"'i'»~r'ii who h^ 'j ooo<~1 f-o ' A •->--^n ^  
with the Shah s n- c-T,/r^e'^  *" e-ii- i'.er also critLr-i^e"* •^'->'=' 
D O l l C y . T h e w h o ! t > - ^ r -3>''ii'n'"- i-^ 'Tctn isnder r-r-1 11'^ 1 ='•" b 's-c 
ulema and reliaiou= -> 1c='--5 . f^  w^ -- 3! so orro^ed b^ - i-nn-r;» -vf 
them for the reason^; ''-^f- 't wm 1 ' (-< cj *" , '-•'-.e= •'f=/eniji^ -^  ''* .-^ 
lands he Id bv the c ' * " ^  and " i S"?'' t;-f- --n ! 1 n 1 n' ,9 e'"*' 11--^  *• • - - ^  
the san c t L ty o •• p'" ' :~- r; f---.r —•" ^  > lode'" ' ^  I 5'T" i i '^ ^i.- . '-o 
clergy also fese" tt'-"' the i^'T 'e ':>eza'j5e ^^''-Jh wag ^A> - -
at temots to cas t- h j •; • : -,' -_. f . T. ^ -;..---jm,ia 1^  n ' 5 1 a'"^  1 r ^ ^  - -
The Shah in a soeo.-* '•• • e'"e'' i'' '^'-a ho 1 - i>' '"• ^  Oo.r, -^' 
I f t h e f^ 'U S I I ••' li(-ni i n j ^ r ^ , - ] ; i p < ^ I ' - n ; . - ! * - t - ^ j ^ ' -
r e d ' J t r e m e ' ^ 15 ~) • ^ -tcjpr-r- - ^ ,7,, i-- ; r- ' 'no T : ^-^ 1 r-1 -
s p i r i t o f I '^ • ?" . , *' i.) ' 1 ! <• • -• -^  w ", 11. c^• r i ^ 
r p ] 1 o l o ' j s a'"* i! '^''" •* ••-.c-' I ' 1 r-1 - ^ ^<-, ^ ' - ^ *.; I M tzi--" 
I j n O O D D S ' ^ " ^ * ' 0 . ' f '(^^ I '•^  n d )• a f o f >r, - -- T T r A 'T . a ' " •= 
1 riduta 1 t a b I ^ 'Z-'j'' - ' ! 0 1'~'J5 ' e a d e ^ s , '-^'j*' thos '? 
o t h e r s who ha 'p» »-"• 'r e s s e i onpos 11lof^ *^ ^ i *" wmj 1 
seem t o be o r e o ' " " ' ' i ed w' ""h f ^ e a o o e a r Anr-t= r a t ' " '?" 
t h a n t h e subs ta ' " ' •" ' * "-he ' " i ^ ' i a i o n . ti<e tf^us*^ • -KJ • 
A l l a h w i l l a u i d e * ' ^=0 i n oos ' ^ i o n s T * ' e a d e r s ^ L r-i 
t o t h e r i g h t p-^'' • ^r^d ••hat b-- b l e s s i n g s c * h i ? 
s a c k e d s h r i n e t h e ' • i t I -'-^'".e I s l a m , '•he Shah a'^"' 
2"S 
their country ". 
'^'••'atollah ^ hompj n ^  f t er hi n p 1 J 1 e 1 "-i t he ho ] v c \ • 
Ramaza'^1. "0.13,'-' 
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N a j a f i n I r a q ) , cr> ' ' r / i e d •"o QI''.'<3 c a l l f o r t h e rorriD l o t-o 
o v e r t h r o w o f t h e Sh^h -snd h i ? f e u i ' ^ e . He w,^ '? t-^r *-r--ir ^t-~ 
o n l y D o l i t i C r S l le-sdpr MI-,Q w a n t e d tr> o e t ' i d o f •^  t h e S'"-^'''. 
f a c t , t h e r e w o u l d '~^ e been v«^ri' f e w , ) f a n y , •--f ^^  * -
r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s "«ni-j f o r c e ' s who had =><~< d e s i r e t-o > o'^f-
t h e Shah on h i s t h r o r r ^ •'or- h i s own ^ a i e . B'l*". f r o m h j s ^ ' ^ - - C T 
o f e * ' ' l i e . t h e A y a t o l l s ' nad f h e 'j'~»?'Tje a d / a n t ^ a e aT'ong t-ha^. 
a l l o f b e i n g aOlt^ •• r-.ri^q- t h ' D D p i ' l a ^ ciem^nH ; n -i 
u n c e r t a i n t e r c i s . ar-" • - ^ • t - f ••nn ^ H J ^ HO - - a j ' j - o H ^^^^•; l i -
es t a b 1 ishTien t o •'^  h i s "••' , ' " ' " a d i t VD'~ ' ^ l - . = *- ' ^ i ^ - n ' r St-^^te >••" 
n o t be p o s s i b l e w i t h m . * t h e c t f ^ D l e t e o-e'-t*"' ' ' '-}*" o * t h e ='•"•'• 
and o f t h e systet 'n o* • i* :»-i'-ij»i<-.r. ^ i iTsona'-z*" i t s e l f th^-j* 
why a fevf p o l i t i c a l > • ^ers sc'^ie c^ * tho''"' H ' ; s l i i ^ b e l i e ^ i ^ ' ^ s 
and o r a c 1 1 1 l o n e r s th<^~- -^es (-i- i^:;^-^ t c wor--'. j h n i j t w h a t " 'C ' ^^  
happen a f t e r t h e r'= - ' ' ' t i o " i^ t h e r e uc^re no Qf-^c-r 
^ r a n s f e r o f power > i-/; ' h o ' i ')L'_^-ii jt t h e 5 h ^ h ^ f * <• 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s 
The Shah c o i i l d r io t be thE hepd r*'' l E ^ a ^ i i ' " S t a t ' = bee-v c 
he was t h e v e r y es^senc-- ' >•? o b ^ c n ' ^ . ' ~ I * \ H ' ' ' . C "^  J P^^  t'="i' t'~>''<arH • i-
w e s t and c a r r i e d c u t ' N * p i i i i c c f ' * & i f i r i e r ^ c f J i s t r :r. - • H T -
2 4 . ^ a t D u ^ l a n , n o . I I ' . ' ^ " ^ . J^^-r.^^t. . 
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t o !< eep I r a n a bac* WA- - f s t a t e . H i s •sub juaa *• iQr> t o •''r>'"i^ : C ' 
p o w e r s co t i iDromised t r i « Df-ogr-e'=s o t t h e I ' ~ jn ia ' ^ n e o r l e ^r-n 
h i s c l a i m t h a t he w ^ - i eadL ' "a I r ^ n t o t h e " f r o n t i e r n + 
g r e a t c i v i { i r r a t i o n " w-,'5 a t i e s'^ri or^ [ - an e> c u s e "<•-• 
u n d e r m i n e t h e c o u n t r v i n d e p e n d e n c e . 
I f h o m e i n i ' s mQV(='f^ »--• " ^ i •=:Q I J ^ ' ' ^ o t h e * •"•^i'sons ' 'O' '-'-c-
u p r i s m g . These were •^"••^l led :?"i^ ; ^ ^ "^  t-^ ""e'^en t i s s u e d " 
M a r c h 1 9 7 7 . f b v ^ h o m e i ' • ' 
i . The Shah IE 3 t ; n ' Hn(i o'^ ' i n o s t h e nti"^ rin S a y s : " • i r : ? ' ^ 
when t h ^ y en + t t ^ r o t ' n t ' " ' c ' e p c s i * i t and f^ai-e *^ *-c= 
nob 1 es t Q"* i t s pe €• t he Tie ^'' es •^  • E .>? ' ' ' 3 1 V . 3*5 t • p . j ' . 
iZ, Ehah—in —Shah f i - t '^ ' r n-f i n o E * . t'~'«= +a*" ]e q i v e ' " •••" 
h i m c ( ? l - f b^* t h e f ' - - , --c jrin ^ E I S - T ' I C t i t l e h e l p n c i n r *• 
God B l o n e . Or r r i f -< MO t o t h e ' - ' rop f 'e t f"''c; hamma d ; ''''-
ct- i rse oi A l l ^ h 1^,1 ' be LIPO^" c ^e wnc I H ' ! ? ar->ot*"e'" "^  
bv s p c h B t i t l e " , ' 1 i > 
7i. The 5 hah i^ i^ .c^ e *'•. * i t l e ^ ho'^a'-'aoan Mr .-a'^^ehr . vj'~\^'~ 
means God l l ^ e •^•< a "^ea! "^'LisJirri ca i ^ h imse]"? '^ -^  H 
] 1 ^ e ' ^ 
4 , T h e S h a h . a n d h ^ c ' , , * hp>r b ' = ' * o r p " " i r i , p l e a t e d t o d e ' ^ * ' ' ' 
t h e a n t l - C O l o n i , ^ , a n d ' c , r ' *• :i or ^r M o ^ l c . e"* ^"^ •=>" 
CQ 
^ , T h e & h c i h "f D ] ] riiiti ^ Hp? ^ --10+ = ^ E p'^ O' ' M a l a w i v a a n d ' a ? 1 n . 
donated petrolen'T '^ci t^ io ic.-^p]i a-r"'-<~ssor , c, *ri-'-
Arabs. 
t . The Shah e - ' i l e o *'~>r A a • 'Ti l ] ah >•'-lo'^t^i ""n . 
"^, Me Q r ^ n t e d t*"'" ^ tpmeri^ c c ^ ' t ' ^ a " * fc '^ Dash t &*"va ~ 
' ar ag-^a en 1 t i l t ' ^ ' ' *^ i^ I'='".--el . "^ *-it=' ' noc* ci'"c>'iii^f"'* 
s h i p p e r ) + o 1 ^ '' •I'' ^-T' ' ' : i ^ ' = ' ! l '-o] V l ''^'^ S S^"! t ^ ^ a ' ' ' > 
r ^ n s l a L ' C j h t e f i->C' ' - ^ _ ( ' f - ' S * ^ l ' " ' i a r i --tr ;; ixf^Qir^f-'c'r 
MLISlam A rabs , 
8 . He p l a c e d t*^e * ' .•"? * * e tx-ztr i ie --• t*"e ^ a ^ n c 
I 
A m e r i c a n BT-iti r m r 1 ' f i i c ^ r ^ / - I I I + A- ^d i s o r c , . 
9 , H e S p e r ' t m p n e ' ' ' ' ' " ' . ' • r - r i r A * Z"^ , Q'^G'^ '"•'T ==' • l ' " ' C * ' l " " 
t o 5 w i t r e r 1 and , r t -^ - QP£ t \ C - " r t he-^ ^ ^ .- , H ^ b".!- "^  ^ • 
C O a t * ^ . h e B''>d: h i » ^ i., ';:> + f i | c - ITO t h a t * " ' * ^ ' " C ^ t e ' " ' *• '-•r ^ 
c; I i n s W * " - ! 1 e fTi;=irt i ' J - i i g n r - :rt r fr ^ ^ o c j i T ; ^ , •: * a ' " v, J '"> T - ^ 
des 11 *L i t e . 
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i O . He o u r c h a s e d ^s'-r. tr--}^^ •-he L . S . ••'- h I ow ir- »•--! 
i n n o c e n t he^ir ' t '^ J * f"*3 o l i ' ^ ' i o n ^ p ie=^ m DhQfAf s' ' 
P a l e s t i n e " and '"^ ""^  i sand= 2* [ r - j m i ^ n ^ 
The o t h e r s ta te r * -^ i ' ('3uo^es f• ofr- a sDep"-h d e l i v e r e ' i ^ 
t h e Imam A l l a^ -*-' 3 a ^ ^ l e i * q ^ t ^ t ^ i - i i Prom r j^hn ' 
B a l a a h a h ) : -
" A i m a t t h e cFP'*^' I ~»+an i E hadden t '"fe' «=». Me I E '-^ic'Hrr 
deep i n s i d e t h e enem' '" ^h ie - f f ind h i s c l o w n s , whn c l a i m s *^ 
be ML IS I i m e " , 
The- stiddef^ des+^ ' '^ Mot: + ;:t-f^ K h o m e i n i i n ^4a•>a'' ^ r 
Oc t o be I' i '?"7 7 Mas a h r j * i/i-^i ' h e t ' " = • fc" t *""= I r a n i a n s , ^ = 
m v s t e r v E i i r r o t m d i n q t ' >- ' ^ e a t ' cciri i n c e t * **"£ I r a n i an? *f < + 
f^losta'^a was p o i s-onoH » '~A'>^l t-< - j ^C j la " " ' ' ' " " T i e i n j ' " I ' ^ E - " ] * , 
h o w e v e ' ' . r^B^B n o -^ C - i * j C " - a n H • -c •" 8 * • - c I C E E C •* ' 
talented son who ha-'^  < '"(^ ad ^^ s+ ?*••''i'^  *ie r a r-amc -fc* "" 
'scholarship and radiri-t' cm with *=Dta'"i'Ki+ and comoo = i"^ . 
'''he condolence meeti"^' '- " o•=''-'i/e*"' x" Or"' an ^  oicpwherc -^i 
I r an open ] / condemned •>' 'A^  a * * '" <" J ' i »^  E ar d r • H h 5 des DO ^ i ~ " . 
b. Habit'.. R,N. and Fa-ihcrr E-hn -. de' t h. - H . n i 5 1=,, 
Republic ir ^^ . Cm ' it; <ed. > . ^pligic arid '^  oil tie-
Middle East > B-<LI ! Hir-, , t vp ' •. "f^ '. j JA-J"'. 
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I t b«cao:^e c r y s t a l <~ '• ••h.^' t h o r e o f - e s s i •'•">T5 h^d fA i l o " - " >• r-. 
a l i e n a t e t h e I r ^ n ; - . - 'fro.t^ - ' ^ ^ t o t I ah i 'Homem i . The r'-'^^ 
t r i e d i n v a m tt~i •' --e a •• cJoi^ betwee<^ rnomhor-'^ c •" - >^a 
" U l e m a ' t h e m s e l v e s . ' " ^ ' t a i n Ie9' i *=r5 o f '-he ' ^ f i r ja ' " ' n--jv--- '= 
( I(T\am-e-Jo<ne I wef" ? h j o h l ^ o^'ii"* f T " s ' l o p o r f i n n • ho 
q o v e r n m e n t . some o * hem M'erg (T-a'~(e t h a i ^ e n u t i e s i*^ *"''•" 
Maj l i s . Some w e r e e^ ?= s e n t a h r o ^ d and t h e d e D e n d e n ^ s o *•' -^  
c o n s i d e r a b l e number - a^'hc"'"?"? f ^ r ^ d i t j o n ^ ' t e a c h e r s ' -./ti-o 
c j i ven s c h o l a r s h t p c f -.f-udv ^ ( i f r . ^ ' - j . The ^h^^h, t h e ^mr^'^c :.•= 
and members o f imo<;-' f a m i l y f e a u l a r i . v i s i t e d t h e ""T ^ ' 
s h r i n e s and g a v e ai->'ii.'" •= t o * he Ulema . ''"he Shah a l s o d ' - ^ f 
on p i l g r i m a g e and t^ - .• ' 'Otos shrn'<i'>g h im c l o t h e d as a "-'-" ' 
w e r e p r o m i n e n t l y d i - ^ - e d , ^ e a u ^ i * ' j L c o p i e s o f t h e On-- --i-^ 
p r i n t e d u n d e r Emo'-'^ - F^ra^ = - ^ u s o i c e s w e r e n r n ^ ' i i s e l / 
OIL 
distributed to the fi- srers 
No political c" . ratic-i was capable o* assumina ^ho 
leadership of the Isla rev-"-' u »-j. o-, Thi'^ w^s not on i * -^iio 
to the severe b! *~' -' re'j j'T.C- h^>j r .^reived fr-r-,-^ ' he 
guerilla organizatiof. <-* o'-hw-- fvr.i^fi.r^i >-.3dje= durin,-
past years, but also •' ! -^  *•_!-,•• *->:(- that <" *-ie movemon*: 
26. Risvi, no.7. PP./' >:'••'. 
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qoina a^^e^si ^t >=" *•< ? r^ pjci pace that DcIaticaJ 
orqaoi 2ationE haa -•" LDtii-'" t-u* tc -foNc-w t*->e Tiass' .^  
SDon t anei t'-' o"' t'^ F "'it p^^'e^ \ , 1 "i thjs rp^cic-rt, o""* ] >• • KO 
cleraympn gave their • +jn^ <fl^  c-OtTr-j rat i o'-'-i J r-etworf- m *-n 
"form o-f mosauPE., thfi-- darert CP' tact wif-i people, and '^^P 
LincompromiBanq leadertr f.^  c n"* ^^.-atoljaH Khomeini callino -fc"-
the overthrow of thr oonarch.- acr>Barpii to prpserst the or 1 v 
possible avenue "for J^ ?-^ Jl^ o thiE movpoient. 
f ^ o r e o v e r , K h o m e j r i j M^S t h e r t n } ,« w e ] ] ' r o w n o p p o n p n t 7-* 
the Shah who had not been ph.? i c a 1 1-•• elifr-jnated b- •'» 
regime o'' con-fjned tp .-ipr j scffnent . H I E oas* per ••orTianrc-
con"f orn t at ion with f*--fr Shah let* no do'.iht i r t ""-e r r-.^ r., c ^ 
minds that Khomeini wcsld nevEr {^ oTccroT'i ?•= with th^ ^^<DI'^'=-, 
Khomeini ] ed the revo^f - pn becaisse. •'ro'r; the sccioJcaicaJ 
perspective, he repr.' ented popular tmi*-/; and because 
people had to act witf" complete unit' in izirr<pr to succeed i n 
Qverthrowina the reoi?""-
PrimariJv, howe'*-* . it ''•a? b •' SLic ce'-5 "f u ] ] V ti i e'lH \ or^  
politics and relioi?' in S-' ^n* : - 1 mpen a 1 1 st anc" -^ < ^ 
dictatorial •framewo'"" * -i * *• t ••-r-o ^ -, ~ Euccee'^ '^ d in ma^inT^ a^ = 
leadership attracti>.~ =i c-r ;.+ah i J:^  to var jo<.is sections of 
society, Bv incjc,t> ' tha* politics and Islam i-iB''e 
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inseparable. Khomei - Had •'ol lowed t^<B oath laid down bv 
Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani 3 centut-y ^go. Evore^-sing «-.H5S 
point of view in A -r-fycb shjrhlv a f her »-he Tehran up'" i'^  I'^g 
in February 1979, Avujtollah 'iots*->a'^ i, the Islamic ideologue 
closest to Khomeini -'-id then ChaLr»T\an of the P'evo lu tionai'v 
Council, the suprefrr. bodv to ta^e control of [ran said: 
"Khomeini not only be'ieved ?:hat DO I i tics a^ d^ religion fiere 
inseparable, he decla-^d that indifference to politics ^nd 
keeping one's self =!(•?••?>' fro"> it was tantamount to leeoing 
one's self away f-^ om r<=iiai.on, tiihomeim s secret of success, 
therefore, lay tn *' • act th^t he carf^ied forw^f-d ^'^(^ 
struggle in the maul • •••' Islamic concents as Syed JairaL H^ ri 
done. He fought oppr^- ^ion tut presented the necessit- of 
fighting oppression in ^i^r-m-B of Islamic criteria. 
Similarly,he stressed f "^ e necessity for fighting mjusfice, 
imperialism, and e>JD lo' *a t ion hv repeating the call th^ if it 
was a disgrace for a T-uslim '•o submit to oooression ^nH ho 
under the domination c* an infidel '-u!er. flotahari believed 
that if Khomeini had f^ ompted to tfing the problem of cl-»ss 
contradictions or t!~e •:oncects o* freedom and justice to 
peoples awareness ir ' h*? frameworv of ideologies of *^ hP 
East or West,it wou! •:" • '«» hav(? met with rereotivity in thr-
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Iranian Society.' f'«^  presented the conceot-s of tl^^'^ 
contradictions, free'3Tt, ard justice 'jsirq fslamic cri^^c^ri^ 
and the rich bac^ o*>'^ 'ind of [sialic culture. The 5ocietv 
received the ideas i" good faith. Thus, the peoole realized 
that freedom was nry« merelv a oolitical issue, More •-har 
anything else it was an Islatnic issue. A Muslim ought to 
live in freedom and be a freedotTi fighter. The Ir^ni^n 
revolution. therefore. could he reg^f"ded as an [sl-?'^ s'r 
revolution, because <=>ver, though Justice. Freedom •^r-n 
Independence were the objectives of this revolution. thev 
were sought in terms i^ * symbols and evpression that stemmed 
from an Islamic tradition. People had risen not onlv because 
of a revolu t lonar-y • ' igious idiom, but also in ter-ns of 
it27. 
Even though thr- =.i rc«nQ cu'"rentE- cf discontent ~r>ct 
opposition to the Shft< s reaime wouJd not ha-'e broLiQh* i* 
down. but for two factors; the- central role played bv * he 
religious leader fabovp all t hp Ayatollah I'homeinii and t ho 
power wielded by Iran «: f.7,00''* oil wor*>ert who, by s t o p p m a 
oil production. oara^ ' ed the government'? authority. 
27 , I r f an 1 , no, i , PP . > f<''~ 63 . 
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Khomeini was net the on]y reliqious citic o"f the Shah 
and his regime, bnt he became the most •force^ '^j! . HP 
emphasized traditional 5hi?i ftnd "^e^sian values, an cc^trast 
to the regime's reBd-' acceptance oi western culture, he wa?^  
incorruptible r In cont'-a'^ t to the corruption oi the IrRni^ r^-
system, he reiuB-ed tr> cofnpromise as the Shah souoht to 
appease the current -"? unrest. Combined with the impact of 
modern communicat ior."L , these attributes provided fc'home i ^  •> 
with unchallengeable authority particularly in relation to 
the one objective «hich unated all oppctnents to the 
overthrow the Shah and the political regime he stood -for. 
The diversity oi A\, r:'ws among the various forces o"f the 
'opposition' was to come to the ifore the moment +'"'is 
objective had been az'-ieved, Untill then, however, -from *IT.S 
e><ile (since l^hl' in i^ -aq, then -ft-om October 1*?78. m Par<c. 
the Ayatollah dete< -i- .-^ ed the strategy ot revolt: + ^ r 
•pa 
replacement of monarch^ by ai-, [-3lamic republi.c: , 
The psycho-pol/f > ca i at-Tosphere of the period between 
October 1978 and Pvr.h.-ij(^r-v l'?7'=', when the Shah's reqime 
finally toppled, is htqhly instructive, both of the co'ir-ge 
28. Treverton, no. 3. e^ ", 97-78. 
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of events in the If-?"ia'-' ^ -fvo lu t ion, n^r} of mass oolitic-*'. 
movements in genera) . Th*' m:*^-:: o* ordin^rv Ir-^man pe'^ c^ ''? 
were prepared to follow V.hoin^ ioL 3 lead alone, because •^  Hey 
regarded the Shah a« ^he ve?-^ ' symbol oi^  all the-' wore 
fighting against and Khomeini as the ve»"v symbol of tf^ e.v^  
total rejection of the Sha^-, and religion although not -
traditionalist Islamic State, of whirH they tnew -c ^  
little, as the binding force and the obvious channel for the 
war against the Shcif- s pseudo-modernist despotism. The 
experienced political leaders o^ ^ the opposition and some 
religious leaders, su' ^» as Ay^tollah 5har ia tmadar i-sh^r-ed 
many of the ordinary L >ODl>e s sentiments and beliefs. but. 
in different degrees. w-B'^ e "worried fa) that the whoil--
uncompromising stance •••* *:homeini would result in an arm-
backlash (possibly enc .uraged by Ame'-ica). and (b) that the 
revolutionary triumph ':nder the leadership of •Khomeini and 
those of his folic.^ ==^ rs who wanted to establish ^ 
traditionalist Islamic State, would result m somethmo 
other than they were hor'ng to achieve. 
However, they wet-, ""endei-ed helpless a"d impotent f' •-
the following reasons, r-jrstlv. the m^ss of the people we* <? 
behind Khomeini and hir. call *-nf- thp overfhr^-^w of the Shah: 
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Secondly. the bul* of the le^t-wLna qrouDS and o^r ^ i^^-^ . 
intellectuals. and <^ iiM:^ ted neoole at l^ i-ce each for- t*^^ir 
own different reason- regarded 9nv attempt a •• a neqoti^'"<=d 
settlement as a bi^^'ayal cf the -^ evo lu t Lon: in sue*" an 
event, one can tmaqme the jdeoloqical ana iv^es whic*^ 
would have described *^ he betraval of the revolution as '•he 
wor^ of the national bo'i'"qeoisie and its compr-om !.•= inq 
tactics. which ar^ ^-fpical of its class characteristics: 
Thirdly there was rj one a«»onq the mor-e e^'per len r'=»rj 
political leaders who would have the couraoe, the abili*-/ 
and the potential po>-i!'i ar appeal for e>amDle, one suc^^ •^^  
Dr. Mossadegh to rise ^tbove the situation and try to corfipe'-e 
29 
w i t h •''homeini 
The Shah and h ic -familv -final ]v ]e-ft I r a n on IB J a n ^ a r 
1979, The army g e n e r a l ^^^BH was d i v i d e d , t h e r e were o r c w i - n 
s iqnE D-f ansubord3na+I f-in 3-1 t h e ar^nv and , s p e c i a l ] - . 
a i r - f o r c e : t h e cont in i ' j - iq g e n e r a l s t r i K e , m c K t d m a +'-<=' 
s t o p p a g e oi t h e oil w n r i o r c , E hov^ed no siQn of breaJ- ing t ^ e 
masses oi t h e peop l e ^-^ •' want«^d ^hcimeini B'~>6 none o t h e r , t^>e 
an-xious c o n v e n t i o n a l P T l i t i c a l l e a d e r s , arri m t e l 1 ec tua j ' - . 
• a t o t t z i a n , n o , j r , 346, 
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had l e f t themselve'? ' >'^ldeD^p<".de"^ i n i t i a t i v e , AlAr-mp>d -5* 
t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t B-?t ^ r j ' yr m i -^b t •f.snage t o c o n s o l i d - s t e ^ ^ 5 
Q o s i t i o n t h e Shah had ' . n ^ l i v ' I ' ^o-a f - ted. K h o m e i n i r e f u s e d '• "-
t a l ^ t o Ba* h t i y a r as • ' • ! as He w^s P r i m e M i n i s t e r , d e c ' i A r - ^ i 
t h a t he w o u l d a p p o i - ' - . a I te f - ^a •-1-•e g o v e r o f n e n t . and deci'"f<--^ 
t o l o s e no t ione i n >•'^ ^ m a t o Te»-f-an. T h i ? was t h e Z^'*-
J a n u a r y . he a - ^ r i v e d • e h r a n f e ^ - a c t l v si>''*"een v e ^ r s ^ f t ^ ^ 
S h a h ' s r e f e r e n d u m '<- ' f - i t e ' ' e ' / t i 1 u t i o n » t o a tumu i t u o ' i s 
v(elcome vihich was "n \ m I ; % i n q >T\emorv . G-^  a r r i v a l . '">'? 
a p p o i n t e d t o t h e Dre>n i^ - -sh iD M a h d i Baza ' -oa" - , l e a d e r 0+ t '^<? 
F reedom Movement. 6 -^ i c t i ' i n a f ^ u s l i c , and a for-me'" 
a s s o c i a t e o f Dr . fl0'=- - p g h . ' ^ ' . r ^ a i l ' / , on \] F e b r u a r y . t^-p 
g e n e r a l s a g r e e d t o ^• e r {-, >wer t o B a z ^ ' - q a n , and d e c i a - ^ e 
t h e army n e u t r a l bv ' ng -»i 5 K-SO t r o o o ? hac^ t o •-^-e' ' • 
bar rack s . 
Sociological Cause 
James. Davies tr t*-ift* errrofnic development 
increases expectation' -10 a + i rc>>'e»-sa] aeneratee relati^'t^ 
deprivation and un-fM ' 'd e-'-pectations . »• evol iitions a'-e 
lively to occiir wh- ^ ne'-iod o"? Drolonqed econcni ~ 
development is follow&ri .,. ^  period of Sharp reversal". 
Theda S^ocpol "-•-'• • --"^  th^t it as in the point B --> 
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intersection between < n ternation^ I conditions •end oKar^'surp--
and class-structured economies .^ nd oolitic^llv or-q^niicH 
interests that we .T><(-+ loot far the contradictions thje 
helped launch Social ? "yvolu ttons". [t can be hvpothesited 
that revolutionary pof»' »ial is hiqH when the coincidence vf 
economic reversal aftc a oeriod of e>pansion with a period 
of liberalization of the oolitv after a lona years of 
repression creates ^ -ift be tweer the state and powef-*"' 1 
classes. In Iran, •^'"' economic reversal of 197S-] P--^  
following the boom or • '*6'^ -^ 5 Generated acrimonv aqams*- *•*->«= 
state in the urban I speculators, the b'Sz-^-^r- m^rrh^r^ *-c. 
and shopteepers, ^nd i'^  lus •-»-'-^  I i s f'q . The I iher^ L iza f ion <-
the polity and Amerir^ - hijm^n '-ights oolic-. perceive^ 
Iranians as the wt^ '^ n inp n^ tHe suppc^t 1 inl hpfwo^n 
Washington and the Sha^-, gave the opposition a new lease o'-
life and a psvcholoq i <_-• 1 boost to mobiIi::e the population 
against the regime. 
The Iranian stat«- • ^ a rentie'- one, which on a reaniar 
basis received subst «ri+•• -^  1 a'^ -oMttts '-•f e^fterna] rent. It ' r-^ 
vulnerable to indic*?-!^  j' and excopnotis vE^sure^ on i^ e 
levels,each of wbirt- ontribiited to the «=>nerQence c* a 
revolutionarv situatiin n the late l'^~'<.'s . 
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F i r s t , t h e E - t t ^ t f " J ^ " v t i ! r < « ^ r a b J P» t o -f I L i c t i i e t i o n s m *^-c? 
p r i c e o-f o i l i n a r i + ^ ' o s t t i o - a i ^il m a r l ' F t , I r a n 5 c i i 
a d d i c t e d e c o n o m v t ht r r t ^ o ^  p o - 1 ' " ' c d L^r•^pro(^l c t a b l e c • '^  <=^  
0-f e x p a n s i o n und 1 * F « < t i ' " i t c - +hp ^ c l e 1 ^ •^ l^ c^ 
5evp>n t l e t . , 
S e c o n d , b e c a u s e I ' ' & t a t « ^ <^r m-ed a T - C I O D O I •• o v e r t *T=> 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o^ f t «"'£ ] w e a ' t h . a l ] Dronp '= . t o -'/ar i r q 
d e a r e e s . became depen ' - n t -*c'r t ^ i f ^ i r c c p e r i t v on tt-t^ 
s t a t e s fDaqnanimi t V, ^ ' n t i r ' ' " f j " - ' ^ o t e n t i a l i s hlQ*^ d t i r i n q 
an econojT' ic c o n t r ^ . t : ; l i J - e < ^ a t r-f t h e j 9"^=!-J 9"7tv p^r 1 r>f^  
when t h e s t a t e 5 o j ] r^ ,-r' i.pc '^sc lanced subs^ 'an 11 a } 2 " . 
T h i r d , a c c e s s t o ' ' A E ' - I e 03 } f e'-'eni.ies p ) a m i n a * e d * ' 
p r o b l e m o'f c a p i t a l sf-^t }i , ^t ccfrimon i n +he T h i r d Wn>-!r . 
and a l l o w e d t h e s t a t e "" • rrf.^^^^e f ^ ' t moH t mode rn m a c h i i 
f r o m t h e W e s t e r n n a t i ' 1 h i ^  r r''^  • > a b u t e d t-^ ^ t h e e^-pa""" 
oi t h e modern sf>c*ri> tf ti"t= f: ^  ^ rt^tf^s I and a c c e l e r a t e ' " ' 
t e c h n o l o Q i c a l dual iEsr . . id pa-^  ed t*^e wav ior t h e - f u r t h e -
d e c l i n e o^ t h e t r a d i t i o n \ i l a ' s e s . m c K i d i n o t h e b a z a a r i s . 
w h i c h e - ' t p e r i e n c e d " d c t "J^ I d mobi ) : * . • ' " . T HO t r a d i 11 onfii ] 
c l a s s e s became an i m p - - ' • pa» ' o-* t h e 5 * r 100 l e H o a i n = t + HC^  
r e q i m e i n t h e seventi<=>=-
r r 
1 c 1 ^ r 
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Fourth, the if'.j'-' independent oi social classes • *^ o 
state became •for thr- r ^  -orataor: oi revenue, as it had i^' t^ e^ 
seventies, the more 'escotjc it became. This m t^i'-n 
diminished its rec • r ::ity witf the civil society and 
increased the chanter *or x'Ho devel oc'«T(ent o'' a coss-
cutting, mu] tic lass orrcsition aoamst the state. 
Fi-fth, the statp. syirrsbD} i red by the Shah, v»a? 
politically dependent on the United States, The -f oisndat i o^ ' 
of this dependent relationship was- laid in the aftermath cf 
the J*'53 coup agains*. PruTie f*iinis.ter Mohammad Mossadeah. 
This dependent relatiot »as deepened and strenghtened m the 
sixties and seventies., 'he prcmi.i] qation o"* 1 he human riahts 
policy in 1977 and 'I'e inronsistent and contradi c tr"-
policy of the Carter a-^minist'^atior vlea^ened this deoenden + 
relation, made the f'^'^hs oppc-Eition bellioerant. and 
confused him and un<if>'i-ined his. ability to deal vJith the 
burgeoning movement c-* •?77-J97'?, 
The State s re'Bti'-'e aistonom-/ exacerbated t ^-e 
monarchy's traditional' •'f-'spot ism. Under Mohammad f^ 'era Shah, 
the state acguired ma''''-' attributes of modernity, but it 
remained traditional jr jts. modus orerandi . The Shah was the 
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l aw and a b o v e t h e l ^ v - ^s he had c r e a t e d a s v s t e m t h a t we'^ 
a c c o u n t a b l e o n l y t o ?-= TS . When i n t h e f i n a l d a ^ s o f h i s i ^e ign 
he e v ; h i b i t e d s i a n s c'^ a n d e c i s i v e n e s s . t h e e n t i r e c;v^^c="^ 
c o l l a p s e d . I n m^n) .— 5 . ths? I s l a m i c ' ^ e v o l u t i o n o f i " ^ ? 
p r o v e d t h a t t h e r e i s ' " d e e d ^ I n n i t t o t h e s c a t ' s r-o i a 11 ^ . ° 
a u t o n o m y , 
The - fo l l o w i n q f a c t o r s p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n + ^.P 
m a k i n g o'f t h e I s l a m i c P e v o l u t i o n , 
F i r s t , t h e i n g e n u j ' •• r*"* t h e o r p o = i t i o r < " fo rces t o ic-o^ 
B b r o a d - b a s e d c o a l i t i o n t h ^ t wa^^ a b l e t o c u t a c r o E s f-^e 
• f r a q m e n t e d q r o i t p s and n i n t e t h p m , "^e-'ol t.<t 1 c-^E . as Dberc ([^ Hr-• 1 
a r g u e s . r e q u i r e t h e pa ' - t i c i p a t lor - o-f ^ .p^.^ra] o ro i jp ' ^ . 
" i n c l u d i n q t h o s e t h a * a^p n o t a*T*ontj the ' mo? t dok-irit rric^de""' ?•-""' 
u n d e r p r i v i l e q e d " , 
S e c o n d , 5 h i i s f i ?•• a r e v o l i s t iona* - . • i d e o l o o y j i uE t i -# i f c " i 
t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n c ^ t?te P a h l a v i s . u n i t e d t h e s e d i v e r g e 
g r o u p s . and p ro f r i i sed -- p r j o h * f u t i i ' - e t o t -^-e p e o p l e ' • l o c e 
w r i t e s : 
" S i n c e t h e tiiTse e"* t h^ - <^pr'? t l e s , and p e r h a p s 
e a r l i e r , no s o c i a l 'Tiri'*e«ne-n+ has been w i t h o t s t i t e 
ar<ny 0"^  p r e a c h e r s -ir^d w i l i t a n f tc* s p r e a d t h e good 
t i d i n q s o'f e s c a p e ^r r im t h e p a i r s and e . l i s o'f t h i ? 
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world..,. It is ^'w-s^s ^n ac tikis': minority thJi •: 
promotes and rfTt^ulaa tes new sfcanda'-ds of 
condemnation Thev are the travelling Salesmen 
of a new inevi i abi 11 tN*'"* . The (Jlema we^e the mair-, 
travelling sale'S'^ '-'n of f^ -an s I-slamLC f^ evo lij tion. 
The third factor was the '^ar^  tahtedness ^nd tenacit- nf 
the revolutionaries tn attract m te«^n^ tiona i suooort an.-f •--. 
win a brutish war of n^i-ves thev staged aaainst the Shah. 
The fourth eleme'-'^  w^s the faviu'-e of the Shah s '-^QKT.C^ 
to effectively use tht:i manv repressive tools i*- could h^ /c, 
eKploited to quell the -Toposi tion movement. 
30 . Milam. Mohs in , The t^al^  m g o* jt-^n s Ls Lai-n: •_ 
Revolution; From Mi.—-archy to Islamic Pgpublic (Bould^' , 
19881. PP.31-31. 
^5 
MAIN FEATURE AND DPTI'ERHINING FACTORS OF 
IKA'> R FORKTHN POLICY 
Jr ;»n c. ioi-eiari : >t , d i i r i r i q Mohd R e z a S h a h w a s t^^^^c 
T i a i n l y pri p r e s e r \ ' a t > . " <•'' =r,-'cr.re i rsn * •• sric* i'"•teci'" i t •>' c* '•^'" 
c o L i n t r v - f o l l o w e d f •• • -• -• t*-^  •~^ '= t . r.)Li'-i ^'c t t - .^s t i f ne ? ' ••" 
w a s h e a v i 3'•• i n d e ' b + p d ' « t'=T S t ? t e E of Arr-c-r •» c f ariri ^pr-*;- r 
E i i r o D c a n coi-.i '"tt ' ' ieE , ' •" *• ""i^ ' r i s c r - s s i s F i^F.*-! h a d t o D<~- •-^ 
e x i l e ^ o r s o m e t ime t ^ kpw o~? d e ? y ' O n s t r a t : s o n t . . s t r i d e ? a n d 
h e a v y c r i t i c i s m , ?1ajr"-• I c-i ooo^-il a t i on h a d t u r n e d a q a i n ^ ^ 
hiffi o n o i l i s s u e , r > e ? p i » c --eDe-Tted D l e a d r n q s h e d i d n o t o iv f r 
h i s c o n s e n t "fctr r i a t i " " ~ i i r a ^ i o r t o^ r>.i i i n d u s t r y a ? »•^ -
b e l i e v e d t h a t o i l i n d " - " -ta? * r i t a ' o r r.?n^-e^^t o n f - . r . : i ->-
e n q i n e e r s a n d t e c h n i c s • '-ri ' r^* : •-"• ^ •; -* '.•.^^ r:-;* OCH ' 3 "" -
t o r(.in t h e o i l i n d t i s - " - • ' ;^ hfi .*. •• " '^  r ; r r c ( i;. 7' Dei^ E o* '^ •'^  ' 
T h i s a n t a q o n i r e d Tsa>f • f? t ' - v " ^- ' ' i-•!" '• w*^\7''i c ' ' e a t e d "^cm.-
s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e 1 •" ''. hp w^'c -*•:(•-i^pji- * ri o o i n *=• •< i ' e . 
I f r . m e d i a t e l V a - f t e r f - \c>fa? 1 7 a t acs '^- r-* o i l i n d - j E t -
E u r o p e a n b o y c o t t e d t*'*^ " ' " ' t '-••* o i ? a n d 3 >"• t h e a b s e n c e c"' 
o i l e w p o r t s , I r a n h a d ' ' ^•*---' ir. t ' ^ e A m e ' ^ i c a w i t h t h e "^f?' <" 
Q-f CIA m a d e a t t e r i s p t a n p • r - p e d e t i i^ "- s e e ^ ^ i n Q t h e c o o o e r a t - i r -
o^ f c l e r g y a n d Q o t t '^'e ? - - ' r e i r t E t f. J s e d . T h e r e i n s t a ? 1 a t : T'-
O-^  t h e S h a h o p e n e d a ' - P ' »-i,rtDt «:=''' 3'^ t h e h i c + r . r y O"? I r f m ' 
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r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U S , S'Hah h e m n ^n E u r o o e a i ^ '='duc-^<"ed ^n-i 
h a v i n a b e e n t n f luen-^o'-* . ^ *-h4-:i u/o^^'-^.•-n aduc -3 t i c ^ , s c L e o 11 * i '-
a n d t e c h n o l o a i c a l -»<•* laraot^snf- ->*• P u r n o e , o l e d a e d •"'-> 
m o d e r n i z e I r a n a n d *- i s ' ' r •-^ ^ ' m e " ^ i n d u s t r i A 1 i - e - i 
n a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d . ' i o ' - ' i i ' s o ' ' '•»=" •godo'i*- ^ h a r^rjQpor^^ T 
o f U n i t e d S t a t e s o f »i-nv--- i i -^ ps j T ^ h e ' c I-M-- t i i j P U - -^^r- . 
c o u n t r i e s t o c a r r . _ * *"< i - p i -< ' - , — ! i ' l e n n m h e -
s c i e n t i s t s . e n q i n e e ' " s ^ ' •Ji3'~r-<s'''= we'"=f n j "-pid t-o bi 11 ' "^  
a modef^n i n d u s t r i a l oow--- , TH^-. w e r e d< r c o r d e d sr-t=>'-i -
t r e a t m e n t , e r t r a b e n v i t » ? a n ^ ^ i : 3th<=>f- • - ^ c i l i t i e s . ''^'=' 
i n d i o ^ n u u s wor^ f t-vr r f ^nd "•>-»«>•'^ o • t h e •=; imo f i e l d s wn--i= 
ei ther deor 1 -zed of *"' " • i l l l i ' " l < = > 3 ^ n H i nH-m ! n l ^ l e s o r ^ ^ l 3 
w e r e l e s s o a i d . I ' l O' d ' fc< ^ a o e a s e *->~i<s \ >•-• f-orj 5t-^t:(=- - - • ( 
A m e r i c a , [ r a n qf-^r*-- - - ^n\ " o n t - e "^^  l o " - t o Cn-nefic-^ jr-^' 
s u p p l i e d o i l n o t T^ * >-; .:»<Tieri-^ bu*" i*"- A l l i e = •'~'~ 
S Q S C l a l l v [ s r a e i . f ' I ' M A - - ^ ^^--fierJ j _ j , - e s ' i ' t C'f 
e > ' D o r t w e r e r e c v c l e c ? f ••'"' "" i =; i n *->-\^ cih^r^o T* rv^^^m^r* •• * -
l a r q e n u m b e r o t we« i i -norf- ted b ^ If ^r - . S l o w l \ ^rr-i 
q r a d u a I 1 y o e o p l e *"e-?' "-^j h.-t.j [ r i f i a r ^ i.nasif-'-. w e ^ "^^si*^ 
evDlo i ted by AiTte ' l A ' ' t b e , ^/ i t i r-K-hai-J - n ^ c : ; -
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . As t h e < •^'' >- - c3=e^'*'^e" •• ^t--' dei"n3ns t r ^ *-i. ^ -
a g a i n s t t h e S h a h s *"eDoeo ' r i r i c ^ r 5h^f- 5 rn i i i .» -^f -v , p - - i ' 
a n d i n t e l l i q e n c e i«^.:;? • • f L,J^-|^ :^inp>.^  ^r-.-i i'=ed ~ *•' ^'-•ir-'r-
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measures to stamo o''*" '"e de'^ons t •---»•: ions and aai tat ions e*-^. 
As the Qooosition i'- •>5^d, t^e (BVRS^I <= measuf^es -^  1S'"! 
increased and this ''•^' ' «-«^d j o to •he oustp'" ->'- elimination 
of the Shah and instil i'^i,jn -it- ^  oew sv = ^ em -2* oovei^nmon •-, 
"^ he Shah duf ino t^'- '•'• J c-d -hf-<:^ «»(ij! v de/i ne1 the *o"~<=' m 
Dolicv thouah it was '-"TS- J I* 'ncljned •-oi"'-'''ds Arne'-i'_--
strong European natio ' • " t f^ th?? same tiirie was di^'ect'^" *' ^ 
maintain qoad re la t in*" H - 5 th f-^-^  i-oi'n *-r 1 es Z'^f taste*"n n 1 -. , 
The'-e was, no doubt, 
powerful European 
maintain aood rela^! 
"••A , \ ' " l i t t"ot-'a'"ds "^""erica and •n'-i-cr-
• ' '" les hut ^^c3 wa ? =h"- ewd enouon ^ ~-
: fh IJT'3P ^nd oth<2r- c o u n t r i e s . 
• A f t e r the e s t a b ! - " ' c^ Is laT. ic PeD"h l i c of [f-an -<-
1st A p r i l 1979, a c l e ^ - - ..-.QP 15 d i ' = c e r n i h i e m the fr-.p-<=ior 
p o l i c y o f I r a n . Be^c - " j - 'nq I ' - t r ^^e d e t a i l o f for-t=!T-
p o l i c v o f It^an, i t • - H'»perativ>^ >~,~) l oo ' i n t o • H^-> 
c o n s t i t u t i o n o f f'"ar *'in-<inQ ou t t-h^^ cons 11 tu ^ i'n^ -^ -^  
bas is o • • the *^ o^  e i - o o l i c v . 5^3 e i c l ' i n e d irv f^ '-^  
c o n s t i t u t i o n of I s l am ' - " ' " i b l s r of I r a n , the government - ^ 
I r an i s I s l a m i c Pepub l i . fr^  th^:. f i ' - s t P r m c i o l e o'- Ar-»-i -1 
of the c o n s t i t u t i o n thra 'Tinceot o f f s l a m i r Repub l i c h^s '"^ ee-^  
e v p l a i n e d as unders tn'~''" i% Sheism. The aovernment o ^^  [--,= -
I'Br 
c la ims that- the SO'/B<-• < ,-' j^ T6<i"NViho IS thi=» 1 aw 
t: ) ^"^Ti^ 
<^^V 
'^i'T.r 
V^^^tiMUNlVt-^-
giver and law-mater. '?•-- -.^  la(«»5 are to be mteroreted on I 
by the uiema. I" •z^'S^ \*' J:he.*-»3 is Daucttv of a clear cut 
divine guidance in an.v -itj-oec*: '^*?w L jw can be formulated bu •• 
these laws require cl<^ '^- •>Doroval of the ulema before the 
implementation. The Cou' : 1 of Guardian sm-i -.'i lava t-e-Parj' f-
stands above the Islt»'~j •_ ''eutltc ^^ f [r^n. The concent c ^" 
Vi laya t-e-Faqih is ? -*-i ? conceot ^f IslaiTiic politv. T^-r 
ruling Vi laya t-e-Faa-I'l .-•-•ov's arbitrarv Doi'»ers even t^e 
popular sovereign t''- e'"".' -• * i"- t^i -'ariiarne^t is s'jbiec*" *• "^  
the approval of Vila-"-' - •' so s ^ '.'''hi 3 limits the powers 'T" 
the Parliament (HajLj-: • * ;?r.T»j [ a t^? i aws . Hance Vilayat-e-
Faqih and the Co^mci ' * Gi^ a'"di-^ f^ s 00 th'-ouoh sno 11 ^ p* 
approval to or te7t=- the cc'-^ oa tib 11 1'"v of OS/P'^ • 
legislations on Islamic '-^ -'incio le . THP Vi laya t-e-Fao i^ . a 1'^c 
enjoys wide discretion m m te'^ ore*" a t ion and aoo I icabi I • '-
of Islamic sources. This curtailment of Parliament's onwo- -, 
has come into disola'v ""• ' *^-e shape o* disapproval of 1 A^T' 
reform and na tiona 11 T ^i' 7"> of foreian trade which worr--
adjudged incompatible <.-j*^*- ••'^e fslainic safequ-^rds of privAfe-
property 
Khomeini stood tnt- , njst world' order and to him on I •• 
the Islamic MorJd orHi- ,:<i f-xna about justice, And iu?t 
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Islamic world orde"" -wi'd have been es^abIl'5hed throuah <^i.r->^  
a faqih-led Islamir f > ibiic -^  = f v ) e of [r-^n, ^^ seems • h^ »-
the concept of the 'i r av a»--e~P ^ nih < le'»der"shto of ^ f^e 
jurisprudent) was •"^"-^  ou tqr •-)(.;»-?^  o<^  "home in i s Doli'-ic^i 
thouqht. As per old *"- adi •" I'-'r, '_K=I ! e-^de-sbto o* •'he '^'--o-
cofufnun 1 tv belonos to G*""!, to f ^ e^ r'oobet Moh^mm^d CPBt-*' '^—i 
••o the infallible l^^^m'S fMasu'Tini, but the cred i *• f" * 
evtendina it to the <'-»Q!'^ , «"Q whom belonoi f«=mnor^l AS i-i«^  ' i 
as spiritual authorit- oes tc Aya'-ollah ''hnmeirxi, fi lo ^^d 
again I'homeini eflio'^'-»« • red that [^ lain stands for brin^jna 
about justice to the •-'-»'-t<^e world. He reiterrjfed "fslam i •=; 
not new one to a C T '^  '--v, several countries, a qf-ojc "* 
people or countries "r eve'- the f^uslnTis". He •'ur^Hrr 
elaborated "Islam wi'^ i^ ir «•-> b'inrj ^11 of hum^n i i-v ur^ de'" ^f-<c^ 
umbrella of its jus^i -
An Islamic statt . I^B'- "• •'^ ct be cionside-'ed a st?*!^ 
that commands the ove-c w^el marn le.-altv o^ i*s people ^s -i--
Islamic state, Iran fi, -ir.^  ar islan'i^ c + ^  + r -^ Qn-'mands *:'">«^  
overwhelminq lo^ -alt ''-* i*z T'eode, 'hp Qovernmerit 
1. Ramazani . R.i".. "i^^-. c Export of Revolution: I + ?: 
Politics, End Br<•' Mean?: . Journal p-f 5outh Asia __ar^  
Middle Eastern Studies, ^'-!.3 7.. No. J f. 2 (Fal 1/Wan<-€-
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established in [ran h-s-s the overwhelmina endor3eT>en •: c * 
Ummah in Iran as an Isl^-^tc st-^te. fh^ othof" ore-conrj i t iorr? 
for the Islamic state '. whether the state has Dositivolv 
and consciously set "«'. to he an instrument of Allah as 
eKDressed in the Ourar •" ^ri in f-he Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad 
(P.B-H.). Under the I -'iershi.o of the imam the state anr! 
its authority set -" •'' posjtivefv and consciouslv *:n 
establish Islam accord'•^'O the Our-^n ^nd Sunnah. The thj- i 
condition is whether or not the state evolJ-citly. botH *: ' 
word and deed see*'s to establis^^ Islam within 3 ts 
boundaries. Iran no doubt see^s to do so. Fourthly. whethe'-
a state is concern with all Muslims irresoective of 
geography and divisions alorg political, ethnic, sectarian 
class and boundaries that Have been created within the ijmmaf-< 
during the recent hist.-' /, Reoarding this one feels "ihat 
there can be no dc i*"? " that if we mal'.e the correct 
distinction betweer< foreign polio and foreign relations. 
Iran has the long t-arcr. • ^-ention of unify t.na the ijmmah ijnde^ 
the authority of Allan Fifth, whether state embodies -9 
clear vision of contennp' r^y world situation i rr-esoec t i vo of 
short term considerations. In this rontevt there is no doub*^ 
that the leadership of [mam clearly manifested that the 
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state of Iran at th.3it (" ime and thereafter- ha-5 a clear world 
view on this issue, '.-:-tlv whether state arouses fierce 
hostility among the tr-'"^ i tiona I enemv of [-^ lam I'lncludif^ c 
the Muslim nation st-^ f^?.5', In *:hLT content we find tha*- •^•"? 
whole world, includino 'he so ca i led world of Islam. n.i i "d 
over by nationalist ^^ecjiar leaders, is so fiercely hostile 
to state of Islam that '-<^ ch hastilitv has not been labelled 
throuahout historv .^o-^ 'nst any Qt^ e^?" sinrjle state. The 
entire secular in te'-"^ '•'• •.'»a I system by and large is ooDosed 
to the Islamic state. 
During Shah's renime, jsan was bracketed with t'^ e 
Western camp along with rther Arab 6u]f 5tates, Any dispi^ ite 
among these states. ••'••/<" rc«r«s jdere*- a matter vjithin the 
family. However, Mohd, '' za Sh^h s downfaJ] brought about a 
change in the situatir"'. *-!ad Iranian revol tit lonarj es. bee'"' 
confined to the O'.-e'"'^' • .'swi no o"* t^ >e ?ha*"i. America could 
have pt-it up with t- e si*'-taticn, but the Iraniar-
revolutionaries v^ ent f - -'ond that. In thoir endeavours of 
revolution they includnc' the prcigramme of e 1 iTiinating all 
American influence frc- their society and gewe calls fo*-
Islamic self-reliance ar-(.-« =el f-suf f i ciencv in the re-oion. 
The United States heino • hr dominant power jn the area tops^  
ey.ceotions, to it. It beca^ne clear after some time that there 
was inherent conflict of interests between Washington ^nd 
Tehran and each tried to g a m at the exoense of other, Thi'-
brought the suoerpowe'- and a rismg regional power loci'ed 
into a conflict. Washmgtion too* r-evo 1 u tionarv Islair. -; 
growing danger and ailaged [--an off Durs'jing e>-Dans ion j s t 
policies under the guise of Islam. W^shinotion found itself 
in a fi>; how to taci '• e this thr-eat to its militarv ^n<-j 
economic interest m the reo LcrT. It v^ as a m^jor dileTi-^  
before the U.S. Thoaah t^arlier United States had been on t*-ie 
side of religion and '"e'tgious movements. U.S. considered it 
to be a powerful tool acamst Marxist forces. In the case o* 
Iran though it was a religious movement but directed aaamst 
the U.S. with armourv and ammunition. Thouah the Iranian 
religious movement was not a leftist m disouise as it w^s 
opposing Marxists at home and the Soviet Union abroad b<l^  
the U.S. government, discredited it as a leftis*- in 
disguise. While looli-^o into the factors detef-mimno t-^ e 
foreign policy of Iran - m c e revolution three factors apoea^ 
to have had an importar-. • bearinq. 
Pan-Isla<wism-In this -esoect Pan-ls lamism has oreatl^ 
influenced the foreian onlicv jn if--»n beino an Islamic state 
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rather than a state motivated by pa tri.otis<T\. nationalism or-
secularism motives. Thea^ elements assumed seconda^v 
importance in Iran. fiftH^- the proclamation o*" [sla'T>ic 
Republic and the outbreak rtf ^i^r- with [raq, m September 
1980, Iranian leaders maae no secret o^ it and ciea-!-^ 
depicted the conflict as between Islam and blasphemv. '^ ho 
west tried to give it a colour of a conflict between Ar^hs 
and non-Arabs. Shia and Sunni, However, the I'-anian le^^^r^; 
adopted a unified apofcach and President •i^amenei obser--ed . 
"If e>;pressions of nationalism are intended, to 
create bsrrL^r-B between (iuslims. cause separations 
among them and threaten their fraternity, then 
this is 100 percent forbidden. There ar^ no Arabs 2 
and non-Arabs in Islam" . 
It was apparent that [ran s claim to such a role •^'-•a 
its self assumed e>:clu = !ve right to judae tht? crerjentials o ^  
its neighbours alarmed the netghbouring state m the Gu I <^  . 
It created strains between Iran anH the Gulf States. It was 
also a reflection on the heads of the aovernment of G'llf 
States. Iran also nought to undermine the leade'^ '= 
politically for not being hostile towards Israel and bei-^ a 
over dependant on the Un p ted States. Throuphout 1979-8'"> o-^h 
2. Shahram Chubin anH '"'-<3ries Triop, Iran and Iraq at-U)a-
(London, 1988 ) .P . 1':"-. 
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countries felt thre^ tinned and it reused m'j'-^^ concern m^rT-irj 
the Gulf States. Sau-ii '^^ rabia. thoua^*, H^s AIW^VS emnh^cireii 
its religious credert ^  i ^ !-g as ^n inteq'-ai aspect o* it's 
dynasty's legitimacy b'jf it also felt gresti" thr-ea tened. On 
the countrary Gulf -''.ata^  too* Iran not as an Islarriic Ir-^n 
and its people as Persians and traditional rivals a* the 
Arabs. Iraa also tool 11 as a sort a* revo lu tionarv thr-^^^ 
to the Arab World and Arab na tiona! ts<T» as a doctrine. 
Anti—Omoricanism-Tide was con^^-tbuted not nnlv by the ma-^ cid-, 
but the leaders were also no less Qntsno^e'^ m thi'^  recja'-r-i 
and the Iranian leaders souoht to caoitalise or-< -r,f.-
American sentiments, Hashemi-Pa+sanj an i attributed '-'~^'= 
American involvement ir- the fr^ n-lf-aiQ ^^^r- witH a now c^aotp--
in the heroic eotc of t'-e ^-evolution. 
Hashemi-Paf sanjani obs«=>' -ed : 
"If we had won the wai^  last ve3»-, ps-ervone would 
have said that a !?•> million strona countrv was 
victorious over a 14 million strono countrv. But 
if we win this year, evervone will I'ngw that we 
3 are victorious over the United states' 
It was in earl' October L989 that h^it a milli-i-i 
Ibid., P.218. 
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volunteers were ceoaf "d tn 1-3^. far .-n-^ rtvrdom-^ e«?i ' " z 
opera t tons to resist f-'^ Untts°d Sf--i';es LH the Gulf. An •• i 
American feeling was c^ i ^ s hiQt-est oitch Q*"" N O V . a. 1'^RP or 
the occasion of the anr-iver-sa-"'- of the seinnre at the U.5. 
embassy. There were mi--'ve a*^ ' "-''.'i, demon 5 t'"a t ions r^r-r) i-t^p 
size and vigour o*^  the de«Tion'5 t-^ a tions were unoreceden teH 
which were never -^ e-i"' befcjire. An ti-American feelmn 
continued to be a use*--;' tool m the hands n'' the Irani-^r 
reulers. 
Rafsanjani further rejtprated; 
"So long as we t-fre arr^ -.-ec? aqainc* Irac and 
other's li) e her DVC rsation die* not feel the need 
"fc" secrifice t^ c- m^ ict-, Esnce * he da--* the 
Americans came the peoiile- a'"e brjnoino so mtich 
pressure-preBS\.ire •'•hat fss- -•nus t expand the wa''-
mobjlaze forces «! use a3 3 otir capabjlities -for 
the war, [Thiisl '^e «»aniaqed to strenothen the 
bac^ ina for the ^--i 
Leadgrship oi Ayatollnh Khomeina-A^ »er the proclamation -if 
Islamic Republic of Ir?-!, ".'atoljaf- ^hoTiemi occupied the 
:.iosition of a /ice • jent . the '/i ] avat-e-f^aai h. Thi? 
entitled him of taking -"-itice: derisions ir the couritr . 
Khomeini made firm d«^*r 15: i cr^ s sis::*"' f^"^  *o *-eer the Mme*'1 <" T^  
Ibid.. P.2J9. 
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diplomats hostage c^ i<^ >'stst tr* 3 di5vastating war- witH rr^Q. 
His deci"5ion was f~ jHsolu^e birtdina on his Qov(5r-nmen»-
regardless of an» cf-^ n reservations anv affici-^ls we^ -e 
holding. (<hQmeinL ?! >-'~ suooc'-ted the decisions made bs *-iis 
governments. *• hom^ 5" • '::'id ->Q* J* I LQK an^ , individ'J-^l or-
f action to g a m o^  -  «=-ninence within his gover'niT,p>-i t. 
Moreover, he mter"''-"^ " in *^ >^va<jir of lead^^'-s, factions whti 
were loyal to the ''n,:<in«^  and s-iihc- aooeared to be loos m a ("he 
control m the regime. Mis uncjrerfafedness to e^'ercise c 1 C3e 
direction of a DOII'" "' to oer«ntt any of hig 1 leu te'^ an ts, 
to evercise that dire"'i-jn *•: r ^im was considered to be f^" 
important conseauenr<- jn terms o'' facfional develoDmon^, 
However. ('"homeini '•self advo'-ated fhe freedom if 
expression and thi , < »-s f-«' f-e'"-^ fed fc' ^^ is desionate'^ 
successor Avatollah '^•' >-taref 1, r^ef e -Tii^ ose 3 Doin>_ r-^^ 
difference over the qiji^* - tion relatjno to raauisite rr-i 11 •i^ r.'--
regarding ideologica' «- Tstanic Df-Dose. Thor-e was De--*ert 
agreement on the e^ 'po? •• '* revolution, however, on the ooinf 
of whether force shoi;! '^ 'jsed to e^'oort -evolution o'- '^  ^  •-
had difference of Qr"i~Jon, [^  f^is resoect there wpr o 
difference m receo^ t'/1 i'*' in .'^.^uest^ n.f non-[r ^jn 1 an 
leaders, for material, •-'} o! oma * i c. even clandestine '»llL^ ^^ '-' 
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support to advance re-vol ut i"""": e-lspwhere. In the -field of 
foreign pcOicv strateo , Use*- o-< central direction wa? 
evident, Poreiqn o"? "f i ca aJ s, individual afithassado^c and 
others "<e]t "^ ree on m^ n,.- occesioHE to act jn the name o'^  
Iran, Thev sometime oei^'erated ir«'--.ti tutlonal support *€••' 
their endeavoLirs r L'nc'f?'" these t: i r cumstant.eE there wa? 
uncertamtv in respect •'-"* Iran s actual policv, "^ he position 
oi AyatolJah Khomeini is clear].- discernible from f-e 
COn"f 1 rfnat ion hearinqs ^C!r nontineS'E 'fo'' c a b i n e t . The: 
selection of nominees ?fot!ld h^ .-e '-«€*d the tacit approvai o-* 
Ayatollah ^homemi. ti^ f^ uQh in some cases there was sl~z 
rejection of the aove'-f-'-ient nominees despite the •'act th^f 
l^homeini himself had app'oved of it. This was. most anomalous 
feature of this authf'» itarian reoime, ^hcimeini did not 
premit a faction to trlismph. This IE evident from sever .::(1 
statements of Khctmemi oiven in E'e'ember i^ ti"^  and Jantia-• 
1988. These statement'-- ''?vealcd that he vtas mo^/mc in tnp 
direction of tho^e who '^ •.ood -*»"•- ^ strono aovernmental roie 
in social reform ,T'd preater epLialit ^  in inco<Ti<= 
distribution. An important institutic«n 111-e the Council of 
Guardians was dominate'"' bv conse-r vati ve-E . It. therefore, 
rejected many reformist Pleasures, Thovsoh it was rebt-ii^ ed ?*rM:i 
its veto position was r^  3 • o qreritl.' damaged. Khomeini did r,ot 
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only rebul'.e it but also criticised the Df"esjder>t of [sl-^ i-"'.^  
Republic Ali Jch^ tr-ione t . Oesoite af ^ M these thinos. 
Khomeini's towerinq o'.--=ition co«nmanded infallible wisdom 
among all his lieutenjits. His command was final. Durina 
Iran-Iraq war Iranian F"estd"nt All Khamenei in 1''86 warned 
Kuwait by addressinq it ^s ""cnj*- frion^j" not to allow [raa to 
use Bubiyan island to-- mlitarv pijrposes and threateooH to 
invade it in case of "-on-comn l lance. Tho-jah Ir^n did not 
invade and continued / ts endeavQu-'s to imorove reiatJcr^ 
with Kuwait. It wa'T f^  IS'S* that areate'" coherence i^ 
foreign affairs could o^ develnoed m Ir-^n. rhe hijacV inq o^ 
an Air France jet tn Tehran m Auaust L'^ B* trigqered a 
bitter int€?rnal debate ^ver ho^si to '^eact. Decision was ta^ ef-' 
against the hijackers, ^'homeint however, denied anv Iranian 
involvement in the inci»!%-~st. Up further criticised the stat*-" 
radio for suggesting th^ ^  £f-^ n Dlan^ed mines ir\ the Ped 5ea . 
In 1984 Khomeini too* an imoorf^ant decision regardma 
foreign relations whe"*"^  he ended the debate bv aDD'"Qvinc! 
diplomatic relations i-'i^-n South At-rica and United Stat"^ 
etc. with the e>;ceQtinif* •><" Is'-ael. Vhomeini advocated *.^° 
independence above a I ?. a'^ d comolete end of ^n •/ deoendence c^ 
the United States. In " i--. view a cure Isla'T-- will protect the 
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country .and Iran « ' >• •ieoendence will ^ eeo Islam DU'-e. Ma 
reiterated the e 1 1'T» f - - - ?on o* foreign debt'5 and souQ'~it to 
seel' economic self-'^' ' ticiencv. '^ollowma his line P'-ima 
Minister Mussavi m A-j-, l'?86 said that [r-^n will not borr-ow 
and fall into the "-=»' S's" o* deoendence. Iranian n-ler-s 
wanted Iran to be • - oected as a model and be able "-o 
exercise great influx- = i" ^he reqion. However-, tbe ''if^ t 
priority was politica' ^nd economir mdeoendence a*" ho'T'*=* '"'"' 
be followed later bv '•'-e domlnl'^^^ abroad. In Februa^v ! ^ '^ •^  
Khomeini emohasined f^'-^t the '^ecT^d orinciple is lotrin^jr 
to the first i.e. th<= '?omina'^ t feouiremer* t ts to saf eoua'^d 
the Islamic Reoublir . 
Role o-f clergy- The ^^ -^ r-t j i v??d cone 11 ttit i ona] aovernment 
established bv the* "-r- olytionarles m 1^0^ proved itsel-f 
politacally powerle^- r 1^'1'fi t^p militar,. reqime o-f Pera 
Khan. who rose to pi-.T- ^n i^ 'I'J, k^ian trftoE-formed into s^ 
absolute monarchy, D^^Jttal rationalist culture that 
emeraed then was urba"" '^ rt'-ec'. f*^aciaj]v tionol i noua 1 , anti 
clerical, cultivatmc *^ pre-! s ) a^ -^  c mltiiral hera + aqE a^ c^  
Western-oriented. 
Bv the mid-twent J p *'1 centur .- thp modp'^n c 1 as5 o'f la 
intellectuals had cci^ -e r" aoe. -^ at-inq -for qranted the so'-i?l 
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and cultural chancjiP^  heir coun ter-ojr-tg m the nineteenth 
and early twentieth i-^ t^urte's hnsd =o viQorouHlv fouah^ for, 
enjoying the fruit ot the =eeds clan ted bv the letter, 
secular nationalism, ihich .->3-5 still r^w and unoal^itable 
since as vet unfamiJi^r to the tradition bound-i 1 11'"er^ te 
masses, often thesp> nte! le-rtuals were better vef"sed jn 
modern scientific d;-^ ' ; ^  I i'>es and ideas th^ n^ m tradi •" iO'~ => I 
Islamic thought, fl-^ n- we^ -e lonoran t or ooorlr mfo-med ~if 
the abuse of clerics' p*3wef^  and -"eliaious tolerance th^t 
Iranian thinners m ore-modern times had to enco•Jn^e'^ 
periodica 1ly. 
The spiritual 3 !^ ^ ler, p.stoJlah ^home^ni, the EupreTiF 
leader was of coursF ^ ilerjc; cJericE control the chie^ 
offices of the state, "hic transfc-rmation of the Dolitical 
elite IS far more e-ftP'nsive than the tranc-formation that 
occurred when Reza Shah Pahlavi. the father of Mohd. ^^i.^ 
Shah Pahlavi's fathe^. -eized and consolidated power between 
l*?!?! and \^2h r The new nrliticsl anr* bureaucratic elite prc-
amona the major mate'j-^' bene ' i c ^  pr a es Q-« t •--e revolLitirr , 
and despite a oreat deal o^ tal' in Irn-i todav abo'it 
mvitina the e^files, i^-* I^B^-x^n U'=c c<"f the more acceptable 
men of talent and e^ 'c*^ ' •«" j >=e c-* the OIK^ '-eoiTie, it IE ^^p^r 
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t h a t w i t h o u t a n o t h e r <T.-^  <o-- u o h e a v a l t h i s c h a n a e in o o i t t i c J i l 
e l i t e s i s now pe^'nri^iiorv t -^nd, <^or t h e t i m e b e i n q , 
i r r e v e r s i b l e . 
W e s t e r n l a b e l s 1 i ' » "sr ior iera te" and " r a d i c a l s " mav n o t 
a d e q u a t e l y d e ' f i n e t e n d r ' - i e s w i t h i n t h e reoami? . b u t t h e y a-e^ 
n o t c o m p l e t e l y i r r e . l <? '?r>t , e i t h e r , '•loder a t e ? h a v e a m c e 
t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t r 1 2 o^ ^ c?-^  isla.Tt ar-d ef r jphas ize i t ? 
s a n c t i o n i n a oi p r i v a t e p r o n e ' - t v , ' hev ii^'-ovyr a l i m a t e r t 
QDvernment r p J e i n t h e ecDnom/ a r id , ' i n l i n e t h e r a d i c a l s , are 
w i l l i n g on o c c a s i o n t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h c e r t a i n s e c u l a r 
q r o u p s . 
In - f o r e i a n a-f-f a i r i . - - j i d e r a t e f a v o u r a more p r a p m a t i c and 
open a p p r o a c h t o t h e r " ' t E i d e woi^ld and a r e l e s s adaf^ant 
a b o u t e ' .<port inQ revo l s . 1 1 " •", They B^B more S L I S P I C I O H S Q"* t^e 
S o v i e t U n i o n , and t h e y f f t -our c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West 
n o t b e c a u s e o"* pro-WeFtr - • H y m p a t h i e s b u t m t h e c o n t e x t o^ 
a n o n - a l i g n e d " fo re ion no] i c y . In stim, t h e i r praQmatisn> 
• f o r t u i t o u s l y h a s a fji- - • viard c a ^ t . For e x a m p l e . F o r e i g n 
M i n i s t e r A l l A><ber V e l a a t i has <D-fte'-, s a i d t h a t li I r a n 15 
5 . S h a u l .Baf<hash, a^t^r t h e fru M War 1: I r a n 5 Home 
F r o n t . The World fodav Vol,-5^=. No, 7 ( M a r c h , i^P^?*, 
P . 4 6 . 
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n o t p r e s e n t on t h e c o - i d s c e n e , i m o o r t a n t i s s u e s w i l l ho 
d e c i d e d w i t h o u t i t . ''n r-Jnvembef l'?S> he •"hefefor-e Crs l ied fr>i-
I r a n t o h ^ v e d l o i o f ^ *-ic " - e l ^ t i o n s wi^H A I I coun t r i e ' - - . 
V e l a y a t i r e j e c t e d - e f o n n ^ e n d . * t i o ^ s bv a numbe"^ ot- s o - c a i l e d 
f r i e n d s t h a t t h e [ s ' * " f i c r e p u b l i c s h o u l d l o n o r e S o v i e t 
o c c u o a t i o n of A f q h a n i s •^ -^ n , 
The r a d i c a l s , b" " < t r a E t . E u n p o r t a more r e v o l u t l o n ^ r v 
i n t e r n r e t a t i o n o"f ^r i^ .r- , 3 n • 'o ' -ei '^ s-'iairs. t h e v - f a ^ c r 
e y p o r t 0"f r e v o l t i t i o r -r •" ha i/e ^ Tiiir'n (Tinre bpr l a n viei>i cf t h e 
S o v i e t Union t h a n c^ i *-' ' moder -a te r . The F r 2 me M i n i s t e r ^1i-
H t i s s e i n M o u s a v i . a»:i '- h •• a " I r a n i a n r ' ^ n o r t e r wh.- f he 
Q o v e r n m e n t i s l e s s ' . i r ^ h 10 i t s c i t i c i s T i o"f the> S o v i e t 
Union and t h e s o c i a t x "••-bloc c o i m t r i e E t h a f o"< t h e we'=t . 
r e p l i e d . "We d i d n o t =ii 'E*ain BE -nuc** damaoe -^ --om them ^c we 
s u s t a i n e d from t h e U . S . r t ^ e l^sst ^ t f t - ve'if-^" . 
T h e r a d i c a l s ^^'-^^^ S n v S lO"^ ^* ^ i f - ^ ^ T ^ ' 1 ^m i n J r - ^ n ' A" 
foreian oolicy even fH^-i o^, i^ the *^i~e c''^  n^r-^h fai-o"-!-i^^ 
realities. ((homein! >-1<-^ eLf seems '^ o f-j/oi' en.:^inc r^j^ -
international isQla*-ii '^ he f ^ d i -a I = -?'-'-^  c Jr•^ i<-u i-^ • 
6. Hunter. Shireen ' , Attf*' •'he AvatQliah i-Qro IQ' 
Policy, no.66 <Sc " - . l'-""'. -«.8"-Oi. 
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oaranoid about anv o>- = - ' bi I 1.1 ^  o *• ro--^ si izma u ,'u , - ir-^^i^r 
relat tons. 
The di "f "f erencp ' citlcoi bptwee^ mociera ten ,-^nH 
those of the econom . ' -5t:: r:: ' S E . ^ r.c^nn praic - -
the war with IrpQ, "'^ ^ J-^a'^e-et rr'jc c* i "*''•:•'en cps h; .- ^rc-
1 " t h e e C O r i O f ' - ' < W3 t *^  "*• ' ' " aC I C - ^ - r - ' A - c i ' ' - z \ + ' r ' - i _ ^ ' ' ' - ^ - * - > 
Ci"f " f o r e i Q n t r ^ c J e p n r * • - , .5^-»" t ^ ^ r * ^ -. t ' - ' ^ - ^ o n t ^r-.,-,+ ^ - i 
o"f t he p r i v a t e s e c t p - , ' f ' ^ a l ^ , *''•" »ir-"-c -* .-> j ^ ' . = i j r <;o= n -f > i i 
i r o e ^ " t i n o t h e i r -"^ - - ' - . ^ ^ ^ r - ' - ' r ^^ric: , .,r-,^ r i a r i a o e ' ^ *C" 
i n r r c ^ c ; ? ^ + h e r o l e O'^ ' " " * " "">mf='"-i •* • ^ " n • ' • " ' • I ' I E C ' ' ^ ' ^ C C p r s t l ^~ '"' 
DUt^l'^iO + Hem j r - c ' ~ ' f »T '~ t ^"'5 - i ^ C ' ~ - t i r r ""* ' ^ w T i f t t e r i ^ j c -^-^ 
t h o s e " f a c t o r i e E w h t i ' Ei; ' - i •'<=• ^ t h e poE-'*'- ""eve 1 LI'^ \ 
n a t i o n a l 1 z a t i o r i Droc" "^~"^p, ">•»-««= >-^ri« r j , i c »-^  t fi i 9 o bee^ '->-c 
m a i r " *orce beHinc* •" '» ^-^^QI-^-V-'T.C- - ^ •'c'"::' ' - t t \ c n i ' — • >(- ! -• -
beaa*^ a t t h e E + a ' ' t '" '^l^= GM •* y ' ^ ' , The '^ '" I '^e'^f i tes. ' j h i i i ^ 
b e m o nc ] a i s s e r - ' % cat i* ^1 ^ s* . a r e i " i avoiif" •" "^  
e n c o u r a q i n o t h e C''a •- sec ' Dr ar-c? D r o v i : i i n o ] o a r E +c 
p r i v a t e c o m p a r i i e E . T^c- mr-ide'"-+e" be'^ t s---lowr t c t h e wps * , 
R a ' f s a m a n i , i s i n -*-»' OLIRE i - -ac* ^ r a ] or» e c o n o m i c o o l i c . 
The fTicEt Eensi"^ ^- i~^ue waE t h e vtar w i t t " J r a o . 
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Publicly almost all t*-*= leader-s s'JOOo^ -t the war effort and 
scorn at the idea nf folding peace ta I *• s. Ye*- s^'-i'-^'*-^ 
differences exist betwe^jn the r-^dic^l and other- fai-tion, ^•= 
to the conditions •»^ "'5 which ^n lend to the wAf- wou 1-* hf= 
possible. The mode'-a*-'-- realise th^t the <naioritv o*^  ••ho 
DODulation IS waf'-vfe-:" and wo-jLd I j * e to see a sttle'•^en^: 
If thev can pull one ^*^, it would ce'-tai^lv be m ^helr 
interest; this would *'3''TX D3*-t of the unde'-s tand m o between 
themselves and the O'jh!''-. But the •"imtno and conditions fo'-
such a settlement ar-o 'ucial. Nei»:'-gf- the moderates n'j'- •^ ho 
radicals can contemoi ' "- ^ eoo*" i ^  *" I'-Q with Baddan* Hus'==ein. 
but the former mav b" oreoa'-ed tn tal* ^o a Ba a^hist 
government without S-- '-.i', [f-^ n 5 --^ vo lu 11 D""' IS m^rVed h, 
the need to justify it= 'deoloot ••o its own oeoole. fts s'lrh, 
the Iranian leaders ha r> to shjw t^at their Islamic ^vstein 
is the best form of ao»e'"nment and that it is universal I 
appltcable. 
For the radical?., 'his has- T«eant an active oolic- c^ 
exportma the revol Lit I'-f- , bv -financmo and even OirectinQ 
terrorist cqani = at 1 ot'^  -'hroad. Thoce oroaniE at ions are moc • 
active in Lebanon but thc^ / oDef-ate too in <^-f Qhanj stan and in 
Europe. Broadlv spea^ i'''*-» the mode'-ateE are in -favou>' o^^ -=1 
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less active Dolicy, p' -ferrmo ir^rt to fem^in es onlv jn 
example or insDi^a^?': ta '5Y«ina the ttc aroups outside t*T? 
country. They have wo'"''i^ d towards I'^Drovinq relations wit^ 
Europe. Visits by hiQh-ranI'inq Iranian o<^ficials to European 
capitals, as well •»•- *^ h« West German ^oreiqn ministe-^ B 
visit to Tehran, r,^^.- i^ e^en the djrect outcome of their 
policy. The moderati'' however, ar» beina '"e luct^^n t *-^  
extend such goodwill f- '"^ e US, aL^*^^uah last /ear the*^ ' we-'e 
obliqed to in the <-•->" of f-^<p a-'r.c deal with the U.D, 
Within the country, i" - the rjrjicals who •ifo most ciosel ' 
associated with Iran ^ -^  rjp-o'-urt=iton t oolicv. The decisior 
to buy arms from the ''-• •-"•"' not have been tai en without the 
approval of Ayatoll*^ :)meini. T}^,a moderates would h^vo 
been obliged to go ai'-n- with the oolicv, tnsnite o* ^hei-^ 
reservations. 
In an orchestrate,'.^ attempt embarrass the radica'-
involved. the moderate'' Br^ ?'-^ oed •'c D'" . ^'elavati, ''^•'^ 
•foreian minister B'^'- >Mm=e-]-f ? leactanq moderate. to be 
Questioned b*/ the "^ ^ i ' ;= on the lEsite o"* ev^ctl'-' who 
brouoht the arms and vi-. --^s mcst clrse] •' involved with t'""^  
Americans. But Ovatrni--* t-Hrtfrc-ini too^ *: *-e- LmDrecedentec* 
step O'f relievinp '' •'• -I'-eiT"' Tnin^Eter o-* hjs dLit •' t' 
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resDond. This action ' :e^"ence 3t t'le r-^dicals tHwe-^ ^^ ed ••'-? 
attempt to reveal the i • "onnectiDn wif^ t^e US. Whi.le ••'*><? 'Jr 
claimed to be open too s^ door- to '>c'^ e>"ate elements i" f^e 
government throuoh > "^  - DOIICV •->»- 9f-m-= =-^ le=;, i •^  w^ c-
inadvertan t ly reinforci-^a the DO-SI ^ lon of the more racjir^i 
forces. In any ca^ «- ' "s 1J s amed »t the release of US 
hostages m Lebanon ><>')ld havo H^d to he held with t-Ho 
radicals since it is ''• - . ^nd r>ot the mode"-? ^ es . who a'-e i-^  
charqe of such ooera' i ^' - . 
(•hameini & c3t + ~'' "•'' ""'ct r'€'"'Tii t •*• i'"'!? ^ "'action t^ 
triumph can he illiiEt'"' '-- t-•' 5e/p»"?'j oei:i E i c" E . in Pecen-iber 
I'-^By and Jannarv J*?S&', *'•r>Tie'J''ii '"ade sevpra! HtatementE th? + 
coLild reasonablv be •' *PT""etE"d :?<? f^ ovir-^  him in f ho 
direction of those w'-tr ciHiJeO "'c'" a Etronc cnvornment '-o'o 
in social reform '^id oreate-- enuali*'- in i'-,rc?>-"<^  
distribution. The : ~'-^ e^rvati ve noT-ioated CcunciJ D"* 
Guardians, which had "« ^ a + ed mar-v j^^ -fr-rmic* mea9ii'"es . '/•••aE 
rebuked and its vetri roistinn weakened. t'homeini al'^ c 
appeared to be cri + irs- "q th*' centrj = t prr-.c i dent o-* *• ho 
I si Sn^i C republic, Al> ' ^ ^m^n^ 1 . THg ^eSDCnr p , 3 !:n t i I " 
Danesh»<hu, Schphr- j^  ade. Th<^  '^ •^ acticr withm I'-a-" 
Leadershiip !lidH(r. fast 3 nte'-nat lonal ( ME I J (Octobsr 
10. i<?e7i, pp.1?,- \' 
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affirmation of (< hom*^ >. n s -s iri »-^  i i i H ! 15 WJ. =do<n b^ •? 1 ! "^  : = 
lieutenants, was -3^" '•''''>ctive re'Tiinije'" t*^?* the Ii-ani-i," 
regime, despite the -"^•"'^alies recounted abo/e. was indeed 
authori tar 1an. 
* h o m e m i Drevpalpd ^rxd aoreed to D]ace Pafeanjani, 
speat er of the Maj]jE.. -^ c. the a c t m c commander in chie-f n-f 
all the armed force-. H£»shemi-Paf sanj anj . a man whose 
pr aqmat ism inclined >-i-^ toward ta^incj po&itions cofi^oat i h i =? 
with conservative pre-f c-t^nces . wps. aole tc "love the cent'"e 
oi power bacK aoain *r + he conservative p^ide when Prime 
Minister Mir Hose"*''"' '••'.-tuE.avi , v^no wae close'" to the 
propressive end o"* sc- ' >"• "^ent *"»! s .--lominees -fc"" t hc> cabi'""=t 
to the Majlis, those "• B' ciose]-.- a=&oc\atec with Moh*.:K5hpmi 
(Interior Ministers c-f'aJl •' rorcjve'd the lowest votes. 
even thouph pre'sumat-! .- tJ't- election had improved thei'' 
positions, and several were re^^'cte^. fhe hjqh point v^ t h<=> 
conservative domination came with the- app'-oval of L'nited 
Nations Resolution ^9S And the accectance o"* a cease-"* i re-
Since then >homeinj h:^r:. re-fttsed to endorse thither side af' 
instead has called fo'' ^ 'fee debat? betwee^^ th(?n^  . 
8. Cottam. Richard, i-'^ -'-de Revo lu •" J onarv Iran twiddle East 
Journal (MEI? . Vo 1 . J T ,Mo . Z iSprioq, l'=>e'^ *, PP.i7a-7S. 
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O y a t o I l a l H Mort'* whc: 13. r i ' y e a r ? vot inQer t h a n t (""P 
man he was e^^foect-"' " succe-e-d, was e l e c t e d as ti-ip 
s p i r i t i t a i h e i r t o t^-^ ' • » HCT-F'! ""'i • ri i<V8^ b .• t h e AEEembl 
0"f e x p e r t s . The cJe? • * f ' 'a t A/f* t rO ] ah ' ^ o n t a z e f i sho i . i j d 
f e s i g n a p p e a l s tc* •--••- Hee""' tB>-!''n or- e meeti ' " iQ o'f t^ '>=» 
A s s e m b l v o'f e x p e r t s ' • !"»e ] T f i n , 
Imam K h o m e i n i - - " t H ^ j c i ^ i s hoti 1 cf n o t ta f -e h i s 
SLiPPOt't •*0'' Qfant^C*' ^ " i i e ' " ovpr t ho Pr'St "* ew months f"'' , 
M o n t a z e i ^ i had n o t P'.n ! «' H J H piinche'= i r - o r m ^ i n a t h e mac'' 
k i l l i n g s 0"^  prisonet"'^ • " ' " : wi>re e l i g i b l e "*r'r amnest-' on t hp 
1 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y o'f ^ ^ '." ' ''^ 1 n 13 ";!". " "os t o * + *-.o v i c t i T s = x 'e re 
POl i t i c a l r i va ls O"* ' ' " O^r. l-fvC -«ff>-H]ir 'er= and SllOPOr t pr c 
pt the deeianated he i •"»=(» •• hr.memj ^  verdict wae the more 
decisive m various d'" • - 'ins, ^he two pernor f^oreign O-'-fire 
resignations were at ?•'•"'•" f'd b> observers to a cleansino o^ 
the ForeiQn Ministrv - ' 'hnce vho f^ H v i r: ed 1"" ''a'.'C'l''" cf '^'< 
cease'fire in the Gitl'^  ' t t-n? r.itt'r''' LI-Z O* ooison"' rjr-ini-c-i 
bv Imam. 
One ot the chjtr -nponents O"* a ceased i*"? wa"^  *'"F 
speaker ot the MailT"> " -••san lani „ .-et a -^ ew davs aoo the 
most radical cjroLip f' ''-nah? ^uoDested hjs name tor the 
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presidential electi"!"- m Ju Iv-A.jgu's t. 
About Mr. Ra fs-^" '-?n t, it >^a-3 been said "he sianals i •? • t 
turns right". Mans- -b = erver'5 believe t^is slogan n^rj the 
Foreign office res i t^-i-? t ions of t^ose i<^  ''avour- of tt>e 
ceasefire against tha' the -^eoiwe has not vet been able to 
convince the peoplf^ -'H • "the ooison" could not have been 
drunt" a year BatrlLer ^i > •". I^ -an was in a favourable situation 
in the Mar. 
It is clear that -rvinQ accepted the comoromise of fir. 
Rafsanjani as the mv^^ lively nevt President, the radicals 
Bre now assertina * *" " -Ives, There- as. acoss-t he-bo^'""' 
interference in any^ '.-'tq and e'vo'"-t hi no said or dor^E > f^  
countries with an Ic,,-",3r norulatiDn includma India. A? 
fnany as 12"5 members cvf the Majlis sianed a communioue on 
March 1. supporting t^e anti-Rf-shdie demonstartion in 
Bombay, Thereafter, Turi'ev rejected Iran s interference in 
its internaJI a-ffai'"'; wren j ^.O Iranian Mailis member^ 
criticised the Tu^^ish hrad of state on a matter relatina to 
the wearing oi scarve? '- womert, 
Not everything dpr f" •' th^ne Mullah E IS jn acco-'ianrp 
with their lofty prir.r M-<^^.^ IrBn 1!? rebtiilrima its mil3tarv 
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with assistance from the eastern bloc states. North •'orea 
and China. These were e-i^iier denounced as "atheist" nations 
with which Iran should have little to do, Ond that little 
would certainly not include the head of the worlds suofenie 
communist power beco>n!'-^ the first oerson to receive ^ 
9 
written message from t*-^ Jfinam , 
A new tendency hj<5 been for the government to lay the 
blame for all its problems at the door of the Gulf War. 
Rafsanjani has called the Dost-war period the reconstruction 
phase. 
"In this phase we sou Id th:5r)fc, th«? revolution has 
just started,.,the people should be contended to 
some extent, they s^•ould limit their demands and 
understand the eKi'=5' ing circumstances" 
The pragmatism of ffan s leaders and their readiness to 
defend the survival of the government has been an eve?-
present feature of the f'=iamic i^epublic. At the q»oment it 1-= 
being shown in the preoccupation of spea^er Rafsanjani and 
President •hamenei with n^ving the way for the emergence of 
9. 'Radicals assert themselves in [ran'The Hindu.tlarch 31. 
1989. 
10. Daneshf<hu, SchebeTazade, . Iran s Ten Years o^ 
Revolution: Achievements and Futures- ME I (Februarv 3. 
19B9), P,J6, 
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strong leadershiD -"id the n e o logica i rjnd oowe'" 
d ivisions. 
Constitutional Factor ^ .iew «?-* Iran bpino Islamic reoublic 
it wc<s nattif-al to -f o*-mvt.j,-»^ e and oractise an Islamic -forejon 
policy. Looking into ^ f =- constitution oi Islamic republic 
one -finds the Princin^f-- i ft2 to J 55 deal with Iran's -foreion 
policy. The Principie ' >? ai the const itvst lori rtins as '• + hr: 
•foreign policy ot th«? '• -r«ic Repi,tbljC cf' Ir^n is -founded o' 
the basis o"f endina a^ .^  • ne o'' do«^ i"f«t io">. 5 a^f egtiardi-'Q t^e 
complete independer'c =" -• ---* mtegr-j t .. Q^ the territorv. 
de-fending the rights 'nslims, practisino non-alignment 
with respect to t^i- "irtstt^ n^g oov<e'"5 and maintainino 
peace-ful relationshir ' non-^el 1 iqerent powers". 
The 1st princip's"- r»-f the Iran 5. -foreion polic-.- -s 
related to their conc^rr, -for t^ !e M'.islims o-f the world. The 
second principle oi neif^c; East nor West is meant to reject 
the domination o-' t^e *. lo s«.»rerpov<er5, or o-f any power r^ 
that matter. The th^rv principle c^ th? con^titut ion \.c, 
non-alignment is imfl •' - tc- T"--'an t'tat I ' s'- will nol t.^"' '" 
side with any o-f the ?•'!•. • i^ p^ rrsi:v<c-r5 while ri*=a]ino thef:. 
(al Concerned '^v^- 3 y ^. '''?'_.i'u3d l.??,' ^^'^ "first piHa- - -f 
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Iran's foreign policv >= fiheir comcern for Isl-^ m and Mus i L^S 
throughout the wo'-lri. Ayatoll^h Khomeini rejected the 
Western concept of "~i^ tion-s ta te which, at present is 
prevalent in the world. He oerceived the e>tstino 
international order as one based no*: only on power ooli^i'^-
bu t also and primarily on ideologv . (Jnde-- the prete>t -^ f 
ideoloaical righteousness, ''hocneir^ i further reasoned t^ hat 
both superpowers souQh*-. to " arrogate wordlv power t^ 
themselves at the exne'-'-*^  of the fnasses of the people". Such 
an interpretation o^ • ^--^  international order led the Iranian 
cleric to perceive the i-<T^-id system as being divided between 
the "oppressors" ' (T' ' = ^ at bar in > and the "oppressed" 
(mustazaaf in) . Morea-F" . this division m t o tvio cle-^riv 
defined camps was <• ' ". litfited to the Muslim tjmm^  
(community). but purr -.- ted to enco'T^oass the entire world 
which was dominated, .= '--,irdma to ^homemi. bv the United 
States and the Soviet !''i j on . 
As an alternative to thie existing flawed and un n,!s t 
international syste«f». Khnwei'-'j believed that a new "Islamic 
world order" must be '^ t^abJ i shed. as enunciated in the 
traditions of Imam or Twelver Ehe ism. Moreover, the 
Khomeini interpretats^jr. of fiuh asserted that until! the 
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return of the Imam 'rsm-. occulAtior, (ah^yb^i, a r^xjor^rr^ 
jurisorudent (f^qih) Tust guide the i-eliaious and non-
religious asoects of t'^ p f^lamic ao/e'-nment. While "homemi 
ac^^owledged the est^h < i^hment a^ ^ the Vi la-^at-e-f aa: h m 
Iran, he foresaw r< hx.-B countr-v 3 wide'- role in "-be 
propaqation of his '-- «'Orld order. This un 1 vers^i [ is f-.i r 
approach does not pre'-- •• to 3>T\pose p^n-Sheism on the world, 
but intends to "Iiber.-i ^- si I ooD'-essed masses from the -"-it P 
of the opprsjssors. •' ,^e "fedeemer nation". Iran w-;-, 
evoected to e>:port revo lij tioi' if if intended f <-> 
accomplish this ob ' •= -^n-? in'=,ijlate itself aoams*-
potential threats. Jr - «-, fhomeini considered the e'TO-"*-
of the revolution as . otective shield fo'- Ir^n when b=> 
stated: 
"We should set a?1Hf the thouQht that we do not 
export our revo}.'+j o", becsii^e Islam does not 
regard various I'-l .f»jc cotintnes differently and 
IS the supporter -" all the oppressed peoples of 
the worJd, On the tv'ipr hf»nd, ft 3 j the superpowers 
and all the powers sBve 'i^er- to destrov us. li 
we remain in an «- losed en.ironment we shall 
definitely face oef-^t' 
11. (<'echichian, Joseph a.. The Gulf Cooperation Council: 
Containing the Ir-iiian f^evolution Journal of Sout^ 
Asian and Middle F ^  3 tern S tud les . Vol.13, Mos. 1 "^  7 
(Fa 1 I/Winter, l^Pv P P , £,17-49.' 
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These Dbj'PCtives ri'-c-r! -first and foremost at protectinq 
Iran, and secondary i . =• t proffiotinq the establishment vi 
populist Islamic gnvc TimentE in other parts oi the weld 
states particular]*,' 1^^ ,tc'^.T, countries. 
On 7th March, IVptv. "^injctr- Q-' Foreiqn A-f-fairs stated. 
"Since its creation following Be^'^rBl decades oi 
genuine Islamic and popula'' struggle the Islamic 
Republic oi Iran has considered it one o^ its m a m 
duties to dei pi-'V dear Islam, its sacred 
aspirations. and t*"'?. oppressed Muslims in everv 
region of the world' '', 
The concept oi evpn"-ting revolution is a corollary o-f 
the phenofnenon oi -«^"i}ut]on in world historv, Thjc 
proposition also hold'- rue m the more recent example o-f 
the Iranian revolution. ¥/ intervention, America wants tc 
make the world safe f-- democracv; witness the cases o"' 
Iran, Guatemala, El SalvsiCor and NicaraoLsa. The Soviet Unio'-
wants to ma^e the wor 5 •' "^ a-fe -for Socialism; witness f-ie 
cases o"f Crechosl ova*'i a ^rtci A-f ohanj s tan . And bv the exDO^i 
oi the revolution, Khrimeini ^ Iran wants to ma^e the worlH 
safe for Islaf": witness the cases o"? the Persiaf-
Gulf.Lebanon and Soviet ^^^erbaiian and Turt-menistan, 
12. Rama rani, no.l. f^',/'' 
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Thtis t h e n>aior p r i n c i p l e s ai t h e - fore ia r i p o l i c y oi 
••'hDmeini ' s I r a n arg ' o b v i o u s , ^ i r s t , by r e j e c t i n g b o t h t h e 
E a s t e r n and W e s t e r n way o^ l i - f e d u e t o l a c t o1 r e l i g i o t t s 
s p i r i t u a l i t y , Khomeir-i i n v o k e d h i s " favoLtr i te p r i n c i p l e oi 
" n e i t h e r E a s t n o r West '" . Secor id . by s u g g e s t i n g t h a t I r a n , a s 
t h e Tiost power-ful bas«5 r^ ^ t h e i s l a m i c w o r l d , can e a s i l v - f i l l 
t h e i d e o l o g i c a l vacuitn e v e r y w h e r e i n t h e w o r l d . l-hofrteiri 
was a c t u a l l y e n g a q i n g m t h e e v p o r t o"* t h e r e v o l u t i o n . ] t 
w a n t s n e i t h e r E a s t rtr--^ West w i t h " e g a r H p e r s u i n g -foreiDn 
p o l i c y . In Khor^'eirti ; >-ior}Hview, " I s l a T i i c d e m o c r a c y " --is^ 
s u o e r i o r t o b o t h E a s t e ' " - -^r-d uj^j^f^em v ^ r - i e t i e s 
The Df^ inc ipa l t-^'^a^t'^ of t h e e x p o r t of t h e r e v Q i u t i o n 
c o n s i s t e d of f o u r m a j o r g e o g r a p h i c c i r c l e s . T h e s e w e r e t^^e 
Persia^n G u l f , t h e C e n t r a ! A s i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , and L e b a n o n , [n 
t h e P e r s i a n Gu l f t h e <norp s p e c i f i c t a r g e t s w e r e B a h r a i n , 
S a u d i A r a b i a and o a r t ir-.i I a r ly K u w a i t , In t h e S o v i e t a re - i , 
t h e y w e r e A c e r b a i j a n &<"••(': ^url . men i s (".an. In A f r j h a n i s t a n ^nd 
L e b a n o n , S h i a M u s l i m s we 's- t h e o r ima ' -y t a r g e t s , a l t h o u p h t h e 
e i g h t p r o - I r a n i a n fac t - ' -ons o* t h e AfrjhAr^ f^^j jahedins ^^•^• 
b a s e d in I r a n , w h i l e th«=> o r o - l r a n L a n H i i b o l l a h i s •a^r-'e l o c ^ t " " ' 
1 3 . I b i d . . P . 8 1 . 
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within Lebanon. On!- n Lebanon has lf--^n maint<3ine<^ •^  
continaent of Revolt ^ ?rv Guar-ds. with initi^tl. 
Syrian blessinq ~ ' " :e the invasion of Lebanon bv Isf-ael 
m June l'?82. And on! v ;n Lebanon h^ve D»"Q-Iranian factions 
continued to hold i.rrj'=-^t-m has*-aae-=. while Ir^i^ry claims *-hr?f. 
its own hostages -^r^e: ht^  1! d by the Phalanqists and ai^ e stvl' 
alive, despite indicatsons to the contr-ar-v. 
Besides hostage-t-^' m g bv oro-If-anian factions in 
Lebanon, [ran was accused of otheT forcible mterventionarv 
acts. These included, 'c-f e*amDle. the attempted coup i^ 
Bahrain in December, !- n . Suicidai t'-uc*- bnmbmgs '=iq-3in-9f 
the American and Ff-«?rr!i •-r^\ ixtai-"^  con tmgen •-•;; in Lebano-^ in 
October. 1983, and » • multiple pQfx^bmqs i" Huw^jt ' i 
December. 1''83. T"he '•':•• i m f p'vo lu *• i onar--^  r-M^rds aided .^ r-^  
abetted the local Shi^ litanfs, enqaginq m armed conflict 
with the Israel force'j; • - Lebanon. The list could be easil^ 
expanded if one we^ e^ tc add the accusations against Ir-^ n 
regarding the hijacking and bombing of planes and even the 
March, 1789 pipe-bombi^c: of a van in the United States fcf" 
the first time since f^-^e Iranian revolution. The van wa'? 
driven by the wife of -apt. wili C. Poae'"s 3r-d who had 
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ordered a missile iirn-^ ^t ^n lr-j,ni^r\ Das-^enaer olane ovef-
the Persian Gulf on Z i-jly 1988 r-e'=u 1 ttnc- jn death of 2^''> 
people. Militant Irani-^n students ir the United States were 
suspected of comolLci'. ' At the sa^ t^ e time we can see Iranian 
violent diolomacY m nM-<:-r countries as well as their stand 
about ("ashmir, Pushd\'-' *'•' fairs. 
(b)Neither East nor ''K'3 *: Accord inq to Mif Wnssain Hus = a.'i 
this slogan implies that the people of Ir-a'^  will not, 'jntj^-
• any circumstances', allow Iran to •^ l^ip toward the East o'-^  
the West'. Furthermore they want ^o establish a systen-. o* 
values, independent of Last and West in their own cQunf-v, 
to expand it and und« the aLl-rou'-'d cover of this new 
system of values-which •r'^ ems from the ideoloQv of [slam, t^ 
continue their own wa ' , c'-qaniire their lives, relations wit^ 
other countries, natior'- and Iibe'-a'iion mover^ents, Iranian 
policy makers themsel -^ s admit th^t the =loaan Meithe"-
West, nor East' only 'o --jj-t re*^ ie'r*-= the I'^fiuence o* thei-
14 
Islamic ideology 
The main sloaan of the revolution, neither "East nor 
14. Ramaiana, R,K», ••humayni s Islam in Iran s Foreign 
Policy' in Adeed DamshaCed,'• , Islam in foreign Pol icy 
(Cambridge, l*?©?.'' ('.72. 
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West' reflects •home^.- insisterfC)?- that Islamic Iran m^ ist 
project itself in thr •«>» 3d as. a t*"'ird force, untaintpd b-
the influence of thcr '- powers. 
In the early mor-^'"-- nf revolution there were scattered 
attacks by militants r-i .dividual Afnericans living in Iran. 
But the first spectactn ;>• action vxac. the invasion of the I'S 
Embassy on 4, HovE-f^it.r-! I'Vyv, -fcMowed bv the "344 da-. 
hostaaes crisis, "^''^  PoisodJ^ t'E-came- a svmbol r •" 
revolutionary Iran's^ \\\- *.'-• de-*-." the superpowers. ^s 
well as the establ ish.-• • , e-t cd .lij oiomac.', 
However, in ret^T--' on carter administration imrio~.ed 
ban on U5 imports of '• • J r^ oi "i o?"! 12 Nov, 197^ and •^ •'ozen 
about * 8 billion o"' j >.-- »an assets . Moreover. America br oi-e 
diplomatic relations - ' ^' Jr^n a^ fd imposed ban on all 
American e'^ 'ports to Ir^r e.* pec ted food and medicine, and on 
all American imports f*'-.' fran ", 
The hostages wa'-^ r' eventu.9il!v released when thei'-
captors had achieved '^"_>if" int-ef-^ ai aims, and calculated 
that any further advan- •> *;o t ">e a^med from holding the'Tr^ , 
15. Ibid., P.13. 
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either m terms of inf^f-n^i Dolitic^ or b^rqaining wi^h tHe 
United States, would h" outweiqhed bv the damage to [t-^n 3 
international standino. 
The hostage BK-i-^^i' <-<as e"^ -^ ect 1 vel y on t^e other. IrB--, 
launched imprisonfnen ^  - thF orcasiona] visitor v*as s p?'- + 
o"f violent diplofna: ' -^ -nr-ar-st thp- L'Hjted States which MB^ 
al&o condifcted el se-'Ji'-''^ , notably m Lebanon. where jt 
served the dual puff'' o-f =t'-l^lng ^t the- Great Satan 
while enhancing thc» • 'itiof o-f oro-Jranian groups m 
Lebanon. The two frtost •: "f -tacula"" such actions were the car-
bombing attach on +'- ' *'f Embassv m Beirut m A p n ] 1983 
which resulted in 69 cP'?-"fhc. artr! tt-e attac*-? on the US '•larjnc 
headguarters -five month- later which too*- ••he lives o-i 2'5 t 
soldiers. These were Q'^-T'ally thouan* to have been carr^e-^ 
out by suicide squads f'' • Mussavi s al-Amala 1-1 si ami based 
in the northern Bel-3 ^, close to where the Pasdarari Bre 
Quartered. Whether th!«- •--? &c<. or whether 3 •'action closer 
to the Hizbollah was rc';onsib]e. there 15 r.o doubt about 
the lrar<ian governmen* '^  ?!_".DC>CI' t tor both the qrotioE . The 
car-bomb attach on thf f -,r,taE- - in s-uwait in December 1^9^ 
appeared to be part o'' *' ^ame nattt^fn. '"he other main lane; 
o-f attacii on the US vi^ ,^ ', <-t>a"on h^e been b- hostaoe tB' ir-\o. 
no 
Pro-Iranian militants '-'.3.,e not been ?-esDonsible for all such 
abductions, nor. as wit'-s the botTibings, ca<^  direct I'-a'tiar' 
involvement easily bf-* demonstrated. But whatever" f-ea 1 
control Iran may have ' over the raators. it has certainly 
used its perceived i-niLaence as a oowerful lever. The 
lamentable Iranaate •^cisode of 1987 shown ho"* effectively 
Iran played on America^ 'f''=3r-'=i for the lives of a handful of 
captives so as to secijrp> substantial concessions ove^- ar-ms 
supplies, which ran counter to the whole thrust of US oolic-' 
towards the Gulf war^ *^ '. 
According to Khr""p-i n,! , thp wo'-ld is divided into twr. 
groups, the oppreEse- ^ Brtd t^ e- oppressed. In order *o 
accomplish their ot j-"*t ' j ves. the great oppressors Have 
followed a policy of '-"• € r'tinq throt!r,h imposed or cultivated 
puppet regimes in th^ " r-essed world. Tht_is, if is argued. 
the illusion is create^-, as m Irars-lrao war, of anter-
regime conflict in t* r oppressed t'^orld, whereas- in fact 
conflict is simply an ?. opressors" response to challencjee 
from the oppressed. The Islap^ic reptiblic cf I'-an. o-f ccii''S€^  . 
is the pre eminent chft j j l-ncjer to t-'"te oppressors heoei^ ion-. . 
16, E'ornoch. Ale'<. . Irar-'s Viol ent-Di pi omac-
Survival, (May/Jur,. , I'^'OB ! .PP. r58--5'^ '. 
I l l 
The Iranian government sees itself, as exoected. as the 
inevitable target of both great oppressors. theif- lesser 
oppressor allies such as France, or the usurper Isr-aeli 
ally and the entire array of the puppet regimes which are 
allied to the great oppressors. 
A central assumption for Khomeini is that the oppressed 
world generally grossly underestimates its own capability 
and overestimates that of the oppressors, Por e^-ample, 
having sanctioned the ta'-ing of American diplomats as 
hostages, ((ihomeini endorsed fully his for-eign minister s 
adamant opposition to •he Soviet occupation o* Afghanistan. 
Then both great oppressors and thei''" camp f o I lov-'ef-s in 
response to this challenge attached Iran thr-ouQh the 
instrumentality of Iran 
Iran has a strategic interest in good relations with 
the United States as counter weight to the Soviet Union. For 
this reason, secular forces in Iran favour normalization of 
US-Iranian relations. The regifrte's more pragmatic and 
moderate elements also recoQnize the need to avoid total 
17, Cottam, Richard, 3ran-Motives Behind its Foreign 
Policy- Survival (Nov./EJec, I'^Bh) , PP.4B6-87. 
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deoende 
t'hamenea DDDOE\ t j ' ' f t o t he i . ! ] t ' ' a < ' e ] i c i o t ! S " f a c t i n n hA = 
moved h i m i r t r r e a c i n o j • rjC'F'^'"" * T Pa ' ^Ea ' ^ i an i an-" f"n£ 
s u p p o r t e r s , t-iho •^s /c t i ' - t h e renew.^] r •f e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c - ' ; 
t i e s w i t h west E'^iroos'ar^ c o t m t ' " l e ' L , Japar i anc* t h e Ur \ + <^  ri 
S t a t es . ] ndee'd . ^ haT'er f^ ^ s c ^ i t i c a ] ? t anH ^Q a i n S t t he i i * 
f e l i q i O L t s t a c t i o n anc* '•"£ ^• jpr"" ' ' ' t <c-^  i Tip--'-ivef^'en* e t I- " 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the v.-e": t ha± Jed r i o s e ott?e-»" / e r s p-f ]--Ar r. 
i n t e ' - n ^ ] p o l i t i c s t c cr" 'c ]L"~ ' t * • . < * t-'c j r i r l o s e a l l - f 
Pa f san 1 an j , 
R a t e a n i a n i E D ' " ' * ' ' ' h^i- *•:_ do v o t h h^c - l e w c^ I >' f^ 9 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h + ht ' •- )-*n»ri E t a t e F , wes t E' !•" ^ 'pean COLI""' t •" 1 e"^  
and J a p a n , T h e r e ^ r i i ^ ' i e d o i i h t t ' ^ a t '"•e 1 E 1 n + e r es t ed 
r e n e w i n p ] r a n E e c on rif^ i 3 *" a'!d p p } 3 * : c a ] t i e s w i t h t h r >;<^<^-^ 
^nri J a p a n . 7 h i E I E n c t . * Owe -'€ r , b e c a i iE e h e I S 1 d e o 1 C'O 1 Z ^ \ ' 
m o d e r a t e b'.'t r a t her b^'.-^L'se *"'; ', E a f r a a ^ a t i : p o j i t i c i a ' - . ^-'^ 
a n d h i E ^ V i p P O r t e r E ' " f ^ a l ' i . ' e * h , t w \ t h f v * T " ' r a n ^ r-^ ,- ., I 
econofftir t i e s w i t h t h e ''Ur » ^•-i'^  ^ a r a ' ^  a o a •- ' ;= 
r e b t l l ] d 1 n o i t s w a r - t {-|i - „ i ' f E "^  r^  ' t '^  r ^J-^ r ' '-iMon-
i e . H u n t e r , n o , 6 . P.C.I 
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Ra^fsan ja i ta i s fsls^n st^'^B'Te, hov- iever, t h a t an\' s p r i c c i ' ^ 
a t t e m p t t o n o r m a l i z e Ir^r: c, r e l £<t i c n ^ h a p w i t h t h e West w i l l 
i m m e d i a t e l y i n v i t e a t t f t r l - ? -*rom h i s o p p o n e n t ? . _ ieoDard i z i n q 
h i s n e w l y a c q u i r e d r - ' ^ j t i c m Briti power i - ' ^ i d e I - ' r i n , "-Jo 
L i n d o n b t e d l V remembe^E Str.i^  c l o n e he came t o t h e end o"* h i t 
p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r when -r-"-^ n-f h j c s e c r e t ar/ns d e a l w i t h t h e 
US and I s r a e l wan jea*^^-"' hv h i s o p p o n e n t s . 
The a n t i - w e s t e r n anH p a r t i c i i l a r i .- t h e a n t i - U & r h e t o ' - j c 
has p l a c e d R a ^ f s a n j a n i and h i s s u p p r - r t e r s m an i d e o l o a i c e l 
s t r a i t J a c J - e t . How can +•"&"•' p r o p o s e n o r m a l i r 2 nq economxr ,T^ < 
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e >/er V g o ^ ' e r nfTipn t t h e - ' h a v e b'^"'-''" 
a c c t i s i n g -for p a s t e l e v e n .-eetr^ ai b e m q t e r r o r i s t i c pnd A 
enemy o f [ f - a n i a n 0 5 0 0 1 ° 
K h o m e i n i s r e c e p t i o r n-f S o / i e t ^ ^ o r e i g n M i n i s t e r E d u ^ r d 
A . S h a v a r d n a d z e d t i r m c "^  ' "^  V I E I " * t o " e h r a n on I ' f i - I ' " ' f ^eb rna r -
1*?8'7, a p p e a r e d t o wash i ' - 'o+on as a t i l t t o w a r d t h e E a s t m 
I r a n ' s " foreaqr t p o l i : : - . Was -h in^ ton sav< t h e S o v i e t U n i o n 
p o i s e d t o e ' ^ p l o i t t*"'c " t r ^ i r ^ ^,etwf=e*"' 1-^•=f-' anr* Et i r r ioea'^ 
commcini* ' n a t i o n s o'^'e' '' ^L!S*"'die a ^ ' ^ a i r , '+ a l s o >-ese'"''te^ 
S o v i e t chuniminess > •ff- ip-- - .• r^ a t If- ' \ viit*^ !• an v t h i l e - \--ir 
I * ' , The W a s h i n g t o n R e p c ' . Vo i . & , ' ic> i . " . 1 '-'b'^ . 
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Iranian •'"actions ir • -' .'••3'-. -^^ .^  1 s 1 •: a * the t^e" f"''^  
soeai' er and now ore ='1^- ' ~ f- I • ^r '-> -BS '^^'n 1 -Pa * i ^•- ^ ^ r- 1 >- -
Soviet Union on 2'?-Z T i'<-r'^, 1'-?"^ , '^ 15 -"eceo'^^Z'n b M-. -
Gorbachev as a neai' > * •-a'-c:. ^^ .-' *--^ ^i:;^!^:: •-" *• 1 D^ • 
P C O n o m i r ;:tr^r' -Ti L ! I t - -
t h e S o v i e t 'Jr i o n . 
• 3 •^'- ^  3 ^ ^ r. ^ -
On{H v e t , r i ? r p H ' • ' ' • • " ^ ^ '' 
t o Wfic, »-i3 •-•n *• " r i Ti^ V. ? ' ' ,. . 
' ' n l l o w j - i o * '-•IT -f\ft'-',.-A'ri:^* " ' t - c ' ' 
7 f - ^ r i w i l l H ^ ^ p f t i ' ' ^ ' ' i t s ^C 
^ ^ ' ^ , * *- , ^ > •-. Mr r r '^vi , 
r,.- tr. 1 " r r C 
f * ; n - V ' •- t •" e t -! - * 
- r-. ^ ,- ^ or C' 
I r a n <= " n c - i + h e i ^ Fc<? t ' " • ' ' ' W i i r S t " C ' ^ l f ^ ' C i D l ^ "<E j n t e ' ' D r e t ' 
e v e r . ' Tia T rj-- I f a ^ ' i a r - ' ^ • r t ' j 'e ' o - e r t "^•'r r a s * d e c a d e , 
k h O T t e i n j f i r lma + + c:'H i n h 3 i= w 1 ! "' t h a t I ' " a n 5 •- leec' "^  C "" "* ? 
aid was an ' tmd 5 == r-jt ed ^ar* . de?.r:*e ni? VIOO>-D'.! E W: 
aqainet I'"an beino den?"'^ent rir ei*^"er t *"'r EaEtern ,-i> 
UJe5te'"n bl oc > 
' 1 
t •- r 
•^  1 1 * Nomenei an t' * " ' H O T I 1 r* i-» ^  ci *- o ,-^  
11! 
Rafsanjani both these ie^de«-3 have den^ons tra ted a sense Q^ 
Dolitical realism, inrl'iiinq a detef-mmation to base Ii^ an = 
relations with othe^" o^tjons, including the United States, 
more on the concept a^ e«3utlibrnjf;i than on the idea of ^ 
struggle between good ar-.d evtl, ^o the e>'tent that sijc*^  -^  
fundamental change ma* i^ ccu*'". [r-^ "- s fijfjr-'^ effects a <" 
exDorting ^"evolution i'?tl' be fe la t ive l-^  tame duf~inc the 
second decade of the Is'-'mtc i'-i=iD!jb! • c ss co''nDared with the 
. .70 
f 1 rst 
(r"!Toward Non-Qliqned '^c'\^ wen^ t^ : 1 ran c. vie-w and col iciee pt 
the conference of Non-a*iDined Nations heJc* ir. New Deln^ cr 
12 Februarv l*?ei, t-ah-Td N'abavi H 'Minister of State* 
address was particttia"" - E.iorsi f i cant, beacLise. bv then 
Nabavi had become clc*^) •' identified with the Islamic 
Republican Party, Nabf=-'j began by criticizing the wav non-
alignment had been practit^ed tinti]] recent]'-', ]n its former-
form the concept had becrrie meaninqless becaisEe manv of tne 
professed non-alioned countries co!.i]:i rto* in T'ractice f ri 1 1 ci'. 
a policv independent O'' i''*e stic>erccn^ ierE , 
Furthermore, their attempts *u pla-. one SLiperDOwer 
20, Rama 2 an 1. no,i, '^F','^  i - ^ '2, 
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against another had of'^ved futile because ir> the o'-Qcesc 
they had been forced to scceot <'»any t inds of deoendency. How 
real independence could be achieved -and how the non-alLaned 
movement could pursue i t-s oriamal thesis depended on the 
understanding of majof- changes m the ThLf'd World. 
Since world war [[ two political poles o'- two socia! 
systems have governed <"he world: the Washington pole -snH 
the Moscow pole. Due to their economic and military powe''. 
each of these poles h^s attracted several countries to 
itself satellites. Natural i^. these countries no longe*-
have the total independence indispensable fof- a government. 
For this reason, while the two poles we^e being formed ^"H 
strengthened, certain T»indful politicians attempted to for-^  
a 'Third World. Marshal Tito m Yugoslavia. Of-. Suta^-no ir-
Indonesia. Gama I Abdel '^ J^ sse'' ir\ Egypt and Nehru in India 
expressed similar ide^s when forming the famous Bandung 
conference in 1''55, and late^ f" the Movement o*" Non-aiigned 
countries. They decided to modi^v the two main ooles 
capitalism and communism and prevent the ob t i tef-a t ion o*" the 
independence of smaller countries. 
A study of the l'-7'^  conference showed th^t ^ith^-iun^ 
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c l o s e t o o n e hundf^ef -^  ;'•^^t^•"Les o u t - i d e t*^<a m i l i t - s r ^ b i c c n 
had j o i n e d t h e f'io/"^'^•^'f . . s t ' ^ ^ r ^ e-."?i^ ''« o n e of tHem w^c , • ^^  
o n e way o r a n o t h e r . d«-7'>,-f"denr jfjon t h e s i joe ' -power 5 . 
F o r i n s t a n c e , th.-y!. jh t h e Cubai^^ Qovernmenr hj^d been ^b'<=--
t o a b o l i s h US domina t i ar- o f Cuba i-" t h e I - 6 ' > s . i t was toc'a--
in t h e h a n d s of t h e S n v j e t Unic-n, c >ba 1= i"^  D r a c t i c e o'^ «=' ^* 
t h e a c ^ i v e S 3 t e l l i t e ' = ; •'•' * '«jss!^ or t^^e c o n t i n e n t a*- Ame- 1 z-"-
S a u d i A r a b i a , an [-5 I->"•.!_•- coun t - " . w»->i^ ,-'-i v'as n o s s e s s e d r-,'- ^ 
•focai D o m t f o r t*"'e '•'' ; •"s j f t-'^e wr»f-iH and -Ti'.ist r-^fiir-T" ' . 
s e r v e a s a oromotef" o * f - ia '^J ic i deo loQ ' . , '-'^d S Q j^nte'-Ti' s^ --' 
w i t h t h e w e s t t h a t 1 ^ -r-"-"! d '"•^•"dlv be ca 1 l ed i n d e o e n d e n * . 
Cuba and S a u d i y"^' 1" ; a i^ere n o t on Lv two e^ ' a fno les . ^l^f^e^ 
n o n - a l i g n e d c o u n t r i ' ^ > - t l f ' - i r ^ , i^^ia and * "^a- E a s t wei^e i-" 
s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n , [ r? . - H o f o r e t---e - e v a lu t io'-> had a l s o been 
a s e c u r e l i n l i^ '^ tf^  1 - " ;ver>=;3j c*^?!" o* ^ e ' ^ / i t u d e . I t s i>"-'Ti 
and v ieaoons had b "^-^ '"• ' "-der t n e i i ' e i ^ ' : i-on,t---Q[ r^* • \r^ ^ >• .^^ 
S t a t e s and i t s thr>u-=-^'T"'~ o*' advi '=ie ' -s . ' ir" I ' ^ n i ^ r , mii )<--•• 
u n i t c o u l d a c t un'~<«i» !• ---d n^- amer 1 ca'-> acer-•"•.-. ?nd b " " e 
A m e r i c a n r e s e a r c h •?'•••' • " i [ i t a ' ^ b a s e ^ wt-iiz^ had k-c-c-
d i s c o v e r e d o n l v a'"'t'"" t ^ e ' ' e ' c ; l u t i o n . E c o n o m i c a l 1 ' ^^'^ 
c o u n t r y had been -ic (. ^^rn^ane'^ •" I'•• d e o e n d e n t t h a t 1 *• i"as 
a s sumed the; I s l a m i c --eoime :•- ['-a-- would ^ l e l d o r co ' l^n '=^e 
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i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r " the-- e c o i o m i c s a n c t i o n s i i^oo'sed b^ t h e 'i^c, 
and I t s a l l l e s . 
H f l v i n a a t t a c h e d * ' e n o r s - ^ l i o n e d movement BS inc>-f-«ecta •-e 
and n o t q e n t i i n e l v i^t'^eDert^erit ir-^fr. t H e 5t.(Derpowe»'E , t ^ o 
I r a n i a n p o l i c y m a k e r t ivrn t o t h e -fcvindat i o n s Q-f t h e I s l a m i c 
R e p u b l i c ' s i n t e r n a t l o r i a ] DOC i t i o n . The most b a s i c o-* t h o c p 
"f O U n d a 1 1 o r i s i s - i n q r a i n s * ^ \ri ft-'o i z 1 c 3 ^ r i o"* " ^ i r i t h e r E a s * r r 
w e s t " , Tt-'iE pc ' l i c ' - ' t-f--t'- beeri s'^icce? s i vi l n o * c^i ] » i "eca ' "d i "^> J: 
d o T i F s t i c fl"f"fai'"5., "-I't* 1 * "-(^^ a l s c c : i 'a ' "ar ' teed * '^t= 
p e r p e t t i a t i o n and c e r - t ' " ' . l a t i o " " v* t'"se r ic 'vo] n t lo r - , AE i r an 
v i e w e d t h i s , c o n c e p t , >* was t h e ct! 3 nsi n a t i o n o"' a p r o l o'"lO'=•'^  
Ques t by t h e T h i r d Wrr-J f! i or a s o l t i t i o n t o t h e CL i l t u ' -a^ f f -o 
p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a t i o ' " " ' t h e F'.tpe'"i:oy«er , ^-ioweve'-. n o t on ' 
b e c a u s e o"* -the m i l i t a r s u p e r i o r i t y o-* t h e s u p e r p o w e r s , b u t 
o w i n q t o t h e i r c i i l t v i r f ] o p p r e s s i /e-sess , t h o s e e"f"fo»-ts "-AH 
n o t s u c c e e d e d i n OPGT t .•" o an i ndece-r-dent o a t h -for t h e T h i ' - d 
21 
World countries 
Iran assumes oeo-po3 i ti ca] s i rni •« i r an re m ,iew ci > • c-
aeOQraphic location, sr r-, '^SSt "'ese" es r-'* ^ 1 "- . 0?"= ^^'O *• ' ^• 
'1 . Z a b i h , Sepehr , ] - . - S i n c e t h e '^'e-.-o j t ' t i m i L ondo^ . J*=^"^ . 
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a r e a bu •: a l ' so i n t p " i'-- '"^^ i t s OCC'J '-31 LO""' t-'^'*ic'~i Df^o/ ic i^ ' r ^ 
b i g m a r V e t f o r t!"-" ' - • ' • p s t i T good ; ; b u t a l s o fof- ^O'Rior. 
g o o d s . I t s o i l r e s e " /'' = a r e e s t i t ' ^ a t e d t o be i^tofe tba '^ ~,-,i) 
b i l l i o n b a ^ i r e l s . B-:--. • •'=••= o i l and ga= co'jr>tr-v has ' " i T b 
r e s r v e s of iT»ineral vi-.'^ • » r^  w h i c H < ^ t : i t i i ^ e b e n e a t h a . j > * h . 
Though some o f t h e '-• •'"T''"a I'S Have a l f " o a d \ b e e " e v p l o i t e d , 
w h i c h s e r v e t o be -^ '^ ^ i'".^oor t a o t s o u r c e o * f o ' - e i a n o v c h a n a e . 
The e x p o r t o f t h e s e T< : f.r*"a I s ^^^s been or. a'-> i n c r e a s e ^,..-,-^,-
t h e l a s t few y e a r s . ("".-.! sn t r i , i-- i o c j t e d on A c c ^ ' j u i q ^ l T . - • ^ • 
o'f t h r e e c o n t i n e n ' : > -'.•;; a , < i ' - " i c a .?•""••:! E u r o c e . [ t i i e ^ ~r. 
i m o r t a n t r o u t e conne"*- ••', A s i - a^.d ? „ ' j r ope . 
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IFAH'S POLICTY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 
Mohd, Reja ShaH F'ahlavj havino come into power m 
I'^'ll , pledgpcJ to ffsodprni le the countrv with unprecedented 
rate o-f growth in whic^^ e-f-forts he sought the cooperaticn of 
the West especia]]'/ i^ fyierica. HIE- ti]t towards Ame-'ica 
further increased aft*:'- -^i? reinstallation with the heir o^f 
America's CIO and othrr:;.. Thereafter he did not onlv mclmf? 
towards America but =.'-c( maintained good relations with 
(>meriCB s allies e^v-t'-•> ^1 } / Israel, 5hah ^yttended all so^ts 
0"f concessions to "frc'ica sndf e^en Israel to whom he 
supplied oil too. He cor«tinued to allow Israeli mission to 
operate in Iran durmo hi= reign, 5hah put the economic 
development o^ the count-.' with the accelerated growth rate 
on top priority ds = ""i^ gar di ng the repui reT<ent O"* I'^ at' <^ 
cultural, social and islamic values. He wanted to catap'j] + 
Iran into the line o-f •'-r-i'^t'rn industrial i red countries b^ * he-
tLirn 0-* the centurv, Bes-j des this, he assuTied the role o"* the 
'Policeman o'f the &ul-* and m this attempt Shah was helped 
greatly by America who wanted to chec^ the P^ -sssian in-f]uence 
and have an assured ar.^  uninterrupted SLIPPIV O1 oil tc f-'e 
western world. 
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The change and '"'" f-s tab] a E hment oi Islamic Reptiblir ir 
Iran ori 1st ^^pri] . '.' -nari-s thp heginf^iriQ o-f a new et ^ m 
the history oi Jr-^n •- 't--]ataons v»i t *-i the worlri. The reaime 
based on l&lamac Shari-^ pledged tc iphold the Islamic valic?? 
and LindertaM' the devc^! rcnent with social justice. Being an 
Islamic Republic th-^  rG,,-,{i,e too* tc bring about a lus-t world 
order which could bri- ' about justice as Avatollah him'^eJf 
reiterated "Islam wi' to brino all ai humanitv under th?? 
umbrella of its lusti-"^ . As the Republic is •'ov.inded on the 
basis of ending an-' i i r of doaanations . safeguarding t'-le 
complete mdependencs T"I''' mteoritv, defending the riahts o^ 
Muslims pract IS m a i- tlioriment deal i no v*ith dominatinq 
powers and maintai".'" cieaceful relationships with not -
belligerent powers. '^^* '"paiTie adopted a coiic/ of "Neithor 
East nor West" imc !• m q to mear» the reiection o-f the 
dominations of the tv cnper powers or of an.- powers for 
that Tiatter. Ftirthe'' "^'c rs tho novomme'^t decided "-10+ to 
align or tal<e side •' .'f of the tv^ o super-powers w^xle 
dealing with them. I^- -' islamic state the-/ found necp'^sarw 
to e-^port the revels-' ! ' and loot- af te>- the intere'^* ' ' 
Muslims living in anN <• - ' i v* the wfi'-ld. 
In the aftermat^ . ' * he revrl.jtior« and estahlishme' • -^ 
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Islamic Reoublic [rsm •?, relations wit*"* Amer"ica did not 
improve only but with the events, which toot olace, fu'^ the'" 
deteriorated. It wa^ ^ T^ November 4, 1779 that the 'J. 5 , 
embassy in Tehran was i^pipzed bv Iranian vouths. The caoti/e^ 
remained in custody i^J* about **'* days. This set [r-^ n 
against much of the '&=t of the world. When diolomatic 
efforts failed to get * ^ '' release of the Omer"ican hostaaes. 
America made an t^tecnr*' to rescue the Amer-ican hostages f'^ om 
Tehran in Aonl l?n''.', fn SeDtembe"- 1780 war bro^ e out 
between Iran and Jr-yz on account a* long standing 
hostilities between th'-'T^  followed bv Shatt al-Arab dispute. 
America covertly or ove-^tly supoorted Iract while Ir^ni^n 
arsenal was crumbling of spare parts as the whole ai^sen^ ' 
was made up off Amerir-,>, Iran was therefore helpless to 
import spare parts fr im America ar its allies having 
reguired spare parts, ^ •-^n in the absence of diplomatic 
relations tried to impc'*. scdrB parts throuah the mediation 
of various persons 1J'= Manucher Gorbani^er, Theodo'-e 
Shac^. ley , Adinan tchashoo' , and Robert f^ ac f^af^lane. In this 
arms deal American no-*ernment either connived o^ overtl 
involved its€?lf with the intention of getting the release v^ 
American hostages in • .".-anon and to send the monev foi^  
Contra reb€?ls. This •^ -'al was disclosed and American 
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administration had J. •->^r the jolts. Dur-mg the Ir^n-l^?z 
war America eithe>' /irectiv helped Ir-aa c indirect!-' 
instigated the regnT.*?^  OQeratinq with Iraq. 
While -:}S'5esinn ' n-US ^eLa^ions one encounter^ a 
chanqe after the e"'* < • (-he war .^ -grj^ rial Iv af fer the death 
of the stalw-srt of • - '-ition fivato'lah Khomeini, Rafsaniani 
being more pragmat'-- .;nd liberal adopted a policv of 
rapproachemen t. In ;• > • - »eriod one finds the Lmpro''-'eiT>en t if" 
the relations with t<"'"' '••iB-at as well as the cou^^tries o^ t'~e 
Eastern bloc. As dur.in.T war Iranian economy sustained seve-c 
damages and the <^  " .-a-ny u^s shattered. Pa f san j a^ ^ i. s 
government tool' it ."^i ' jp priority to f"econstruct it with 
the help of the West '" -^  ta-t^ t, 
Iran has two ma/or foreign policv issues; Iran s 
relations with the ^ "> and the West ^nd I^an s e>;DO''*^  if 
the "Islamic Pevoli;' i *•"»'". In his '.^ verr i d i-tg concern w' t'"' 
establishing a faa..'i~ led Islamir f-eDiiblic, ^homemi saio 
on December 9, 1979. 
"A nation that f' -s^ in unisori that it wants. the 
Islamic Republjf . it wants neither East nor West 
but only an IsJa'f^c rep'ablic- this being so, we 
have no right to "sa-. tha* t^ e- nation that engaoed 
in an uprif-i r.r.1 diti E.D in order to have 
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democr--3cy ..." , 
This statement wac made at t'"te heiQht oi the Arerbaiian 
crisis over the adoption o-f the new constitution, Withm 
this context. Khomeini was emphasizmq that in engineering 
the new republ ic, I ran should not blmdly imitate Eastern 
socielist or Western capitalist models. claimmo tH?t 
"Islamic democracy" is superior to both Eastern and Western 
democracies. The idealist interpretation ha= le-<t out the 
key phrase "but only an Islamic rep'->bl i c "• and has Ltsed t^ ie 
slogan "neither East nor West" to advocate that Iran should 
not have relations with either t^ «e soviet or- the ijt 
governments, nor with aovern-'nents closel/ associated witH 
the super-powers. 
Regarding the othpr issues, Khomeini believed ii^  f^ -e 
universal validity o* J = 1 a«»» and its export to the rest c^ 
the world. In his w^ trds., Islam "is not peculiar to a 
country ,., even the Muslims. Islam comes iar humani ty . . . I s i aon 
wishes to bring all humanity under the umbrella oi 
justice..,.". We hope this will gradually coi'rie about". As a 
1. Ramarani, R.K., Iran's Foreign Policy; Contending 
Orientations , in f^iddle East Journal. vol.47., fi'c . T 
(Spring, 1 '?&'=? ) , P . rifS , 
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corollary to thig conc<"'Dt of -jn ideal Islamic world orde"" . 
Iran, as the only faqih-ruled Islamic republic, "Should trv 
hard to e>'Dort ( i ts > '-evolution to the world". But. he adds 
emphatically. "It does not ta^ e sword to evpof^t this 
ideology. The export of idea by fo^ -ce is not eKoorf . I'-" 
the same speech he added that the wav to export revoiutnn 
15 by setting an e>amp!e of Islamic ethical behaviour. THO 
idealists' interpretation overlooks the fact th^ t the c-=i ! '. 
to establish an Islamic world order is what Khomeini ca I I^  1 
an expression of hopw. [t prohibits the use of force r^.-i 
requires the e>:port of f^ e^ revolution through Islamic qo'^ C 
behaviour. 
Two e'-^ smples of •f^-f conflict between these conte'-'di r"-> 
foreign policy orientations during the hostage crisis would 
suffice. Bani-Sadr wor t ed hard to transfe-- control of f-e 
hostages from their captors to the goverrKnent so as to 
obtain their eventua' release. He and Sadegh Ootbrade^ 
supported the visit of ? United Nations inqttir-.' coT-mi E ? i-'^  
to Iran ior that piirrc^e. but t^e stttdents opposec i * . 
Finally, when the ccf'^ -; ssion was allowec to visit, p\,f^'-. 
Ibid. P,20B. 
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before its d^rrival in Tehratn, Jihomeini decreed that the 
hostage dispute would be -settled by the Majlis, which was 
yet to be elected. At the instance of Bani-Sadr; the 
Revolutiooarv Council r ecQm«<ended the transfer of hostages 
to government control, only to be rejected by Khomeini. He 
was supporting the students as he had initially endorsed the 
seijure ot the US Embassy. 
The other example relates- to the export oi the 
revoli-.tion. The students, who »*ere pursuing the export oi 
the revolution, delyincs the *f*ishes oi Foreign Minister 
Sadegh Ootbzadeh, sponsored an irttermational conference ot 
some i6 national liberation .inovements Irom across the world. 
Other revolutionary loealists, such as Mohammad Montazeri, 
the late son c,i f^yatollah Hussam Ali Montazeri took it upon 
themselves to try to export revolution by any means, 
incKiding the tise err tor^re. He organized the Iranian 
f^ evol ut lunary Orqaniration oi the Masses oi the Islamic 
Republic and wished to despatch Islawsic "fighters to Lebanon 
as ear].' as December JV79, long before tt<e Revolutionary 
Guards were sent there in iVtC. 
Iran finally decided to take the initiative on 
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September 9, 178'? to settle the hostage dispute because the 
hostages were no lonqer neeoedi ^s a means of consol idatLon 
of DOwer bv- •homeini ^ TO his followers required 
reconsideration tor three reasons. First, although 
m s ti tu t iGoa I Iv Dower t^ad beer\ relatively consolidated with 
the adoption of the constitution, the election of the first 
Dresident. the election of t-'ie first Majlis and its first 
speaker by September 1980, the ideological and political 
struggle between Bani-Sadr and his disparate supporters and 
the triumvirate or MQ»-,a<nmad Baheshti, Mohammad ftli Rajai, 
and Hashemi-Raf san jao i ,3nd their unrul^ followers became 
oiore acute after Khomemt tooJ the initiative to settle the 
dispute. Second, the US freer .--IQ of * 12 billion in Iranian 
assets and varying degrees a- economic sanctions by other 
v-jestern nations e»;erted sigr- ••icant pressure on Iran. For 
months Bani-Sadr and the Cei-tfal BanI- believed that the 
freeze would net srtect £r,jnian assets in US ban^ s in 
Britain and the rest of Euroo-^ and resorted to litigation to 
try to free the assets, but their efforts were unsuccessful. 
Third, Iran feared an [r^qi in^.-a^ion. Border Skirmishes had 
escalated; Iran believed th^t Iraq's repproachement with 
Saudi Arabia included some I'lMd of military coalition. In 
addition the Soviet Union rejected all Iranian demands to 
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cut off boviet arms suppliers to Iracj, 
Far from ending Iran •s confrontational foreign policy, 
the settlement of the hostaae dispote actually intensified 
it. In view of increased activities of the United States in 
the Persian Guif, beg inning as early as February 1979, the 
Iranians tooV the United Scutes as the real instigation of 
the Iraqi invasion of [ran i^ei September 22,1980, Paranoid or 
not, this view of the ^^r a^ saving been "imposed" by the US 
"deouty" Saddam Hussein , 
To e-'-al i.tate I Jj^ant Khomeini's movement. Westerners, and 
particularly Europeons, have remembered only the French 
revolution, a comparision v#hich s^ias com-forting to those who 
judoed the Iranian revolution retrograde Hadn't the French 
Clergy, allied to the mohi 111 •  and Louis KVl , opposed the 
forces of Drogrei^ is D/ oppciring the demands of the Third 
Estate"' And wasr< t the Iranian Revolution led, organized and 
oriented by clerics, incensed by reform? It is true that the 
catholic chLirch 1=. not, i5t*<">er al ly speaking, known as a 
liberatinq force and that in our societies the notion of 
secularism is inseparable ir.u^ that of democracy. 
3. Ibid., P.2«:w, 
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The erLiptiori oi the Iranian revolution m 1*^ 78 
rei lected as- cruch a nataon-wide opposition to the Shah's 
^oreiQn policy as to his dc-^ ie^ stic policy. The opposition's 
attach on his foreign poi j c ' centred on his de-"facto 
alliance with the United Stare?, and hence the revolutionary 
epi + het, "the AiTierican ^<•, Whether the "roots" oi the 
revolution are traceable ha'. ^  to 1^^3, when the government 
oi MohamtTiad Mossadegh was destroyed, or to J963, when the 
opposition to the Shah's rec;i<T>e led by Ayatollah Khomeini 
i^ as EL(pp'"eEsed, z-r to the soijety. cultitre, and politics oi 
ar ]rar, oi earjier tirrieE the imf^ediate causes oi the 
re-.olutiori lay iri the unpret edented •ferment of the 1972-77 
period, ':<>' in what can be otscriPed as the "twin revolution 
D^ risinq alienation" -from t^ 'e Shah's regime and "from the 
United States. 
The overthrow erf the Shah meant not only the loss to 
the United States o"f a*-, all';- • ut also the loss oi its radar 
Intel 1 iqence-qatherinq siteir m northern Iran near the 
Soviet border and o'f i he ust ui Iranian bases in the Gulf 
area. These losses put t^-e-' linited States at a grave 
disadvantace viE-a-^is the '-o^'iet Union, Since 1979 U.S. 
policy has been directed toworfs tv*o iftam objectives: (i) the 
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develooment ot an ettective Rapid Deoloyment Force (RDF), as 
announced in Octooer 1979; and $11} the acquisition of bases 
from which the RDF could ooerate, Throughout 1780, the U.3, 
engaged m a trant-ic and rather humiliating hunt for new 
bases in the Gu i t. the f?ed ^ea, the Arabian 5eai, and the 
Indian Ocean, but found itself repeatedly rebuffed. First 
its credibility as an ally h^d oeen severely damaged by the 
fault of the Shah. Second, most of the Arab States m the 
Gulf Area were vulnerable t« >• homeini' s propaganda and had 
no wish to share the Shah s rate. The tragic consequences of 
trying to launch an operatior at the extreme range of one s 
military capabiiity. in the josence of adequate bases in the 
regime, was illustrated bv the disastrous failure of the 
attempt to rescue the Amef-i can nos tages from Tehran in April 
198u^. 
Bararqan tried to pursue a non-hostile, non-alignment 
poll'. toward the United States » To end the Shah's de-facto 
alliance with the United Stc^tes, on March 11\ 197'f Sanjabi 
withdrew Iran B membership from the Central Treaty 
'5, Sa^or^. , Roger, The GeO'.m] 1 ti cal Impact of the Islamic 
Revolution m Iran on the Gulf Region" m A, Braun, 
( ed . ^  , The Miodle East in Global Strategy 
(Boulder , J ^ e"'^ , PP,2<;*r-^"3, 
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Organization (CEiJTO'. More consequently, on November 3, 
Foreign Minister lof-JhKiv f >£ii cancelled the Iranian-US 
defense agreement or Wart.i' , 1959. To overturn the Shah s 
defacto alliance more subs ta.< tively required the overhauling 
of a comolev web ot tnilita-^ i relationships with the United 
States built uD over tne vea, ^ by the Shah, This overhauling 
invol'/ed such issues as the lisoosition ot the * 12 billion 
worth ot arms or, order, t^ « • security ot some 80 American 
Duilt F-14 5, and the disbanding of two secret US listening 
bases near the 5o-/iet bordeir " . 
The international miiitar-y and alliance system into 
which Iran was integrated j>»'iQr to the revolution rested 
upon an accumulation af arr ^  Tjeisen ts, One set dated from the 
mid-l'^ 5i;'s 3nd in itsi UDda!^'d form, the Central Treaty 
Organisation, involveo le^ an LI. military ties with the USA, 
Britain. Turf ey and PaJ-ts^jn, The CENTO was orimarily 
directed aoamst the USSP, •> t also enabled the West to 
supply Its regional a I I le'? tin military support for the 
purposes of internal polit- a-1 control. Despite the fact 
that friction with the US''* declined after the Shah s 
5. Ramazani, no . L ,P, 2'-»5 . 
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agreement with the Pijssi.a"s m 1962, tol lowing a trade off 
in the wa^e ot the Cuban missile crisis, Iran remained an 
important- part of the liSA s oLobal posture vis-a-vis Russia. 
But the Qtticial polic> of the new Iranian government 
has been m the tirst instance one of renunciation, Iran has 
Withdrawn trom CENTO 3n«3 ^he organisation has now been 
terminatt^d. Iran has cancelled all military agreements with 
the USA, and has also abrocjted, the 1721 treaty with the 
USSP. Iran has broken all political and commercial ties with 
Israel, South Africa anrf Chile. 
These policies have had significant international 
effects, because Iran has detmitely ceased to play either 
of the two roles allotted to its under the Shah's agreements 
With the UbA. It is certainly not now part of the western 
alliance system directed against the USSR and it is not 
willinq to Qlav a counter revolutionary role in the Middle 
East at the behest ot '.»<ashtng ton , 
Iran s attitude toward the United States was evidently 
6. Halliday, Fred, The Iranian Revolution m International 
Arfai's: :Programme and Practice' in Farid, Abdul Majid 
(ed.J,Oil and Securit> m the Arabian Gulf {London, 
1981). PP.20-22. 
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intloenced tov American polio towards Iran m the post-Shah 
era. It is imDortanc to r»ot-e that the hostage crisis was an 
ex'ceptiona 1 I / tumultuous event m the relations between the 
two countries and as sucn did not permit a balanced 
evaminatian at (J5- £fan relations. Once it was over, the 
assumetic". of power bv President Reagan out these relations 
in a new CQnte>t. 
When PoreiQn Minister ^ r-^di went to New Yor*- to attend 
the 'JN 6ene'"a] AEsembi- ir. r t-ber.m a secret meeting with 
U5 Eecretar, '-'ance and Pm matador Mc Henry the Iranian 
-oicer' 5tt-or-q dOv(::itE about ts •- US Bincerity, Interviews with 
t^e iC'-mer Ira^-^iBn •foreign .Tfir,lEtry olficiais revealed that 
Iran hac* defrianded tnree f^ oriQE- irom the USA as concrete 
evidence that the. nao qenitinely accepted the revolution. 
One was that the UE should atsoluteiy cease and desist -from 
e'presEi^'Q concern abctut t'-.e trials and punishments of 
D"f"*icalE c-f the -fo'-T.er req^ e, Second]'/ that the United 
States should T^Qrg-p +;, e t; .-
f'Otc'"iD •; T'ljita' 
^•^c t.efc- -'"tec* rc^t 
iCea o * i*"e.t6'"»'•' tft Eh 
? at least some of the more 
o'^ficials of the Shah who 
, tts 'Jz-^-> sho-.ild abadon an-' 
. :i-P'5''3 s hen sic* cooperate wath 
^r.i.y c •^  the Shah s ass-3^ !: 
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r,p,-.- f-::::^- r •• -^'-••'Z'l • i.te" that the LISA was most 
r-ir c 1 i a a*c.--• o^ . f.^  .' the-ES scores, literally accepting 
I. HnfT.e: r-i ? ter-T.H "fc'" ac co<TiC I'CT 11 on . Onl y on the issue 0"f the 
e' t'-;,oa 11 on Q-f the b^ sah t o'f'ficia)s did the American 
diplomats remirtd ''erdi that as a "forfner Iranian e'xpatriate 
in trie USA. he E hoti 1 d fc now that the laws ai the United 
States vMOLild not permat sucf' an action. Otherwise neither 
the issue Q-f a ne**-; ambaEEad?.-'" to Tehran,nor the question oi 
the PL!'"Qe o"f the -former Iranian o"f"ficialE. should be allowed 
to impede the process o^ * npr TI^  i ^  sation. Thus., m June Bruce 
Lamqen became the US charges affairs and was reportedly in 
]ine to become the ambass.t^dor when and 11 the sittsation 
improved. 
America s emphasis in oeaJinq with Iran has been almost 
solely military; to protect Western access to Gulf oil by 
supporting -friendly Arab ^tates m the reqiort which iee\ 
threatened by In^r^ and to bs..iJd up a military capability in 
the Persian Gulf. 
The seizure of the US Embassy on November 4, 197«V and 
the 'i^^-da/ hostage dispute that followed became the 
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cnjcible at an laeaiistic re^ oiijtion-3i<ry foreign policv that 
set Iran auamst inuch at the r-es t of the world, Baiargan s 
nonaliqnment Doii.c- »v35 nationalistic and accomodationa 1 , 
base<i on the histjr-ic pf-inci- " *; at equilibrium. As such, it 
souqht to maintain I f-an s independence within the conte)"t ot 
the e>istina m tercxa t lona 1 s-^ te'T^  of nation states. The new 
idealistic revo lu tiona-'v orientation in essence defied that 
system. its no'-ms -^^ di^ O'oa^lc behaviour, and its 
in tefoa t lona i law. ft <-*as oaa-j on a radical interpretation 
ot Knomeini s trjnsiiionai 'aeaI of what terms an,"Islamic 
world -'(-der". Tne "Student-* aotor" of the US hostages were 
the original architects ar this confrontational foreign 
policy, an orientation that continues to date within the 
r-uling oolilical e L i le and "ertam non-elite factions o^ 
Iranian oolitical culture , 
The seixure o^ U6 e<nba5 - • .»• Tehran and attacked on the 
sta-fi. f-ang the crisis be"! •'' r the US Navy, The carrier 
K i 11 >/ Hf,wr and he-'- escor + B wci <-' o'-der&d to joan the carrier 
battle Qroup ce-ntred on t^ - i'[--S Midway already in the 
Indian Ocean, It appeared thi. ' * or the next two years there 
RafTsarani , No , 1 , P,rOfc 
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would seldom de less t^an cwc American carrier" battle groups 
in the Indian Ocean. 3-rcas lona 3.1 y even three. If one Q* them 
had actually entered the '3'^  • " in April 1980, the operation 
launched dr Americans to rescue their hostages from Tehran 
might have proved a Less e*Ci-arrassir*g fiasco. 
In Iran s ,ie*^  the %-4a^ launched by Saddam Hussein in 
September i'?80 couia onlv de explained by US complicity and 
encouragement. The c.-isis 3s er the seicure of American 
hostages. served, m this view, to encourage an attempt by 
the US and its regiooaL a-. -.'•',., Saddam Hussein to strangle 
the vQung revQlutio^. In sut/,": 3«-"t of this argument. Iranians 
oomt to the absurdit-. and i n^rent improbability of Saddam 
Hussein daring to embart .^n such an adventure against a 
foe three times tne s;z— i* Iraq, and the low t* ey US 
reaction to the attao and its obvious interest Lo reversing 
the blow to its fortunes m t'^ie region represented by the 
revo lu t io'-. . Iranian statements since the out-brea>. of war 
emDhasi::ed the United 5a tes complicity in the Iraqi attact . 
the US hand emerging fr3»7> Saddam's sleeve' and less 
prominent IV the superpowers equally objectionable policies 
on the y'tar both bilaterally -jng m the United Nations, 
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The hardeninq c^ respective positions contintied in 
i<^pm, Ac a rpsLilt o"f itE apii'tTtt involvement in the Beirut 
boTiDirir; ^,i £, ijS .7"ar.\r-ie bfr' • ac^s-, ] rari was designated a 
terrorist state, thus: -fLut^ f--* restricting its access to 
malitarv technology -?rom -.'.e <JS, By JVB4 US policy had 
s^i-ftBd to one o"' pre-'entinc sn Iranian victory in the war, 
impl'.'inc a de-finite tiJt to«»,£-rds Iraq, Iraq gamed access to 
U,5, intelligence data gathered by the AWACs in &audi 
•^rataa. i ^.e o'f'facia'' 'JS position was that it was Iran that 
waE re^L'Einq to erid t^e war not Iraq, which had accepted UN 
Securit- Cotinci] reso-jtion '.I'U'j oi October 1983. Also it was 
argued that wnije Iraq cc>nf med its air attacks on GuM 
shippinq to a de-fir.ed v-^i?" zone, Iran attacked non-
bell iqerents in internationci s .aters. The tilt towards Iraq 
was also evident m t^ *e use •'^ US good olfices in the search 
"for aEHurar.ceE concerrtir.g 11" '.fc'CLirity c<"f a nevj pipeline to 
be built b" Bech+el unzi ante- •j^ J to bypass the Gulf. 
In iVBti, Irart E Eituati.t 1 «^t the war had deteriorated. 
The i^sr seemed unwinnable wi t i.vj'.it a new infusion of arms and 
unneqotiable beLauEe oi irar^ • CV.T intransigence. The margin 
•i o^~ manoe-uivre was. li>iiited b, . f^e regime" s insistence that 
the war was a defer.ce :.••* IsK- ^x tne s.ame time, the polic/ 
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3f hostility tov^ a'-cls both =u :e>--DQwers had proved costly. The 
US •e-Tioaraa damages I'-jr in ^ tualiy eve^v category of arms 
and suD5tit<jtion ,-,a5 si'upj >ot possible in the case of an 
entir'=' air i-orce. I*" the - zsts at hostility to the US 
aoDeareil 'c be tolerable i^ September 198u. five years 
later . -^1'-'- tne coliticai 11^  3e'"a 11 >, e of victory in the war 
and with s^r io>,s t deplete:! stocks, tfie US connection no 
Irnaer- seemed as danqerous or political ties as unthinkable. 
Iran s interest in new contacts was evident: 
(a) to a a m access ^z weap'--^  systems and spares usual Iv 
re-^ er<-ed to as the returr. ut Iran s assets i.e. weapons 
bought and paid »^ or but unpounded by the US during the 
hostaqe episode and the war. 
fbi to mcf-ease its room tor manoeuvre v is-a-vis the USSR. 
(cj to gain some reduction] t the flow ot aid to Iraq. 
(d) to obtain recognition or tf^ e revolution as a historical 
tact . 
None of this EUQpested a basic reformulation of Iran s 
aims. It sti]] considered tr>f US to be aiminci at stalemate 
in the war, that I E , a peace without justic for v^hich its 
net. trail t-' was smolescreen, ^rtd it insisted that the Gulf 
securit- was an jss>ae that .oncerneo Iran,as the dominant 
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powe'-. and not the iJb a*-" at^^* outside Dowers. 
The revelations -j' l'-3 'JS contacts that came to liqht 
in late l'98<b served to und - -t_ore doth the basis tor, and 
the oroDlems and luiita*- a involved m even limited 
dialogue. The orifnat ^ prob ^ n was that, while Iran sought 
arms ("o win a wa' m whicif"" (-^5 oogged down, the US souqht 
ties onmar il/ tj fele^se i». nfjs tages, but also to open up 
channels far future i-^tlue >-'•. Bf making ar«ns the currency 
of the dialogue, the U5 rai = ? a host of questions about its 
intention. its judqement, * its firmness when it came to 
dealing with terrorist st*>-ea. For our purpose, it is 
sufficient to note that the :}'rect supply of US arms appears 
to have included some 2,'>'« Tow (anti-tanf missile), and 
some 2T!> H«W^ (air defence, j^ r^i missiles), the Iranians den/ 
receiving any HAW*'s . 
To some P'tent, nit-er i >e arms for hostages scandal 
relaticnc between Jr^ sr ano ' » KJZ appeared to have reverted 
to norma], Tehran continued '.i^' 4.ail upon the US to admit its 
srrors, unfreeze iran = at i-, and curtail its relations 
with Isr^ie], ano to insist tl lr«n would not subordinate 
11^ =. foreign po^ic^ qoali stE arms needs, Khomeini 
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rejected any idea Q* J rstn'-.' r•::'chetnent and this was seconded 
by his desmna'ed success ' '^'ontaceri antJ President All 
Khaminei. And he still i"listed that The Superpowers 
beginnma with ^he United jtes (were).,, the prime cause 
of world cu,'-r(jDtio--» . re^ , something important had been 
broached in the act ot cu >:act. Iran had survived the 
Doiitical revelations about the contacts and the ev'?n more 
embarrassina lin^s with [•S'^ e^i which made nonsense of the 
proposition tha •• T<e^r,3n w.3.1 »ei to liberate Baghdad as a 
first step towards Jer>js * L _-i'i. Rafsanjani continued to 
threaten to close the ztrai to criticize the US retention 
of Iran s assets and to p-, .. condition for a renewal of 
formal relations, but he <*l . referred with some regularity 
to the channels establishei^ f^Od the eventual resumption of 
ties. The Iranian leaders c "retted the [rangate scandal as 
a famous /ictorv for tne re- "^  iution, The disclosure of the 
contacts with the US came O' the eve of the anniversary of 
the seizure of the US amass, nostages. Rafsanjani pointed 
3ut that; the USA had accepted that Iran is standing 
invincibly on its own fee*^  , Ihis theme was echoed by 
Khomeini. who said that the «-_i-isode was 'an issue greater 
than all your victories tof tne US, after making threats, 
had been forced to eat humta'- pie and its representatives 
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had presented thetixsei/es <Ti...-^iy and humbly at the door ot 
•-his nation and wtsh to es f o<i-5h relations. They wish to 
apologies tor tneir <T\Lstai-s. whereas our nation rejects 
'"hem. 
The ]ranan£<E were therefore qenuinely mysti^fied by the 
ne^t chapter ir, thiE imhapp- relationship, when the United 
States in earl>. i ^ -87 starter :c play up the dangers posed to 
the freedom o^ navioatiort t ••' Iran's acquisition oi the 
5J,l^worm anti-shap "HEsilt-- . ^rom the Eastern bloc, It 
seemed to them that the US "ad moved rather abruptly -from 
courtioQ them to threatenmt, ihem, and they attributed this 
to a cc'Tibi nation r,i iQnoranf .<rtd conspiracy, 
President Reaqan ji.isti^  -sd the need "for an expanded US 
naveJI presence in tne fcul"f i • ;_ : 
"The use oi the vital ?ea lanes of the Persian 
6u3"f will not be dictr.:-. a by the 1 ranians.These 
lanes will not be ai'owed to come under the 
control oi the Soviet (<• iO'"(, The Persian Gul"f will 
remain open to naviaa"" <" by the nations oi the 
world 
Iran welcomed the r^c ',"tition implicit m President 
y, Ch'jDin, Shahram and Chat J fS Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War 
• London. IveSi, f=\l'lA. 
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Reagan s defence or his ? fc-.- of arms to Ir,iin earlier: 
withaut Iran s roaoera ttc». «•« cannot bring an end to the 
Persian Gu 11 war; wttnout . rs s concurrence, there can be 
no enduring peace in the Middle East . 
It appeared that the U- was trying to coerce it into an 
imposea peace . tor- a la>- j.? US naval force oermanentiy 
cruising in the Gulf s watei.--^-i coold not be a neutral act. 
The ^tnited States was -j. •J.IJI > een, after it succeeded m 
getting agreeme'^': in the Ur>. ft^cority Council on Resolution 
598 of July 2»:>, 1987 ca 1 I is . tor a ceasefire, to move to a 
tough to a second resoluttof t 'tposinq mandatory sanctions on 
the party refusing to accep* its terms namely, Iran. Apart 
from anything else, this ' .-^ -inq of muscles appeared to 
satisfv a basic poLitica' eed in the US to purge the 
adminis tr-ation after the Ira sate episode by confronting the 
ragheads m leh^an. (£ra \ appeared as necessary for the 
US ps/che as the 'JS tor Irac * . 
President c ha(T>er>ei li'- '.i the US after Irangate to a 
wounded sna^e . and Ir-^nti > ownentators tended to see m 
the activitv m the United •" - 'H-a.and in the deterioration 
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of relations wtth Frar\c<£ snd Britain, proof of an 
international consoiracy «;j> confront Iran. Yet the same 
Khamenei, aware of the dangers of toymq with such ai beast, 
was also careful to reiterate that unless there was a direct 
threat to Iran s oil ewportn, we have declared that we will 
not pre-empt or s to^ e anv f !.<'«. We will not involve the USA 
m any war with ourselves . P*rime Minister tlussavi put 
Iran s view in a tough way: 
"We beiievf that the -.ay to end the existing 
crisis for these forct-i to fn*] i out, <They) 
are here in order tt -f^^t up bases, establish 
domination i^nii help, f'^.t Saddam regime, they i<re 
here to safeguard the jiJtqitimate US interests in 
the region" . 
No doubt because of t e yast disparity in military 
power, Iran was careful to •''•••.' not to confront the United 
States directly. After an ]r^ %n:3an naval was caught by the US 
laying mines in September, JIH crew taken prisoner, and the 
ship scutted, the Iranian lenoers said that a confrontation 
was a distinct possibility ^> o pven inevitable, and that we 
shall most certainly ta^e rr-. i^ nqe , Later Rafsanjani gave 
what he called an e/^plici; '.i^naog' to the US that Iran 
wDLild soon be engaged on f _.*her front. In the following 
'^•. Ibid,, F.217 
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month the oDportunitv t-j rontront the United States 
presented ttsel^" when US n. t icovt'ers s-snV three Iranian 
oatrol boats. J-iilinq two "^  the crew and capturing four 
others. Iran vowed a crushmo response , On 16 October an 
Iranian missile hit Sea i _. land City flying the US flag 
inside ^fuwait s territorial <-.-aters, blinding the captain. US 
national. The US response was to destroy two Iranian 
ofi'shore oil piattoni-. on I ^  th October, Three days later, 
rejecting the offer to call it quits', Iran hit the Kuwaiti 
aeep-water Sea Island termL> -y i . This exchange of blows was 
notable because of Iran cart f^ ot to attach the US directly 
but to target its reqional -• -^ s. 
Hashemi-Raf san jam =. .jnt to depict American 
involvement in the war as ? -v chapter in the heroic epic 
of the revolution: 
"]t we had won the waf ii'sit year everyone would 
have said that a ?0 m.-2 lion strong country was 
victorious o/er a J4 tjaiiion strong country. But 
i-f we win t^iE year, r -ryone will ><now that we 
,,10 are victorious over the iJMited States' 
Without going full c 'cle, Iran-US relations have 
10. Ibid., P.218, 
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evolved on both -sides. The demands af the war have been at 
the root of the (novemen t on Iran s part, while strategic 
interests have provided the motive, and the war the 
opportunitv, tor the US overture. Ironically, while the war 
W3S the central concern at the islawic authorities, and the 
need tor victory or at least apparent victory was 
indispensable for the continuing vitality and the legitimacy 
of the revolution, for the US the war is a potential danger 
but primaril- a day-to-dav irritant. For the US, there can 
be no question ot aiding an Iranian military victory in the 
•-•oDe of achiSi-inq a better strategic relationship, 
tontainment will have to continue to co-exist with 
cultivation. This difference in perspective and priorities 
has not prevented some attenuated contracts but it does 
limit the scope tor a complete normalization of relations. 
The contacts have revealed a regime m Tehran able to adapt 
to trim its ideolog/ to its needs, to see* more room for 
manoeuvre. It reflects botn confidence at home and near 
desperation about the state of the war. The channel to the 
US had brought some limited returns but not enough to mal-e a 
decisive difference to the prosecution of the war. And as 
long as priorities differed Iran would see*', assistance for 
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its major concern trom ^ notner quarter 
tfhQttiemi conaemnea ("he M«n<?rican rescue mission 'Landing 
military forces in an independent country is an unforgivable 
crime . he said. It contiotev' nis tears regarding American 
intentions about Iran. To fz -?s ta I I a repetition of the 
American action. the Irami*^ authorities dispersed the 
hostages to difi'erent cifciea. The precaution was not 
ei'cessive. It was revealed Latter that Carter considered a 
second raid on Iran shortls itz&'- the April 1980 fiasco and 
that the Pentaqon or-de«-ed anof 'iv plan. 
On lltn September • howt?!'" L lormulated below sentiments 
into speciric demands: return 3 (• tne Shah's assets to Iran, 
cancellation ot US tinancial cLai<T<s against Iran, unfreezing 
of Ir-anian assets, and cjo Amer-ican promise of non-
intervention m t'T-anian B^^air-^, Ronald Reagan^ the 
Republican candidate tor Oi-r^ident, said that he would 
accept thr-ee of these '"ond 11-1--^  T , and leave the question of 
the Shah s assets *or fhe US • jorts to decide. 
Deep hostilit-/ between i jn and US. which existed at 
the start ot the v,ar , pers i -1, On 23th January 1984 
LI. Ibid. . P .22:>. 
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Washington added Iran to its list of terrorist nations' 
This meant that I^ -an was now subject to rigid US export 
controls' . Four iTiunths later at a press conference m 
Lahore. iP-3*tstan). George '«"j-3ti. then US vice-president, 
stated that the wound ca^jsed bv the American hostaoe 
crisis was still Qoen . and that Iran's fingerprints were 
all over tne te'-'ror ana mur:3er o^ American marines in 
_eb3non . He warned the isia-ric Republic against attempts to 
ovei-'throw other OQ-'e'-'nmen ts . 
Both have the nDportant qeopol a ticeil "factors: Iran s 
contiQuity with the Sovjet Unaon, and it& J000 mile long 
coastline along tt.e fcii 1 ^  . lri\n & 1^21 treaty with the USSR 
made It virtually immune -iron z^ i>_%i\ -fledged attack by the 
US. ItE coastline along the ^ull length o-f the Gul-f gave 
Iran iiP'i vailed power to da tspt shipping in the Gull. All 
these "^actors combined to i' hibit the US "from using its 
military miqnt to ciit Ira'" cown to size. And America s 
inability to do E C damaged its standing among its Arab 
I'"' 
allies m the reoion""^ 
On 'November 3 . 1 v5 '6, a p r o - S / n a n L e b a n e s e p u b l i c a t i o n . 
1 2 . M i r o , D i l i p , I r a n Unoer t h e A y a t o l l a h s ( L o n d o n , l ' ? 8 5 ) , 
P. 31 '0-31 . 
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Al StMr-sa. r e p o r t e d s e c r e t c o n t a c t s over 18 months between 
hia*"' l e v e l L'S ano [-a^iL-jn o f t ' i c i d l s . I r a n ' s g o a l was 
Amer ican- made mi l i ' i a rv n^rrjware, £t i s now c l e a r that 
America s aim was the r e l e a s e of s e v e r a l American c i t i z e n s 
held h o s t a g e in Letianoo o '^ p r o - Iranian m i l i t a n t Sh ia 
g r o u p s . 
In November J^&'S. an jranaan arms dealer Manucher 
Gorbani-fer contacted the former CIA o"f"ficer Theodore 
Sfiaci le,-' iri West G-ern-an/ ^nd ::«ropo&ed the selling oi US arms 
tc I •a'"' a& a swap "for hostages in Lebanon, Nr, Shachley 
passed or< the information to Washington. In July 198^, Mr. 
Robert Mc. Far] arse, the t^ ef^  National Security Advisor, 
•fresh -from *">is disctissions r*ith Nr, E>avid Kimche oi the 
Israeli Foreign Hirtistry, -:.-. ways and means oi improving 
relations with ]rarv, parti culdriy with the bait oi weapons, 
proposed the idea o^ * arms ^AI^S to Mr, Reagan. What really 
transpireo in White Hotise tir'..m t*"<en till the end oi August 
when Israel delivered the •iiriE.t shipment oi arms to Iran, 
remains a mystery even i }. 1 } today. Mr, f1c» Parlance 
emphatically testi-fieo that ?•!>• , Reagan approved the shipment 
m August. "1 want to get the hc^staqes out. li the Israelis 
say we can do it, let s try" the President allegedly said 
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chief Qt Statf Donald Reaoja and Attorney General I Edwin 
Meese claimed that f*r. Reaocn f new about it only after the 
deliver- was made, [n teres ting li' , President, during his 
first appearance be^^are the Tower Commission accepted Mc 
Far lane s claim but Later recanted as having approved the 
deal well after August but could not remember the actual 
date. The Tower, '^'lus^  te and Scowcroft panel, while granting 
to the legendary memory lapses of the President, concluded 
that the "legal "inde'-Dinf--1' ^'" of first shipment of arms to 
[ran. bv way ot Israelis W5i "at best highly guestionable" 
even it hr. Reagan gave the»»'' nis approval. 
Mr. Peagan consistent!., uenied that they were arms tor 
hostages. At least until I Hn;- commission found otherwise. 
Curious as it mav seem, not once in his 15- minute address 
on Thursday did Mr. «eagan conclusively state as to why he 
approved the sales, even, when he eventually did. He seems to 
have arcept;ed the report s eifston of what his role was, an 
against his own. "I told the American people £ did not trade 
arms tor hostages. 1y hea' ' 3"d my best intentions still 
tell me that is true, but t . 'jcts and the evidence tell me 
it IS no*-". He continued b ti«otaming that he "undertoo^ 
the original Iran initiative m order to develop relations 
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with those who might assume leadership in a post-t" homeini 
qovernment.rt is clear ffom the board's report, however. 
that [ let mf pe^'sona 1 concern tor the hostages spill over 
into the qeoDQ 111 ica ' 5tf"ateq' o'" reaching out to Iran" 
Whatever be the truth, the [ran deal blossomed on 
September 14 when a US host5u-=? in Beirut, Benjamin Weir was 
released. In Janua"-. l'^ >^ 6, Mr. Peagon signed a secret 
Intel lioence "t•l^ .3L•^ q" 3nc authorised direct US a^ms 
transactions with Iran. Mt . fieagan also instructed tir. 
William Casey, the chter of 'TIA, to conceal the project from 
the congress. Mr. Shulti and Mr. Weinberger were also not 
no11fled . 
t^ cco'"dinQZ'. , the -first Direct shipment olf weapons from 
the US to Irpn were '^eiiverea in February and the money was 
deposited i^ - the SWIE= arcotH t as arranged. Mr, Edwin Meese, 
sLibseQ'jent 1 •' discioE-ed tha*- the profits were "funntlled to 
the Coritra siipp] . network, n>s was a turning point in the 
Iransc£,m Scandal, i-r,r jt .i.Mz a blatant violation of 
conqreEE lona I ] aw tnen iri ccerat ion that barred any e'<tra 
leqal aid to Nicaraquan rebel •^., 
13. Adam. Sum I , Begmni'tq of the end of I ranscam' ,Tjhe 
Hmdt^stan Tames (H.T.), »'^ arch 8, 1*^86. 
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Mr, f-eaqan, o-f course', flatly denied any >fnow2edge of 
the a-f "fairs, 5o rtid Mr. Reaqan and Mr. Casey, In fact, Mr. 
Ca^e-- claimed that he came to know of Iran deal (before 
fcmal tsutHor isrition I oniv through "gossip", and even less 
about the Contra a> TIE deal. Mr. Mc Far lane testified to the 
confarv and said Mr, Case*' t now about it all and that CIA 
had provided trDnsportation -tar a November 1985 shipment. 
The commission cond tided ti i wa= evidence to show that Mr. 
Case" received infprmatici L-out the diversion of funds 
almost a month before + h- <• '.or ^ broke out. As for Mr. 
Reaqan. the cotrm \ss-ior< laid i^ re a "primary responsibility" 
for all the rLir-awa . ;3Ciicit^ u the NSC. 
Iranoate has demoiis'-n f^resident Reagan's claim to 
lead a world crusade againtt letrorism and quite possibly 
aaamst communiEm at well. No wonder America's Europeon 
all let nave received the revelations coming out of 
WashiriQton with c-'nical amusement. The loss of credibility 
has other, morp terious repercussions. It has put a brake on 
the UJest Asia ;:iFace proct cind greatly reduced the US 
Cripacit/ tz< o i B' a ciqnifac <it role m it. 
Moreover, it alto cat** ••• * tremendous embarrassment to 
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moderate Arab States i ii e Eavpt, Jordan and )<.uwdLt which 
have cantrLbuted to the Ifaui war effort. These countries 
now Teei be tra ved . a'ld more 'Man a little arngry that Mr. 
Reagan ne i ped sustain ("hoineini at the very moment when 
military weaf ness , e-.onamic caJ lapse and growing domestic 
-resistance was •Tia'' ina m s regime move unstable than e^er 
before, f^mallv. President Reagan has even managed to convey 
the idea to the Lebanese ^^ ^^ [bol lah' and other terrorist 
groups in West Asia that it j-j sate to abduct Americans and 
Europeans and to e>;change them tor sophisticated arms and a 
handsome ransom. 
After a] J t m s , the realisation that the US was playing 
a double aame could ha-e a de-£»stating impact on the morale 
oi the Irapi army and the qovernment. Surprisingly, Saudi 
Arabia, tHe most power-*ul rountry in West Asia, has 
maintained a CLU'IDUE silence '-•ver the whole affairs. Riyadh 
simpl>. den .led r..,-g.cc reports tnat Saudi billionaire Adnan 
>>ha5noQi was invoJ ^ ed ir- setti'icj up and even financing part 
o+ the US- Israel- Irjn jea I 
For obvious reasons. I rsi' ^as been wooed by both super 
14. Jha. A. N.. Faliour of i,*ngate , H.T., Jan. 5, 1987. 
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noi/.c;'-^ "-11- ^ wi*"'-i i i T t e '-^ l i r j . ' e s 3nd t n e ^ n s . The Sovle•" 
'niTH n^ r-. ^ •• r n e -.d,9nf-^j>^ -> - I ' I E ' j n b r o r e n p r e s e n c e i n I r a n 
a i t h o u ' t '•tit.--e Ma/- )»-•>-". .jo-, :•<*« d o w r a . But i t s a d v a n t a g e i s 
' ^ e u t ' o l ^ . t ' b ' i« jeuu' '<?'MCI'" J .* i o c a t i a n and a l o n g b o r d e r 
,~iith [ r a n , ' h e ni t-c- . o t ^ " ( S S Q - [ f - a n t a n r e l a t i o n s , and ^he 
TP+liC* 'Lm i d e o ! oq l e s nt t h e two s t a t e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s 
-.ri-ii- ' '-t 5 * i 3ina c ' e - - * d o m i n a n c e and ^n t e r f e i^ence 
"•o - "I i- • ^ -- e L 'T d J p I " '^  ^ ' ' * L' f e . 
.' ^ • "-, w j - f o ^- ' jr t h e (T\ind o t US p o l i c v 
" l a n n * . ' - =n J , i n s t ^ i t c i " »^ 11 imoiemen t a t i o n , t h e US 
a iw3 1 I'j I ' •5int? '^ i r I f - ' 1 ' a u r r e o t i t i o u s l i n t ' s w i t h 
i<^fir . «-^ '*» ' ^eor ;-- B ; - ' ' ^ - - ..» J t h e p r e s i d e n c y , t e n s i o n was 
- t i - ' -. ^ - f t . - . ' ' . J - i n r h e wa^e o t ^hoir^eini •= 
t-<tK- 31 J . --'" 3:< I >" - < ' " - s a i e . The S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t 
f i ' i ~ i e "< • >e Jt-rr-et-. f-^  *"*"*•:; ("omer t , I r a n - US r e l a t i o n s a r e 
'^ -^  i J1 1 . '' •'hoiT\)^ini ~ •le^*-'^ ^ r e s i d e n t Bush made a c r y p t i c 
•-TiTi ne' *• h-iciriT »-hat U an would move t o w a r d s "a r e s p o n s i b l e 
TI f^ ' ir -f-te wc-ri:* '-ommurt: <-v . [f P a f s a n j a n i e m e r g e s a s a 
fr j--)_ riJ ; -3 Lf *-h<3 I<I(:J 5 ^ .^ r /, a r 2; e c t l o n a b o u t t h e man comes 
f r i ip n-o , J nean • na •>"'-- 1 .^if»i-, > r o u o h may q u i e t l y o c c u r . 
' ^ . '-'t 1 u ' . »-'. H .} < ^ , * •-; n • home m i 5 Leqac^ (-•, "^  . , 
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bi't the admioi ? t ra t jon s p u M i c justi t i cataon for the 
BDDarent c-'ange in itE often declaimed poJacv of not dealing 
with terrcriEtc or vjith ^.tates that sponsor terrorism was 
the need -'or the 'J-itf.'d -tates to open channels of 
cofnmnni cation with jrtore ".-•de<'ate Iranians who might 
determini? the c^-nr^iti:r .-,; the regime once Ayatollah 
Khnmei"! passes fro^i th^ i-ceii... 
few accepted the aoministration s explanation. However, 
ever ECMTI6- senirr ad'f.a r. i ^  1 - i,, 11 on officials dissented. 
Secretary, o-f Defence Caspar Weinberger argued that all 
moderate !>-anian leader5 had already been billed and that 
an*- '-eff'ai'^ iing were "Ixsnatic^". And many opponents of the 
poiic e-p'-esEec* tcf-tcs'-n about damage to US relations with 
(•'.'-at. ttcHt-- . 
if ^i^,'"t, LT'th ^.Dporer, t f and stipporters of tne 
f'-p'^  idpr,»- - a^ .p'-:: a-'' z- J r an betray a basic 
mi stinder? tar-dinn r- tfe -i i LIIJ11 On an that country and the 
real thr-c-at it oo^et '.o U-.- if t-e-ei'sts. During the last six 
earc (^,5, pcii 1 c/ma* e< i ha-fc thought of Iran only in 
_onfiecticr, with de vX-".) opme<T t i '- •^'"16 Iran-iraa i^e^r and t (-le 
•EecLi' It • r^ the P'e'-?ac,r fit,' •• ^ -.b '.-•tates. The*, have become 
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alarmed when Iran seems to be winning and h^ve r'etu'^ ned •ic 
comolacency when Iranian sQtdie'"s a'-e "o loncef able to '"^c: ^ e 
forward. Most US QO I ic^ '^ ai e'"= ha/e ta^en ^c" a"*?nted I'^ an = 
territorial and ooliticaL s'j-"-.'i-'a 1 a'^ d i t= con t m-j^ tion o^ 
cool- thought now f^aoidlv fi^ D""o^ -'ina relations wit*^ the 
Soviet Union. Thev have e^'aggera ted Iran's ability to 
unleash Muslim fundamentalist forces m the Middle East. 
And, blinded by their focus,thev have been unable to 
recognize that there at-B some positive aspects to Iran's 
foreign policy: its vigorous opposition to the Soviet 
presence m Afghanistan, its friendlv relations with such 
US allies as Pakistan and Turkey. and its balanced 
relationship with Eastern and Western Europe. Because o^ " 
this flawed approach, US 0Qlicy. toward Iran. particularly 
in the wal'e of the arms for hostages fiasco, poses dangers 
for a wide range of US interests m Persian Gulf and beyond. 
Iran, regardless of regime, remains of enormous 
geopolitical significance to the United States. It is the 
most formidable barrier between the Soviet Union and the 
Persian Gulf: To ('eep Soviet troops away from the Gulf, 
they must be Kept out of Iran. 
But Iran does not have to disinteorate or erupt into 
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civil war to influence its neiahbou^s. Ir^n f-emains 
important by virtue Q^ its sice, DODulation. economic 
resources, and military potential. So long as the United 
States wishe's a role in the Persian Gulf area, there+-Qre, it 
must try, as with every other i'T\Dortant state in the ai^ ea . 
to affect Iran s poiittcai evolution in directions that ar-e 
compatible with U'5 interests. For- this reason, the United 
States must adopt a broader perspective ot Ir-^n. It should 
consider Iran on its awn terms and not just in relation to 
the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf Arabs securitv. The United 
States should have a clear viev* of its short and long term 
interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf,and of possible 
points of conflict between them. And it should assess, as 
accurately as possible, the nature, source, and ranae of 
threats to US interests m Iran and in the Gulf. Finally, it 
should not exaggerate one set of threats while underr-atina 
others^^. 
The United States had diplomatic relations with neither 
of the belligerents when the ^ar broi-e out. IrnQ was openlv 
suspicious of an>/ American role in the Gulf, and the regime 
16, Hunter, Sbireen T,, After the Ayatollah Foreign Policy 
No,66 (Spring. iS'87i, PP.76-^. 
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in Tehran remained deeply hostile towards the Sh^h s 
erstwhile ally. The situation was comolicated further by the 
continuing hostage crisis, which cccupied Washington's full 
attention. 
The importance D-f the &u]-f -for the U5, both 
geostrateqi ca] 1 y and as a imajor source of oil, had been 
restated by Persident Carter m January i<?80. In the wake of 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he declared that 
any attempt by any outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be repelled by 
any means including military means ,, 
Whilst the United States ideally wished to avoid 
becoming involved in the Iran-Iraq war. American interests 
centred on the oreventLon of any physical in tef^ruption m 
the e>;port of oil from the Gulf, either as the result of 
deliberate actions on the part of one or both of the warr-mg 
states. or because of an uncontrolled widening of the 
conf1ict. 
Inspite of the revelations of secret US-lranian arms 
deals in November iVS6 L'S strategy towards the Gulf <^£ir has 
17. Adelphi Papers. No.rjv (Spring, iV87),p,?i. 
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consisted, broadly sc"= = *jng, of thf-ee in ts'-r-ela ted stipends: 
repeated public comititments to freedom of navigation thr-Qijqh 
the Strait of Hormur; the reassurance of local allies: and 
the maintenance of the regional balance of power. UnderivLnq 
these strands is an awareness of the need to limit potential 
Soviet gains withoivt at the same time orovo*mg j Soviet 
response that could ie^a to confrontation. 
When the war bro*e out. American naval units were the 
only ones capable of f-cintering an immediate threat to the 
Strait of Hormur: the United States was thus the de-facto 
protector of the oi? iTterests of Saudi Arabia and otHer 
Gulf e>;porters, and. by extension. of the major oil 
consumers. Within three weeH's, the number o* western shiDs 
in the Area,, including SritisH and French units, had risen 
to sixty. Though it v<ould be difficult to argue that the 
firm American stand alone deterred Iran from implementing 
its oft- repeated threat to close the Strait, official 
warnings do seem to have had an effect-if only to confirm 
the notion that such actions would clay into Iraq s h^nds, 
When Iran declared the entire region a potential war cone m 
1980, President Carte'" defended the freedom of international 
navigation in the Gulf; there uoon Iran responded that its 
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own forces would I'.eeD the Strait ooen. In May 1982 then IJS 
Secretary of State Ale>;andar Haig reminded Iran (at a time 
when it was enjoying considerable success on the gfound.' 
that the US was not indifferent to the outcome of the war. 
and warned against broadening it; this seems to have 
prompted Rafsanjani to declare that Iran was not adventurous 
and did not intend to jeopardice oil supplies. 
The continued use of Arab ports to land supplies for 
Iraq and reports of a Franco-Iraqi agreement for the loan of 
a number of Super Etendard aircraft provoked fresh Iran tan 
threats to navigation in late 1983. These threats caused 
considerable international alarm. In line with the more 
outspoken US attitude. Secretary of State Shultr said that 
Western nations could not allow Iran to blackmail them; 
President Reagan, too. expressed the belief that the free 
world' would not allow the Strait to be closed. He repeated 
these assurances in m.'v 1.986- This willingness to counter an 
Iranian blockade does not extend, however. to the 
1 8 
commitment of major fleet components to the Gulf 
The United States "Great Satan" has everything going 
18. Ibid., PP.51-52. 
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against it; its oast with the Shah, the searing experience 
of the hostage cirsis. the years of mutual suspicion and 
accusations, and its pro-Iraq, anti-Irjn tilt in the Gulf 
war. What might motivate better relations? From Iran s 
perspective, America is 3 great power and can not be ignored 
by a state that aspires to influence beyond its borders. In 
the future the United States could be useful for a classic 
power balance if the USSR should threaten. But if the USSR 
continues present policies, Iran is unliVely to worry about 
a Soviet threat. After all, Iran safely ignored the threat 
from the United Staes during the hostage crisis without 
turning to the USSR for support. 
More important for Iran than political dialogue will be 
what the United States can offer Iran through commercial 
channels. Spare parts and new machines, training, and new 
techniques Are needed in every sector of Iranian life 
whether in the military where the Pentagon set the 
foundation under the Shah or in agriculture and medicine 
where Americans did relatively little but -^rG respected, 
Khomeini has called training impressionable Iranian youth in 
foreign universities the greatest danger to the republic. 
But many technocrats too^ such training and I'ept their 
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purity; they will want the benefits American universities 
can offer for Iran's development, Their model is Japan.a 
modern state that preserved its culture while modernizing. 
Also, many Iranians ar^ attracted to the basic "goodness" of 
the American people, despite hostile official policies. 
Khomeini and Montaseri each has endorsed relations with 
Washington on a new basis. 
Kuwait approached both the United States and the Soviet 
Union in I'^Bh with a bold plan to refjaq f re-register i 
Kuwaiti ships and thereby bring them under the direct 
military protection oi the superpowrs. The Soviet Union s 
positive response to the ^'uwaiti proposal promoted the 
United States to abandon its initial hesitancy and o^ ffer to 
reflag eleven Kuwaiti ships. As the first two Kuwaiti 
tankers were re-flagged on 21 July, I'^Sy, Washington 
explained its policy unterms of preventing a friendly 
country from depending on the USSR for the protection of 
its oil through the Strait of Hormur', Perhaps an equally 
compelling reason for this was to limit the damage in US-
Arab relations as a result of Washington's secret arms sales 
to Iran» However, in its haste to recoup its losses among 
the Arab States of the Gulf, The Reaqon administration has 
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taken a position that in effect has br-Q<jght the United 
States more explicitly than before on the side of Iraq'. 
The deployment of thirty-eight American and some thirty 
five additional Western Eoropeon ships m or near the 
Persian Gulf did not help Iraq to win the Gulf war through 
military means. In other words. US naval presence m the 
Gulf only emboldened Iraq to escalate its attacks on Iranian 
shipping and other economic and civilian targets, such as 
Baghdad's summer 1988 missile attacks on major Iranian 
cities. 
The declared objectives- of the US military presence in 
the Persian Gulf, however, has been to tilt towards Iraq. 
The Peagan administration publicly justified the increased 
US military build-up in the region m terms of maintaining 
freedom of navigation, ensuring the free f 1 ov* of oil, and 
countering an increased Soviet presence m the Persian GuJ-f. 
From Iran's perspective. these objectives. are based on 
fallacious assumptions. 
With respect to the issue of -freedom o^ navigation, 
Iran sees a distinct double-standard irt U& policy ir. the 
Gulf, Between March 1P8^ and March J*?87, 173 oil tankers and 
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other commercial shios were reported to have been hit bv the 
two main belligerents in the G«J I f K^-^r, about 70 per cent of 
the attacks on commercial shiooinq came from Ir^a^ Ir^q 
initiated the "tanV^r war", thus compelling Iran to 
retaliate by attaching ships carrying goods to Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait-Iraq's major i'l^r- allies. The main purpose of 
Iran's strat€?gY m thi^ regard has been more to intercept 
arms and other war-r»? I ? f.f,:f supplies headed for Iraq than to 
restrain traffic in the o^es. Frotm the Iranian perspective, 
the massive US military presence m the Gulf has had an 
adverse effect on freedom of navigation as the number of 
strikes against the ships in the Gulf increased by 56 per-
cent from 1986 to 1987. 
On 21 September 1997, a US Navy helicopter fired on 
Iran Aj r, an Iranian ve?-9.el that was accused by the Reaqan 
administration oi beinq a mine-laying ship, a charge 
vehemently denied by Ir^n, Instead, President A]i Khamenei 
of Iran claimed that the MS attack on Iran Ajr was timed to 
coincide with his ar-j al in New Yorh to attend the 42nd 
session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
The tension betweer. Iran and the United States reached 
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new heights in spring 1988 in 3 •series of SL^U I taneous US 
and Ir^qi attacks on Iranian targets. On 18 Aoril 1988. 
American naval forces m t,,e Persian Gulf mounted an atr and 
sea attach on Iranian frigates and oil olatfor-ms in resoonse 
to damage inflicted a few days earlier on a US ship by a 
mine allegedly laid by Iran. The significance of these 
attacks lies not in the magnitude of US fire power but in 
the Iranian response ^n US military attacks on Iranian 
targets. Untill then. the prevailing assumption in 
Washington was that Iran would not challenge the US military 
head on but would resort to terrorism' if confronted with a 
direct military challenge from US forces in the Gulf. In 
fact, Iran did not choose to retaliate directly when the US 
Navy destroyed two Iranian oil platforms in October 1987. As 
a Reagan administration official stated: 
Our e>tpe»ctation was that it would be similar to 
the last time we attached, and that the Iranian 
would not retaliate 
From B purely military standpoint, direct confrontation 
between the world's mo= ( powerfttl navy and Iran was doomed 
to -failure. However, from the Iranian perspective, a 
19, Entesssr^ Nader, Superpowers and Persian Guli 
Security? "^ he Iranian Perspective' Third World 
Quarterly'. Vol.10.,No.4 (October, 1988), P.1446. 
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tactical military defeat at the hands af US forces was 
benificial for two reasons. First. it could serve as 
warning to the US fof-ces that thev, too, could suffer-
military setbacJs. albeit on a rnuch siT'alle'- scale. In this 
view, the downing d1 an American attacl' helicopter bv Iran 
was hailed as a victory for the Islamic Republic, Second, 
direct US-Iranian milit--*-- confrontations m the Gulf could 
boost Iran's political ^nd diplomatic position by portrymg 
the USA as a direct participant m the I ran-Iraq war, thus 
damaging US claims of neutratitv m the Gulf, 
Moreover, US-Iranian military clashes coincided with a 
major Iraqi attach to recapture the Faw peninsula, Iran was 
convinced that the USA had coordinated its actions with 
Iraqi forces in order to distract Iran. The Islamic Republic 
further accused the United States of providing air support 
to the Iraqis in their Ofive toward Faw. 
The most devastating US attach on an Iranian target in 
the Persian Gulf was L>^ shooting down of Iran Air flight 
655 by the cruiser USS V-.-icennes on 3 Jul^ L988. C 11 I m q -^^ O 
passengers. ).'n short, the United States claimed that the USS 
Vincennes mistook the Airbus jetliner for an P-i4 fighter. 
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Further more, the USA co'^tended th^t -since hostilities had 
broken out earlier in the day between US and Iranian fof'ces 
in the Gulf, the USS Vmcennes was still in combat mode, and 
its captain thought that the Iranian oassenger airliner was 
an attacJ'ing plane when it failed to respond to wa»-nirtq 
issued by the US cruiser. 
Although the USA expressed regrets about the loss oi 
innocent civilian lives, it bagan to issue seli serving 
statements praising the heroic US -forces in the G u M . 
President Reagan called the shootinq dovm oi the Iranian 
passenger jetliner an ~u"derstandabie accident' because the 
ship's crew thought they were under attach. De-finang all U5 
military actions in the Persian Gull as purely defensive. 
Reagan announced: 
we will not put any limit on our act oi s e M 
de"fense. We will retaliate very strongly whenever 
we find American interests.' 
The tragedy of Iran Air flight 655, 15 the latest 
manifestation of US policv in the Persian Gulf that has gone 
awry. In a broader sense, this painful tragedy and its 
aftermath sre reflective of a new mood of alarm and angei- ' 
20. Ibid., P.1447 
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toward Third World reolutian^t-y regimes, -a mood th^t in 
its Dolicy manifest-^*! }"< became t^e h-^ Iln^ ar-i Q i- Reaaan 5 
foreign polic/ in the '^ •-ifd 5«jQrld rooted in a policv settirtq 
characterised by tunnp-l vtsiort and historical amnesia 
Reagan s strategy HAS n-ertamlv strengthened the USA 3 
military posture and f J^  re-jsro iecttQ<T, capabilities m the 
Persian Gulf but wi ' -j< I blending that military strategy 
into a coherent diolo'^ i •> t ic strateg>. One painful result o^ " 
Reagan s combined st'-^tegv ot 'tiilitaf^ -* strength and 
political weal'ness in She Third World has been, to borrov) a 
phrase from Noam Choms' •. the regular need to r-esQr^ to 
21 
violence' in Third World c»"isis areas 
In a surprise move, the US go%errs«nent ^^5 droppeo ail 
charges against four Israelis and five international 
businessmen accused of t'-^mg to sell * 2,3 billion worth o^ " 
US made weapons to l<t-4Ky, fn oaoer-H filed wit^* the US 
District court in New Yort, federal orosecutors acknowledged 
they would be unable '^ z 'iisprove "bevond reaonable doubt" 
the defendants claim thvt thev were acttnq under the same 
authority involfed bv '^_ie Peagan administration for its 
secret arms for hostage-=^  <1ealing [ran. 
21. Ibid.. PP. 1448-4*-
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One o-f the de"fencp lawyers t<ol<d Los Angeles Ti^nes that 
US Attorney Rudolph w, Giuliani, the high pro"file New v'ori-
•federal prosecutor, hsd disjnissed t^e case because he 
"realised he was not only qoinq to lose a headline case, but 
he was goinq to drag thr new Bush administration through the 
muck oi contraqate in the process". 
The de^fendants were arrested in April 1VS6, caught in a 
sting operation mounted by the US cvtsto'r<s service. One oi 
them, retired Israeli &eneral Avrahman Bar-Am, contended 
•from the start that t hc>'' had been acting on behaM oi the 
governfuent oi Israel. Wl^ tpr. the Iran contra scandal brof>e m 
November 1*786 with the news that the Peagan administration 
had been secretly selling arms to Iran, the defendants 
claimed that they had known about and were acting in accord 
with the administration s secret policy o^ selling arms to 
1 ran. 
The evidence ior their claim was. SLibstanti al , At a 
White House discussion oi the attempted * I". 5 billion sale 
held soon alter the scandal broke, the deal was 
characterised as a "private (endeavour) with government 
knowledge". 
169 
Cvrus Hashemi, v^ ho posed as the Jranian bLiver in the 
stina was |<nown +o BO'^S oi the would be sellers as a'^  
mtermediarv -for the Ira'-tian requtne and as v^e who was close 
to various centres ci ODwer an the U5, Accordinq to the 
London observer, Hashera had wc"-|hed iar the CIA since J^7^., 
Reportedlv ^i cousin o^ '-'ajlis Speaker Hashemi Ra^sanjani, 
Hashemi had been mdirt-d in J'?£t4 i or i]3eQa]]v export m o 
arms to Jran and had ao'"-"^ ed to cooperate v*ith US authorities 
m exchanoe -for ]enie-<c'. 
Hashemi and Adnan Mia=hoqi met with then Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres in the summer o"* i'VB^  to disct«ss sellmq arms 
to the Islamic Republic. Shortlv afterwards, * f^ashoqi beqan 
working with Manucher Ohorbani-f ar , t.»"te go-between produced 
bv Israel who was user" jm the admmjE tration s arms--for-
hostaqes dealinqs, E'-'-Iier the thr^e men Hashemi. 
Ghorbani-far und ("hashTi.-, had met m Europe and discussed 
getting "official US snT^sorshiD" fnr- arm^ sales to [ran . 
The US «»nd Ir<3n a m mcfe-ssinq l\ resortinq to bilateral 
negotiations to settle hJ 1 I ions of dollars in claims before 
the special [ran-US clat'^ tribunal m The Haaue. The aim 15 
22. Middle East International (MEU Jan.Z'.*, 1989, PP.16-18. 
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to bring the nine yea?- old settieiinent of'ocess to -an-ear-lv 
end, and, possibly, to ooen the wav for' norma i is-31 ton of 
overall relations. 
The most recent '"out oi cottr*" settlement involved 
Phillips Petrole^tm CDmrsny and the National Iranian Oil 
Company (N30C), The tvio sides agreed « Eiim of *• '^2 million 
after Iran protested t'»^ t a * 110 nsilJion award by one of 
the tribttnal's three member panels was "biased". The 
tribunal had scheduled hearing for IB January to decide 
whether to consider IrpT s complaint, but cancelled it after 
Phillips and NIOC reached their o»*n agreement on tbe lower 
figure. 
The twci cotmtries had eBrlxe-r mgr^eti the effective 
liquidation of an account set up with the Banh of England, 
the U^ central ban**,, m l^&i to settle claims by US banks on 
non-syndicated loans to the late Shah's government, Iran v*as 
unable to draw on the * 818 mi HI ion balance of the account 
because of some remaining minor clai*r«s, allowing Tehran to 
withdraw the balance m mid-December, Jn ^n apparent gesture 
of goodwill,, Iran agreed to cash i" onlv * fi68 million, 
transferring the remaining $, 2^3 million to the account in 
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the Hague. Both the Haaue and London accounts were set up 
after the US hostaqr: c^-isis ot L97'5-8L to settle financial 
claims arising out nf the revolution. The claims run into 
billions of dollars, -^nd onir about * 1,000 million has so 
far been settled thrmigh the special Hague tribunal. 
The original H^ ci'"? account of t 1,000 million fell 
below the agreed min:'^ -/- of * 500 million in 1989, and the * 
243 million injection has nov* raL=&d it to about * 650 
million. There is a ''uf ther * 100 «»»illion in an associated 
interest account, but I'"an may soon have to replenish the 
fund if the pace of nf-: tt leme" ts soeeds up and thef-e ^r^e 
further big awards to f'r firms. 
The question ol" oayment in oil and the issue ot 
undelivered US military equipment claimed by Iran could 
provide <'ey early tests of the two countries wide?-
political intentions. Both ^f'^ tied to US sanctions imposed 
during the hostage crisis, 
Iran's *• 12,CK»0 fi. IJiom claiTf for the delivery o-i 
military equipment ordered by the Shah before the 1979 
revolution- known as ca='? E'-J- i s now at the briefing stage. 
Iranian sources sav 1 "^ e US is wi^linq to make a cash 
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settlement but Iran insists on the equiDistent. Presidential 
permission for some or all of the weaDonry to be delivered 
to Iran would represent a significant breakthrough in 
relations. although it would require a different perhaps 
impossible policy revision by the ad(t«inistra tion m 
Washington. 
The Iranians. at the Hague' vierp untill recently 
outclassed by the An.e-ican corporate lawyers. They also 
faced a built in bias ar the neutral third judges on each oi 
the three tribunal ps'iels usually came -from Western or 
Western-oriented countries hostile to the Islamic and 
revolutionary government in Tehran, 
Nevertheless the Iranians still -face heavy odds. There 
is apparently, a thriving marHet in stolen and -forqed 
Iranian documents vihich former employees d NIOC and other 
state organisations allegedly sell to US -firms. 
"Quite o"ften. originals cf documents we need are 
23 missing from our files in Tehran" , says one Iranian 
lawyer. Thesre are: ali'^z«?dly sold to US claimants for large 
sums. The lawyer claims that exiles who fled abroad at the 
23. WEED. Feb.9, 1990, P.7, 
173 
time of the revolution A i •<5Q tool- b i 3r>»' letteif- he-ad's which 
were then post-dated to sho*-* that unshipoed goods we^e m 
fact delivered. 
The tribunal hac EO far accepte-d oone of Iran's- claiins 
of forgery. The Iranians, however, benefitted in at lea&t 
one case concerning rt^l'n dccument^., wf-nen the former chief 
of Ashland Oil Corpc^ft i (•" alleged]/ o-ffered crucial files 
to Iran. He was charr.'--: n a US co«rt and Ashland settled 
Iran's claims by payT"? •- 7'!"^  mai]ic«" in September J'^ B^  -fc 
pre-revo] ution oil sHio^ t-^ r ts. 
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[RAN'B RELf.TIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
It had alwaypj been assumed that if there was 
instability in any part of the twiddle East. the Drincipai 
beneficiary would be the Soviet Union. In the long term this 
may be the case, but m short term the USSP is having its 
own problems. Eunda<T>en ta 1 ist IslaiT> is strongly anti-
Western. From the S O V L ? L point of view it is good. But the 
inference can not "-•= r'^ -^ wn that fundamentalist Islam is 
therefore pro-Sovie^: In fact, the Pussians are showma 
increasing irritation with the Iranians for not recognizing 
at once that the Russians are the natural allies of the 
Islamic revolution m Iran. A report m Pravda on March 9, 
1982, claimed that communism and Islam •^r-^ not 
irreconcilable. Howeve-" , here, we call what Lenin observed 
about religion: 
Religicm is one of the forms of spiritual oppression 
which everywhere weigh upon the masses of the people crushed 
by continuous toil for others.,,,..Religion teaches those 
who toil jn povert" • ''3 their lives to be resigned and 
patient in the world and consoles them with the hope of 
reward in heaven..,..,..Re]iqion is the opiate of the 
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people, a 5ort 0"f sp i+na] lionor, meant to mate the slaves 
of capitalis>m drown -t'ie>- hitmanatv and their desires -for a 
decent evistence . 
The reeison whv t^c WuESians ha-e not been welcomed with 
open arms by Iran 1= tH«t at daes not scihscribe to the 
Marxist division vf 1'*? world into socialist and capitalist 
countries; Iran standE ^c-r the traditional division o-f the 
world into believers ^ ' 'i infidels. The traditional Muslim 
world view divides the -orid into daf al-Islam (the hoLiEC of 
Islam) that is, coun*^ r-p an which Muslim governments rule 
and in which the i " >i of the land is the 5hari a. the 
religious law of I'^l-^- and dar al-Harb (the house oi wai 1 
that IS, those areas r>f manf-ind as vet unsubdued bv Islam. 
Jihad, "holv war" again-^ t^ infidels, is the obligation of all 
Muslims, and there cen be no peace between the house o-^  
Islam and the bouse of • r. The best that can be achieved is 
a truce. So, in the t-aditional Mtislim view, both the 
Russians and the We^I ^rp m the same infidel boat. The 
Soviet government ha'=: h-en irritated by Iran s tendenc. to 
lump the United States ='^ H the U55R together as "impe*'1 al 1st 
Savorv , Roger, Th- (Geopolitical Impact of the Islamic 
Revolution in Irr-^ , J M the &u}i Region m Aurel , Braun 
(ed.). The Middle East in Global Strategy (BoLilder, 
1987 1, P.200. 
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powers". From darvi^t DOint ol^  '/Lew oni\ non-commun i = t 
states can be accij^ «^ -' of Lmper la L tsm. In the short terir,, 
therefore. the Russians have not been able to qet as inuc'^  
mileage out of the ?~l'"i.c revolution in Iran i^s thev hAd 
hoped, but they reir-aijn hopeful that they can turn tt to 
their advantage. 
In short tertn, the Islsmic revolution in Iran has been 
good ior the USSR comirtercial 17; m I'i'Bl , t^ade- with Iran 
stood at a record * I.I billion, Fo] 2 ti cal 3 y , howe^ei^ , there 
have been setback's, 1"' Jrarj, the Tudeh Part/ has been 
virtually destroyed. F r»r two yesrs afte*" the IriaT'iL 
revolution, the Tudeh c-j^ rty avoided the purge that decimated 
other left-wing groups •"*/ d m t of pretendi":: to cocfie-ate 
with the ^hoifeini reoimc. There were repor-tt: that the ""tide*" 
had managed to infiltf-^e the uppe- eche]o-.5 o^ the lEla-^ir 
Republican Party. In rs='-,'--jar </ iV£Ci, howe .'e*"" . i-homeirii brc' e 
with the Tudeh, arreE*«?^ twent/ thre-e me<r»bers o"* the Part, 
central committee, includi.ng its leader Hw al-Dm ^lancsri, 
and charged them with Er/inq fc-r the USE^P, Seven men were 
subsequently released, but on ^\B',-' »^, i^ B^T', the Tudeh Part.- , 
plus "two smaller pro-ftoscow groups", were official 1-. 
banned. On April 30, i^ /FJ, Nur a]-E'»in »ianura made a public 
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"confession" on Ir-Brmn te Levis i.O'^ . L.-V tne couf'se o * i>ihirt. 
he said that the Tudof^ P^ j-tv h^d "-suopiied information to 
the USSR" and that Tudeh leaders were "guiltv of esoionaqe. 
deceit and treachery" and "deserved the most severe ounitive 
actions". Seven other Ts^deh leaders also made confessions. 
Nearly 4,000 suspects were reportedly arrested- the 
crackdown on the Tudeh was the result of chQirieinis anger 
against the Soviet Union for. 
(i) resuming its s^ i*^  of arms to Iraq and 
(iL) objecting to Khomeini's support of the Afghan 
guer i1 las. 
After all, it was Hi^fita Khrushchev wHo described Iran 
as a "rotten apple" tbp+ the Soviet Union cotilc? s-ha^ e from 
the branch at any time a chose tc« do E O . 
The Soviet occupation of Afohaoistan jmoaared the 
purity D"f its anti-imperialist stance in the eyes of some 
Third World countries, but the west failed to e^fploit 
propaganda gift. About more than fjve years after its 
invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas E-.'e in 1^79, the Soviet 
Union had little success in winrsip.g recopi"!i ticn for the 
Babrat' f-armal repime. There was apparently --'o siqn d 
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w i t h d r a w a l of i t s ' <• r^ from A f g h a n i s t a n , v.)hef"e i t h^d 
a t l e a s t 1 , 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e r . 
]n t h e p o l i t i c a l '-^- 'n-ice s h e e t , csrie mus t n o t i g n o r e t h e 
R u s s i a n s own s u b s t a n t i f ] i n d i q e n o u H >\;E}ira p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h 
I S s t r i v i n g t o pu+ • - '}i by t h e •ea'' 2v*v'0 ori an eoLiaJ 
• f o o t i n g , n u m e r i c a l 1 . - p e a k i n g , w l t ^ l t h e non -Mts s J If^ i 
p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e S ^^ » U n i o n , The- non-fktE 1 IT< groi ipE an 
R u s s i a c u r r e n t l y ha-*^ • z e r o - p o p u i a t ic»r"ii qrowtf-i , and t h e 
S o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t is '{<>-. t r y i n g tee e n c o u r a g e - R u s s i a n women 
2 
not to apply birth control , 
The Soviet Union h-c,, -for its part, played a much less 
evident rale- in the i- iian revoK«tion than has the- bS*^, 
despite the -fact that Ihe- re-volutiDn occtfrred irs a state 
along its southern h e -z-. Indeed the Russian polic/ has 
been a cautious oner the ^ir^t oHicial So-'iet staterrients ori 
the revoJ utionary ffo-vp- t were mmfe c»r<] / m November J9"?£i, 
and a'fter the advent < f frhoTjeini s oo'-ernme'nt to powe^ 
Soviet coverage olf e'/e'"t5 inside Iran was spasmodic, i-f not 
without some method, i' -'•^ r^seral ter.T«s., f-te ^ali o-f the- E>hc4h 
appeared a net gain •fo'" {he USS*^ *, whst^: sa"'* ei hos.tile reaime 
Ibid,, P.202. 
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removed from its borders. A secti<>T o*^  Pussisns ret-^ irsed 
hopes that over a oeric-d of years ts^ e oro-Sovtet le^t wing 
forces in Iran will g^ i'~ ground, [t was not possible for the 
Soviet Union merely to ignore Iran, and the revolution and 
its aftermath have oosed •» number o»" di^^iojlt problems tof" 
it. 
The hostages issue has at the- sa«»»e t^me haqhjiqhted 
what IS the OverricJino Soviet concE""" in ]r£*rt, na-T'eJ;' the 
desire to prevent a dire-ct OS n.i ] i *a«--/ ir.terventicin there. 
The November i^7B statement by Ererrte^ i' c-r^  ]ran, warned the 
US against any such sncve s^nd ccveraoe a'i the hci^ .tage if.s-ne 
placed criticism o^ US tHreatE. agamEt ir?..-. st the toe c^ 
the list of concerns. The Russians stressed that tt^e l^'l'l 
treaty gives them the riQht to intervene in J ran. The reason 
'for this an'xiety was nc*t jus-t that the Riss.sianE. vjianted to 
prevent the USA re-establishing itself in 3 ran, bitt rather 
that the very fact of a US uniJatary action acamE.t a coiir-.t r .-
on Russia's borders. could ccms-ti tute a strategic 
humiliation, even if it did not perjitanerit 1 y alter the 
political balance mside the countr-. , 
The Soviet response to the hostaoe iE.si-i»e "'BE that the/ 
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did not support the *'-.' < <~-Q of hQstr?ge-5. t^ev st'-essed th^', 
this could not justt*''" f^e u-se by ^^a USA of militaj-v fo'-ce. 
From the PussL-an oniot of vtien thetf m terven tLQ<^  L" 
Afghanistan could not H^ve occuf-f-e^ d at -3 wof-se time -s-s f-^f 
as relations with It'an <^ e''e concerned. This was not so mucf^ 
because of the real :»s distance which Iran gave to the 
rebels. but because o< the wa*" m which the (Afghanistan 
issue was used by the f•=!-Ji^ ic government m Iran to denounce 
the Soviet Union and tc ra|^[-,< international ODmion, aqamst 
Soviet supoort for tha *abui qavernment. In the iTtos t 
immediate terms, it ma i-^  it even more difficult to evolve 3 
working relationship wifh the Tehran government than it 
would otherwise have be'="i . 
Soviet intervention m i^-f g^ sa!^ listan, and their criticism 
Q-f those Iraniaric. whc oppcs-e'd t^ JC Soviet inter ^ e^nt ion 
apparently increae-ed the qap in relations- between Soviet 
Union and Iran, Eioviet ccmBjentators. is-E-ited warninoi to Irars 
that its revolution wi ^i ", be suppcerted on],, to the e^te-il 
that it supports others, i.e, fi-Jgha"! s* an, 
The Iranian revc]'< • lori has ai's-o hai? a ce-^ i'-iite, i "* 
limited, impact on ' fic USSTv its-el-', ThiE. was so m the 
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economic field, si^nc" tan was the USSP -5 majo»^ Middle 
Eastern trading parf.s-- ? •^, the ori5-rev'oi«j tionarv oeriod. The 
cut-off in gas SUPDII"=S badLy affected oarts a* Sout^ er-r-. 
Russia in the winter Q*' 1'^7Q-'?. and the Soviet Union showed 
its interest m conc«'ji^>ng n,ew trading aqreeinent witn [ran 
in order to revive t'-ade and possibLv ta^ e advantage of an,, 
Western boycott. A new agreemeirit oo Iranian use o <" the 
Soviet Canal system for •>cces'5 to the Caspian was signed m 
September 1930, but thj-g syste*m i-s already burdened and 
becomes ineffective d'jrmg wmte'' months. The political 
impact of the Iranian ^e^-olution mside the USSR has bee«" 3 
matter more of spec,'' ^  ' ion than of substantive evidence. 
While one can only a=s'fsie that the 50 mi 1 1 ion Muslims of 
Soviet Central Asia .^rii^ t^ some wav 4i,-t-iT-i3 of the revolution 
in Iran, and while thin' demographic and political weight 
within the USSR is growing^ the?-e is very little indication 
that the events in l - ' i have found anv echo inside the 
Central Asian republics . 
Russian historv t^^^t-ifies to a continnjnq aoterpc,! m 
Halliday, Prpd.'lhf: Iranian Pevc>]liit3C»»"« in Intemataonai 
Affairs; Programmp And Practice* Jir» Abdel Majid f^ arjd 
(ed r > , Oil and Security m the Arabian 6u3f<Lc«ndon. 
1^811, P.32 
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the Gulf. Western vulnerability is -3 new bonus that gives 
the USSR potential leverage, while Sovj.et-bloc future energy 
needs add a new incenti e for acco'-ding the f-egion high 
priori ty. 
Iran is not typic^^ rti conntrieE. outsade the two blocs. 
But the overlapping in*rr-£ts in Iran o^ the two s-uperpowers 
and blocs will ma^.e it t^e single moE-t important touchstone 
of East-West reiat.^cf^s 30 the 7»->ird: World, It wi 1 J 
constitute a test of Sc let behaviotsr toward a neighboLir and 
of Afnerjca's ability to wanaqe relations with both the USSR 
and a volatile Third World state in a region of strategic 
importance. Precisely because the trends y^itin Iran, and 
Soviet policy toward Iran, yield no clear picture. it is 
important to keep the region under close observation. 
Iran's preconditiori- for a settlement were as follows:-
Uncondi tional So>iet withdrawal ang the A-fghanis 
complete freedom of chcire-are scarcely accomodating to 
Moscow. Beyond verbal opposition, Iran s- tolerance of 
protests outside the ^-r ./iet Embassy in Tehran elicited 
strong notes of protest from Moscow iri iVEK* and l'?8I'. ]n 
addition, some concrete arsistance has been provided to the 
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Afghan r e s i s t a n c e and t h i s commi tmen t h a s b e e " f-ea <" <" i^mec 
4 
from time to time . 
Despite Iran's ' - i^i'-it'/ problems, 3t did not remain 
dependent on Soviet •T''--'^  alone, An^s, re-ftched it -frons the 
Eastern bloc mainly CVii-f.n J^orea, S/rm and Libya, However", 
they were purchased irtdi-'ect 3 y, ]rars sought arms on the open 
market and -from Western sources as wel J Iranian o-f-ficials 
made purchases o^f am^'unj tio" -from bDt^' blocs; their 
restriction o1 1 arqf"- ^rqiustions tc* smaller countries is 
intended to avoid e'^'ccssive deoendertce on any one source. 
Reports o-f purchases -from t^ «e Soviet Union were initial Iv 
contradictory, but some Iranians diEt1nq5.11 shed between arms 
(permissible) and advise-s C!.»inacceptabl e > , 
Iran did not he?''"^- to ewpei Soviet representatives 
in mid i«?7V -for SP'/T-:? and in January l'^&7> a TasE 
correspondent -Icr '"j".-=*'"'''quate jouroal 1 =.ti c activity". It 
also sought to diversi-*.' trade relaticw«E. and especially to 
increase commerce with 1'le Third World, As a result, the 
share cf imports -from t^ "^  less developed cot.«ntries m 1979-
19Bi increased to 18." r-'f cent o-f totai , while that -froa. 
4, Sociol ino,E 1 a m e , ' ] r an ' s Durable Revolution , Foreign 
Q-f-fairs. Vol .61 .No,4 f J ^ B^?.) ,P,^7.1, 
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the industrialized OECD countf-ie-5 fell fro«n 80 percent to •S'l 
per cent). Finally, Ir-n 3 cultivation of ties with its pro-
Western neighbours iur-ev and Pakistan may be viewed as 
evidence of pragmatiST-. ^ trait which the Soviet Union was 
not keen to encourage I'r^ this content. 
In addition there ^re numerous cases of Ir-ania'"' 
indulgence of the USS'^. The first ambassador received bv 
Khomeini was Vladt"sir Ji, Vinogradov of the USSR. When 
foreign banks were na t Dtina I iced , the Russo-If-an ban*, the 
only bank exclusively foreign owned, was eyempted. When all 
secular political p^ • ties were banned. the Tudeh s 
activities were still permitted until I January-Februa'-y 
1983. Iran often showed uncharacteristic patience and 
restraint regarding Soviet activities in Afghanistan, It is 
a striking fact that criticism of the USSR wet^e much moi^e 
direct and authoritative hefore than after the invasion. 
Once the Iran-Ir:»q war started, Moscow clearly tilted 
in favour of [ran by warning of Iraq's impending attack : 
then supplying jet fuel by at?- tanker; giving ressu'ances 
about its own military dispositions to enable Iranian 
deployments to the Southwest; and stilL later, providing 
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tactical information derived from satellite Dhotography. 
Though (Kremlin denied -t, Mlascow reportedly also offered at 
an early stage to SUDDI> arms directly, but lr-^r\L^r\ recused. 
In July 1981 a three year renewable military agreement 
was signed with the U'S'^ S. It provided t'or the training ot= 
Iranians in the Sovi^*^ yniofi, the e>r tens ion of technical 
assistance and the '.t!3n of Soviet advisers to Ir^n. By 
November 1981 there were reports o*" soviet e>:perts in the 
security field ^rri^Lryq in Iran with the appropriate Persian 
language skills. This mission apparently was to help tram 
the Iranian security s^ p".-/f.ce f SAVAfiA» ^nd the revo lu tion^'--
guards (Pasdarao) , 
It is clear that tht Sovie-t Union has gamed so<ne sort 
of •foothold in Iran in the military security area. Moreove'-, 
Soviet assistance has- not been unconditional. We have noted 
the possibility that limitations on Iranian support -far the 
• — — 
SAVAriA Sareman-e-ettal at, va ^snad "ill-e-Iran 
P^s-dBrsn— (Revol uticnar / Puards) The Organi j£*tion o-f 
Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Irlami was created immediately a-fter 
the revolution ai i^yp-y^^ It is a semi O'f'facaal armed 
organization. In the b^ g^inrsiing it served as an armed iorce 
•for perpetuating the revoJutiori and tc cr^fset any "Counter-
revolutionary" movement. It remained standinq in si.ipport of 
Imam Khomeini and rel iqious leaders ds-srimg iV7V-80. It also 
took part in the war =>Qainst jrao alcnq with the reQula!-
army , 
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A f g h a n r e s i s t a n c e wer-^ >;•• . r a c t e d ; t h i s a s s i s t a n c e i7»ight a l s o 
a c c o u n t f o r t h e anomali>-i=i c a s e s o f r e s t r a i n t n o t e d e a r l i e r . 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n has r e p o r t e d l y g a i n e d a c c e = 5 
t o t h e rad^r s i g n a l y a c e n s i o q s^'5te^'^ o f t h e F - l ^ i i n e> c h a n g e 
f o r i t s a s s i s t a n c e , C'^ *. ^ u n l y t h e t r a i n i n g at t h e P a s d a r a n 
r i s l ' S t h e i n f i l t r a t i o r i; S o v i e t n o m i n e e s s u c h a s , a c c o r d i n g 
t o some r e p o r t s , monge rs o f t h e Tudeh and t h e i f" u s e t o 
f u r t h e r S o v i e t a c t i v i i e s m A f g h a n i s t a n . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
S o v i e t s e c u r i t y a s s j s t ^ " c e ma^ a l l o w t h e USSR t o d o m i n a t e 
t h e f l o w o f m fo rma t i G ' ' - e g a r d i n g t h r - e a t s t o t h e r e g i m e , and 
e n a b l e i t t o s u p p ' - " t h o s e r e p o r t s i t c o n s i d e r s 
u n f a v o u r a b l e . Subseq«ys^ ^ M Y , S o v i e t p r o t e c t i o n ma- p r o / e 
d i f f i c u l t t o d i s l o d g e . 
I n t a m a t j o n s O"* &c<vj(et d o u b t s ••octiEed on t h e " f u t u r e 
r o l e s o f t h e c l e r g y and I s l a m , w h i c h t h e LI55P has 
u n d e r e s t i m a t e d m t h e paE t artd w h i c h m i g h t g e t o u t c* h a n d , 
Oc)i n o w l e d q i n c i t h a t I s la ' ' " ' ^iid t h e p o t e ^ t t j i a j t o be a meann oi 
" e x p r e s s i n g s o c i a l p r o ^ r ' = - t " o r a "n.earsE, ctf l e q a t m i r i n q t h e 
s e c u l a r a u t h o r i t i e s " t j n P a l i E t a r - . t c>r e-fen a " f o r ce ^c-!-
r e a c t i o n f a s m A f g h a - ' - * an * , E'Owiet a r « a l / s t E h a v e arQi.ied 
t h e need f o r an a s s e s H ' ; - t o f " t h e r e a l c o n t e n t o"f I s l a m i c 
m o v e m e n t s " V4 i th pa'*^ " ^ ".' ' - p - fe rp r i ce t o t h e i r " c l a s s " 
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composition. In the sc"-'~i.fiiz case of Iran, while conceding 
Khomeini's importance^ SovLet commentators are unwilling to 
go further; they simply note that many progressive forces 
came together "under the banner of Islam" and that this gave 
the revolution "a special character" , 
In the last few yea-'S the Soviet Union h,3s consistentl/ 
sought to radicalize thie -^eg ime in [r^ in and, in the process, 
to become its ac*.now I edged protector. Internationally, the 
most well-^nown evample is the hostage episode, during which 
Soviet broadcasts were inf lamjpa torv , Right upto the fin^l 
hours of this crisis, S»?v iet publications were warning of an 
imminent American attacfc. Apart fro<i^  diverting attention 
from Soviet activities in Ir^n ^nd Afghanistan, this e^-ent 
contributed to Iran's international isolation and to the 
siege mentality o*" the regime. The more isolated 
commercially and diplo'^a tica I ly from the west, the more 
dependent Iran becam^s Q-T. the USSR, especially for trjinsit 
overland but also for t' :»de. 
Despite its posture o^ befrjendinq the Islamic regime, 
the USSR has never "feJit cc'nH.t*"sined tc drop its 
5, Ibid, ,P,'?37, 
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i n t e r D r e t a t i o n o f t h - )~Zl So v j i e t - [ r ^ s n t a n Tre,? t y - w h i c h h^s 
been d e n o u n c e d by '^ t ' ' s s L v e I r -a r . tan goverrn-nen t g , On t h e 
c o n t r a r y , t h e S a v l e ^ - . -^•> <'e i n s i s t e d t ^ a t t h e Tr-eatv Q i v e = 
them a r i g h t t o i o t - » ' - > r^ve m [ ' ' - » " . r^ot m e r e l y i " c a s e 3 t 
a c t i o n by some t h i r d n ^ j t i o i " siheni c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e " i i g n t 
t h r e a t e n t h e o i , some* i snes tv t n g i t t o t h e i r c l a i " » as t h e 
p r o t e c t o r o f t h e r e v o l u ^ i . o o . The i imH i s n o t a c c i d e n t a l and 
i t s a s s e r t i o n i s t n t -^ ' -c 'cd , and sees'^, as an i m p l i c i t t h r e a t 
t o I r a n . 
T h i s " s t a b i l i t y anc' ^ q t s i d i s t s n c e ' " E c e n a r i c s i n I '^gil ' mftv 
u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e !'••• - s - i t y c^ c o m ^ J i c t w i t h a n t^«e reQiT<e 
i t s e l f b o t h on domf^ t « c p o J i c y ^rt j i om I r a n s - ' c r e i o n 
o r i e n t a t i o n . The mo'<-- r a d i c a l c i e r g y , E y T i p a t h e t i c t o 
s o c i a l i s fn and r a d i c a l " ^ f ^ s u r e s dome-st i c a l 1 y , I E i^eene' ' en 
c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t i - "He USSR and t h e E a s t e r n b l o c , Tt-.e 
more c o n s e r v a t i v e , t r a d i tic«r"iial i s t c l e r i c E c«rpose co(Ti(T«LinjiEfT, 
and t h e l e f t a t home anc" w o u l d see^ a waore aen4.i3ne b a l a n c e 
b e t w e e n t h e b l o c s . 
The d i v i s i o n s betv f ^ n t h e s e tv^o f a c t i o n s h a v e become 
more p r o n o u n c e d . A n» r ••"• o f d o m e s t i c m e a s u r e s a i m e o a t 
" l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " ' i fsHcr ' t o f ^ r e e e n t e r c < r i s e and t h e 
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individual's legal righLs*, the measu'-es against the Tuders. 
and a less stride'".': tone toi-^ ard the We-^t suggest the 
temporary eclipse of the radical faction. 
11 is possible ti^i? t the dange'" Q* a d''ift toward So/iet 
tutelage was at the r'Tot Q*"' this shift, PO'" the clerics 
value the regime's S'=<:)'-it» as much ^5 ^nvone else, ^he 
revolution's consens<.>- :.s b'"oad enough to accomodate quite 
divergent views of dci-e^tic and foreign ooltcv. And these 
will be determined as ^ result of a process o*" comoletior., 
not from any natural c "-'- -^nsual evolution. 
In sum, the Qpti«5^ * itic scenario assumes, mter-alia, 
that domestic forces wiLS allow a drift toward eauidistance 
and that the USSR will be uowiLlmg or unable to stop it. 
There is another- eaually plausible scenario. This would 
see a long, divisive and costly struggle tor power within 
the revolution's rants. The principal of clerical njle 
itself could become the subject of dispute, in any case the 
clerical factions would lee** allies amonp secular- and af-med 
elements: the (Pasda"-:3n) , the armed forces, and even the 
cadres mobilised '^or th,^  wse- f the Basii'' , 
Baslj— (Volunteers for l^^<r ; Basi j are non-regular army ttnits 
comprising mainly the- vclunteers who recrLiated during the 
War against Iraq, "^ hey •'eight along with the regular armies 
and were of great helo i-< W;^ r , 
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Soviet Union's r^-r-sp^ arms transfers to Iraq point in 
the same direction, nr T-•^, i t> j y directed at seeding an enhanced 
Soviet ro]e in any -if-r.e negotiations but aJso putting 
military pressure on T r ,-»ri, possibly to demonstrate the price 
o"f Iranian recal ci < r rs-^ ce m neootiatinq with the »armal 
regime in Afghanistan, 
In coming years the- (Bt»^ mber oi Muslims irt USSR will 
increase. This Binnr- v^i 1 1 increase its southern borders. 
Among them, Iran and "''•-key have the only borders that the 
USSR has not extended - : r»ce I^ I^B and this is not -for want o-f 
trying. As a multinational empire t^ >e Soviet Union claims a 
particular interest in l^ «e lands bordering it, particularly 
where the ethnic composition is similar unlike its policy m 
the Arab world, w^€:-e it has supi:»ctrted integral ist 
movements, the Sovie* "niion has not beer« supportive oi a 
strong or stable Ir— on its borders. Such Etrer»gth or 
stability could result in a willul neighbour, and Iranian 
(Shi a) unity could allc t the USSR's Azeri- Shi a population. 
The Soviet Union therp+nre has consistently m this century 
sought to weaken Iran, opposing virtually any substantive 
(not merely military! rr' ationshi p with the west. Only a-fter 
attempts at intimidr t i'.m -failed zfitf Stalin's sticcessors 
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learn to live with th-r I^ah. However, their definition of 
"good neighbourl ines" h-^  - always been tightly related to the 
existing power realitif^. 
While seeking the mesns to achieve vacto'"-/, Iran sotiqht 
to do so without comprc^isinq its fundamental values^ The 
war has precipitated z< rethinihipo and re—eval uation o^ 
positions vis-a-vis thc^  superpowerE., This has included the 
need to consider whpthe'- the eauation o"^  Moscow and 
Washington serves Iran 5. ourpose, or to put it differently, 
whether Iran is not r^yina too high a price "<or its 
simtil taneous antagoni /-.i' ion o^f both superpowrs- Iran has 
tried to exploit it= -'•WT! strategic importance anc the 
superpowrs rivalry tc= increase its roo*" "^ or manoe«.ivre and 
to harmonize its ideol'tny with its practical needs. It is 
now clear that Tehran initiated as well as accepted contacts 
with the United States in J^ O^ft, and has never been without 
an indirect channel to Washington, Relations with the LfSSR 
have vsrxed, but the l^^^mic authorities- re-fused to drop 
their opposition to 5c - 1 e t policy in A-f ghanistan, despite an 
obvious need "ior Soviet ooodwi 1 1 . 
In sum, Iran w,'^- --cf?ds did not dictate policy, and 
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found itself cons tr,s i nel to consider principles. ideology 
and image. Despite their co'npeti tion, and also because of 
it, the superpowers ha/e pursued their interests with some 
restraint, unwilling to relinquish control of thei»" policies 
or their wider concerns to the demands of their bilateral 
interests viith Tehran. 
Phase(1 ) Tehran-'^toscow rg-Jations cooled when, durmq 
B'Ummer, tension rose br't'^ 'een jran and Iraq, an ally o"* the 
USSR. In early Auqtir-t, protesting against Soviet arftis 
supplies to Baghdad, Omtbradeh threatened to recall the 
Iranian ambassador to "^-cow, A ^ew days later he addressed 
a long letter to Andrea (-rofnyRo, Soviet -fore-ign (ranister. In 
it he surveyed relatio'-«s. between their countries since J'v4i. 
"You have proved in practice that you €Kre no less satanic 
than the US', he wrote. He accused the USSR o^ sending arms 
to the Kurdish insurgents, and attached it for refusing to 
acknowledge Iran's abrcgation <on <^ Nover^ber iV7'?f of 
Articles Five and Si'' of the 1^21 Treaty, thus adding to' 
Iran's fears that the T«-c-aty would be iised as a pretext to 
launch aggression and attacks against our country". In hiE, 
reply on 22 August Grofnyi^ o offered to sel i arms to Iran, But 
the latter rejected the; offer. Regarding articles Five and 
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Sir. of the l'^ ?21 Tr^&i*:-' . *'He Soviet QosLtiQ" was th^ at theif 
one-sided abrogation b-- i f an was meaningless. These afttcles 
were part o^ a mu I »• '-r»"'i'-QQse treaty which included an 
article on the caifk- ~-• lotion o*" Soviet loans to Iran. 
Abrogating the whoK' • • i ty would irean Iranian debts would 
have to be repaid. A^ -jj-j-ent prices thev would amount to 
over $16,000 million. 'he abrogation would need to be 
ratified by the two o-:---' s amen ts to become effective. It is 
quite possible that S--. set leaders had tHe tnowledue o^ 
Iraqi plans to [ran and tidied in va m to persuade Baa this*: 
leadership to drop fr-"-. Once Iraq had invaded Iran. the 
Soviet authorities immed i-»te I y assured Iran that they would 
remain neutral in the- conflict; and this allowed the 
Iranians to move troops 5 id equipment fra»^  the North to the 
South^. 
While rip-fraininq ^ • - jr« braodinai Iraq a& the aqgres&or, 
the Soviet qovernment ~Sitie statements- which showed itE-
displeasure with Baghda"'. Or» 7«<i'th September Brexnev warned 
that the war might pr,'-< ide thse- US wit»"« an excuse to move 
into Iran militarily i^rid -ontrol Gulf oil Linder the pretext 
oi freeinq American host'^oes. Aware- o^ ti''-e i^l-e^^ects o^ 
6. Wiro, Dilip.lran v.i.-Jgr the j^/atoj j ahs''London ^  l^ Ei!":, 
P,286, 
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the western economic and .arm's embargo on Iran-eQuipoed 
almost eKclusively with American, British and French 
weapons-and anxious to help Iran maintain its anti-
imperialist stance, Moscow offered to sell weapons to 
Tehran. According to Premier Rajai, Soviet ambassador 
Vladimir Vinogradov «n?»ie the offer on 4 October, and he 
rejectd it. Before the revolution the Soviets had sold small 
arms, Katyusha rocket artillery and surface-to-air missiles 
to Iran, not to mention military transport equipment. 
Iran rejected floscot^'s offer in the knowledge that it 
could buy Soviet weapons and ammunition from Syria, a Soviet 
ally, which had already .airlifted such equipment to Iran. It 
was significant that the Syrian president, Hafii Al-Assad, 
discussed Iran with Brecnev during his visit to rioscow in 
October to sign a Friendship and cooperation Treaty with the 
USSR. In a joint state«ner»t the two leaders supported Iran's 
inalienable right to de^L^rmine its destiny independently and 
without any foreign intE?rference' , 
Addressing the twj?r,ty-siKth congress of the communist 
Party of the Soviet Union on 23 February, Brecnev described 
7. Ibid., P.287. 
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the Iranian revo?'."'"' "irn ^<i a «»ajor event QO the 
international scene s"™ ^^eceot years". He added, 'However 
complex and con trad ic'- •-y, it is essentially an antL~ 
imperialist revolution, though reaction at home and abroad 
is seeking to change thi-^  feature'. 
In May 1981 the Sov/^t Union contracted to e>-,Dand the 
Isfahan steel mill's ••>-'"'j?l caoacitv to L.*' million tons. 
The new mining projects in which the Soviets were involved 
were scheduled to prod'i"- • two million tons of Coal and three 
million ton«> of iron ''"i: annually. Trade between the two 
countries reached t l.I billion, a record. This happened 
despite the absence of '^-anian gas e>xports to the USSR for 
most of the year. The -^  rnly of Iranian gas to the Southern 
states of th€> Soviet tjr *, which had been resumed in April 
1979, suffered when I»"^ "-ian oil outtwjt slumped during the 
1979-80 winter, and Irao insisted on raising its price. In 
early February the gas flow was down to about 15 per cent of 
the normal. An ewplos;'-'-; in the pipeline later that month 
shut off supplies. In r«*-ch, I98'> the USSR offered to pay 
$2.66 per thousand cufci- feet of gasversus * 3.80 demanded 
by Iran, a dramatic )•'•"-> from the original price of 65 pe^^ 
cents. Iran rejected '" "- ..iffer, and shut off supplies m 
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April, such a move ha«1 an ideo logics I basL-s. 
Iran has had no political Q»" diplomatLC p'-oblems wLth 
these (small) nations of the Eastern bloc. Its economLC ^nd 
diplomatic lint's wit^- I'lem have remained unaffected bv the 
developments in the Tu»f war. Contrary is the case with 
Tehran's political r»3la!.ions with Moscow. 
The Iranians attributed setbacl^s to Iraq's newlv 
received Soviet weapons Tehran felt bitter towards Moscow. 
On 19 December 1782 thip» Iraqis fi»-ed two of their newly 
acquired Soviet-made g.*'Xind-to-ground missiles, Frog-7, on 
Dezful, tilling sixty-^wo and injuring 150, This made Iran 
more bitter towards ^^<3 USSR, Reflecting the mood. the 
Afghan refugees' demonstration in Tehran on 27 December, to 
commemorate the Soviet intervention Lr\ Afghanistan .was 
particularly provocative. The Soviet ambassador protested. 
In reply the Iranian 'oreign ministry blamed "abundant 
Soviet political and military aid to Iraq' as responsible 
for 'bringing many (Iianian) toMins under Iraqi artillery 
fire'^. 
It was thus scarce!/ surprisinq that on the first phase 
_ jtiic,^ P.270. 
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of the wdir (1980 ?.) the Soviet-Iraoiao re 1-9 tionshio 
reflected this. On *:?•'& Soviet side, the w,jr Sr5»«* -an 
intensified effort to reduce Iran's suspicions and to 
demonstrate Soviet q'-od faith. The Soviet authorities 
forewarned [ran of t'^ ?^ impending attac* , offered to supply 
it directly with arms, rvfc~off direct supplies of artr^ s (new 
orders) to Iraq supp'-n' Ir-^n with jet fuel, and gave Tehran 
assurances about i.h^ir joint frontier to enable the 
deployment of Irani'in t-'-fops westwards. 
Iran did not eK->!y encourage this Soviet orientation 
but it was aware of i^. It refused to txjiy or rather request 
direct arms purchas-^ ~ - " deliveries. But it swifthw became 
reliant on arms from Soviet clients, including Syria and 
Libya, and from Eastern bloc so«jirces such as North Korea, 
which may have been acting as Soviet proxies or laundering 
stops. At the same ti»!»e, trade, mainly barter, with the 
Soviet bloc increased -^bstantiaIly. The Iranian communist 
party, the Tudeh was <>Mr!wed to function unimpeded, while 
western' parties wer^ hi^med. The attitude toward the Tudeh 
was indicative of Irao i relations with the Soviet Union, As 
long as the USSR (and ?'••- TudehJ were seen as supportive of 
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the Islamic republic, i »: w^ 'S allowed to function. This was 
despite the preceptio«"v tf maov, -and articulated by Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, that ' thev ire inspired from abroad, they ^r<B 
practically Russians - Iranian commentaries continued to 
exhibit considerable <i'strust of Soviet motives, A good 
illustration is t^>»^- comment bv one J, Saadat in 
Independence is the •e'^ '^^ '-^ ce of the Islamic revolution . He 
argued that the sup'2'-'r<"w*ers »«»ere exploitative wanted to 
dominate, and were Qft*'-? in collusion^ but that they were 
also in competition, and that was wise to use this 
competition for Ir^n s ends, that is, to achieve 
independence. Thus^Iran ought to accept the USSR's proffered 
hand of friendship but be under no illusions about Hoscow's 
basic aims. By force of circumstances^ Iran's relations with 
the superpowers thus s^w a distinct tilt towards the USSR, 
manifested in relative restraint on the issue of 
Afghanistan,a distinct tolerance for the Tudeh and 
modernation in comments about the USSR, At the same time, 
its closer relations m the regime were with the states 
closest to the USSR- S'-ja and Libya, 
Phase(a) Tehran ?ccepted the Soviet Union as the 
lesser threat, and Qr-^gimatica 1 ly reduced the ^t-&.iB of 
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dispute with it. The s'^cood ph^se of the relationship opened 
in mid 1982 with [ran 5 discussion to tal-e the war into 
Iraq after the e>:puI'?iiQn of traqi forces fro<i« its own 
territory, and to overf-.H-ow the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad. 
The Soviet Union c«3flil'1 not countenance the defeat of a 
nominal ally, nor «••?'? it *een to see the e>'tension of 
Iranian Islamic po«>*er in the region. But above all Moscow 
did not want an Irs.ui'^'- invasion o*' I»^ aq to provide the US 
with an e>:cuse to int^r^ene militarily in the Gulf, or to 
gain access to bases in the name of defending its regional 
allies. To prevent thi'^ v Moscow warned Iran against such a 
policy, and shifted fro»»H its earlier stance of ' neu t'"a 1 i tv ' 
to a resumption of direct arms supplies to Iraq. By the 
autumn of 1982 Soviet—=upoIied Frog SSH were landing on 
towns in western [ran, c^^using civilian casualities, and by 
the end of the following year, longer-range Scud-Bs were 
made available to Iraq. 
It was no accident that the Islamic authori ties nllci*"ed 
demonstrations by ffc'^an refuqees outside the Soviet 
embassy in Tehran, and -ejected Soviet protests, nutinq that 
abundant Soviet political and military aid to In^Q' had 
been responsible "for bi-inqinq many "Iranian) towns under 
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Iraqi artillery fi-- . A radio co«wwentary asked whethef-
there had not been -3- ' h-i between the Iraoi attack on Ir-an 
and the Soviet interst in weakening [ran in order to prevent 
it assisting the Afg^ :^ "^  resistance movement. Other comments 
equated the superDO*-:" '-•. and singled out the relationship 
between the war, f-v - eakeoing of Iran and the issue of 
Afghanistan, 
The Soviet res-r-^TP was to turn up the volume of its 
criticism o"f the clericf^l regime, noting ats horrible record 
of bloodshed, and it'" "p^ctionary policies that smacKed oi 
"Islamic despotism'• ^he Soviet Union began to interpret 
Iranian criticism P^ .^ r sign oi a drift towards the west. 
Other Soviet comm'^ r ' ^  emphasized the interest in an 
independent Iran, ref.^ tlf>d the possibility of establishing 
good economic relation^,, and accused Iran o"* deliberately 
blocking a peaceful se+t'c-ment. At the end ci 1*?87. the USSR 
supported a Securily Council re=,olution calling -for a 
ceasefire in the war. 
The National Voi«:<- r>^  Iran Radio said m its. broadcast 
of 11 January 1<?83 that Iranians backing for Afghan rebels 
would further strain relations between Tehran and Mos.co«", 
and isolate the Iranian revolution in the international 
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arena. On 19 January 5 Tehran Radio ccMnmentary attacf-ed the 
Soviet stand on the war. The Soviet Uoton too* sides after 
seeing Saddam Husseir. suffer one defeat after another, 
gradually making public its pro-Saddam attitude , it said. P 
weeJ- later [ran e>'oelle<1 the Tass correspondent, by refusLog 
to renew hts visa. 
Soviet military -r Esi&tance to Iraq was on^ c major 
barrier to good relations between Moscow and Tehran, t^ ie 
other being the Soviet presence in ft-fghanistan, "As long as 
the Soviets sre in A-fQh;:»nistan we cannot be your -friend , 
Said Hashemi-Ra-fsanjanj to V.K. Boldyrev, tt>e Soviet 
ambassador in Tehran, •"-( J ate May. 
Iran wanted to act in the delence o^ the rights of ail 
Muslims', as stated in the F'riciple J ^ 2' of the constitution. 
All Muslims' inclLided those in tt»e Eioviet Union. In late 
May l'?87> Iran launched a campaign on behal-* oi the 
'oppressed Muslims in t^e LISSR' . Propaganda posters showed 
the Kremlin as the capital o-f E»evi 1 . Yesterday the Satan 
looked liif.e Carter; today tve wears, the "<ace of Yuri Andropov 
(the Soviet leader) . S^id Ayatollah Hojati Kermani. But 
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•je I-now the Satan behi'i'i tihve wva^ l^  ' . 
The Iranian (c^ * •>'^ ign wa^ s directed at rel'ind I tnq 
interest in Islam a«no•n^ ^ the Mus I itng of the Soviet Union's 
Southern republics a^ A.^erbai jar*, Kacha* istan , If'irghiEia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmen i ? ^nd Ucbel. istan, Four-fifths of the 
USSR's forty-five cilltoo Muslims lived there. 
Secularisation of So*"'^ ^ ••. Muslims was obvious from the fact 
that there were only ^hout 54X"» mosques in USSR compared to 
an estimated 25,<X>0 before the BolsheviV revolution, and 
that there were onlv two schools for training Muslim 
clerics. 
A mild revival i'~- l^law had begun in these reptiblics 
before the Iranian ?»•''''>ori ties took to beaming radao 
broadcasts at their j''^ -^ i tants.^ One oi the mana-f estations 
was the rise in the number ai unoifificiaJ clerics. In late 
1983 TurKmenia, with -T population o^ 2,& milliorj, was 
reported to have 300 such clerics, 
Following his vi=i! to the Soviet Llnion, F«»f, hr-al-E»*.»n 
Hejazi, a Majlis dF-p>.>*y, said that he had been told by 
Muslims in Soviet Arrrbaijan that during Ramadan they 
Ibid,, P.291 
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listened to Ardebil R^^dio to find out the correct times for 
breaking the fast. F'.'ch statements tallied with Soviet 
assessments of the s i ^:«.ra tion , Soviet officials agreed that 
Azerbaijan and Taj iJ i'= t^ 'T had proved susceotible to [raman 
propaganda. LiJ'e thei» counteroarts in Iranian Acerbaijan, 
Muslims in Soviet Are'^ t T t jan were Shia. (There was also .^n 
Iranian consulate jn Bslu? with their language at* in to 
Persian, TajiKs h^r-d always been culturally close to 
Iranians. In these reo"b!ics there was a growing demand for 
mosques and religious s-^Mi^ols, and more and more women were 
adopting Islamic dress, ^hese developments were viewed with 
disapproval by Soviet JIU thori ties, and created ill-will 
against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
On 1 November the USSR backed the UN Security council's 
call for ceasefire,, which was ignored by Iran, It was 
against this bacl-.qroijnd that Tariq Acic, Iran's foreign 
minister, held a series of meetings with his Soviet 
counterpart, Andrei G-owyl'Q, ir^ Moscow, Their joint 
statement expressed the shared desire of the two 
countries to devoiorj bilateral relations on the basis 
of the Soviet-Iraqi ^-e't> of Friendship and Cooperation. 
What the statement die* r -t say was that the Soviet Union had 
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agreed to sell fresh qu^jntities of weapons to Ir^q. 
This was as wel I , because otheirwise the USSR s<jpf-eme 
Soviet's message in mid - January LV84 to the Iranian "ajlts 
for cooperation between their countries in the struggle 
against world i«per ia I i'^ m and US acts of aggression" would 
have been greeted in Tehran with contempt. As it was, 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani received the Soviet ambassador, bearing 
the message of the Supreme Soviet, with attentive courtesy. 
He pointed out that Saddam Hussein had attached Iran as an 
agent of America" and that he was now being aided by 
'Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco and reaction aries in the 
region'. He advised the Soviet Union to notice Iranian aid 
and presence, together with the Lebanese people, being 
active in Lebanon against the Western occupiers and Israel, 
and actively engaged in the anti-imperialist struggle' . 
The Soviets withd--e»'< their experts from sry Isfahan 
steel mill an Ahwaz po*'i??r plant, and other installations, 
ostensibly for safety reasons. This step caused serious 
difficulties for the fr^oians, including power blackouts, 
but despite protests, the USSR has refused to send the 
10. Ibid., P.293. 
2C^ 
experts. West Germ^nv ^- j-jo^ n repl.!jced the Soviet Union a-s 
Iran's major trading a^^rtoers, tran also impf^oved its 
political relations wi<:f' »>Jest European countries. 
Phase ( i i i ) By e^s'' ^984 there t-^as a period o*^  relative 
truce; nine months n' ftoperatioo had advanced neither 
side. Iran was still r>t;-^tfir\q the war, handicapped, by its 
own choice, by poor re 1-•'". ions with bath superpowers. It had 
become increasingly c'. ••ar, however, to the leadership in 
Tehran that a military vjctory would prove elusive without 
access to weapons sy»:"'--i *a offset those available to Iraq. 
Furthermore, while the alienation of the United States had 
led to an arms embartj'- '' ?t was now beginning to be felt m 
Tehran, the decision fc * ^ f/G the war into Iraq had resulted 
in the transfer of sonh i"«^ ticated weapons systems by the USSR 
to Iraq. Clearly the ti«i»e had come for a reconsideration of 
Iran's principles in Iiq^ t of its war needs. 
Rafsanjani was co^ciIiatoryi he told the Soviet 
ambassador, V.K, Ba! d - •^v, that Lr\ the light of common 
policies of anti-i»»nr?:• •- i^ lism of the two countries, m 
Lebanon for e»;ample, •^-^ do not expect the USSR. , . , to pour 
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its missiles on au*- -^ jvili-jn popolation . He was also 
quoted as saying ra«^?' plamly; If the Soviet Union will 
not co-operate with «.•- t- otjr struggle against imperialism, 
at least it should r,i'.: be a participant in aggressions 
launched on us'. A mo'i">> later, he earned the USSR that the 
supply of missiles to ftjQ was inconsistent with the aim of 
good-neighbourly reMf-? oog; [f V Q U do not want this 
(current) hostility turned into a clash in the future, then 
stop what you ^re doing We want good neighbourly 
relations, but you ^re Iving". 
In June, « ='^"ior Foreign Ministry official was 
dispatched to Moscovi to discuss the principal obstacle to 
improved ties; itrms- B"r!ies to Iracj, He met Gromy»fo and 
some progress was apr'«^ ~'^  ""tly made Pafsanjani now sought to 
decouple the subject ; ? i"proved relations from the war: 
"The issue is nrt f onnected to the* war,,,we have 
our relations wi "• > h?? Soviets, we have commercial 
dealings with e••-c^  other. We have many dealings 
and meetings w)**i each other. We do not wish 
relations with • h«-' USSR to become darkened, 
neither do they, Pf rovirse, we protest tt-te sale of 
arms by the UE»B'^ ' to Iraq; we protest about 
Afghanistan, There are other similar issues, but 
we should try to improve our relations and solve 
these problems" 
11, Chubin, Shahram, Iran and Iraq at War(London, 1V88), 
P,223, 
12. Ibid,, P.223. 
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Iran was eti]l highly critical o"* the Soviet -failure to 
condemn Iraq's use o^ L'Hemical weapons, o< the contmvious 
•feedinq ' oi Iraq's ftyse"<als with the latest ci the Brms- m 
weaponry' and oi the -tij^ sber vi Soviet advisers alleqedly in 
Iraq, Criticise* equating the twc<-super powers and accusing 
them o^ collusion j n trying to sa-ve Saddam Hussein 
continued. Indeed, or-e Iranian newspaper commented that 
Saddam Hussein goer ^n war with Soviet arms i^rt^f Western 
Strategy'-
Ra-fsanjani said ir. February 198^ «i we i*re inclined to 
have qood relations with the Soviet Union', Iran was now 
prepared to separate the issue oi the war and political 
differences irom the question ci a^em^il relations; the 
•former were no longer to dictate the entire relationship nor 
was their solution to be the precc«ndi t ion -fcir any 
relationship. By Play J*?©^  Prime Minister lussavi detected a 
change; 'In c>*.%r relat'^^ns «f,«ith the USSP', v»e sense a 
realistic approach en their paf-t ^, This pr-esumably 
reflected trend identified by Rafsanjani in Feb'"uary-a 
reduction in arms sup^l ies to tr-aq. Whether real of-
13. [bid,, P,224. 
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imagined, it spurred l-ir^ to tna* e encQu«"aqioq noises in the 
direction of the SoviV'': authorities despite the adnowledged 
existence of two outs ••a-^ d ing major issues: arm supplies and 
Afghanistan. On the- ••••ter, it was indicative of the shift 
in the balance of thp -e'-tionship, that it was now the USSR 
that brought up the luestion of I»-an"s support for the 
Afghan 'rebels' whenexc fran raised the question of Soviet 
arms supplies to Iraq, "i' le Soviet communioues tool Iran to 
task for continuing a =; >r se less' war, Iranian commentaries 
pointed to the discrie-^n-v between Soviet tall' and actions; 
"They keep talking ?f-"^ !t a meaningless war- while on the 
other hand arming the Afl^qite regime with more weapons , 
Another referred to th<f« dualitv' of the Soviet position 
which sought to supplv --rms to Iraq and pretended that it 
was exercising restrain' in e>:pQrting sophisticated weapons 
which could aggravate t'l ' 't-^r, 
Whether the new »"&-•'I ism stemmed firom Ir-an or- the Soviet 
Union is debatable, Wt'- ' v\s clear was that the USSR was now 
in the position of "=' •"TJ'yinq arms direct l> to Iraq an-j 
simultaneously indir,. ' v if it wished-to Iran, It could 
turn the arms tap •"- ^nd off to either party, thus 
demonstrating ,..its ' ?vance to the warring parties and 
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its influence to the o»-h«?»- Gulf St^stes, 
In March 1985. <3 P--jvda .article, no doubt reflecting a 
belief that Iran had burned t ts bridge-s to both suoerpowers 
and lacked any qre-*'^  room for manoeuvre, called Iran's 
tendency to equate the t*«o •superpowers absurd and 
insulting', referreiri '•--> its assistance to Afghan counter 
revolutionaries" in training centres at Mashhad. 
At the end of '"^^ 198'5, the SovLet-based National 
Voice of I?"an' called fjr the first time for the overthrow 
of the Islamic Republjc And Soviet statements angrily 
continued to shrug off resp»3nsibi I ity for the scale of 
damage in the war^as ir the ^^r of the cities which large Iv 
consisted of the use of Soviet equipment by both sides. For 
their part, the Soviet a«,5 thori ties, whose prima rv concern L" 
the ii^sr remained the ''"'ted States, accused Washington of 
supplying arms to Iran t<-? l.eep the war going and to provide 
a pretext to intervei"«^. (From the viewpoint of superpower 
rivalry rather than T- ;»n-Soviet relations, Soviet arms 
supplies to both r = ' *" ?-es in the war mav be seen as a 
preclusive measure to c'S^^pt any moves bv the US). 
The exchanae of do'•"•gations increased; an aareement was 
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r e a c h e d i n o r i n c i p l e i"' A u g u s t 1786 on t h e r e s u m p t i o n of q ^ s 
s a l e s t h r o u g h IGAT-1 ta t h e S o v i e t Un ion and c u l m i n a t e d in 
F e b r u a r y 1987 i n t h e f i r s t v i s i t o f t h e I r a n i a n F o r e i g n 
M i n i s t e r t o Moscow s i i c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n . 
S o v i e t s u s p i c i o n s abcuj t I r a n ' s < i f g h ^ o i s t a n p o l i c i e s , 
and d i s q u i e t a b o u t t h e e - c a l a t i o m and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of t h e 
w a r , d i d n o t i n t e r f e » - e " i t h t h e p a c e of t h e s e c o n t a c t s , o f 
i n h i b i t S o v i e t o f f i c i - ^ l s frotii s c o l d i n g t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s . 
The S o v i e t a u t h o r i t ' » < i * - e l u c t a n c e t o j e o p a r d i z e t h e i r 
c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e [ s l a r f c »-egi«ne stemjned a s much fro'n h o p e s 
of f u t u r e i n f l u e n c e , p o s s i b l y p o s t - w a r when I r a n wou ld n e e d 
a c c e s s t o new w e a p o n s - i3«j rces , a s from s u s p i c i o n s o f US 
p o l i c i e s and m a c h i n a t i o n s <• w h i c h may h a v e b e e n i n t e n s i f i e d 
i n t h e wal 'e o f l r a n a * t e > . Bu t d i f f e r e n c e s c o n t i n u e d t o 
r a n k l e on b o t h s i d e s , i^^oreign M i n i s t e r V e l a v a t i s comment 
t h a t ' I r a n w i l l n o t a g r e o t o S o v i e t domina t i c^n o v e r i t was 
c a l l e d u n n e c e s s a r y ' and i t was c l e a r t h a t t h e F o r e i g n 
M i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t was c h a r j c t e r i z e d by c o n t i n u i n g d i f f e r e n c e s 
on t h e w a r . 
The S o v i e t d e c i s i c " ^ d i d n o t s i g n i f y a new e l e m e n t in 
i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h ] r^- i '-tit u n d e r l i n e d i«n o l d o n e t h a t t h e 
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Islamic republic, M^H?'- • h'g sel f-absorption. would ignore at 
its peril: as a supers-,,5:-, the USSP dealt o" a much larger 
chessboard than lr-?n. However important its bilateral 
relations with Iran, these were never the most important 
consideration for the USSR, which focussed instinctively on 
relations with the L'S first and foremost, This aspect of 
Soviet diplomacy became increasingly evident in its policy 
toward Iran and the wir t.hroijghout 1937, At one and the same 
time it highlighted I'-" s importance and the limitations on 
Iran's capacity to irT, f t »ence or manoeuvre at the summit of 
international relatiomi. 
As the war becr'-Ttc ^n object O"* superpower competition 
and involvement, lrar» PI-^O -found it had fewer cards to play. 
Lacking much prospe. !: *f strir,,inQ a bargain vjith a newly 
inflamed United Stat"^' . its leaders sought, as a prudent 
insurance policy, an i "^  "-roved relationship with the USSP> 
Por Iran such a rel at ^  "•nship held cn.it the promise o-t (a) 
increasing its room for manoeuvre with the U,S, 'b) 
weakening the prospect for superpower collusion at its 
expense; and Cc) re^'ncing Soviet a«-m=,, and pc«s.sibly 
commitment, to Iraq c 'i-" 'ime. Specifically with regard to 
the >^sr, Iran's relatir"-'^ with the USSR t»ecame focussed in 
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1997 on blocking d i r> I -»wii.a t i c oressure-s ff-ot" the United 
Nations and the West, and gaining an ally in diplomacv to 
reduce its general isoIa*:ion and to help in articulating its 
views sympa. thet ica I I/, fn e^rchange for -sijch limited suDPort 
Iran offered limited co^ioensa tion: a posture predominantly 
anti-Western in rhetari.c and action; a toning down of 
criticism of the Soviet position Lr^ Afghanistan (and 
possibly more); and itmr^ roved commercial relations, holding 
out the prospect of reasonable good-neighbour iv bilatei-al 
relations in the future. 
Far from being identical, Jramsn and So-iet intere&t5 
in the 6ul^ merely came to overlap to a degree in 1^8"?, The 
common denominator stemmed -Irom the mutual O D D O S I ticn to the 
western, and in parti ri.t3 ?!•" the American, mjlitary ve^-e-f^ce. 
This was an adeQuat?- basis for a finite, circumscribed 
tactical partnership, 'b-.xt hardly a basis "for mi.ich more. 
Above all, it was limited as much br the inherent broader 
scope of Soviet interests and ambitions as by any -failure on 
the part of the Islamic Republic, At best, it .iteant that 
Iran could only buy time with its diDlo^ac/ with the USSP, 
and that this revived cc«nnection could not serve BE. a 
substitute ior- basic strpteqic decisions about the war. To 
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contrast the emDh-s'Si" " "^  to show the diver-gence between the 
positions of Iran ^n<d t'"(e USSR it seems necessar-v e>a<nine 
the diplomacy of each '" turn. 
The improvement i "^  oolitLcal relations with the U'5SP 
came only gradually, fra-j^in leaders and (^ ledta psf-sisted in 
seeing the superpowe's as two sides o<f the same c o m 
essentially m tercha'"q«=»ab le. [n this view thev were 
reinforced by the revelatioin, in May l^S? that the USSR had 
agreed to reflaq •uw.iiti tan^ei^s. A Foreign Mimstrv 
spokesman criticised So «\?t Poretgn Minister Shevardnadze s 
comment that only a iDf^''tical solution' is possible, saying 
that the USSR was se«''* i';q to increase its influence in the 
region; Rafsanjani eg«j ?' ed the two supef-powers and accused 
them of collusion, while the newspaper Ettela'at said it was 
regrettable that th<^  li'^ SR had involved itself in hostile 
plots against Iran. Ss^iwetimes this c^-ttlcism was mo^e 
forthright; the command^, of the Pasdaran, Reza'i, suggested 
that perhaps the USSR '~--"d been behind the Iraqi attach on 
the USS StarJf (in May < ?.Q rupture the lin^s between Iran and 
the West. A radio commip-" tary accused the USSR of "indulging 
Iraq with its military -'nd economic aid', while Pesalaat 
suggested that the USS'^ had chosen the wrong side and must 
change this as they wc " *.cjw facing defeat. In general Ir3n 
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was sceptical about T-T Let irntentions. insisting, for-
eKample,during the visit of Vij l i Vorontsov. the Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minist-'-, in June, on the rights of the 
regional states to assuro the security of the Gulf, Besides 
equating the superpower and accusing thetxi of conspiracy, 
Iran sometimes adopted an injured tone as»i.ng, as Rafsanjani 
did in May, how the '"SSR could support a dictatorial 
aggressive regime lH'e Ba'thist Iraq and not Iran, a great 
anti-imperial ist revol'<^ '-an' . 
Iranian comments '• c»w di ^"f erentiated between the two 
superpowers, noting the fSSR's 'change o1 mind'. The 
concrete mani^festatim c* the convergence c>-( t*^ e two 
positions came with the Soviet decJaration on 3 July caJJinq 
for a withdrawal of ^O'-eign ships from the area together 
with a cessation of attacKs on co«w<ercial shipping, which 
was immediately welcomed enthusiastically by Iran's leaders. 
The Prime Minister called it a constructive proposal , tbe 
Foreign Ministry welcomed it as 'positive and Rafsanjani 
said it was very prnqressive ancf no one can oppose 
it',,.,,, 'The Russiar^ have the honour of being the 
14 
forerunners in ensuring oeace in the region 
_ _ i^j_^^^ P.223. 
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Nevertheless t'"'E' i'S dec a si or* to comma t -forces on a 
large scale to the Gui < region did provide -for a tactical 
convergence o"* Soviet -1 ranian interests, Iran benefitted 
from this in a concpte j^anner, in so "far as E<ovaet 
diplomacy became more solicitous the Soviet Union's own 
priorities or hidden ?iqenda' , it was notable that it went 
to considerable painc to put the most con=.tructi ve 
interpretation possible on Iran's international behaviour. 
For example, Soviet sp'^ '^ 'esmen emphasised that Iran had not 
rejected Resolution '^''P, and depicted it as showing 
f le-tibi 1 i ty and beir r prepared to cooperate with the 
Secretary-General, The f>jviet aut^•orities hinted to the Arab 
States that i-f Iran had rejected the resolt'tion. they would 
have been a great deal tougher. And to push the Iranians 
they intimated directly that the passagf? oi a second 
resolution was still ps^-fectly conceivable. However, by 
their diplomacy oi demurring on th»e need iar a Quicl- <ollov<-
up mandatory resolutior on the heels oif Security Council 
Resolution ^'^B, they u-"-loubtedl y helped Iran viraggJe "free 
from international pressures. In so doing they have chosen 
despite-or because o-f-''-ir support for a rapid end to the 
war, to emphasize di^^-»macy more than the threat o-f an 
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embargo, whose effecti'^ t^p'^ iess they Drofesg to doubt. 
An area in which {"-an was a moving force was in t^ade 
relations with the Soviet Union. What concer-ns here LS the 
degree to which this '••as seen as relevant to Iran's war-
needs and therefore acf.ed upon. Alif-eady in mid-1986 there 
was the possibility s HJ *: the Soviet Union might become an 
important outlet for [f-ani^o QLI e>:ports endangered bv heavy 
Iraqi Air attac's, Si«f»ilat- considerations again came to the 
fore in 1987, when these attacks and the threat of an arms 
embargo (possibly combined with a naval blockade and trade 
embargo) revieved interest in diversifying trade outlets and 
routes. The quickest way to do this was overland, and the 
most natural partner t^ as the USSR, However. the If-anian 
leaders were not cle^*' as to the imoact as intensified 
relationship would have on political relations with the USSR 
and on the two states' respective leverage on each other. 
At times it wa-=: depicted as a consequence of US 
pressure on Iran, as in Mussavi's comment: when the USA 
threatens our waterways t "^  the Persian Gulf, we have to see* 
other routes', at nt9<e'^  times the reo^^ien ta tton w^s 
attributed to geography , ^s i" Rafsanjani's comment in 
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August: 'I believe th^t the future of bilateral relatLons 
dire bright because HT' > ^re neighbours and have a cotnmon 
border of 2000 K i lotre ?. = •'= , Consistently the scope for, 
and the pace of, de'.'f'i .io«nen t of bilateral relations have 
been either del ibera».>"r'.v exaggerated o"" misjudged, ^ot-
example, a report »- '^ «»gust insisted that a polLtical 
decision had been mad»3 t • convert a gas ptpline (lGAT-1. m 
disuse since 1980) to an oil pipeline leading to the USSP to 
serve as an outlet *^ -r [ran's oil exports; this pipeline 
with a capacity of 700,0*»0 b/d was routed to BaVu and thence 
to the Blacl- Sea; it war to be replaced (reported ly^ in due 
course by a new pipe lino, while it reverted to gas. 
Rafsanjani seenns f "• 'iie doing botH simultaneously in the 
following statement. 
We could be'n«=''Tit Krom Soviet transit routes, 
roads, railroads a^d ports ior our oil and pas. 
And they could r»!**=iin advantaqe-s in return,,,For 
instance we couHd construct a railroad leading 
from the Soviet border to the Persian Gulf or the 
Gulf of Oman-*^. 
Granted that Ir-"- has found it an its interest to 
15. Ibid,. P,27.0. 
16, Ibid,, P,27.0, 
218 
improve its relation's i-^ ith the USSR, including Ln the 
commercial domain, »vh^  t does it offer the USSR in return, 
and how fif at all) has the view of the leadership towards 
the USSR evolved? What President fr^hamenei Characterized as a 
Strategic' tie. Prime f^ linister Mussavi referred to in more 
sober terms: 
"The Russians ha^ /e adopted a much more realistic 
stand' on the revoJ'.«tion and on the war than the 
west,,,The Soviet Union know'=. that it can not 
e^ert too much pressure on us" 
The Iranian official appear at times to be under no 
illusions about the tenuous and conditional nature of their 
influence on the USSR, and the priority in Soviet policies. 
As one realist observed -?fter the Reagan-Gorbachev S«jmmit in 
Washington in December- I'^BJ^ 
It seems that the Soviets did not give in to the 
US pressures. We sho«Jild than* them for this. Of 
course they have their own calculations. i'Bu t 
given their technical and economic requiremen ts<l, 
they do not want to mal'e the Americans very 
.18 
angry 
Soviet policy in the war has been aimed at three sets 
17, Ibid,, P,231, 
18, Ibid,, P,231. 
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of interests and majo?" audiences which »-»e shall e>'-*mioe in 
turn, starting with our principal concern, Iran. Despite a 
strong-even obsessive-ti^adi tiona I concern about f-elations 
with adjacent states which is evident in attennpts to t^^p'ove 
relations with the fs'amic f-epublic, the USSR has not 
treated its militant nieiahbour with »! id gloves", or hidden 
its disli^e of the reai«^e. 
Soviet-Iranian meetings Bre invariably characterized as 
frank and business Ji^e , Even when on a relatively high 
level, as in the visit 'o-i the Iranian Foreign Ministe"" to 
Moscow in February 1^&~',. no attempt was Atade to disquise 
differences, Gromyko told Velayati; 
"Our assessment of that v^Br and your vjew €>•* it do 
not coincide, , ,cowff»c»n sense suggests that primary 
attention should be C!>n the future i*rti:} not the 
past-on putting an end to the war,,,,,The only 
ones who gain from the continuation of military 
conflict Bre the imperialist forces for whom this 
war is profitable" 
Nor are differences on Af ghanistan .whtpre Iran aided 
Mujahedin ignored. The Soviet Union reminds Iran of its 
full responsibility for the fact that its territory is 
being used for armed MBri^re against the Democratic Republic 
of Afghanistan', 
_ jt,j^ jj_^  P,232, 
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With the beginnifv^s oi a US-Iran con-f rontation, the 
tendency' to attribute sneci'fic strategjc aims to US policy 
came to the "fore, Indicrtive ai Soviet mistrust 'rather than 
PLtrely propagandist), and o"* Soviet thinHinq as we] ] , was an 
article in Li teratuma.. a Gareta, arguing that US pressure on 
Iran was intended as- ?- means o-f returning to that country 
so as to be able to '^s*? it as a bridgehead against the 
USSR' . Similarly, it •- 3 '^'d that US pressure on Afghanistan 
was intended to r*?sf.>I', in the use ci Olghanistan as a 
backdoor' to Iran, 
Inevitably because of the strategic importance of Iran, 
and the value that thp IJSSR attaches to keeping it anti-
wstern, or to put it differently, denying the US access 
especially strategic access to it- the USSR can not be 
expected to see approaches to ending the Iran-Iraq war other 
than in terms of the net outcome for its standing in Tehran. 
Seen from this standpt-.i nt, Soviet reluctance to alienate 
Iran is comprehensive. 
Soviet policy toi'ar*-) Islamic Iran in the Gulf war has 
evolved, coming close'- to Iran, and avoiding any major 
crisis. It is not evide^5^ that it can do so for much longer. 
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Iran's continuation of the war creates oroblems for the 
USSR, in terms of pn- • •>' e benefit's that might be extracted 
from it by the Ti' •' <"h as access to bases in Arabian 
peninsula on a perma'--- « ">;ists) and of the negative effects 
of an Iranian victQr% m the region for fundamentalism and 
the regional balance '9-1 well as on Soviet credibility as an 
ally in the Arab WorId>. It risls forcing choices that the 
USSR would prefer tn 'Void. The onlv opportunities it 
provides ^re in the Or.^b Gwa I f States where the USSR has 
posed as a 'protect"- , Additional benefits might be the 
weakening of both bt-31 ! ' "-»rents and their liV^ ely dependence 
on the USSR tn the f' *•" ->, But these ^r^e lilelv to happen 
anyway and do not need -5* •'di tiona I years of conflict. Nor can 
they be measured '-"" • it the risfs of the xi^r- tar- the 
enhancement of the sf'-•'';• =gic position of the major Soviet 
preoccupation and its '-• 'ncipal rival for status and power 
the United States, 
Soviet policy tov -^ds- Iran in the- BLII"* war hae^  been 
shaped with one eye alvi, --. on competition with the U,5, This 
has meant that Iran has {-een able to benefit to some extent 
•from the inability o^ the superpowers. to align their 
policies to move to a t'S"! position to end the war, ]t has 
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also given it a m-^ f-c'rv fof manoeuvr-e io e»;Dloitinq the 
respective -3n>;ieties of the superpowers .about each other s 
capacity to entrench <» ^ -^selves m Tehran while excluding 
the other. At the sa-ne t'"e, because there is a significant 
overlap in their pi-'-'tJons on the Gulf wa^ - itself (as 
opposed to the questi.cn 3' rsoective influenc€? in Iran}, and 
because relations between them ^re; ir* a state of transition 
try many dimensions, the Gulf war has been a period of 
experimentation and strategic dialogue between les deu> 
grands themselves to t^ e^ exclusion of the local states. This 
fact has tempered Soviet policy and also altered the 
startegic calculation, -^ /.luting somewhat, potentially and 
importantly, Soviet ool «'"'>' toward Iran. 
By the end of 198''' Tran was still at war with Ir^o. the 
superpowers had not ''Tt moved jointly to pass a second 
resolution imposing ar> "-ns embargo aty [ran, and Iran still 
maintained passable r--'?tiQns with the USSR. How far could 
this be judged a success and how far w^s it attributable to 
Iran's sl-ilful diplomacy? As we have seen, as superpower 
competition became more oronounced m the war in 1^87, the 
interests of [ran and USSR converged on a narrow. specific 
but not unimportant paint, namely the withdrawal rif the 
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naval vessels of the US and its allies frow the Gulf. prior 
to any other consideration. 'In this and only this, Iranian-
Soviet interest overlapped. The USSR still insisted on 
Kuwait s right to be left alone and supported its 
sovereignty and independence; still called on Irain at every 
opportunity to end the senseless bloodletting; still 
diplored Iran's policy in Afghanistan, its domestic policies 
and its attempts to e>;port the revolution to the Islamic 
world. Even on the issue of the withdrawal of foreign naval 
forces from the Gulf, Iran and the USSR did not see exactly 
eye to eye, for while Iran sought a total withdrawal of 
these vessels, the USSR sought a withdrawal of the navies of 
western countries, and offered as a substitute a 
multilateral presence, that is, a UN naval force authoriied 
by the Security Council, implicitly bringing itself into the 
picture directly. 
By 1VB7 Iran had gamed a bre-atbing spell without 
solving any of its princiipal problems.. Borne progress had 
been registered in bilateral relations with the USSR, but 
nat much; econo'Pi c re-l^itiarf- remeiined minimal, 2ess than a 
tenth oi those existing in l^BO (• 1 billion), Iran had not 
Eucceded in de-internationaliring the war and the war and 
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the USSR did not shrsre its view on this, w-anting to be 
involved rather than «c»*'cloded. [r-^ n s determination to 
continue the war left open the po-S'sibi 11 ty that in the face 
of a new Iranian threat to the Iraqi lines 
Islamic Iran has oroved neither inept nor unrealistic 
in its diplomacy with 'he superpowers. It has shown a 
capacity to adapt and learn from its mistafes avoidable 
m^5ta^es, to be sure^ stemming from rigid applications of 
its own rhetoric, literal interpretations of its ideology. 
Despite its continued opposition to Soviet policy. 
Iran could not ignore th«=» Soviet Union's influence on the 
war. In June 1784, an Iranian delegation visited Moscow in 
what was reportedly an unTuccessful attempt to halt the flow 
of advanced weapons to Iraq, Later that month,^ return visit 
by a Soviet delegation seemed to confirm that relations were 
atleast thawing. Nevertheless, a rapid end to the fighting 
remained a stated Soviet interest, and Iran apparently 
believed that Soviet technicians were withdrawn, in mid-L''85 
not because of any danger to their lives, but rather to put 
pressure on Iran to agree to peace negotiations. Iran noted 
20. Ibid., P.238. 
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that the establishment of diDlomatic »'elatLons between t^e 
Soviet Union and the »JAE in Nove»i»ber l'^ ?85 reflected 
traditional Tsarist ->-r»iLra tions in the Gulf, but did not 
attach too much practical significance to them. 
Although the visit in Februa»-v 1^86 of the highest-
ranking Soviet mission =ince the Iranian revolution received 
a good deal of attention, Iranian commentai^-y continued to 
refer to differences <-•>-=»(- Soviet policy towards both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, For i^i part, the USSR continued to allege 
Iranian interference ir Afghanistan; to insist that the war-
served only Western inte»-ests and allowed the US to build up 
its regional forces; and to support the Iraai war effort. 
(Indeed, in January 1787 the Soviet iJnion officially 
criticized Iran's continued belligerency; and the Chief 
Soviet UN delegate suggested that this country was actively 
propping up Iraq). T" '.He later half of 1986, the Soviet 
Union and Iran signed agreements to resume I»^anian gas 
exports, and to improve economic relations generally. But 
these developments signified little more than Moscow 5 
continued willingness ' ^  strengthen bilateral ties; though 
they might help Iran financially (as indeed Soviet arms 
might help militarilv> they did not imply a change in 
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Moscow's basic assessment that a strategic balance should be 
preserved in the Gulf , 
More re-fugees- cpxld be generated to add to Iran's 
already heavy burdip"^  erf 2 «ti]3ion Afghans, Indeed, 
significant Iranian hrlp to Afghan rebels could bring Soviet 
retaliation. The fighting has s-pilled over the border 
before, and Iran ha- only one effecti-i^e alternative to 
Soviet pressure the ideologically impossible answer of 
turning to the United states> 
The Soviets moved Quickly to recognize the new reality 
in Iran, Their BmhBs^^'iryr was one of the first sr^d most 
freqttent to call on Khcieini^ Their posture of waiting out 
the revolution and suffering abtise stoically as begun to pay 
off. In 1"?87< the Iranians smashed the communist Tudeh party 
and ei<pelled 18 Soviet d'olomats. Now that chapter is closed 
and a page turned with the Soviet Iranian agreements in iS'St 
and l^B'7 on oil and gas exploration and the reopening of a 
gas pipeline. Under these agreements, Soviet technicians are 
to return to Iran, And some years hence Iran may export oil 
Adelphi Papers, No.21V (Spring, I'^Bf) , P,^ ^O 
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by means of the pip?line. Economic ties also h^ve grown 
closer than at any time •since 1978. 
The Soviet Union. lifre the United States, has 
maintained an official stance of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq 
war. The outbreak. of the war put the USSR in an 
uncomfortable diplomatic position. As a major supplier of 
weaponry to Iraq and as a country that had a signed treaty 
of friendship and cooperation «^ ith Baghdad, it was e»^pected 
to support the Ba'thist regime of President Saddam Hussein 
of Iraq- However, ttoscow also wished to improve its 
relations with revolutionary Ira" and not alienate the 
clerical leadership in Tehran to the extent that they would 
be compelled to turn to the USA for military assistance. As 
a result the USSR, continued to fulfil existing arn\s 
commitments to Baghdad while refusing to accept Ir^qi 
requests for new arms. 
Iranian riajlis. speaker Al i Akbar Raf sanjani ' s Moscow 
visit in June 1V8V immediately after Ayatollah I'homeini's 
death was Tehran's first pragmatic move to end its 
international isolation. It was also indicative of Soviet 
adroitness in establishing Quic»j,ly a channel of 
communication with the post-Kho^fteini Jran, Mr, Rafsanjani s 
228 
visit was the first o*-' L^.s I-ind afte-r 1979. ^t the he^d o*^  ^ 
high ranking delegation. This was indicative of the victory 
of the 'moderates' in '-.f>fB ongoing debate inside I'"an whethe'" 
it should depend on outside support for the reconstruction 
of its war ravaged economy and defence. Till now the [f-^nian 
leadership, with the c'.">vious don»inance of the hardliners, 
had been tenaciously opirosed to the idea af inviting foreign 
loans and investment f•: *" fear of letting the country slip 
into the pre-1979 situation. An opening with the fremlm was 
considered safer than o sudden turn around towards the West 
as that might set the leadership on a collision course with 
the radicals. Mr. Pafsanjani's visit made it easier for the 
Soviets to build bridges with Tehran. This was a natural 
follow-up to the normalisation of relations between the two 
countries following th? withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Kabul, and the Ayatollah's letter to Mr. Gorbachev praising 
the Islamic content in Prestroil-a and the subsequent visit 
of Soviet Foreign f1inis':*?r Eduard Shevardnadze to Tehran. 
Iran's desire tn --.operate with the USSP is borne out 
of significant econoair .itnd political considerations. With 
the unemployment rate soa'f'ing to nearly Z^ per cent and an 
annual inflation rate of 50 per cent, there was no option 
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but to loQ^ for outside -assistance. Iran's annual foretan 
exchange earning is not more than '% 12 billion which comes 
mostly from oil exports. There is little le^ 't to ^-ejuvenate 
the ailing economy aftef earmarJ-tng S ^ billion for defence 
and * 3 billion for f-•-}••' imports. The Soviet offer of uo to 
* 2.1 billion in credit to finance ioint v€?nture projects 
apart from agreements m areas of science and technology, 
space and the use of nuclear energy would be a big relief. 
The agreements signed in Moscow include massive exchange of 
Iranian natural gas for Soviet help in the construction of 
dams, railways, production of steel and building gas 
processing plants. Moscow has also promised to help to r-e-
equip and modernise f-dnian armed forces. Mr-. Rafsanjani s 
visit to Moscow thus i'*as a landmark or a major move by 
Tehran to end its isolation 
A rapprochement •itb Moscow thus presents fewer-
domestic problems, although the fact that it has been the 
Iraqi enemy's principal arms supplier. The Kremlin made 
significant propitiatory gesture-s, including a call to Iraq 
to respect the l^/S border agreement with I'^ an which Baghdad 
22. Pafsanjani in Mosco** H.T. June 26. 1990. 
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was disowning. Secor...; ly, Ir-an, ^nr} tHe Soviet Union h^ve 
complementary economic ^sed'S, [ran i nows Soviet aid will be 
useful in the recoT-s t^uction and evpan'sic^ of its 
infrastructure and ^Jsic industries Ii»e ^tee I . and re-
equipping its armed t'3'-(--;s, [n turn, Moscow will be grateful 
for Iranian gas whic^< the adjoining Soviet regions badly 
need. 
Azerbaijan decide"-! that what was goc«d for Berlin would 
be good ior Moscow-r>nd thems! eves» The&e devel opmentE- ci<me 
after wee><s of unrest not ju&t along the border but all over 
the predominantly lusliT' republic of Arerbaijan. 
In Baku, the Penole's- Front of Azerbaijan bad been 
stepping up its calls for independence, while other more 
moderBte voices were rst least calling for closer lini(E, with 
their southern neighbour, J ran, 
Apart from growi'^g political demands m B^^i-u, there 
were instances of rrrt^e demonstrating on tbe ban»<E. oi tbe 
river Aras which IF the dividing line between Iran and 
NaKhichevan, from <?r ^  !y December, On the last day c<-f the 
month the demonstr at •.' *s toot, a turn for the v*orst , as •'ar 
as Moscow must have b^en concerned, and crowds attached 
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border posts. There ><if" e cl-*t«ns that tractors were used to 
pull down barbed wire and cement costs. Most of the 
disturbances were wat-'^ '^^ d bv Iiranian border guards. In the 
days that followed *.kHe Soviet bofdet'- guards rarely 
intervened. 
It has long btren ^n a&pi ration o"* the seven million 
fluslims in the Soviet Union to rejoin the twenty million 
' Azerbai jani &' in Iran, The des-trnction o^ bridges. that 
1 int.ed the two stater made things "ors-e, Recent demands to 
rebuild the bridges ha^e been made. 
The Soviet Union oromised to help re-build Iran E war-
torn economy. Other agreements "followed gas-supplies and, 
most recently, the E^oviets agreeing to act as honest 
brokers' to solve the outstanding di 1 •* i cul t ies between Iran 
and Irag, The diplomatic change is fnost noticeable in the 
tone oi o"f"ficial Irani^ -.n statements- and actions. 
The o'f'ficial 7r.?nian news agency 1RNA made several 
statements congratitl ating the Soviet authorities and the 
border guards on their handling oi the situation and 
containing the ier'^vur ai local Musliws, During one border 
demonstration a parliamentary deputy, Karim Sha"*ei , told 
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over a thousand Soviel 'Muslims th^t '^^thering along the Ar-as 
river would be fruitie 5 and that Soviet Muslim's should ta 1 ^  
to their officials to orepare the grounds for their visit to 
Iran. He was speaking through a "Megaphone to a qroijp of 
protesting people on fhe ban»s of the Aras. He added that 
Iranians were an>:L->'>'^  to see them but only wi thin 
regulations . 
There is no chanc<' that the Azerbaijani radicals. wall 
get their reunil i cat j on with Iran, but Moecov* has. played a 
good card by allowino the frustrations of the border to be 
taken out on barded "<• ''.'. In the Rnowledge that the Jrariians 
will support N0SCOW4 ^-'" wove an touris-m should please most 
of the local populat;- , 
Iran's dilemma i^- '-ather different. The last thjr.q the 
government in Tehran wa'-ts tc see is a growth of Azerbaijani 
nationalism which will "pill aver into its own territories.. 
But radicals within tfie regi^ Tte »re horrified by the forre 
which floscow has emfloyed to repress the uprising in 
Azerbaijan, contrasting it with the delicacy the Kremlin has 
23. The Middle East, '•'^.18^ «:Feburary, 1^90} ,P. 11 , 
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displayed in dealina wj!S the Baltic republics. "The Soviet 
leadership should l.<-o».! that the resort to violence LS not 
the solution to f -^  jroblera of Acerbaijan". Said (iehdi 
Karroubi, the spea^e of the Majlis, "Obviously, violence 
and toughness towards people will entail consequences", he 
added ominously. Tehran has vigorously denied charges that 
arms have been shipped across the border to Azerbaijan, But 
it can hardly be seen as condoning Soviet repression of 
24 
fellow Muslims 
The separatist movement in Azerbaijan imDinqes direc*!,-
on the Soviet Union? rr^Jations with the Islamic RepubKic o^ 
Iran. Mr, Mikhail Sorbachev, justi"fied the *re"«]in s 
fnilitary intervention in Azerbaijan on the Qroimcl that the 
secessionists had plpmed to establish an Islamic Reotiblic 
there. According to w»ost Krefl*! inolpists.., Mr, Gorbachev 
exaggerated the possibility o1 Bn 1E1 a<nic regime m 
Azerbaijan in order to mitster 3 !.lnJ^ ied responEe •fro'-t the 
rest of the Soviet rcp.-.t'^l i cs. Nonet he j esE., there- v*35. a q'^ai" 
of truth in Gorbachc'-'- ?• statement. T^ hi»t is-. i'--BC t ""le-
separatists succeeded ) r: breai-ino aviay f'-ct."- Moscov*. the only 
direction in which the,- woLsld have- «ir«oved was that C'"^  jslai-i. 
24. Ibid., P.ll. 
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The Iranian learir^rchip WBE divided irt its reEporise to 
the events in Er-iet ftrerbaijsn, Ji->p hardline 
revo] Lit lonaries. were f- nf-ferjno Torri3 and fiiateraaJ aad to 
the agitating Areri= £C»"OEE. the bo-'de'r- E D as- to enhance 
their chances o"* E'^ -r.cdinq ircn^i Moscow and declaring 
independent Azerbaijan, P>.tt not the Jrfloian prsg^nati ets, who 
&re led by no less ?. Le'"sona]ity than the President, Mr. 
Rafsanjana, 
Acting on specific instructions -from the Ra^sanjani 
government, Iran's a'nbassador to the UN described the Arera 
nationalist movernent a'j an internal problem oi the Eo-iet 
Union, This does not -iqnif/ that the leaders li^e Mr. 
Rafsanjani are not =ts Islamist as their hardline 
counterparts. It mp»^<% simply that i^tr , Pa^^sanjani is 
determined to concentrate on repairing the severely battered 
Iranian economy and not allow himsel"* and the nation to be 
diverted into the revoJi.tt lonary upsurges in the neighbotir i nq 
region-be they Islamic r^ nationalist. 
There B^e compe]li''<q reasons lor Mr, Pafsanjani not to 
do anything that p<jii' •- spoil the -friendly relations he 
•forqed with the Kre/ri'isrw in late Tune 1^8^', The series o^ 
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agreements he signed ^t the end of t^is highly success tul 
visit to Moscow covered not only economic, scientLfLC .and 
technological lints, ^ivtending uoto AO 2001, but .^ Iso 
mi 1itary. 
One o^f the=.e *»€!•• eements binds- Hoscow to aid Tehran in 
improving its de-fenc cspabi ] i ties. Even though Iran's 
(August 1*?88 truce with Jraq has f^ eld so -tar, its leaders can 
not a"f"ford to JO'-T"- the-ir guards-, Improved fiJitary 
preparedness, there"forp, remains a hjqb priority in "Tehran, 
In the absence o< r<orma] diplomatic ties- betif*een Iran 
and the United Stater- and the United ••'inqdom, there is no 
possibility o-f Tehrr.-» being able to improve its weaponry 
with the cooperation o^ the West, It must f^erefore E-trave 
to maintain cordial relations with Moscov*. with a vjew to 
having access to the sophisticated arms o-f the Soviet Union, 
The USSR is an important actor in helping Iran to 
repair and expand not only its infrastructure o"< power 
plants but also the ccml-mining »ri^ steel industries. These 
projects involve Soviet aid to the tvme o^ * 6,*;KKII million. 
The Soviets sre also ronductinq joint exploration o-» the 
Caspian Sea ior oil. They are the single largest buyers o-» 
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Iran's natural gas. i"eHr-ao t no«<*s that •any overt assistance 
by it to the Azeri seoa'"atists would nsean an end to Moscow 5 
economic and militar-y cooperation with it. 
Then there is the diolomatic di«nension. The Soviets are 
intimately linked with Iran's neighbours to the east and 
west: Afghanistan and Iraq- Where an incensed Moscow to tf-f 
and maVe life difficult ''or Tehran, it would i^ ind willing 
partners in Kabul and Baghdad. 
Estrangement be^weenl Tehran and Moscow would mean the 
end of any progress in ?:he peace tails between Iran and Iraq 
to consolidate the truce in the Gulf war. Those 
negotiations, coducted under the UN ausoices. had been 
stalled since October 1988, It was only on LI January that 
both Iran and Iraq agreed to conduct peace tal^s m Moscow 
under the chairmanship of the Soviet •'oreiqn minister, Mr, 
Eduard Shevardnadze. 
As against 6 million Areris with Shia Muslim bac*-ground 
in the USSR, there are about <^ million Areris. living jn Iran 
in the region bordering the Southern Soviet "frontier. They 
speak Areri which, as a Turkic language, is. quite distinct 
-from Persian. Though Lhe Aieris living outside the Iranian 
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A z e r b d t i j a n a r e w e l l i n t e g r a t e d t n i t o I r a n i a n s o c i e t y . t h e 
e m e r g e n c e o f an ind<=o*^ndent A z e r b a i j a n r e p u b l i c w h e t h e r 
I s l a m i c o r n o t woul'"* * 3n t h e f I a»»ve'5 o f A c e r - i n a t i o n a l i s m 
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w i t h i n I r a n 
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IRAN'S REIVVTIONK WITH NEIGHBOURING ARAB COUNTRIES 
(IRAO OND G , C . C , COLIKTRIES) 
A . IRAN-IRAQ 
In the broadest EeT'se, conHlict between Iran and Iraq 
errterged with the vjit^-drawal o1 British -forces -from the 
Persian Gulf and the antagor»ism and competition that v^ as 
subsequently given roi:::^r't for "full e-f press-ion, As long as Iran 
was led by the late 5hah (Mohd, Reza Shah) this antagonism 
was held in chech . Iran «riade no claims that challenged 
Iraq's e'''istence, it accepted the idea o"f state sovereignty, 
cultivated a strong tnilitary deterrent and sought a 
"favourable balance cff power in the region. Since Iran was 
in the same power position in the region at that time, this 
military imbalance but-essed the evisting order and deterred 
threats to it. Despite a- arms competition v^ith Iraq and the 
existence oi a concre^*' territorial dispute c^fer the Shatt-
al-Arab waterway, the '-'^ gional balance oi power was clear 
and the option oi resort to the use oi force held in cHeci- . 
These conditions changed drastically with the 
Revolution in Iran, T^e Iranian state that had been a 
secular conservative artti pragmatic rieighbotir, was. replaced 
by one that recognised only the commtinity o^ believers, saw 
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its role as a oros*^' '• •• B'er amonq f^'jslims. esoecially the 
oppressed Shia (cons tj s.<j Ling majoirtty ot Iraqi, popu la t ton i , 
who criticized Iracj -^ar its secuL^r leadership and its 
oppressive governTeit. Revo lu tion^rv Ir-in excluded 
ideologicai-religious -ilitance and rejected the notion of 
any restraints on its tield ot activities; Iraq consequentIv 
felt threatened. The rsngjonal political environment at the 
time was fluid and or-nssive. The super-powers were at 
loggerheads-the US of ~"c ' pied with the re-^olution and then 
the hostage crisis, '^^ USSR with Afghanistan, Iran was 
diplomatically lsol-lt='^  and Egvot was dip I oma ti ca 1 s / 
estranged from the Ai^--%b "lorld after Camp David agreement of 
1978. At the same ti"" f"* aq was eroerlencmg a coming of 
age, with political •=' >'-iltty, economic growth, a broader 
international acceptance, a rapprochement with other Gulf 
States, and a wi I 1 in'T"-»ss to define non-alignment more 
rigorously than in the past, when Iraq had often appeared fo 
be a virtual client of the USSR. Iraq s desire to e>oand its 
leadership role in the region thus seemed to coincide with 
an environment not onlv conducive but €>ven positively 
supportive of it. Iraq was anrious to grab the leadershio 
role lost by Egypt in t^ «^  Orab world, and b^ the Shah m the 
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Persian Gulf. Ir-^Q !..of^. 1 rJ oose as the cratectar Q'' tne Ar-^b 
Gulf states, orq^^-'r: t^ •e reglo«^ and e<T»erge as its 
undisputed leader. 
ConEideration o? olory and oolitical ambitior; thus 
changed 1 rag's at»i*-T'e' towards »*hat it saw BE- the 
Qualitatively new thr?^* DOsed by ]ran. <5rc element an this 
was a desire ior rev.-rc-p ior the set11 eiderst wHach Ir^o hsd 
been obliged to ma'fe as a resttlt o^ Iran's military strength 
in JV7fi, Another element involved domestic politics. When 
Saddam Hussein assumed o"'1ice in vJuly J^79, he immediately 
discovered Shia and Syian conspiracies against the state, 
which were ruthlessly repressed. Saddam HuEsei" may well 
have concluded at this sfrly stage that war was inevitable, 
that Iraq not Iran shoLi^d choose its timing, and that the 
domestic pay-Q-ffs -for a puic*' victory co5.ild only rem-'orce 
the regime's dome€l:;c base by providing it natiar^iil 
legitimacy , 
In the early l'^70'£ ]ran made an attempt to isolate Iraq 
politically -from oths' Gull States. It made a clan ior a 
regional defence organs r?.tion comprising Iran. Saudi Arabia 
1, Chubin, Shahram. ?^e-f lections on the Gtil f War Survi ,-a 1 
( J LI 1 y / fluqus t, J ^Bh ' , PP. 307- 308. 
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and Kuwait and, abi'V?? all, the ev tensive econoicvic and 
military assistance «:<.» ^ he Kurdish ^-ebels m the nothe'^n 
Iraq. The growing 'Hostility between the two countries 
erupted into violence ;.r the winter of l'^73-74, witn fierce 
border clashes- The ceasefire of ri^rch l'?/^  did not in 
practice lead to the cessation of hostilities which merged 
into the Kurdish war. 
Unable to suppre?;^ an insurgency that wa= impc«sing an 
intolerable burden en its do"»estic systens, Iraa had no 
alternative but to seeK some Hand o^ aggreemient wjth Iran, 
This took the -form o"* t^ *» Algiers Agreement o^ 6 larch J97?. 
which provided -for so«»»r- territorial adjust«T«ents, including 
the deffiarcation oi th& S^hatt-al-Arab waterway s boundary on 
the basis oi thalweg ''i.'?.^ median) lane. 
It was, however, shortly belore the closing summit 
meeting oi the Organi ration o-f Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in Algiers March, J*??^, that Baddan* Hussem, Vice-
President oi the Revolutionary Comfrtand Council oi Iraq, 
agreed to meet with t^ »€ Shah oi Iran (Mohd. Per a 5hah( at 
the invitation oi Prpaident Hanars Bumidian oi Algeria, to 
iron out the di'f"ferencri b*?tween the tv»o countries. 
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Two meetings, attended by only the Shah, Saddan* HuEEein 
and Bumidian, were hold on June t^ and 6, iV7^t, On 6th o^ 
Jtine, the talks resi'lted in a" agreement o" essential 
matters o"* common co'-'ern. The agreement centred on t^e 
following matters: firc,t, the thalweg would be the boundary 
line in the Shatt-al-A-ab; Second, the Shah agreed to stop 
his assistance to the Kurds, which virtually meant that Iraq 
would deal with the Kurds in accordance vjith the autonomy 
proposals of-fered to them earlier; third, Iraq and Iran 
agreed to cooperate on the maintenance of peace and security 
by putting an end to in-»i l tration and SLibversive activities 
on both sides oi the frontier. 
The Algiers Acrc-r-J«ent consti ti.«ted a formal Iraqi 
acqLiiescence in Iranian dof«inance vjhiJe Iraq went OL?t of its 
way to placate Iran bv tyanting its sovereignty over half of 
the Bhatt—al-Arab, Iran wade no practical ccinces.sio"s-un] es E. 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other Eovs-rc-iqn 
states can be considered a conceEEiors, In ot^^er wrordE-, i r-
the Algiers Agreement Jrao bought' the inviDIabi1ity of itE 
frontier, a fundamental and sel f-evidenit attribute o-f 
statehood, at the high price of territorial concesE ictnc , T ne 
weiqht o^ the Iraqi co'-. esE.ionE. IE iurf-jer i 1 J itstrated f ,• 
24 3 
the fact that the S^at^. [l^'•.3a s sote cai.ot af access tc the 
Gulf. IS supremely !'':""ta'^ t fQi- the CQuntfv s aoliticai, 
strategic and ecor-T"!'" needs, [rani s willingness ta m^ i-e 
such far-reaching c«-'•'•..••?ss ians on •;•^se Shatt .-et iecte-^ its 
painful awareness f^^t the e*'fectLve enforcement of its 
internal sovereignt- •'•^ 'aended o" tf^ e aoodwili Qt" ^ t = 
neighbour to the ^-?-*-and tt i>»volied also ai" Ir^QL 
recognition of Iran -. -military supe-Lor i ty . 
Iraq was LH "•«"" ; as it ion to cotxiplete with [r^n for 
hegemony in the Gulfs 3' the time of the Algiers Agreement, 
the Iraqi armed force- were wea^ to withstand the Iranian 
military strength. Accoi^ding to Saddam Hussein the Ir^Qi 
army had been su *"'"'er ing from 9 great shortage of 
ammunition' in the wiT'teir of 197'^, j-^ hich prevented it from 
suppressing the u^rd'-•-"• '-ebeltion. This sho'-tage was iept 
secret lest it affect '^^>5 morale of the army. 
In June 1979, the revolutionary regime of Ir^n began 
publicly urging the '-aqi population to rise U Q and 
overthrow the Baath (-"-jiiwe. This propaganda campaign was 
paralleled by widel.' ifread anti-Baath demonstrations m 
Iran, some of them irM-,.iving armed attacis on Iraqis and 
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Iraqi installations. In late 1979 Iran escalated its antt-
Baathist campaign by resuming its support for- the Iraqi 
Kurds; it also began cf^ os^ id log moral and material support to 
Shia underground movements {in particular the Da awa Party) 
in Iraq; and, last but not least, the Iranian government 
initiated terrorist -^ttacJs on orominent Iraqi officials, 
the most significant of which was the attempt to assassinate 
the Iraqi Deputy Premier fnow Foreign Minister) Tariq Acic, 
on 1 April 1980 which failed. 
The Ba'ath npgiTte tried to chec*' thes-e Iranian 
pressures. In the dom«~-*ic sphere, Iraq suppressed the 5his 
Linderqroitnd organiratacns and expelled Iranian cjtirenE, On 
the externa] level, Iraq tried to oraanize a Unjted Arab 
front to oppose the export of tt>e Iranian revoi ut i c"">; it 
countered the Iranian propaganda caffipaigri by launching a 
series of verbal attacks on the Islamic regime; and finally, 
it lent its support to Iranian separatist ele«wents such as 
Iranian Kurds and the Arabs in i^ht.ires tan, These 
countermeasures failed to impress the revolutionary regime. 
Responding to Saddam Hussein's pledge to taitfe revenge for 
the attempt on the life of Tariq Ariz, >ho«nein3 called on 
the Iraqi Shi as on '^ June J'?B<> to overthrow Saddam s 
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g o v e r n m e n t ' . I r a n ' s r -3r -e iqn M i r » t s t e r . S-3degh O a t b r a d e h , 
r e v e a l e d on t h e •sair**? d^v th.31 h i s govern'Tsen t had ta»er< t h e 
d e c i s i o n t o t o p p l e t^ '? Ba a t h r e g i m e . The satne theme was 
r e p e a t e d two d a y s l5*;*?r by t h e therv [ r a n i a " P r e s i d e n t , 
A b o l h a s a n B a n i - S ^ d r . ^•(>,3 a l s o w a r n e d t h a t I r a n w o u l d g o t o 
war i n c a s e o f a fu-'-J-'"'- d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e s i t u a t i o n on 
t h e b o r d e r . I n A p r i l l'>!30 t h e I r a n - i r - a a c o n f r o n t a t i o n had 
e n t e r e d a new p h ? - ? w i t h c l a s h e s on t h e b o r d e r . These 
s ^ l r m i s h e s , w h i c h "-> '• p l a c e alo-^.g t h e w h o l e f r o n t i e r , 
c o n t i n u e d i n t e r m i t te '~ ' ' ' • u n t i l l l a t e A u g u s t , A t t h a t p o i n t 
t h e s e e s c a l a t e d i n t - j ^s^vy f i g h t i n g . i v T v o l v i n g t a n i ^nd 
a r t i l l e r y d u e l s and ^ J ^ n t r i J e s . 
I r a n ' s s u b v e r s i v f * a c t i v i t i e s m g e n e r a l . ang t h e 
p r o t r a c t e d and e s c a l , ? t ! n g b o r d e r f i g h t i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
d r o v e t h e I r a q i l e a d e r ? : ' ^ I D t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t had no 
a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o c.O'^s *: !* in t h e I r a n i a n t h r e a t by r e s o r t i n g 
t o a r m s . W i t h t h e b « t t e r e ^ ^ o e r i e n c e o f t h e i ' ? / * - / ^ ar-med 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h I - -•-' s t i l l f r e s h i n t h e i r m i n d s . t h e 
B a a t h l e a d e r s had s e r t o - i i d o u b t s w h e t h e r t h e I r a q i p o l i t i c a l 
s y s t e m c o u l d s u s t a i n :»nother p r o l o n g e d and e x h a u s t i n g 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h I r a n , These d o u b t s , w h i c h w e r e c l e a r l y 
i l l u s t r a t e d by r e p o r t e d s u r g e s a g a i n s t u n r e l i a b l e ' e l e m e n t s 
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in the armed fo'-ce?. 4nd the B^-a th Party tn earlv 1780, 
were reinforced by t"T; uo iaue nature of the new theocratic 
Iranian regime. 
Iraq did not wan'' ^o qo to war in DLCSnit of B-ome wider 
ambition but was. pu!E>>ird into i t as a resuJt o^ incre-asinq 
anxiety.. War, was not Iraq's -first choice, but rather an act 
of last rc»sort ta* PH only after all other methods of 
deflecting the Iranipn threat i^sii been e.<hausted. It was 
indeed a pre-emptive mr> ^, tal^en when Iraq re^l j^eti tHat it 
could no longer livF "i t^i Iranian superiority because of the 
simple fact that the superiority threatened to lead to the 
overthrow of the Ba'ath ro-gime'. If the Baath entertairce-d any 
hopes c*r aspirations •^'tyond the containme-j-it o"* the Iranian 
danger-as they may hpv-r- done-they did not constitute the 
reason for launchirsq ihe war, rather they represented 
2 
possible gains . 
It was thought just after the revolution that the whole 
Iranian Islamic revoiu^..ion was about to crumhle, The v»ar 
between Iran and Iraq began after Iran ignored Iraqi demands 
for the withdrawal of Iranian forces frcipi Zain ul-Oo=, in 
Karsh, Ef raim, ' Mi 3 i tary Pc»v*er and Foreign Policy Goals: 
The Iran-Iraq ^iBf Revisited', International 
Affairs.Vol ,64.No. I fWinter, j'yB^.-eS), PP.e^-B^v-, 
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Diali province on the tjorde?" between the two co'jntrien. If^Q 
maintained that this ?f-ritorv shauld have been returned to 
Iraq under the l"?/^  agreewent with [ran. Iraq therefore 
abrogated the 1775 Sh^tt a 1-Arab agree<T^ent and invaded Iran 
on 22 Sept€?mber L?QO. t'ost observers now believe that this 
was no more than ^ pretext on Iraq s part: the real 
objective of its Presid^^nt, Saddam Hussein, being to topple 
what he regarded as ("h*? threatening but vulnerable Iranian 
regime. 
On September 17, I'^BO, Saddaip Hitssejn, ijnable to 
persuade the Iranian rr^gxme to hctnour the Treaty o^ l^^^t and 
settle the differences, between the two cotintries by peaceful 
methods, decided to tej-Tinate both the ojqaers Aqr^e-^nent and 
Treaty oi If^^ as a step to de-*end by force jraq s 
territorial integrity. In a speech hroadcast to the nation, 
he declared. 
"The Iranian rulers' attitude- si^ice aEEu^ninQ 
office, has con-* ir wed their vaolation o"* the 
relations of good neighbourliness and their non-
commitwent to the clauses, of March Accord (Algiers 
Agreement), They, therefore, fulJy bear the legal 
and de facto responsibility o"* rendering this 
Accord null snd viod»,,.,.,. 
Since the ruler* p^ Iran have violated this 
accord,,,! here ^j^inounce before you that the 
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Accord of March '?, 1975 fAlgiers Aqree«i*eot) is 
terminated on our o.^ rt too. 
Therefore, the legal relationship in Shatt al-Arab 
must return a'=i it had been orior to March 6. 
1975 
We a'f "f irm, , . thf^ t Me Eee*f, good neighbour ] y 
relations, with f»i ghbouring countrie-E. incJudiriQ 
Iran; that Iraq ha=. no designs on Iranian 
territories and t'~f.t we- did not have any intention 
to wage y»Br against Iran or E"'<pand the i^r^^ ci 
conflict beyond r«ef ending oLir rights and 
sQvere iqn ty"", 
Iran was asked tr- turrender half the- waters o"* the 
Shatt al-Arab, which *. had acquired binder the Algiers 
Agreement and the 7re?+ of 1^7?, and to recognize Iraq s 
sovereignty over the -r^jre river, as it v*as defined m 
earlier Treaty of J937, 
The revc" lilt ion in f-r ^n upset the balance in the r eg a on 
in two ways: first primarily, by replacing the Shah's army 
with what seemed to be a revolutionary rabble; and E-econd, 
politically, by making f* conservative and satisfied Iran 
into a revel utionary r^•^ •"r intent on the quasi-imi versa ] 
mission of spreading i^r version oi true 1 = 1 a«w and hence 
destabilising its neighf-curs. What made v^ ar likely even 
Khadduri, riajid, T-^ g^ ilf War J Oxford, J988< F'P,8^-86. 
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inevitable. was not •5in>nly [fan s provocation but also Lts 
neglect of, and disdain far, the traditional militaf-y 
balance between the tvo countf-ies. (It h^d been this balance 
in Iran's favour that J^ ad secured the 197'5 Algiers Agree«nent 
and sustained the nipw relationshio of respect and 
reciprocity that had followed it>, I'-an s rhetof^ical 
excesses and claims and inattention to the military balance 
were matched on the Ifjoi side by a compound of fea^ and 
ambition: fear about [fan 5 goals if the res^olution were to 
become entrenched and ambition to achieve a position of 
regional supremacy while Iran was preoccupied and Ifaq was 
in a relative position n* unmatched militarv and economic 
strength. From Iraq's perspective the time to strile was 
unlikely to be better th-m in 19B0, before the revolution 
put down its roots, while its forces were in disarray, and 
while its relationship i»«ith both superpowers and most 
regional states was at b'^  11 strained. 
Iraq's miscalculation was severe in that it 
overestimated its own capabilities while misconstruing the 
nature of its adversary and the sQu'"ces of power at [ran s 
disposal. For while revolutionarv [ran was deficient m the 
traditional or quantitative indices of military power, it 
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made up for this, to » certain e>. tent by ^-elL^nce on the 
superior commitment o*" i Vs oopulace to the regime and hence 
the war. Indeed so s^^'srly did the r-evo lu tionary t-egime 
embrace the war as ^ '?!.3ssinq' , label tt as a struoqle 
between "Islam and b:.'-^  -'ssaK^y ^ define its i-iar aims as the 
overthrow of the 6-3. ^K""---*; regime m Baghdad, and use the 
war to suppress its '^ -i-^ mies at hofvse, that Iraq s leaders 
might well have wonde*n1' what Iran would have done tn the 
absence of such an e^ ,te^ -nal diversion. 
Iran stumbled into a y^^r- »««hLch it did much to D^'OVOV e 
but was ill prepared fo'-. Once emba^'Jed upon the imposed 
war', which it embtacrd with c^ ai^ -ac tens tic a^douf- and 
militancy. Iran used st to harness the energies of the 
mobilised revolutions?" •< ran^ and file, settle domestic 
scores, consolidate po-^ - and focus on the >flission rjf the 
revolution abroad, Tlr? letter was less controversial than 
the events of the 'at ion at home. which f"emair>ed 
contentious- The war thus came to represent a test fo*- the 
revolution-its capacity for commitment and sacrifice, as 
well as its ingenuity ard self-reliance. It came gradually 
to epitomise all the theiri'es of suffering and martyrdom that 
the leadership seemed determined to cultivate. In time it 
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simply displaced arv other item on the agenda of the 
revolution. The war a.r..i the revolution had merged; suoport 
for the two had hO'-'^p so inter wined as to mate them 
virtual ly indistinqu i -•'-'^'; le . 
Ji Iran's. revc?' tjon and ats claims. he-J pe-d to 
precipitate the conf jirt. its de"'inition oi the absolute 
stakes that the *^»r rr-'esented helped luel at Jong alter it 
had stopped makinq F'-- sense. Iran's expulsion o^ Iraqi 
forces from its territor / had been effected by mid JV82', Vet 
the momentum of war and the drive to extend the sway o"* the 
Islamic revolution throughout the region prevailed over a 
sober assessment of Iran's military capabilities, A series 
of costly offensive iert by revolutionary guard?. (Pasdaran) 
and volunteers (Basijis-' failed. In the next two years the 
war settled down into a pattern of reckless Ire^nxBrf attacks 
on Iraqi forces dug i-n behind water and earth obstacles, and 
defended by a network of mines, artillery and automatic 
weapons. Iran's att?-ic. ^t lajncon island and Howeirah 
marshes m the sp^ i'"-- of iVB4 and 1^&^< respectively, 
demonstrated Iran s incenuity and tolerance fo«- ptmiEhment 
but also an inability io hold the territory it had captured. 
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Iraq s-eemed unvu ] } xo-^  to resort to cotinter-oHeT'Ea ves 
or to take casualties: "onseaiient 1 y it Jet Iran dictate the 
tempo oi the war, ]r30 also relied on superior weapon-
systems because o"* its comtanued access to -frjendly 
governments (especially the USSR and France a-fter JS'B2», bi.it 
otherwise resorted to uni verbal conn cri ption , The morale o"f 
its "forces appeared '^ M'^ oect if only becatise it had lost 
three times as many prisoners of war to Iran as its 
adversary had lost, 
Iran by contrast relied heavily c>n the sttperior 
commitment oi its fcrrrF^ It constantly affirmed, and came 
to believe, the slogan articulated by Refsanjani ih J<?S4 
that the faith o"* 't-<? Islamic troops is strc<nger than 
Iraq's sttperior firepower , As a consequence Iran s leaders 
really believed that the-:- could demonstrate the vital a tv of 
the revolution and affirm its message ^nd validity by 
con-frontinq and overcoming adversity through self-reliance. 
They were in no moTT^ 'or lessons fromi the Wes-t or the 
professional military; their war, 11 »> e their revolution, was 
to^ be an experience <•' xoue in the annals- of war, unsullied 
by practical considerations, or constraints. 
If Iran's milita- •• -uccesses between 1^81" and J*?8t< were 
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ephemeral and co--.' \ , with loncj oaps betweeo m^jor 
offensives from l^ S''-1-"!*:, the orablem steiTtmed as much ff'om 
deficiencies in stf •' IY as ti^ owi logistics, Altefnatinq 
between frontal offr-^-i -"s and attrition along the length of 
the frontier (defe^ -i> Jihad ), between enthusiasm for the 
daring of the re^ "li" (onarv guard and the more sober 
appraisals of the pr3*<- ri looa I militarv, £r-an's leaders were 
unable to frame a -,^' •'tegy that tied theiif- wair aims-the 
overthrow of the eoc ^  ' f- their military capabilities, which 
m terms of equ i P^ -^^ T •' dwindled with each offensive. To 
achieve their war c '-•^, [ran needed either to defeat the 
enemy's forces deci'->' -jv, or to capture a major strjiteqic 
asset, thus preclpl^'• their sui-^render f for e> ample, the 
southern port city of f^yif^-A^ which was predominantly Shia). 
The problem was th.^ ?^  !'-aq' s forces would not venture out 
into the field to fiaht t^ nd risl- defeat while the caoture of 
Basra or Baghdad remA^ -ir^ d increasingly difficult because of 
their redundant <;!<"+"-"<" lines. This gap between aims and 
capabilities was to wi •'^  and precipitate the orocess that 
led to the end of th"* •^ - . 
Iran =• leadersbit^ s'^sjEtang, as • homeini said m 1^8^, 
that Those who l''j-ii that the- Ouran docE not sav War 
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until 1 victory are mi^taien . [f self —sufficiencv w^^ the 
goal, then improvisation, self-rellance and a refusal to be 
bound by conventional aporoaches had to be the means. At 
times the war apn^^ared to be mereir a vehicle for 
consciousness raising. rather than a deadly serious 
business. It was 'A continuation of politics with the 
admixture of other means, 
Iran s-eetned to be winning the war. The breal-through at 
Fao in feiyrixsry l^'&h seemed to confirm that an Iranian 
victory was only a matter oi tame, Relerrincj to Je"*^rey 
Record's analysis it \-' observed: 
"The longer the 'r»»r- lasts, the greater the 
prospects ior a d'?risive Iranian victc»ry, Iran has 
three times thp ?>'• pul ation o1 Irap, and Iranian 
forces., though l*'ss well equipped, appear to be 
much more highl^ -^ <~ctivated than those of Ir^q" , 
By Fet3ru3.ry 1906 a number of cliches had achieved 
widespread currency. One was thjit peace was only possible 
with the removal or disappearance of one or both of the two 
leaders, Saddam Hussein And Ayatollah Khomeini'. implying 
Chubin, Shahram, The Last Phase of Iran-Iraa War: From 
Stalemate to Ceasefire',Third World Quarterly. Vol.il, 
No.2 (April, 1989), PP,l-5. 
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that compromise ^ho-t of vtctof^y fo'" Iran would be 
unimaginable and tantamount to political suicide. Another 
was that "Iran could not lose the war nor Iraq win it , 
implying that time was on Iran's side. 
Iraq spent more f'^ an Ir^n every year between IVtBl and 
1985, in ratios varying between 6:1 and 3:1- Iraq 
consistently ewceede-i Iran in "i^ ilitarY e>:pendi ture, 
maintaining a constant annual rate of * 12-14 billion during 
1984-87, while Iran's expenditure plunged and dipped fro<n t 
14 billion in 1985-86 to • 5,89 billion the newt year to 
between * 6-8 billion in the succeeding ye^rs. As the war 
dragged on, Iraq's access to superior sources of arms became 
increasingly pronounced. In 1984 Iraq could only manage a 
2.5:1 superiority in tanks, 4:1 in aircraft and APC and had 
a 3:4 inferiority in artillery. This had widened by 1988 to 
4:1 superiority in tanfcs, 10:1 in aircraft and 3:1 in 
artillery. The commander of the Revolutionary Guard, (iohsen 
Rezai, was to say after the war: 
'They had armour and we did not. If our 
circumstances in the war -^rs not ta^ en into 
account when comparisons ^re made with classical 
warfare, it will be a major error on the part of 
the analysts. We were unarmed infantrymen against 
the enemy's cavalry. There 3.r^ few instances m 
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the history of Isl-jflni of 3uch -^ ««f-ar' " , 
Even Iran's much vajnted numerical advantage of 1:1 tn 
terms of population was not much in evidence on the 
battlefield towards the end of the war. Whereas between L986 
and IVSe Iraq was ablp to increase its manpower bv some 
1,50,000 men and reorganise and expand tts forces from 
thirty to thirty nine infantry divisions, Iran's manpower 
fell in the same period by 1,00,000 men. 
The strategy begun by Iraq in I9t34 of 
internationalising the conflict was beginning to bear fruit. 
In 1986 the ' tanfer war' had e>Tpanded, with more shipping 
hit and more casualties than the cumulative total of the 
preceding years. Iraq's aircraft witH new missiles and air-
refuelling capabilities •• Dre now ranging as f^r south as the 
Lark and Lavan terming*3, putting at ris^ all Iran's oil 
terminals in the Persian Gulf. 
The formation of rt<n<-urity Council resolution 59g bv the 
United Nations was ar. indicator of the degree to which 
Iran's conduct in the w?f- had aroused inter-nationa I cor>ce''o 
and even stimulated a parallel response. The resolution, fof-
5. Ibid., P.7, 
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all its apparently neutral terminology,was manifestly aimed 
at arresting Iran's rontinuation of the %>4-^r, threatening 
mandatory sanctions in the form of an arms embargo if a 
ceasefire was not auc^T'-ed, 
There were E-evfr^] indications that Iranian leaders 
were atlea'?t rea&s-essinq their aDproach to the war as of 
mid-lV87. 
1. Iran's wi]]ingne5«^ to ta><e up the gauntlet o-« the 
superpowers' dprisjon to escort »uwaati Shipping 
suggested that Iran somehow «r*elco«wed tf^ ^ diversion of a 
sideshow in the wa*-, 
2. Iran's unwi 1 1 ingnc-^s to reject the Security Cotmci] 
resolution outright but to seel* modifications was also 
indicative of a change m attitude, 
3. Iran's war aims, although still ambiguous, had 
nonetheless been modi^fied over previous months; the 
demand for the removal of Saddam Htissein still stood, 
but the insistence on the removal of the Baath partv, 
reparations, and the installation o-f an Islamic 
republic had disappeared. 
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4. The stream of vr ''."^ '•ee^ 's ffi'r t^ s^ front had dwindled anrj 
Iran's leaders, n.-abl-, Ra f san jan i., had begun to taiv 
publicly i-^ mif{~5'^ '^ 7 of continuing the war unles-H or 
until 1 it begar. to interfere i^ ith the political 
administration ot ^ncietv. 
BY the autumn of 9'7g7 [ran s leadershto ^ad begun to 
despair of a militaf"- solution to ^he co«->flict, but was 
still far from devjsi'^ ii a dioLQ«^^ti.c strateg> for [if-an s 
extrication from th^ 'or. For one thing, the *'*st^, whose 
importance had been f -li^jtedlv and irresponsive I \ inflated, 
and equated with 1-1 ^ 'm' and our life . was clear-ly 
becoming costly to r-^n'unue, but who could guess what the 
political costs of er.'i-o it ignominious l^  -in failure-would 
be'^  And who would be L>'^  cotjrageous soul willing to convince 
Khomeini of the neen for an er\d to the war, and of the 
change in the cost -alculus of protracted war versus 
negotiations'^ This was not made ans easier bv the fact that 
Iran's sense; of aggrie r^ent about the origins of the start 
of the war was not sh^ n^ -^ d br many permanent members of the 
Security Council, in o^rt because of Iran s prolongation of 
the conflict since mid l'"32. And the political collapse of 
Iraq now seemed more r^jwote ^nd a less liielv source of 
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saIvation. 
Simply stated, two set& o-« events catalysed Iran into 
the decision to s«?<: k a otuc^ ceasefire m mid-JV8S: the 
intensive use by T'.;:: o-f lonq-rsnqe missiles on cities and 
chemical weapons ot the ^ront; and a consequent cHanqe in 
the balance o-f W'lp'r on the ground, part i cti 3 ar ] y the 
shattering oi the mprsls o+ Iranian ^cfces. 
Although Iran and Iraq had been trading attacks en each 
other s city centres since I*?84. They had not reached t^e 
intensity oi the exchanges witnessed in the revived war o'f 
the cities' in f?ar^  'VBB, In earlier years Iraq had used 
its air superiority <o take the war home to Iran by bombing 
Tehran iior examplr,, in the spring o"* JVO^*, m order to 
raise the politict^i} and economic costs o-< continuing the 
war. This had some political e^^ect, but not enough to 
produce more than orcrsional panic and resentment. Iran Had 
responded by protla ming a prcgranime ^or btiildinq air-
shelters and by aroMiring Soviet bloc^ SSME. -frow Syria, 
Libya and possibly China, These missiles, toghet^er with 
artillery, were to counter Iraq s air threat to Iran s 
inland cities, 'or Iran had the advantage oi being within 
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shelling range of Fraa's princLpal cities. The sLtuatton of 
mutual vulnerabi1Jtv might have been expected to produce an 
end to these e>;ch"'i':r.'5, wer"e it not fo^ ' [r-aa s perception m 
late 1987 of the n«red to intensify the war against Iran at 
the period of its ^oimum vu Ine^abi I i tv" . 
After the Wo' , "•^fsanjani was to claim that ryf a total 
of 1,33,000 ['-7'^.i.»ns Killed. 10-11.0'X» deaths we^e 
attributable to ^ i •- and missjle attads on cities. T"he 
effect of this wai ii3>'bled by I?"aa s f-esu'i^ ed use of chemical 
weapons at the rro"' . notably i.n the attack Qn the to'-r. of 
Halabja in the nof''"h. Again, the effects may h^ve been 
greater psychologically than they iNiere mtlitarilv. But it 
did not escape notice m Ir-an that the, international 
outcry at documented uses of these banned substances was 
relatively restrained when they fell on Iranian soldiers or 
villages. Rafsaniani was later to tell the Revolutionary 
Guards that the 'J-»r had shown chemical and biological 
weapons to be .• ,' decisive . and that all the moral 
teachings of the i*':?ricJ are not very effective when war 
reaches a serious oT'ition. 
The turning poii^ t in the war came, ] believe-, shortly 
6, Ibid., P.il. 
261 
after this with the double bJow sus teamed b\> [r-ao on i~-l8 
April 1988, when Faa was lost to frao and sevef-al basts to 
the US navy. Fan, of coufse. was aolittcallv and 
psychologically significant, being the major- tangible sv'T>bol 
of Iranian success in the t^Ar, whose loss would leave Ir-^r^ 
virtually empty-hand^.d after st> years of prolonging the 
war. But more important still was what [rag s recapture of 
Fao signalled in terms of the shift that had taien place m 
the psychological balance; £raa had durt\oed its de^'ence 
only' policy of leaving the initiative to Iran, 'iidina 
behind static defences and see& ing to 11*" L t casualties in 
engagements. By sei::ing the initiative and s trii^  ing-ou t with 
counter-offensives, Irao not only complicated Iran s defence 
planning but showed svidence of a new and susoected 
conf idence. 
After all, it was generally Known that the- US was 
already providing Iraq with detailed intel]igence data to 
aid Iraqi bombing runs on IrBni^n targets.. Furthermore, both 
the range of Iraqi aircraft and the accuracy of their 
bombing against Iran'=. oil refineries. and terminals had 
improved suspiciously r>f late. It was but a short steo fr^ ur, 
there to seeinq the actions o" i7-lB Aprjli J V8© as beinq 
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coordinated and even .'o-ntiy planned Ra.if'saniani accQf-dLngly 
depicted them as a p f o'. . 
Judged -from t!«- -tandDomt o"f traditional diDlomacy, 
Iran's war e-f-fort h^r* been a v^jiant but poiotle^E eie^cise. 
Having elevi^ted seJ ^-'^ '^.1 jance to art absolute qoa] , Ir^n tx^d 
•found through its owo iffimoderation that it was n^ longer 
just a goal, but a reality and a constraint vjith which its 
war e"f"fort had to Elruqqle, The concepts o''-E.el"f reliance, 
sel f-suf "f iciency , a nation tempered and icrg^d in ''tsi'r and 
similar such romantic notions were the moE-t that cotild be 
salvaged "from a war thpl should ne'-er have occurred, Iran s 
inattention to the military balance had made war attractive 
to its rival neighbour. Similar inattention to the btisiness 
oi making peace at th? optimum time ensured that Iran was to 
reach the conferencF table at the point o^f its ma-imum 
weakness. The major ca'i'.ial ty o^ the war was the initial loss 
oi credibility o^ t f»e Islamic Republic among its own ran^ 
and -file. It -foLind itsc-1^ no longer able to call e^f "f ec ti -e J y 
upon its populace "for rrtisades. and sacrifices., but to act as 
a traditional state. It was "for this- reasc»n that Hashemi-
Ra"fsanjani indulged in preemptive sel"* criticism o^ the past 
policies. It was "for this reasori too that reconstrijct ion 
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policies were parti c* i ^ *^! v important. However after the end 
of war and subseaw^'^i t acquision of tost territories and 
prisoners of war people -^ ot sigh of relief, A oeace dividend 
must be found for fh*=> supporters of the revolution if the 
virus of discontent >s not to spread and affect the very 
legitimacy of the revolution whether or not future 
generations will com'T>emorate the xf.S'r as a glorious chaoter 
in the revolution. ' h-=- present generation iria*-, be forgiven 
for not doing so . 
The war, which ended one month E.hort of its eighth 
anniver&ary, had th-r«<.'ghout the- J*?80E. become cart D"f the 
political and E-tr-ttpcic landscape o"f the Middle East. 
establishing or acr«='l i-r at inq new al lonments- and forcmq new 
priorities. Because of its durabilit/, its boLits o-f intense 
clashes altering with seascmal I U I J E , and the 
impenetrability of the Iranian Islatiic resolution, it Had bv 
the middle o-f the decade given rise to a host oi 
assumptions, bons mots and clashes among observers tnat 
substiutted for in-formed analysis. No part o-f t*->e war, it 
appears came as a greater surcrise to suc*-> spectator^ than 
the way the V4sr ended. 
Ibid., P.l^ 
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Khsmenea , a c c u s e d "f T U,Str D"* s t fDDor t i nc' J^BCS irs a tE e-iof^t 
v e a r war w i t h I r ^ ^ ' <i ma*-3'^q Eiaddij»»'s " a r t - o o a r j t e-r rs'-ic-*" t o 
i n v a d e • ' u w a i f r B u t . ^"= Bsitit i t >"ss t*"!e d u t / o"* t ' ^e c t f ^ e r 
s t a t e s oi t h e <reQ;i-' ' o E e t t l e t*"e cc"*" ' i i ' " * , "Any D^e who 
• f l Q t i t S A m e r i c a S a o q f ^ ^ H 1 O r i " , * h a ~ e r e j , v i c r t C"! , ' h ^ s e r : ; a n o H 
i n a H o l y war 20 t'""=' ca t i se vi A j J a h , arsrf ^rs .'orie v«hc; i s 
b i l l e d on t h a t D-3th j ? a m^r t - ' i ' " " , 
M e a n w h i l e , I r a a i . F o r e t q i n MtnLs tep- T a r i q t^ziz: l e d 3 
d e l e g a t i o n i n SeoteiTs-b'trr 1*^90 t o T e h r a n ant j n o g a t i a t e d t h e 
r e o p e n i n g o f f u l l da .0 i .3mat t c r e l a t i o n s a f t e ? r t h e b r e a * o t^  L'.> 
y e a r s . A day l a t e r t h e T e h r a n Time-s r e o o r t e d t h a t I'-^n " iMght 
b e g i n d e l i v e r i n g f o o d -^nd w e d i c i n e t o B a g h d a d , R e p o r t s s o o n 
l e a d e d t h a t I r a q h^d a r r a n g e d t o s h i p 2,«>». 'K"? b o'f o i l a 
day t o I r a n , f r e e i n g f ' - s n i a n o i l t o r s a l e or* t h e h i a h o r i c e 
s p o t m a r t ' e t . 
8 . T ime I n t e r n a t i p n B J , No .3 ' ^ '5eptemt»er 2A , J VS'O » , P . J 3 . 
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B. IRAN AND THE G.C.C, CTJIJNTRIES 
The a n t i - S h a H -'•jcvement o a t h e r e d mc«wM?ntLim •froc 1V77 
ont^srds, BiiJi ruJers wr ; tched it wi fn g>-a>>-t2nfj ccmBte-rri^f jori. 
The Shah 'E- o v e r t h r c i w , t h e y "beared , MQIIICJ e n c o u r a g e 
r e p i i b J i c a r i " forces i • t h e i r ayn' c o i i " t r l e s . They we-rp i ] ) -
e q m p p e d t o t a c k l e r^irrh a t h r e a t , s i n c e tN^-y had a l l a l o n g 
Bought l e g i t i m a c y •-< < * h e i r r\,r}e v ^ i t ^ u " 1 s 1 ama c p r e c e p t s , 
K h o m e i n i ' s v i e w , baser? on an i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n o^ tHe Outran, 
t h a t h e r e d i t a r y powr ' "^'as tin I s l a m i c , v<aE. tf"'e mc'St s e r i o L i s 
i d e o l o g i c a l c h a l l e n g e t h e y had "faced s o ^ ar . | .hcmteirii s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was i p ? i d i l y a c c e p t e d by most Sha a '.ilema i n 
t h e Gnl"f, T h i s m d^*"- B a h r a i n t h e <nc«st v u l n e r a b l e - t o 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y Lipheav;^], 
The I r a n i a n r e - o l u t i o n i n e a r } y JV7V b u o y e d t h e 
o p p o s i t i o n . Aware o"f t b e p o p u l a r i t y o"* ••homejni a^d t h e 
I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n frtong t h e S h a a « i»ajor i ty c o n s i s t i n g o"^  
w o r k e r s . C i v i l se rvr^"*? . and m e r c h a n t s t h e r ^ t l e r bar«ned a l l 
news on t h e s t i b j e c t ' ^ r t y u n d a u n t e d l e a d i n g u l e ^ a i Esued a 
t w e l v e p o i n t c h a r t e r . demandi r tq j n t e r - a l i a t h a t B a h r a i r : be 
d e c l a r e d an I s l a m i c " " ^ c u b l i c . The rifj^r s r e s p o n s e - was t o 
s u p p r e s s t h e st«bseau>ent d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . by s t u d e n t s and 
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o t h e r s i n s u p p o r t •-'^ '^  he c h a r - t e r . and t o e v p e l bav'^'ed H a d i 
a l ( i o d a r e s L , an e m i n e ' t S h t a l e a d e r . 
K u w a i t was t h e • - t h e r s t a t e t o f e e l t h e w i n d s o*^ t h e 
IretniiSin r e v o l u t i o n . Thiftv p e r c e n t af i t s h'>*J,'?00 n a t t o r j ^ l s 
w e r e S h i a s . t ' u w a j * " ! S ' l i i i t e s i»»ere r e c e p t i v e * t o f'hQtTseini s 
a t t a c k s on t h e Gu I r i j i e r s . whom he Q f t * *n d e s c r i b e d as 
" m i n i - S h a h s ' . I n Ju I v I'^^T? a d e l e g a t i o n o f l o c a l S h i a 
n o t a b l e s f l e w t n r^t-v- jn t o c o n g r a t u l a t e " h o ' ^ e i n i . L a t e r 
t h i r t y f o r m e r p a r I i->ne" t a r y d e p u t i e s o u t o f a t o t a l a* ^ ' i f t y 
p e t i t i o n e d t h e r u l e r . S h a i J h Jaba»" a l - S a b a h . t o r e v i v e ^he 
n a t i o n a l a s s e m b l y d i s s o l v e d t n A u g u s t L'?"^ >b. The r u l e r 
r e s p o n d e d by f u r t h e r '-t=>s t r i c t i n g p r e s s f r e e d o m -sfyd b a n n i n g 
d i s c u s s i o n o f p u b l i " a f l ^a i r ^s e v e n a t p r i v a t e m e e t i n a = o f 
l e s s t h a n t w e n t y ptp"- =; "ii -,. He r e s o r t e d t c o r d e r i n g w ^ Q L e s a l e 
e x p u l s i o n o f u n d e s j r a b l e a I l e n s » cb ieJ^ lN S h i a I r a n i a n s . 
The House o f •< m g Saud was s h a l ' e n bv t h e s e i r u r e o f 
I s l a m ' s h o l i e s t S h r m e . t h e G r a n d Mosque o f M e c c a , by some 
400 w e l l - a r m e d g u e r i l l a s a t dawn on 20 November 197'?. x^htch 
marked t h e s t a r t o f ^^.e I s l a m i c f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I t t o o ^ 
t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a f o - I ' l q h t t o c l e a r t h e v a s t mosoue o f '"he 
r e b e l s . I n t h e p r o c e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o o f f i c i a l s o u r c e s . 12^ 
t r o o p s , t w e n t y f i v e o ' l i r i m s and I L " ' r e b e l s w e r e l t i l e d . Q<" 
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the 170 guerill<3'= ' 'Dtured, 103 r^eceived long Df"i3Qn 
sentences,and the f"es'- were beheaded by -sword in public 
places. Encouraged b' the sir of defiance engendered by the 
events in Mecca, (.he 4,00.000 strong Shia minor-ity. 
concentrated in the oil rich province of Al-Hasa. bro^e the 
long-established h-'-' '.n the *• ingdo«n on Ashya on 27 
November. To the /l^-m of the authorities, tbe Ashijr^ 
processions turned ? r ' o pro-J'ihomein i de«nons tra ttons m eight 
important towns in th.r lil region. 
Khomeini rega":'" ' the Gulf rulers as corrupt men who 
fostered what he ca i !«-'<' Americar*. Islam or golder^ Islam . 
He was scathing abou'- '.i^sir policy of depleting the valuable 
oil resources of their countries to satisfy the ever-qrowing 
demands of America, u'^ich he described as the Great Satan, 
the number one source of corruption on earth. He denounced 
them for denying t^ ieif subjects any role m the decision-
making processes T" the state. The creation o* a 
representative system in Iran, with a popularly elected 
president and p^""! .*ii.Tient, made his argument for 
republicanism attr^cti e to man-i in the Gulf countries . 
9. Hiro, Di lip, Ira'-' Under the Ayatollahs (London, l'^35», 
PP.334-36. 
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Iran was not a I togh^ '.^ r^ r overse to ^ regional defence pact 
In this conte>;t Irani^ «-» wee*' l>- If-anwee*' wf-ote in June l"^ "^^ . 
while the Qove»"niT»en t hs-s denied fumour's -ibout 3 
meeting to be convened among golf states to 
discuss the fc.»-Tsation of a defence oact, it is 
expected that I'^^ would not be opposed to such a 
development pr-o'ided that the big powers and 
"agents of imp*—ia I isn»" be absent from such 
discussions 
The ]=-lamic Rp/ulution in Iran ba=- radically chanqe'd 
the balance oi power j-- the G u M regicrii and tbe Middle East 
in general. It has pro»npted a rethinf;inq of alliances and 
alleaianceSr Some ha-e maintained tHat the Islamic 
revoKition in Iran wa?. a Epecial case and would not affect 
or infect other states: in the ^ire^. most of whicb had Sunni 
governmentSr Khomeini s initial attempts to foment trouble 
among Shiite group? iri Bahrain, the United <^ rab Emirates, 
and Kuwait were stipP'«^ssed firn»ly arid riqorot(sl> b> tbe 
governments concerned. By Febr^jary JVEtJ , however, ^ayban 
declared that,"the Islamic PevoKitiort car« not be confined 
within Iran and can not be impriscfoed m a cotintry of 
1,648,000 Sq, Km, W H N a population of 36 million" arid the 
10. Abidi, A.H,H,,'The Iranian Revolution in the 
Perceptions of th? Gulf States. in Surendra, Bhiitani 
(ed,). Contemporary Gul -f (New Delhi, l^v-BO), P,40. 
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president of Iran, '-^•^^ i-1 All »fhamenei, has stated that there 
are no geographic ' •- ^  dsries for- f he Emam^ '^". The I^-anian 
Revolution would <--' i compiete =o long as oppression ^nd 
e>'pioi tation conti^ n'r--' m other fslawic nations. said 
Kayhan; "the mission if the Iranian peoole 15 to st'-ive 
toward a better e> p , f *' ion and better ot-eaen ta tion of this 
revolu tion". 
Purinq 1^81, af^ '-^ - crushing internal disse-nt. ^hoiriemi 
was in a position ^o -^tep up i-ns e^f-forts to liberate the 
Shias living under th:: 5unni go^ 'erooinents , These qovernments 
toof< the threat seriously enough to establish on I^ Mav, 
I'i'Bl a Gulf coopp"--*:' r'h council t'&CC^, iri order *c ^nl• 
closer defense ties chrrLigb a colJectiw-e security- pact. The 
six signatories oi f ^ <• -»ew pact were Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Oman, >'uwait, Oatar . - -c' the United Arab E<nirates, In iVBl , 
Shiites attempted to -.T^  ^ rthrow the government of Bahrain, In 
November I'J'Bl, thriM«-,-"cJ= o^ Shjas deifonstrated ir. the 
streets. Shouting All-'-i Al<bar, ihhomeinj raihbar 'God IE most 
great' •homemi IE ^U" leader ». ]r« November 1«?81 , Iranie^n 
II. Savory, Roger, 1 h-^  Geopolitical Impact of the lElamic 
Revolution in ''-=(0 on the 6u)f Region in A.B'-aun 
(ed.l. The N \"' c ? East in Global Strategy 'Boulder. 
1 '787 1 , P. 196 . 
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President Ali Kh-r^ c -eL = t-a ted th-s t Khomeini's Islamic 
revolution Wa>s "bloTring" m pl-^ces undeif- U.S. influence, 
such as Egypt. In a soeech on Tehran Radio, he said that, 
"The Revolution, lif'e the gentle spring breece, does not 
recognice gates and walls, distance, barf^iers or- frontiers; 
it moves and is exporied". In September 1932 Hojjat al-Islam 
Mussavi Khomeini led a band of Shias to Mecca on the 
occasion of the pilgrimage, and said his aim was to "Smash 
conspiracies of the deviated people" fi.e,, the Saudi royal 
family). And in the "all of 1783, thet'e was sn attempted 
coup in Qatar. 
It is lesrnt that the newly •formed Git]-* Co-operation 
Council has three mair aims; to thwart any e:<tension oi the 
Soviet threat -frovT) ^^-f ghanistan; to prevent a possible 
spillover oi the Iran-Iraq war; sn to -frustrate attempts by 
Khomeini to subvert their own regimes . The last one was 
the main aim. 
Before the Iranian Revol ttt ion, Arab Gul"* mcmarchs 
shared common intersts with Ir^n, Ther ''ecognired that Eome 
of the Shah's policies guaranteed their stability and 
12. Ibid., PP.l*?6-<?7, 
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p r o t e c t e d them f r - - r ' J t e n t L a l e v t ^ r o a l t h r e a t s . Thev a l s o 
a p p r e c i a t e d t h e 5f. »'•> s a b i l i t y t o r a l l > o i l p r o d u c e r s t o 
s t a n d U n i t e d i n " -he i r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Wes te»-n o i l 
c o m p a n i e s , a n d , a l o n g »^ j t h I r a q , bv a g r e e i n g t o SUDDIV S a u d i 
A r a b i a and t h e S h e j ' " -fo'^s w i t h a s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t o* t h e i r 
manpower r equ i r eme tv f <^  t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p e r i o d . In s h o r t . 
w h i l e t h e Shah was »-, <3rbear m g m s t y l e , h e was s e e n a s t h e 
main p r o t e c t o r oif V-"^ s t a t u s q u o i n t h e G u l f . Ar-ab Gu l f 
r e g i m e s , h o w e v e r , j-'i t o f e a r t h e o p e n l y b e l l i g e r e n t 
a t t i t u d e of A y a t o l L =ii'^ -' Khome in i s I r a n . S i g n i f i c a n t l y . I r a n 
d i d n o t l i m i t i t s ^«'"^^ J t i e s t o a t t a c ^ i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of 
A r a b r e g i m e s , consid«? ' -^d by T e h r a n a s b e i n g p r o - W e s t e r n and 
t h e r e f o r e u n - I s l a m i < , b u t a t t e m p t e d t o e v p o r t i t s own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of !•=; ? •s."-i.c g o v e r n m e n t . 
T h r o u g h o u t t h e l* ' ' ?0"s , GCC s t a t e s i n d e n t i f i e d I r a n a s 
d e s t a b i l i z i n g f o r c e :•> ' .he G u l f r e g i o n p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e of 
T e h r a n ' s a t t e m p t s t o - q-ort i t s f - e v o l u t i o n . V e t . a l t h o u g h 
GCC r e g i m e s g r a d u a i J • ""elt iwore c o n f i d e n t a b o u t p r o t e c t i n g 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , ^^" t i ^ r e a t o f i n t e r n a l s u b v e r s i o n n e v e r 
s u b s i d e d . E m a n a t t n a '• y- w i f ^ m , t h a t t h r e a t p o l a r i z e d GCC 
s t a t e s ' p o p u l a t i o n s , • <'-h d i s f r a n c h i s e d S h i a s s e e d i n g more 
e q u i t a b l e p o l i t i c a l "irid e c o n o m i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The 
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resulting rift br twesn consef-Vr3 tive GCC reqi«nes dod 
revolutionary Iran threatened the region •s relative 
13 
cohesiveness 
The Shah's Ir-pr had made clai^ nc. ori jtE- neighbours, 
particularly in \ v p-HortE to support a regional 
arranaement hostile ^o commimi H.*T» and regarding sowe i Elands 
which he considered strategically important, but had 
otherwise made no e'-fcrt to order t^ l^e• internal structure oi 
the Gul-f States. The i^V^ Algiers agreeflnent between-* Iran and 
Iraq regulating >.•"«- overall relationship as well as 
adjustinq respective bcurder clain»s had been a triumph o^ 
praqmatism over idec><ogy on both sides. Revolutionary Iran 
managed virtually evprnight to destroy the modus vivendi 
laboriously achieved. '~y the nature o^ the claims it made on 
its neighbours, Iran appeared to be intent on undermining 
the Gul-f states, monarchical or republican, rejecting them 
as secular, progressive and corrupt, and determined to bring 
its version o-f a radical universal Islam into the -forefront 
oi Middle East poli'ics. It had the advantage o"* the 
13. Kechichian, Jc'?tr'h A., The & u M Cooperation Council; 
Containing the ^'anian Revolution Journal oi South 
Asian and Middie Eastern Studies, Vol. i7>. No. J fx 2 
(Fall/Winter, i<?PVi, P.J46. 
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powerful appeal of •evolutionary Islam among all Mos I Lms, 
the specific att' - "son for- the oppressed", often Shta, 
commmunities sprin> Ifd all over the Gulf States (with 
majorities in Iraq J ' ftahratnl •inri the natural constituency 
of overseas Iran:.5n'- settled on opposite littoral of the 
Gulf. Iran could c<^ -»e a threat of subversion to the Gulf 
states which was. and remains, virtualIv inescaoable. 
By virtue of i t-a revolution, its claims of leadership, 
and its rejection a'' ''n^^ concept of national territories or 
intervention as prini.! rules that could inhibit Islamic duty. 
Islamic Iran was <^r-=?n as the orimarr threat to their 
security. On the eve -, <' the M»ar, it had managed to push them 
into the lap of I' ?o. iNihich was now seen as a potential 
bulwark against an ^^npredictab! v volatile and powerful 
neighbour. There wa= thus little question that the Gulf 
States, and especir^M^'' Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were aw^re 
of the Iraqi plan fo ci' tac*- Iran, and did little to restrain 
Baghdad, possibly off^»inq some assurances to encourage the 
attack. 
Iranian comments .'"*ri€*d from Tehran Radio's, call for 
the overthrow of ti f 'rs-rupt Saudi regime, to Rafsanjani s 
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more resigned: "we ^ now tih<st the Gulf 'at^ jte'S -are heloi-ng 
Iraq with its war effort,,but we forgive theii\ . 
Khomeini never differentiated Iran's interrests from 
those of Islam, thus waging hts claims difficult to 
disentangle. 
"The government « •< the Hijaz will waKe up softe day 
when the isEite is over. ]t E-hould start novi to 
mend its ways, J viarn the governments O"* tne 
Gulfr.rto stop opposing Iran and assastanq Sadda^n, 
'^ n Islamic government 3S better ^or all the 
ShayHhs of the region than tfne flimsy American 
power "•'^ . 
Iran repeatedly sought to B'i'firm its support for the 
unhindered flow of ojj., with the proviso that it could only 
accept this as long as its own oil was flowing; attac^s 
incapacitating its ability to export,it was implied, »-ls^ e•d 
the closure of the Straits for all states. Playing on its 
interest in limiting rather than extending the war, its 
spokesmen emphasized the compatibility of interests with the 
Gulf States, Rafsanj^ni put it as; 
"The nations in our neighbouring co<.»ntries should 
know that the Itil^mic Republic first and foremost 
desires security in the Persian Gulf; we have 
14, Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp,]ran and Iraq at War, 
(London, 19881, P,i65. 
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proved this. .*''c call on vou not to become 
partners ^ ^ n •••-"- w^r. We can guarantee vour 
secur 
:n in 
«rity"^^. 
The speaker o^ ^ "^-i Majlis- ep<phflsired that e/port oi the 
revolution did not i>ply the use o-f the Evjord, but that we 
wish to provide t!"'- divine messaqe to the depri ^ ecf mc^ e^  
people oi the worJd , President J'hamenei echoed the theme 
that the export o^ '^r revo]i.ition did not imply the use oi 
force, 
Iran thus sour"* '.i project a new imaqe in the repi'ne. 
It denied any invo"! . • -^-^t in outbreaks oU violence such as 
the asassination att-^vt on the Emir oi Kuwait or e-fplosions 
in Riyadh, and insi*-' * on its d<c-sire "<or Qood-neighbour ] y 
relations. It accused Iraq oi sponEorinq these incidents to 
destabilise the reoir and to blaclfmail the &ul-< States to 
arrest the normaliratnon oi relations with Iran. 
Iran was e''fpectr>d tc* e-^port its resolution a^ it 
intended to accompli'-•^ this objective and insulate itsel-f 
against potential thrprts. In -fact, khomeini considered the 
export oi the revo)i"+ion aE a protective shield ior Iran 
15. Ibid,, P,J66-
276 
when he stated: 
"We should set ^-^ide the thouqbt that we do not 
export our revtiHttion, becauE-e Islam does- not 
regard various- Islamic countries- di "f "f er-ent 1 y and 
is the supporte'- oi all tt-te oppressed peoples ai 
the ytorld. On the other hand, all the superpowers-
and all the povjerv. have risen to destroy us, li we 
remain in an tMclosed en .-i rc«nment v*e shall 
definitely face d-^'eaf-**^. 
These objectives 3 uv^'ed first and foremost at pfotectinq 
Iran, and secondarj'•, at pramotmg the establishment of 
populist Islamic go'e» nmeots in othe*- parts of the world 
states particularly HvsJim nations. 
The principal t-f'aets af the ewport of the f-evolutton 
consisted of four trito'- geogr-aphic circles. These i-iere the 
Persian Gulf, the Cen'_-st Asia , Afghanistan and Lebanon. In 
the Persian Gulf tn<^  "ore soectfic targets were Bahrain. 
Saudi f>iraibiA and P-J' 'icularlv Kuwait, attempted coup m 
Bahrain in December 1781, multiple bombings m Cuwait in 
December 1983 and incj.r:-^ nts in Mecca at Hajj periods. 
Iran's neighbo'C " would have seen the commentary as 
applying at least as muc»^ to the evolution in Iv-^ n s 
16. fiechichian, no. 13- P-l**"^ . 
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preception and polic'«n as to themselves, Iran saw tbechange 
as a recognition of i tr. power. Prime Minister Mussavi 0<j t it 
as: "They have to recognice it *. [r^n) as the most 
determining factor in the region and the Islamic sphere of 
Iran's power and Of'^ dorrtinance in the region there had never 
been any question, rjr ticulariy ir^ relation to the Gulf 
States. The issues ;»jd been how that power would be used and 
Iran's universalist 3<r\d regionalist ambitions. Now that 
Iran's demands had teen modified to encompass the concerns 
of its neighbours, the continuation of a state of frocen 
animosity made no -cnse. On [ran"s oart too, the war 
required concentration of resources and energies that made 
it imperative to retr-orch and consolidate ambitions as well 
as commitments, at least in short term-
Saudi Arabia had to deal with Iran every year on the 
subject of H^jj Pilgrims, In September 1981, tension between 
Tehran and Riyadh rose. Over 70,000 Iranian pilgrims were 
determined to use th^ occasion to spread Khomeini's message 
of politically active Islam, On Z5 September fighting brote 
out between Iranian ci'grims and Saudi Securitv forces m 
Medina when the Iranians raised slogans against the US and 
Israel. Twenty-two p" grims and siv Saudi Soldiers were 
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injured. Intent n-. c '-biog the u'se of Hajj for political 
purposes. Saudi le-»<J > 5 were LO -an intransigent mood. As it 
was they had to deal '(ith more than two million pilgrims, 
three quarters of tH»_-'r, alien, an exercise which was a great 
strain on their seciirjty system. 
Violence durina '.''>"s Haij made Rivadh even more security 
conscious and anti--*^-one'ini. Saudi leaders were aware af the 
publicly stated poli'~' af ('homeint's »-egime since the early 
days that it consider^-' it its ' Islamic duty' to support the 
national Itberatior- -o^'ements of the deprived peoples of 
the world. Explainir-y the policy, Iranian foreign minister 
Yazdi said, 'The '. 'f:eratior» movements had stemmed from 
internal and natural cr-ndi tioos - They only wanted to benefit 
from Iran's experience (of national Liberation and gain 
strength from Iran's -'upporf. 
Addressing GCC LnterLar ministers irv Bahrain in 
December 1981, Saudi '^ •-abian interior minister, stated; 
The Iranians who laid after their revolution that 
they did not want to be the policeman of the Gulf, 
have become the '-rj-ortsts of the Gulf, 
17. Hiro,no.9,PP.3T'' : 
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In ear]y vlantsar • J*?8J, F'rance Nsyil arrived in Manams 
to meet his Bahrairn counterpart. Shaikh Muhammad ibn 
Khali-fa, and o'f'fered to send Saudi trooDS, The sabotage 
plot was engineered oy the Iranian qo-'ernment and v<as 
directed against Ft=,i>di Arabia', saad Prmce Nayi"*. The 
external danger (to tHo Gu]"f States* i E. Ir^ tn and the oreEent 
regime in Tehran'. '^;. ' d Bahrain^ c«re?Taer Sh^ ifc J'halalfa i bn 
Salman al-Khal i "^ a , ""^ he Iranian regi^ i^ e is anst iqatinq the 
Sbias jn Bahrain arti" the G u M under the slogans. o"* the 
Islamic revolution,,. ., training the«n in the tise o^ weapons 
and acts of Sabotage '^-d sending the<« to their countries ''of 
origin) to "foment chars and destroy* security' , 
As Iran began scoring victories in the battlefield from 
the spring of I'^&l' onwards, &CC members, paid close attention 
to what Tehran said nr did. •homeini called on the Gulf 
States to abandon their "Obedience to the US and ^o+neri 
international predators'. Addressing the people of the Gul-f 
he stated! 'The people and government of lraf« war«t to free 
you o-f the disgraceful load of being under the control ai 
the superpowers, Thes*^ ' powers viant to force your blac*- qold 
(of oil) out oi your threats , 
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Iran's advat'Cf^  into Iraq in JuJy and its threat to 
bloch the strait O'f '"Tirmtiz the ^ol lov^inq month di E.treEE.ed 
Saudi Arabia, Thii • .3? the D^ elitde- to the Hajj seasc'«"i in 
SepteTtber 1^B2. f.}ir<r-~ - r.x inc + r^scted Hfaj ji at1.1l 1 si am •'hoiniha, 
the leader oi the ."rtnian Haij Committee to Acotiamt 
Muslims with what is taHmq place m dear Lebano", in 
crusading Iran, and i— ctppressed Afghanistan, inform them of 
their great di.(tit?'= in con-fronting aggressors and 
international plunderers , During the pilgrimage •'hoiniha 
called "for mass prayers by ^el low-pi 1 qr jms. to smash the 
conspiracies oi the :'eviated people -a clear reference to 
Saudi rollers. In MC c. i secvirity forces, arrested 100 Iranian 
pilgrims -for- atte'^ r'; ^  ""'q to add'^e^B'E- qatherangn., ]• seemed 
that while the Irsr^ i. ,-^  had become bolder m their actions 
the Saudis had bercmr 'nore sHilJed in frustrating Iranian 
attempts. 
On the eve o-f \' •' G-CC foreion ministers, conference in 
Riyadh on 20 February 1V83, the Iranian daily, Azadegan I'The 
Pree), advised GCC rulers to return to the lap of Islam, 
abandon the Saddam Hussein r^g^mie in Baghdad, and stop 
squandering the wealth of their peoples. , 
But the reasons for the split in Islamic ranks, in the 
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Gulf, and elsewhere. 1 s'; in Tehr-^n s actions: So air-qued the 
Saudi government an'' itsedi^ . Ever ^Lnce the I ran tan and 
Islamic peoples we'-e afflicted by the i^ :hQmeLnL regime, this 
regime has failed to ----n^ Jer any noteworthy Hervice to Islam, 
and the Muslims', saif AI-Medina * The Citv?. a Saudi daily 
in July. This reo-V^e has tried to create schism among 
Muslims, not only in their politics but also in their 
mosques. The Khomeini regime sends its age^^ ts everywhere to 
foment discord'. 
Prince Wayif , E-aitdi interictr Ttam Eter, £.tated that by 
staging noisy demons t'at ions in Hecca artd Medina in praise-
pf Khomeini the Iranian pilgrims had, if! the past, be-haved 
in a manner incon.patibl e with Prophet Muhammad s 
injunctions about t^ >e Hajj, Undesirable though this 
behaviour was, what v c ried the Sattdi authorities even more 
was the fact that the pilgrims irc>m among the Shi a trjbes of 
the Arabian Peninsul-n '^ ad ta^en to contacting the Iranian 
Lilema during the Hajj, Such ]in».s posed a threat to the 
Saudi Kingdom's inter«t<l security, 
Iran had been disappointed by the failure of Shjta in 
Irag to rise up and s'T^ J^ e o't i the Eia'ath regime, sci m its 
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relations with the Gulf States. The Iranian religious 
leadership had been trystrated by the failure a* its messaqe 
to taVe firm roof and lead to spontaneous imitation. It is 
difficult to pinpoint the date bv which the allure of the 
Islamic revolution a'^  a «r<ode I had worn. off amongst the 
people in the Gulf States, but one can confidently sa-^  that 
this was indeed fh.-' case b'- the end o<- i9Q5>, Iran 
recongnized this 3nr< -'.--iied an', di=*sire tc to'"ce its model on 
its neighbours. But f^ --i did not Lmol) an. satisfaction with 
its neighbours' ac'icies either. Under threats and 
provocations they h^d responded bv sidtng with Ifaa in 
almost every way shnrt of a formal declaration ot 
belligerency. They had intensified mtlitarv ties among 
themselves m a grouping that looted from the Iranian o o m t 
of view to be suspicjouslv lile an anti-Jr^n a*is, and had 
increased their mil''""""y ties and contacts with the United 
States. As if these were not enough, substantive disputes 
remained m Iran s relations with the Gulf States relating 
to the conduct of the \'>Ar. These had primarily to do with 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the measures each tooV to assist 
Iraq, while trying to i<T»Drove ties with Iran. 
Regarding l<uwai^ .. Iran continued its criticism of 
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double posi tion' b<-'t '-^ -^de clear its f-eadiness to ignore tf-»e 
past. Alternative' . if tfiey do not discontinue their 
support and indi t *^'; - -? ice^ they will be answerable m 
future'. Iran's thr^^^'ening noises and newly established 
positions close to ' '"^  frontier increased the pressures on 
the small emirate. 
It was not p'?':"ib]e 'for Irsn to continLte the war 
succes&f Lil ly witbou*; •.' real ening the Bui"? States, or tc "fall 
out with Kuwait witf.? t touring its relations viath the other 
states. The GCC ^1inis^ *?r.i al Council reverte-d to its earlier 
role o"f criticirinc Iran, calling on it to withdraw, and 
warning of the possitiility that the confjict might expand, 
Iran in turn caustically remarKed: 
"The GCC was "for«ned while Iracsi force's were 
occupying part o"' our Islamic home 1 and... btst nov^  
that the tablr^ are turned they have suddenl/ 
decided to cor.d-^  ~>n what they ca3 J the occupation 
of an Arab count• '^". 
The Iranian poi it»on repeated time and again was to let 
bygones be bygones, r^ a'^firtirt its interest in the secLirity 
and stability of the f- >lf , tc» diE.cJaij's any ambit ic<ns irs sny 
of the littoral safe-;, and tci argtie that if the reqior. was 
IS. Chubin,no, J'J, P. I'M 
284 
to enjoy any peace ir the future It-^n i war with [rao could 
be ended only with t^'S removal of Sadda«iR HussetP. In July 
1986 Rafsanjani ref-? r^l to our neighbouring CQuntri.e-5 with 
whom we have no w"^h to beco<ne involved and to ['-an g 
intention to limit n-' "»iden the i-i-^f-, reserving within this 
framewor^ the right 'a consider states he I Ding Iraa as 
partners in this c i'T\e . He put Ir^^rt-^ case more fully 
later: 
"Our past history shows that v*e have not been an 
"fi^voLtr oi advcnt(erism, given the' excttses Qrc^'ided 
by the littori^l s??:tes oi the Persian Gtill on many 
occasions by thc^r open aid tcs Iraq they sell oil 
on Iraq's behalf, provide funds, ma*-e their roads 
and ports and perhaps even thear space available 
to Iraq for military purposes and KnoMinq that at 
is easy to punish them. We have no antention of 
e>;panding the was- ' 
The Iranians rtj^ajned in a position to damage the 
Saudis' standing both in the Gulf and v^ithin OPEC especially 
in depicting Saudi oil policy as a sell out of the Muslams' 
birthright. The Irr»ri:>r case that Saudi oil policy v<as not 
neutral but actually very hostile to Iran was certainly 
persuasive, and equ "•' V/ so were the list of possibilities 
for Iranian subversion and intimidation I'startiriq viith the 
1^. Ibid,, P.172, 
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H a j j and e x t e n d i ^ n "^ o t h e S h t ^ i n e a s t s ' " ' ^ Q'-Q-. i n c e ' and 
e x t e n d i n g t o a t t d c ^ ^^  o i, -sihiippLng j n d o i l I ' a r i i i t i e a . I'"-3'"i 
had f r e q u e n t l y t n t ' ! - J ^ ? ^ t h a t^ i t c3" jLd f e t a l ia*"e a c ^ m s t - -'ne 
G u l f S t a t e s f o r ! r ^ c --, in«--"-ea'5 i r g 1% l o n g - ' - a n ge a t t a c h 5 :ir. 
s h i p p i n g and o i l f^ • ' i t i - S * 5 - ['--a'^ ^'3-- * -e- : : J ^ ' ^ t L ,f i -» ' : i -3* "ed 
t h a t i t c o u l d r e * - i ! J "-.e a g s i - ^ s t t h e G J I * " S t a t e s ' ' 3 - I ' ^ z H 
i n c r e a s i n g l y lQng- ' - i - 5«3 a t t s c S s c^' i t s c i l e ^ ' ^ j c r t s . an-:! ' -?d 
b lamed them f o r e> t - ' - ^ - * 'na a s ' S i s t a n c e t o [ r ^ q m c o v e - i n c t ^ e 
a i r r a n g e s i n v o l v e ' - . 
A v a t o l l a h MDn*^ / ' - - 5 toJc? a dome-s t i c avidie-rfce- ^ "* i ' ^B" ' : 
"The r e g j o n s ' i - f i c t i o o a r i e - ? wan t t o d r a o t h e 
s u p e r p o w e r s ^^•^s" '•h^p Pers- jars Giil"? t o p r e v e n t JsJani 
and I s l a m i c T i ^ -j - p n t a J 35«i», as t h e . - p u t i t , -from 
s p r e a d i n g t o o t * - " - cQun f - i e s " 
l < h o i n i h a w e n t V'n rj a r g i j e t'^^"^ t^*e p e o p l e s h o i j i d d e c i d e 
and t h a t t h e Ha j j ^H r - ^ l d be u s e d n o t mere I > as a m ^ r r r , o r 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n b u t as T. r e f e r e n d u m ; L e t t h e p e o p l e be a s ^ e d 
w h e t h e r t h e a c t i o n - " i d e r t a ^ e n &> t h e govern«nen t s ' S a u d i 
A r a b i a , K u w a i t ) ar^ g - r - J o r r s o t ; 
I r a n was d e t e r m L n - d t o e v p l o t t t h e S a u d i s s e n s i t i v i t y 
2 0 . I b i d . . P . 1 7 5 . 
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about their role as Gu-ardian of the HQIV Pl-jces at the TVOS t 
important time durinn the high season of the otlgrLmaqe. T^ ho 
upshot of its atte<7>cl t3 Qi^ «5ain.iEe demons tf-a t ions on 3';* July, 
to which the Saudi security of^'icisls over-reacted, was the 
death of nearly '^>? pilgri«ns, three Quarters of them 
Iranian. 
In October J vp"? Pa^sanjani tried to pi.it ]rari=. case 
more positively. (->=. -^. -fered the 6iLil"f States and the United 
States three options if order to restore peace in the &u]"f: 
(i) to stop Of hinder Irac; -<row attach ino Iranian 
tankers in t^->e Gii] "f ; 
(ii) to designate Iraq as the aggressor in the war; 
(iii) to cease all military and "financial assistance to 
Iraq and assume a position o^ trtie neutrality. 
Again and again Iranians emphassred the limited riatitre 
oi their claims on the Gulf States; 
"We do not want Dnything c«i yctt» e'fcept that /oti 
stay neutral, l'^.' not give ("the enewy * oa 1 , air 
space, pipelinr"-. rciads and ports so that the 
Iraqis can com"^  ''" ma^e the Persian Gul"< insecure. 
Don't give the<f intelligence, and switch your 
propaganda to the side oi netitrality, 1 "• you do so 
you will have a oood neighboi.ir to the- north, who 
will be your '^iend and has the readiness to 
"forgive you -for your sins, Bitt this Saddam s- sins 
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are such tha' '•-• can not be forqtven; he must be 
21 punished" 
Despite its atte-'r: ts at improving itE. image in the Gulf 
States. ]ran is still .een as the greater threat to their 
security. An ei<t'"e.T>- ; Mt not unrepresentative view oi Iran 
was voiced b^ / a Jor-,?r'?Tt o^^ficia]!; 
" I "f Iran wine ^ere, all the &u}"* States are 
•f inished, ,,] ran -i)] sampjy cfaspatch its chosen 
governor at t >""= head of an army of 10,000 
revolutionary guards to J-'uwai t Saudi Arabaa, 
Bahrain, and so on, and who wi]] dare to fight 
them? It will be the Cfttoman conquests all over 
aqain" 
21. Ibid., P.J77. 
22, Ibid,, P.178. 
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IRAN AND THE THIRD WORIJ) COUNTRIES 
In a major shift ir the traditiona] direction o1 its 
"foreign policy, Iran is preparing to integrate itsel"f more 
into Asia than into the Arab Middle East. The eight year Mi<r 
against Iraq has pG"^suaded the Iranian rulers that the 
"future oi the country 1; ?s more with the Asian countries to 
the east than with the "^ rab countries to the west. 
But since the wr- and its a"ftermath, Iranian leaders 
believed that Iran B"^ i be Arab world and shias and SLinnis 
are "barely co-exisl ?bl e", in the words o"f one oi the 
architects oi Iran's foreign policy. The war cemented Arab 
unity to a degree rarely seen be"fore. With the notable 
exception 0"f Syria, almost all other Arab nations "firmly 
stood behind Iraq, although Libya and SoLith Yemen ha]"f 
heartedly sided with Iran. "There is no more room -for us in 
Middle East dominated by the Arabs", said one high ranging 
Iranian diplomat, hirf^eli a member o^ the "foreign ministry's 
"think-tank" on strategic matters. Culturally, 
linguistically, ethi {.al 1 •/ and even to some extent 
geographically, Iran is much closer to Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and India than to Iraq or the other Arab nations 
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of the region. 
WhiJe be-fore '.-''• revolution, some Iranian industries 
made inroads into • •• •;''bourinq Arab markets, par ti cti] ar ] y 
those in the Gulf ' Tiy, as the country ]ies poor and 
ruined, there is nol' -i^ D to e-'<port. 
"The Arabs are rich and despise us. They pre-fer to buy 
western product*^ and we have nothing to o^ f-fer them, 
except oil, oi which they have much more than we do. On 
the other han:*- our economy can be complimentary to 
that of, let's 'F-'^y Pakistan. We can provide them with 
oil and qet agrjriltural products in return. The trend 
can be erxtended tr Afghanistan and India. We can build 
joint venture ir-cl:.«stries with China. We can look even 
further into Ea5^ Asidi" , 
said another Iranian economist of the same "thinJ'-tanf 
institution". 
Relations betwe-r, Iran and Pakistan have developed 
extensively in near] .• ,->'»! fields. Both Tehran and Islamabad 
play important role"^ '^' Afghanistan, another Muslim non-Arab 
country, which both -ovintries border. To a shia delegation 
of Pakistan, the Irani->-i Prime Minister Mr, Mussavi , said he 
"hopes to see I rani-Pakistani relations as the model of 
2 
relations between tt"o •-^ s^lim nation" . 
1. Middle East In te'-national (MEI). March 17, 1989. P. 9 
2. Ibid., P.10, 
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The overridjrio n-t?'l oi Iranian revolutionary -foreign 
policy was procl airr di to be absolute independence from the 
West and East. It means self-reliance and freedoffi from the 
domination of either power bloc not only politically, but 
also economically, culturally, intellectually, and 
psychologically. Toward this goal Iran is said to be 
pursuing a two-pronged policy: 
(1) Self-reliant non-alignment policy; and (2) a pro-
Third-World policy t^?t accords first priority to Muslim 
countries and second priority to other Third World states. 
Movement in t^e ^*irection of expansion of relations 
with Third \>iorlti ^t-'J&s is discernible as evidenced by 
emerging new ties no< cnly with such Muslim states as Syria, 
Turkey, and Pakistan, f^hich have revived the old nation of a 
common market among them, but also with such diverse third 
world nations as North »:orea, Argentina, Braril, Nicaragua, 
India and others. Oil is still the principal commodity in 
the Iranian economy. It is being used in an ever-increasing 
number of barter deals "'ith diverse foreign countries. 
The PPP (Peoples Democratic Party) of Afghanistan 
regime welcomed the Sha«'^ i's downfall, which held a promise of 
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improved ties with Tehran. But the revoiu tionery goverhfuent 
in Iran soon began deporting Afghan workers, alleging that 
they were criminals. Thii; soured relations between Kabul and 
Tehran. On 18 March L977 [ran closed its borders with 
Afghanistan. When fighting broJ-e out in Herat between 
security forces and Islamic rebels, the PDP government 
expelled the Iranian consul in Herat, alleging an Iranian 
hand in fomenting the trouble. 
On 27 December Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, 
with the Kremlin claiming that they had been invited by the 
Afghan government to help foil foreign conspirancies 
against it. In the fighting that erupted at the presidential 
palace, Amin and many of his aides were billed. Babra^ 
Karmal, who had been living in exile in Moscow, returned to 
become the president of Afghanistan. Tettr^n condemned Soviet 
action. 
Karma] addressed a letter to Khomeini snqges-tina 
consolidation of fraternal and friendly Islamic relations 
between the Afghan and Iranian peoples. At the next Islamic 
Conference Organisation (ICO.i Iranian foreign minister 
Qotbradeh, said that Iran was ready to supply arms to Afahan 
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insurgents. "Independence of Afghanistan LS as sacred as the 
liberation of Pa les'. i ^ "^ ' , he said. If Iran accepts the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan it will fall fro*^ the hand of 
one superpower into the hand of another supei^power' . 
In due course t'^"? '"TA became the coordinator of foreign 
aid, in cash and weapon^:, that flowed to Afghan rebels frocri 
the US, China., S^ c-ff •'-abta. Egypt and Pakistan, This 
applied to the activities of the rebels on the Pakistani 
side. Being on the ooonnite side of the Pakistani border, 
the Iranians (-ept well '. lear of the CIA and its activities 
among Afghan rebels, Iran was one of the four parties 
invited to participate in the taHs to be held under the 
aegis of the UN General Secretary's office to find a 
solution to the problem and secure the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, as recommended h/ the UN General Assembly. The other 
three parties were Afghanistan, Pa»istan and the USSR. But 
Iran refused to conduct face to face negotiations with the 
Karmal government, a Qoernment it did not recognise . 
The influence of •Khomeini's Islam has been clearly 
3. Hiro, Dilip, Iran Under the Ayatollahs fLondon, i''8^i. 
P.354. 
4. Ibid.. P.355. 
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visible as in the c^-:~? of Afghanistan, The Soviet invasion 
had been consistently condemned by Iranian revolutionary 
leaders; the pro-R'-'ss: an reg itne was viewed with utter 
contempt; the Afghan ?1t»,i a hid in were hailed; and nearly a 
million Afghan refugees were sheltered in Iran. To be sure. 
the Iranian oolic "nward Afghanistan is shaped by 
geographic proximity, historical experience, cultural and 
religious affinity as <<•" L I as Khomeini's ideological stance. 
But the Iranian position in the case of Afghanistan is the 
best e>;ample of how fr3r the Iranian revolutionary regime was 
inclined to go on pushling to create a favourable Islamic 
environment around Irm. In effect, Iran wanted to replace 
the Marxist regime '" J-'abul with an Islamic government 
significantly modelleii -after the Iranian one. 
The best evidence fnr this is the Iranian proposal for 
the solution of the crisis in Afghanistan. On 10 November 
1981, the Iranian Oer"ity Foreign Minister, Ahmad Aiici. 
unveiled an Islamic solution, admitting clearly that it was 
based on the revolution-ry experience of Iran. As a bacVdrop 
to announcing the Iranian plan, he denounced numerous plans 
issued by various international organisations and by 
governments. In the opinion of the government of the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran, he •s'-Tprted that most of these plans have 
been designed to allow Europeon and US forces to inter"vene 
in the region. Instead. Iran proposed a plan, guided by two 
principles. These were: 
(i) UnconditionaJ Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan;and 
(ii) Recognition of the right of the Afghan people to 
decide their political fate". 
Tehran in its f i's t «najior political initiative on 
Afghanistan since i t^ fntjr point peace plan announced in 
November 1981, the I'^ -vnian government convened a major 
international conference on "The Future of Afghanistan" in 
mid January in Tehr.j'i. Preceding the conference, the 
Iranians on 4 January. ?ent five plane-loads of humanitarian 
assistance to Peshawar which was then passed on to the 7 
party alliance of Mujahidin for distribution to the Afghan 
refugees. The conference was unique in that it was probably 
the most represen tatl "^ ^ lathering of leaders and members of 
both the 7 party alliance based in Peshawar and the 8 painty 
alliance based in Tehran, plus prominent Afghan 
Ramazani, R.(i:,, J^huwayni's Islam in Iran's f^oreign 
Policy in Adeed D»'<(ishat ed . ) , Is lam ir\ Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge, 17Q3). P.28. 
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intellectuals living in Eurooe, 
Inaugurating the conference. President Khamenei set the 
pace by focussing on four essential themes of the current 
Iranian approach to the Afghan issue. First, he welcomed the 
direct talks between t^e Hujahidin and the Soviet Union as a 
"positive development" and urged the Mujah id in leaders. who 
had subsequently developed some reservations on the efficacy 
of such dialogue, that "continuation of the dialogue will be 
useful". Second, President »:hamenei underlined the need for 
sectarian unity, saying that "sowing discord among the 
Mujahidin and Afghan people Under religious. cultural and 
ethnic pretexts is one of the objectives of foreign powers". 
Third, Khamenei urged the Mujahidin to "beware US plots to 
secure a foot-hold in Afghanistan", He urged the Mujahidin 
"not to allow any foreign power to penetrate the countrv so 
that Afghanistan can start a new ers with its Islamic 
identity and non-aligned character". Finally, the Iranian 
president stressed that "from now on Iran, with all its 
power, will rem^Ain an the side of the Afghan Muslims and 
will aid them in different fields" , 
6. Mushahid, Hussain, [ran Forges new Lin>'s', ME [ . (Feb 
17, 1989), PP.16-17. 
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Pakistan v*ae once a member oi the Baghdad Pact, oi 
which Iran was also a member, ]n 1^6>^ the three countries 
•formed an organisation, called the Regional Co-operation -for 
Development. It concentrated on improving communi cat lorts in 
the region. During the Indo-PaHistan war ai 1*?6?, the Shah 
provided Pakistan with some military aid. But when the next 
Indo-Pakistan war broke out in December JV71 in Pakistan s 
eastern wing <now Bangladesh), the Shah was unable to do 
much to help the military regime o1 Pakistan, The Shah 
deplored the dismemberment oi Pakistan as a restilt o^ the 
war , 
General Mobd, Zia-ul-Hag, seized power in a military 
coup in early July 1*!'77, and had the support oi local 
Islamic parties, 'Pakistan, which was created in the name oi 
Islam, will continue to survive only i •* it sticks to Islam', 
Zia-ul-Haq said on assuming power, 'That is why I consider 
the introduction oi an Islamic system an essential 
prerequisite for the country' . 
In the charged politLcai atmosphere engendered by the 
American hostage crisis, radical Islamic elements in Iran 
7. Htro, no.3, P.352. 
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placed Zia-ul-Haq in the same category as President Sadat of 
Egypt, a lackey of American imperialism. Addressing a group 
of Pakistani naval officers in late November. rhomeini 
called on them to initiate Islamic Revolution at home . 
Regional co-operation has been revived under -j new 
name—Economic Cooperation Organisation fECO) - including 
Pakistan, Iran and Ti'''ey, with the strong possibility of 
Afghanistan joining later. There is general appreciation m 
Iran for Pakistan's neutral role during the Gulf War and 
there is now broad similarity of political oerceptions 
between Tehran and Islamabad on such countries as 
Afghanistan, India and China, More importantly, Pal^  istan and 
Iran have also revived their relationship in the military 
field and this could lead to joint production of defence 
equipment. Following his recent visit, the leader of the 
Iranian defence deiegition, Minister for the Revolutionary 
Guards Ali Sham^hanl. said m Tehrjrv that "Iran in 
collaboration with Pa^ritan, will form ^n important part oi-
the Islamic defence Ii .e in the region". He added t^^t his 
visit to Pakistan •'-^ s tif>e "'"fir-Ht oo 111 ica 1 I v-charqed 
8. Ibid., P.35Z. 
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develoDnxent for the [sl^mic RevolutLonar-y Gsjd»f"ds Lof"Ds" 
Syria was the fL«"st Arab countr-y to recoqn L-se the 
Khomeini regime. Prfc--= ident Assad, an allv o*" tHe Soviet 
Union, was in symoat^iy with t^ le Ir^nta" reva lutLor> s 
militant an ti-Amertcan i-rrtx*. What further attracted him to the 
new regime was its Shia character. 
The Iranian revoUttion occurred at a time wherv Syria 
and Iraq v>iere committed to achieving political unity. 
However, after Saddar* Hunseio became president in July L979. 
chances of such a union dwindled fast. Soon the Iraqi and 
Syrian governments reverted to their earlier querulous 
relationship. Since the Assad regime shared its hostility 
towards Assad with ''>*omeini, Damascus felt all the more 
cordial towards Tehran. 
Not surprisingly, vihen Iraq attacked Iran in September 
1980, Syria suppli'pc' weapons and a«T»mttn i t i on to Iran by 
staging flights ever Greece, Bulgaria and the USSR. Syria 
also provided IrBn with intelligence on Jrac. And at least 
on one occasion, in April J«?8J, Syrian planes gave air cover 
Mushahid,nD,6, P,IB, 
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to the Iranian aircrsfl ^s thev bombed the [^aqi air- base of 
Al-Walid. 
Tehran's stronq anti-ziona=.t line was popular in 
Damascus, Syria wa*- then the leader o"* the Front of 
steadfastness and confrontatjo" (with l^fBeJi^ consjstjnq of 
Libya, Algeria, South yemen and the PLO. The Front anvited 
Iran to its foreign Tianisters conference m Tripoli, Libya, 
in mid September J'?8J -ts Bn observer, Hir Ht«=.E.ejn Mussavi , 
then Iran's foreign '^dnister. d month later Iran signed an 
arms deal with S^'ria. 
This was a prelude to the fcTqinq of long-term 
commercial ]linf(s between the two states. In March iver they 
signed a ten-year trade pact, Iran agreed to sell, over the 
next year, five million tons of oil to Syria for cash, and 
exchange another 7,00,000 tons for Syrian phosphates and 
manufactured goods 
Soon after, Syria came to Iran's aid again in the wa^e 
of the loss of Khorraf^shahr to the Iranians in May, Saddam 
Hussein sent out urgent appeals to Arab leaders to j o m him 
10. Hiro no,?., P,34^. 
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in the war, F'resideof -'•^•gn.L nub^ral of Egyot sided with Iraq 
and Syria lined up Hit*-. Iran. This dissuaded Mubaf-ai from 
joining the fray. 
In January 1*>'83. t'T? "fore-iqn mmasters ai Iran, Syria 
and Libya met in Da'^ -^ s-ciis "for consul tantiomsr In a jsomt 
communique issued by ?;/»-3B and Libya, they condemned Iraq 
^or its invasion oi ^rs^rt and pledged to stand by Iran 
against hostile forces, Iran showed its aporcciation oi the 
Syrian stand. When drawing up trade terms -for the nevt 
-financial year Iran agreed to sell Eiyria not only -f 3 ve 
million tons oi oil 'ov- cash and barter but also oHered 
Syria one million tore--, r.-' oil-with nearly i,2<Mj J!f<il]ic»rt as H 
grant, to assist it in 1 f n, -faght agaisnt Israel. 
The Syrian government derived pctJitical and diplomatic 
advantages "from its al.'iance with Iran. Syrian government 
having -found Iraq engacfd irs war with Iran, at had a quiet 
eastern -front -for it^pl-J, 5adda«» Htissean v«as unable to 
instigate destabi 1 isinq ctivities aqairfst the- ^ ^ssad regime. 
This allowed Assad to concentrate on r^'B-ai^i^'O the Lebanese 
crisis caused by the Is'-aeli invasion and Qccupati'^n 
11. Ibid., P.345. 
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Syria provided •=.tf>qinq -facilitie-s -for Iranian aircraft 
which attached westp"^ t Iraqi c<i 11 iclds an April JV8J. 
Syria's most importarsi nateraal contrat«nt2on to Iran's- war 
e-f-fort was the closure o< Iraqi pipeline to Banias in J982, 
a move which had sp-in'.is economic repercussions in Iraq, 
Although Syria declaret^ that it might 
Iranian -forces invadrc' Iraq in Jun^ JV82', there was no 
shift; in January J^FIJ, Syria joinE-d Iran and Libya in 
callinq -for the overthrow Q-f Saddam Htissein, 
revie-M atE. position a f 
In early 1V86 it was widely believed that certain 
issues had begun to complicate the Eyrian-1ranian alliance. 
One was Syria's tardinr»ss in paying for the 10<>,<KK> b/d of 
Iranian oil it had been receiving at concessionary rates, an 
compensation for the less of Iraqi trijnsit dues; as a result 
Iran was said to have cijrtailed oil supplies an early J*?86. 
Another source of friction yias (what 
interference in Lebanese politics, where the pro-Iranian 
Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad operate. In mid-l^^h, Kang 
Hussein made repeated attempts to promote a dialogue between 
the Syrian and Iraqi leadership (in oqder to create a wader 
Arab front against Iran), but thesq foundered on their 
mutual suspicion and resentment. A 
Syria saw as> Iranian 
rc<und of ^>aq^^-level 
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meetings between 5vr i i and Ir-^ani^Oi off'tci^ls. an«1 the 
Iranian decision to -••='11 Z,5 million tons of oil between 
October 1786 and f^^-r-t-. 1987 confirmed that the Svrian 
position remained r"--.'•-jnged, and that Iran valued the 
relationship. Altho- c'' Syria would find a majo?^ Ir-jntan 
break-through uncomfQ*^able (both for oan-Arab reasons and 
because of its own (-•"(flems with Muslim e>; tremis ts} , the 
relationship continues ^<i be useful; it h«jrts Sadda«n Hussein 
and it increases S^r-ia's regional and international 
12 
influence 
Intensi •( ication c' the revolutionary movement in Iran 
in the latter haM o^ I'^ TS engaged the attention o^ the 
Shias in Turkey (know-t :.••. Alewis) who, forminq onc-s-iyth oi 
the national populafict ^  were concentrated in the south-
east. Turkey itsel'f "?*= being rocked by violence between 
extreme Right and extr' rr Left, which claimed seventy lives 
a month. 
The regime in Tur ' - • changed twice during the next five 
years, but Turkish-Jr?nian relations d^d not change. 
Improvement in commer-inJ linl^s between the two states, m 
12. Adel phi Papers. K'o.J'JV (Spring, J*?e7), PP. 41-42. 
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the wjiJ'e of the We^f-rn e<nb-^ '"go o*" Iran i" the soring of 
1930, aided Turfe - ailing economv, But it had onlv ^ 
marginal impact on ^^  »' deteriorating law and order situation 
in Turl'ey. While ronfltct between Pight and Left 
intensified, the movenent for [sla««\tc revival gained g»-Qund, 
In normal ctrcu«ns tances Iranian leaders would have 
probably acted nn t*^ eir view which holds military 
dictatorship as un-Isl^wic^ and disapproved of the military 
ta^eover of Tur^ey. But with tension on the I ran-Iraq border 
building up to open warf^jre, thev tooJ a pragmatic stance on 
the subject. When th»^  Gulf war erupted Tur^ev declared 
itself neutral. This meant an upturn m its trade with Iraq 
and a continued fir'f of oil through the 90*.»-mi le-long 
pipeline from Ifirkul t«' the Turi ish port of Yumurtali^. In 
early August 1982 TurHxPv s mtlitarw premier, Bulent Ulusu, 
visited Tehran. He offered to mediate in the war, but 
nothing came of it, A year later Hashemi-Rafsanjani summed 
up Tehran-Angara ties thus: we have extensive relations 
with Tur^ey- We do no^ thinl we ^re a threat to Turkey s 
interests m the region . 
TurJ<ey continued lo Qive top priority to it= lin»'s 
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with Iran. This was ^s true of the f^^ ilitary government as of 
the elected civiltc-n ':fmintstration, headed by Turqut On^l 
which followed in 0»rcember 1933. The Qcal gQverntT\ent 
reiterated-Turl'^ish neu'.rality in the Golf war. In late April 
1784 Ozal visited Tehran, thereby highlighting the 
siginificance that Turkey attached to its ties with the 
Islamic Republic. Tur-J-ey regained Iran's third most 
important trading partner, after Japan and West Germany. 
Iran tried to balance its trade with Turiey by increasing 
its sale of oil to Ankara., Ewports of 100,000 b/d to Turkey 
in early 1984 for nearly $ 1 billion showed that its efforts 
were successful 
Turkish trade «<ith Iran has been -flourishing as a 
result of the war; in fvp^, J ran was Turkey's second largest 
customer and its second most important source oi impcmts. 
The Iranian-Turkish t-«?1 ationship does not appear to be 
threatened. A draft agreement on the construction of a 
pipeline from Iran to Turkey was signed in July J'?86; and 
its eventual construction would give Turkey leverage over 
both Iran and Irag. 
The Amal congress of April 19&0 elected a new 
13. Hiro, no.3, PP.3'?9-M. 
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leadership council, ^^^ith Nabih S^rri, a lawyer^ a-a the 
general secretary in ». ebanon, Under him the Ama I eKoanded 
and became one of th«? most important fighting forces. In 
October 1981 a delegation from the Ama1 visited Tehran and 
had a meeting with f*r"s«.dent Khamenei. 
On 3rd and 4th J^r^tjsry 1984 sixteen Israeli planes 
bombed Baalbel' and twn adjoining villages, billing nearly 
100 people and injuria- ^>yO ^ «os t of them civilian. Two days 
later the Iranian deputy foreign minister. Hussein 
ShaiVhoi is lam, visited Baalbek. In his statements he was 
re0orted to have prai^ i^ed suicide bomb attacls on American, 
French and Israeli troops. This was ta»en to be an 
affirmation of the earlier allegations by US, French. 
Israeli and Lebanese ,-- tel I igence officials that Ir-an was 
masterminding suicide -e^ isaults in conjunction with Syria, 
President Gemayel had -already reached this conclusion, and 
ordered the closure of the Iranian embassy in Beirut in 
December. 
Tehran denied I^-'^F' charges, and replied that the 
Western powers and Isr.^ f>l were looking ior scapegoats ^or 
the "f ai lure lO"* their policies in Lebanon a Mtislim majority 
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country ruled by a (^-. r'\ i te minoritv allied to the West and 
Israel. Ayatollah HaC •' ' "nosrowshaht, the traotao an^bassador 
to the Vatican, explained the reliqio political content of 
suicide attacks. Arq-iin^ that the Muslim peoples of Iran, 
Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon had the right to defend 
their 'freedom, faith, honour and independence from the 
aggressor' by whatever means they see fit', he said;"This 
honourable defence ir\ ? right for every free human being, 
and dying in this ri-^h i *r cause is in our view martyrdom m 
t he way o f God'. 
Soon Lebanese 5hi-^ r- showed themselves to be well-versed 
in conventional meaT-- i ^ lighting. When President &e««Byel ' s 
order to the Lebani?-- ""-my to flatten the- Shi a Suburbs of 
south Beirut was caTjr;^ out on 7- February, Berri ordered 
Amal militia to attaci* the army. The Amal captured west 
Beirut, and dealt Gemayel's army and the government. leif by 
Premier Shafiq B1 War?an, collapsed. The success o-* the 
Muslim -forces, supported by Syria, over the &emayel 
administration, backed by the US artcf Israel, pleased Tehran 
as much as it did Da-^f^-cus. 
Tehran saw the victory o1 Lebanese Muslims in Beirut 
area as the first stp-p to be followed by the e-'pulsic«-« of 
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the Israeli-5 from scstih Lebanon-towards the finat goal of 
liberating Jerusalem, r !; w^s not accidental that the tslamtc 
Republic portrayed i^5 -struggle to free Najaf and farbala 
from the ' non-Mus I i TV »-eqime of Saddanvi Hussein as part of 
the march to liberate J*?rusalem, »no<.«o in Arabic as AI Ouds 
(The Holy) or Bait-aI-duqaddas (The Holy Place)^ Jerusalem 
is the third holiest ci^ce of Muslims'^^^ 
Within a wee^ of tf-? revolution in early Februarv 1979 
Yasser Arafat, Chairjrai of the PLQ, acco«noanied by thirty 
one aides, reached TgiTran and had a meeting with Khomeini. 
The building, which until 1 then had housed the Israeli 
mission in Tehran, was turned over to the PLO. Arafat 
appointed Hassan al Hans, his f orewos t political advise*-, as 
the PLO ambassador to [ran. It showed the importance he 
attached to revolution?rv Iran, He and other PLO leaders saw 
the change in Tehran \s compensating the loss that the 
Palestinian cause had suffered due to the defection of Egypt 
from Arab ranks, ready tn sign a seoarate peace treaty with 
Israel. The Iranian gov?--nment pledged financial aid to the 
PLO, linked to the co'jntry's oil e>::ports. 
14. Ibid., PP.345-4Q. 
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Iran lo&t goodwill among PLO leaders when it rejected 
the Iraqi offer of .* cease-fire- in June 1^92, which v*ouJd 
have enabled the erstwhile combatantE. m the Gull War to 
combine and "fight under an Israeli seige in Beirut, After 
this i^rsist began siding with ITBQ in its war with Iran, 
In May 1^&7> thf?re was a split i" the- leading 
constituent oi the PLO, Al Fatah; the power base of Ara-fat. 
This showed Tehran that Ara"fat's popularity among 
Palestinians was wanin-j, Iran's sy«riipathies lay with the pro-
Syrian faction within Al Fatah which opposed Ara-fat, and 
which wanted to abide riractly by the PLO covenant that all 
of the Palestine, not jjst the West Banif, and E-etxa Strip be 
1iberated. 
Some months later President Khame-nei articulated the 
Iranian government's misgivings about the PLO and 
Palestinians 
The Palestinians are weak because their governfl^ent's 
criteria are not in accordance with genuine Islamic 
principles', he said , The people who speaK in the name o^ 
Palestinians never speak in the name of Islam', In short 
secularism was the root cause o-f the weakness o< the 
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Palestinian I iberat >.-T tnovement , 
The r€!volutio»-t'- - fran pursoed a religious oriented 
foreign policy ra^ •^•^.•!- than economic or political. Their 
understanding is th^ it ''^ tle they ar's champion of the ^aith, 
other Muslim countries h^ve given up the true oath of Islam, 
acted against the den-? of their oeoole or Muslim masses 
and played in the ha • " y<e one or another superpower who sre 
awQved enemy of Isl^'- -d the Muslims people. Led bv this 
understanding of th»?n - ^  ves they felt compelled to e»;port 
their revolution ta yther Muslim countries m order to 
liberate th€» oppressed ''1 js I ims from the '-epressive clutches 
of their rulers. Jr nursuing this policy they adopted 
violent and non-viot-c—t method's. Obviously they did not 
succeed in their pur ---•• , However their revolutionary ideas 
and policic>s played A • i ta I role irv awai-ening the Muslim, 
the world over. 
The Iranians ha- - also shown concern 1or Mu&lim 
minorities living in nr-.! -Muslim countries such as India and 
the Soviet Union r Whr--^  o cr there occurred serious anti-
15, Ibid,. P.349. 
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Muslim riots, such is in t^ ee'-ut and Bhag^lpur they 
criticised th« Indian government for- its failure to protect 
Muslim lives and property. The Iranian government supported 
the issue of Kashmir, hut bac»slided on the question o^ 
Azerbaijan. This shows .^hat under economic compulsions they 
have some times taken contradictory stands. 
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(' mcwsiofi 
In thi":. thes.i? -^  Hiimble attempt >"»aE. been jnade to 
discuss various asp^r*' o1 Jr^tn's. foreign policy alter the 
Islamic revolution i^'iff r: lahJisbiment oi Islamic Republic on 
1,^,1*?7V, To evtplai' ''r wain thrust o"f the thesis it v<as 
felt necessary to taf r :-.to account what e-^actly the Islamic 
revolution stands "'c , '-ihat are its salient features and 
that how it was brouo' t aboutT' As a result the first part 
oi the thesis, irts,* r .-••'. c»-* dealing directly with one iDr 
another aspect of l'-r» =. foreign policy, is devoted to 
analyse the causer- of the revolution, its m a m 
characteristics and d^ ^^ r • Tiiininq factors, This chapters has. 
in fact, helped undP's'.and the foreigra policy ot Islamic 
Iran in a proper pc r - ;-->c li ve. The first important thing 
which has been discii-^ -^^ —' in this thesis is that what vjere 
the causes of the Is' -" ic revolutioi^ irt irare? it has been 
found that there wert '. •~i»?rous reasc^ns, political, economic, 
social and religious, l':">ind the revolution. 
Under the tyrant ^'thlavi re^i^y.ftt^ political oppoEition 
was intolc'rabl e, rU'''r-nting w^oices were used to be 
suppressed and oppone^* - --uthlessiy liquidated or put behind 
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the bars where they H^d t-a •suffer ^ vartetv of humiliations 
and torture. The •aa'i'scal opposition came both from the 
secular as well as t'-<e -^ligtous classes as both of them had 
to face the wrath of the Shah and his dreaded '3AVAI' . For 
instance members of an organisation »• no«"«n as Mu j ahid m - e -
Khalq were used to be either liquidated or imprisoned and 
tortured. Likewise religious leaders were harr^ssad. put 
behind the bars, tortu^-ed or exiled. 
The clergy's opposition was initiated mainly against 
the westernization d'^teriora tiog Islamic values, anti-
Islamic policies incl-><ding the Land Reform programme to 
which they labelled as anti-Islamic and politically 
motivated to win the ~'irrQrt of the rur^l masses rather th^n 
to improve the lot of C-e peasants and improve agriculture. 
Later on clergy also i^.^ryca**© critical of the monarchical 
system itself in lra->. Another reason for political 
agitation in Iran during the Shah's period was the 
Capitulation Bill which granted diplomatic immunity to all 
Americans in Iran whether they were at the diplomatic staff 
or not. The Bill was against Iran s national honour and 
dignity, and hence it was condemned bv every section of the 
society. (<:homeini called the Bill a sort of American regime 
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in Iran. 
The introcJuctior n-t White Revolution and particulsrly 
its- part oi Land Re-fo»r» proQran»me evoHed *nuch critaciSTt -from 
clerqv, AyatolJab 'homeini who was. critical c<"< thas 
programffie and spol<e pg-.'-inst it, »*aE- intpri sctried in lVf,7., He 
was ]ater on e-^ filed, ^he pctlitical agitation was. further 
fuelled by the govern.TCF,t' s -failureE- in the- ^ield oH due to 
wrong priorities f-r,-ton»ic policies and ill cc»r»cei"/ed 
planning. The Shah i^'ovtred rapid industrial a jataon and 
neglected the agri tul t-i^ -e sector. This resulted in mass 
migration oi rural popi lation towaf-d the cities where they 
were e'-tploited and thu? i'ept in perpetual poverty. Mar«y did 
not get jobs and join^ r^' hands with the E<h«h's opponersts in 
their political agitatjrn. 
But mainly it -^^s- the dynamic leadership oi Imam 
Khomeini which brought ?hout the Islamic revolutic<n in Iran. 
He was anti-monarchy ^nd had a clear vision oi Islamic 
Republic, He gathered intellectuals as well as ulema around 
him and began to create mass awareness against the 
atrocities oi the Sh^h nn^i anti-islamic policies oi the 
regime, f^ohd. Peza Sh^h exiled him in 1^64, Khomeini went to 
Najal and began to Q'IT.!:' his followers from that place. The 
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Shah then, put pre'ssv e on [r*at requwe to evile hi.<« frQ«» 
there. He went to P^ns where he w,as ^ble ta come m contact 
with Western educated t^ani^n intellectual's who were ooDo^ed 
to the Shah. He was abli? to guide the political agitation in 
Iran from Paris and ultimately bf^ought about the Islamic 
Rvolution in 1979. 
In order to comprehend the loreign po3acy oi Irarj, a 
brief assessment of of it in historical perspective has been 
made. Shah having come *o power m 194j pledged to modernare 
the country, in which he sought the cooperation of the West 
especially America. This tilt tov»ards America became more 
and more apparrent after the reinstallation of the Shafis with 
the help o-f CIA and others. Iran did not onjy incline 
towards America but also maintained its good relations with 
its allies including i^rael to whome it supplied aii too. 
Israeli mission cont ir-'ted to operate i" Iran during has 
reign. Shah wanted to c->tapult Iran into t^ «e line of modern 
industrialized countrie<=. by the turn of the century. He 
assumed the role of the Policeman of the Gulf' and served 
America to render uniterrupted supply of oil und check, the 
Russian influence. 
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The estab] ishmE-Tt {?i Islamic PepiibliC vi Irun on 1st 
April 1V7*? mar^s tHc beqinnang ai s "en era m the hiEtory 
0"f Iran's- -foreign t<o<icy and Iran s relations with the 
worldr Islamic Reputlic based on Sharia pledged to uphold 
the Islamic values, undertake the development with social 
justice and bring about a juEt world order which could brina 
about justic true to the "fact that islam stands "for bringing 
all o"f humanity unde'' the umbrella o1 its justice and 
putting an end to any f-ind o"f dominatic«n, Iran sought to 
&a"feguard the complet"' independence and integrity, de-fend 
the rights o-f the Muslims practising non-alignment tfeBi l'^Q 
with dominating pDwe'"s and maintain peaceful relationships 
with non-belligerent powers» The regiiwe adopted a policy o-f 
"neither East nor We= t" implying to mean t("«e rejectic«n o^ 
dominations o-f two suncrpowers or o-f any power -for that 
matter, Iran decided not to align with any o-* the two 
superpowers (whom Iran considered as tbe in-fidelE), Being nn 
Islamic state they -found it necessary to export the 
revolution and look a-fter the interest of f^ iislims living in 
any part oi the world. Following this policy * hoft^irti 
reacted on the Soviet aggression or intervention in 
A-fghanistan and covertly or overtly continued to lend 
support to A-fghan querillas i^nd deported A-fgahn worJ-ers 
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a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e y ui---.^ cruTvina i s . r h i s s<3«jf-ec< i - e l a t L o o s 
b e t w e e n f a b u l and fcC ' ran , I r a n c l o s e d i t s b o r d e r w i t h 
A f g h a n i s t a n on March l!?» l '?/"?. D e ' s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t i* arma I 
had s u g g e s t e d t< ho?"*^ i " i . , t h r o u g h a l e t t e r , t h e 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f f r s e n d l v r e l a t t o n s b e t w e e n Afghan and 
I r a n i a n p e o p l e . The F o r o i g n M i n i s t e r of I r a n e v e n e>*oressed 
i t s r e a d i n e s s t o s u p o l ^ jo t i s t o A t g h a n i n s u r g e n t s a s I r a n 
too^ t h e i n d e p e n d e n c r rjf A f g h a n i s t a n a s s a c r e d a s t h e 
l i b e r a t i o n of P a l e s t i r - - A f t e r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f I s l a m i c 
R e p u b l i c c e r t a i n even^-^ ^QO^ p l a c e l i » e t h e s e i c u r e of US 
e m b a s s y on November *-. ' ' ^ 7 9 . on a c c o u n t o f w h i c h a l s o i t s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h A m e r i c a d e t e r i o r a t e d . 
I r a n ' s r e l a t i o n s wtJ.h a n o t h e r s u p e r p o w e r , t h e S o v i e t 
Union h a v e n o t b e e n a s h o s t i l e a s w i t h t h e U . S . The I r a n i a n s 
condemned R u s s i a n i n v a ? ; ; o n of A f g h a n i s t a n and g a v e he I D t o 
t h e r e s i s t a n c e move<nen t w i t h i n and o u t s i d e t h a t ca«unt'r"y. 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n w<t r- a l s o h i g h l v c r i t i c a l o f P u s s i a s 
c o n s t a n t a r m s s u p p l y t o I r a q d u r i n g t h e e i g h t v^-sr- w a r . 
A n o t h e r b o n e of c o n t e n t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s h a s 
been t h e Tudeh P^rt\ . ,1 c o m m u n i s t o u t f i t i n I r a n . The 
I s l a m i c I r a n saw t h e T v ' ^ h P a r t y a s a t h r e a t and s o u g h t t o 
e l i m i n a t e t h e m . But tf-'=-;> m a t t e r s of d i s a g r e e m e n t and m u t u a l 
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distrust and bittern«i~ did not le-*d to the severing ot 
diplomatic ties bet»*'>^='"> l-fie two countfies. Of late I^an ^ 
relations with the U^l^ have been normal. The process of 
normalization had alrea^.v begun during the l<ho«neini er-a 
itself especially when the [mam wf-ote a much publicised 
letter to President Gorbachev appreciating on the Islamic 
tenets in Prestroifra ^nri ^•^t ing him to embr-ace the faith of 
Islam. This process ulti^stelv culminated ir» Rafsanjani 3 
Moscow visit in 178"'. Despite Russian oppr-ession of fellow 
Muslims in the Soviet (?t-'on par ticu la^lv in A^erba 1 jars the 
Iranian regime is hav inti ^rlose relations with Moscow. As a 
result several agre«^ <r'"?n ts have bee" signed to expand 
economic and military C'^ "fcver-ation . 
During war Iran t"e«ained isolated from the rest of the 
world because of its policv of evport of revolution, implied 
threat to monarchies m the Gulf and repeated rejection of 
initiatives by many c«~«jntries and the U.N. to ceasefire. 
However, after the end of war, regime seems to have decided 
to breaJ- away from isoiatioo in international politics. and 
has already stepped HO its ties with ^ wide vartetv o* 
countries of Eastern bloc. West and the Thir«j! World. Ir^n 
has used its oil barter >"-»?l5 with the Third World countri.es 
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l i k e S y r i a , Tu r f ' ey , ^<^' : .^ •:-?" . N o f ' t h * o re** , [ n d t a and o t h e r s . 
I r a n ' s r e l a t i o r i <'»ith t h e t»»e?»»bef" co« j " t r i e s o f t h e G u l f 
C o o p e r a t i o n C o u n c i l b^-.^rte u o f r i e n d l w m»«nedLateIy a f t e r t h e 
I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n , A^wong t h e G . C . C . c o u n t r i e s . B a h r a i n , 
K u w a i t and S a u d i Arab».? h a v e a s i z a b l e S h i a o o o u l a t i o n . The 
K h o m e i n i r e g i m e o p e n l y u r g e d t h e s e S h i a o e o p l e t o r i s e m 
r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t • He j»- co f - f -uo t o i l S h ^ i J - h s , who s^efe 
A m e r i c a n p u p p e t s i n '•'^e r e g i o n , Kha. tne in i f u r t h e r " u f ' ged t o 
e s t a b l i s h " t r u e l y " f a i ^ j m i c gove rn imen t s i n t h e G u l f . 
H a v i n g a d o p t e d an a n t i - ^ u o e r p o w e r , " n e i t h e r E a s t nor- W e s t " 
p o l i c y t h e I s l a m i c R e p i f l ^ ' i c o f I r a " has c h a m p i o n e d t h e c a u s e 
o f t h e T h i r d Wor ! •?. a l t h o « j g h t h e y h a v e d o n e l i t t l e 
e s p e c i a l l y on econom i ": '. '"on t .Howeve»". on p o l i t i c a l f ^ " o n t , 
I r a n h a s been v e r y a c t i v e , Thev n o t o n l y condemned Puss i -3n 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i-H ^ an b u t a l s o p r o v i d e d a c t i v e s u p p o r - t 
t o M u j a h i d i n ' s f r e e d c " * s t r u g g l e . L i k e w i s e t hev have 
c r i t i c i s e d and oppos«»rt W e s t e r n p a r t i c u l a r l y o .ner- ican 
a t t e m p t s t o d o m i n a t e th«=^  T h i r d W o r l d . The I r a n i a n s h a v e g o t 
a r&dicAl v i e w o f t h e r'o-T-a I i g n e d m o v e m e n t . W h i c h has been 
t a k e n by t h e T h i r d ("^r i d c u i t h l i t t l e e n t h u s i a s m ^nd 
a p p r e c i a t i o n . 
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There hat long bern an aspiration oi the seven million 
Muslims in the Sovic-f Union to rejoin the twenty million 
Azerbaijanis in Irsn, In Bahu the Peoples s Front oi 
Azerbaijan had been f^l oi.ip-inq up its calls -for independence 
while other more mode^iste voices were atleast callino "for 
closer linRs with Iran, Moreover, the«"e were many instances 
oi domonstrations on the bank oi the nvpr Aran- v«hict-. is-
dividing line between Iran and Nakhichevan, In one oi the 
violent disturbances and attacks on barbed wire and cement 
posts Iranian border ouards acted viith restraint. This act 
oi restraint was much appreciated by Soviet authorities. -for 
proper handling oi the situation and containing the -fervour 
oi local Muslims, Iran's parliamentary depttty ^urirtt Sha-fei 
told o^er a thousand Soviet Muslims that gathering along the 
Aras river would be fruitless and that Soviet Muslims, should 
talk to their o^fficials to prepare the gro«.tnd -for their 
visit to Iran. Irari displayed the gestiire o"f peace-'Lil 
cooperation by not evsplciiting thte Azerbaijani radicals "for 
their unification with Iran, 
Khomeini was particularly averse to the rule c<i the 
House o-f Saud in Arabia and termed it the corrupt or\e, an 
American satellite or aoent in the region. To him the Saudi 
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r e g i m e worVed agair .^ i t ; j .he i n t e ^ - e s t ryf Mijs I i»n w o r l d ove f - . 
I r a n i a n s f o u g h t wi^^'-s ttue Sat»dts oo t h e que -s tLon o f 
Ha j J . S a u d i s w a n t e d I c ' •-ep t h e h o l y p i l g r i m a g e as au<"e lv ^ 
s p i r i t u a l m a t t e r . TK<n r - .?n ia ins i o t e r p r e t e d i t i n p o l i t i c a l 
t e r m s w h i c h s t r a i n r ^ , , j .<-j b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e two 
c o u n t r i e s c u l m i n a t i o n ' r - i .o t h e s rvapp tng o f t i e s m 19Q7, i n 
v i e w o f t h i s I r a n b Q y c c t . ' c : i t h e I s l a m i c Summi t i n H u w a i t i n 
1987 b e c a u s e i t was h p ! d i n K u w a i t and w a l ^ e d o u t o ^ t h e 
l a s t f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r "s me«3t ing m 1*5013. b e c a u s e i t r e f u s e d 
t o s u p p o r t [ r a n ' s CO<T>D La i n t s a g a i n s t S a u d i t r e a t m e n t o * 
I r a n i a n p i l g r i m s . I ran j .?< ; - e g i m e a f t e r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f 
I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c was m p r i n c i p l e a g a i n s t t h e g o v e r n m e n t s 
and e v e n M u s l i m s govc^m.-nen t s g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t o v e r s ^ J e o l o g i c a l g o a l s , [ n a m a j o r s h i f t 
i n t r a d i t i o n a l d i r e c t i o ' - i "^  i t s f o r e i g n p o i c y I r a n i s t o u n d 
o f p r e p a r i n g t o i n t e o ' ^ - ^ - " i t s e l f more i n t o A s i a t h a n m t o 
t h e A r a b M i d d l e E a s t . • -^ e e x p e r i e n c e o f e i g h t y e a r war 
a g a i n s t I r a q p u r s u a d e - i t^ ie I r a n i a n r u l e r s t o f e e l t h a t t h e 
f u t u r e o f t h e c o u n t r ' - l i e s t o t h e e a s t t h a n t h e A r ^ b 
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e w e s t . The a r c h i t e c t o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
r e a l i z e d t h a t war ce«5»eoted A r a b u n i t y t o a d e g r e e r a r e I v 
seen b e f o r e as w i t h t h e '^T ceop t ion o f S v r i ^ a l m o s t a l l o t h e r 
A r a b c o u n t r i e s f o r m a l l y - cood b e h i n d I r a q , a l t h o u g h L i b - - a 
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and South Yemen ha i ! --^ --tedly sided wtth [r-an. A membef- of 
foreign ministry's "i.ht*!*- tant " on strategic matters and a 
high-ranfing Iranian liplomat observed "there is no more 
room for us in the Middle East dominated by the Arabs-
The Gulf war wh."_ch started in September 198'> further 
added to Iran's di f *'ic>< I tees at home and abroad, Iran tn the 
face of superior techno iogy of IrjiQ w^s m desperate need of 
arms and spare parts. V'ley toot the xt-ar in defence o*" Islam, 
The hostility toward-^ 'hoth super powers proved costlv. The 
US embargo on Iran i" virtually evef^y category of arms put 
Iran to a disadvant^n* In the absence of spare parts, the 
Iranian arsenal wh^ch was entirely made up of America 
crumbled. Under these circumstances there were secret 
contacts for months toa*-: ther between Iranian and high level 
US officials in which Iran's goal was the procurement of 
American made military h-srdware and America's motive was the 
release of several Am**'j ran hostages held m Lebanon by pro-
Iranian Shia militia group. 
The eight year 6ul l >tar put Iran to many hardships. and 
the population had tc B-'j-f-^er -for the lac^ oi esE-ential 
commodities. The ecDnorn.' was shattered, production declined 
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sharply in almost eve' y sector barring ar<ns tnd'js trv .Mos t of 
the industrLes were dLr3rted to produce M^f goods. After fhe 
end of war Iran engaq-"^ jtself m the reconstruction of the 
war ravaged economs . ''•''•^r the death of Ayatollah fchomeini 
on June 3, 1989 Hashetm-Pj f san j a m s visit to Moscow in June 
1989, was the flr^^ pragwuatic move to end Ir-^n -3 
international isolat;oT [t was a move to establish quic^ly 
a channel of commun i • '"^ lon with the DOS t-l< homem 1 Iran. 
After the establ ishm*?'^ '^  ^f Islamic Republic it was the first 
visit of its k Lnri o' - high ranJ ing delegation. [t was 
interpreted as the \i-forv at- moderates in the anooina 
debate inside Iran "th'P^ifyer it should depend on outside 
support for the reco'" = ,-"uction of its war ravaged eco"0">\. , 
Though the hardliners f^ ?d been tenacious I v opposed to t^->e 
idea of inviting fore^ 'Tr* ioaos and investments for the f^-j^r-
of letting the coun«-fv 5110 into the pre-l*'7'' situation. 
This was not only a ?to'"' towards normalization of relations 
with the countries wit!- which they had strained relations 
but also or beg inn m a •-> * the process of see^ tng cooperation 
with USSP out o*" '^  > n-^ i f lean t economic and political 
considerations. Apa»"* ,'jm sg* eeii^ en ts m the •^'•'•e-^s ot 
science and technology. }ace i^Ki the use at nuclear energj 
USSP offered a cred i "^  -> f 2.1 billion dollars to tinance 
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joint venture projev. • A,i\ong ^He -agreements signed between 
the two countries '^ ^^ luded 'Passive evch-ange o^ [f^nisn 
natural gas for Soviet helo in the construction of darns, 
railways, production of steel and building gas processing 
plant. Moscow also of'erd to help reequip and ''xoderntie 
Iranian armed forces, i^afsanjaai s % tsit to flcscow was a 
land mart denoting 9 ."-(soff- ch^'age m the tof-eign polic to 
end its isolation. With regard to economic cooperation ^n 
agreement had alread's been reached m principle m August 
1986 on the resumpti-^f^ "f gas sales tHrough IGAT-L to the 
Soviet Union, It is nov« to be seen that how Iran practises 
radicalism especial'" at a time when thev- have to 
reconstruct their ^"•5'' -ravaged economv which the" can 
possibly do only with •hs help of the west. 
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